DEPARTMENT OF STATE • UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XI

United Nations and General International Matters

Editor in Chief John P. Glennon
Editor Lisle A. Rose

United States Government Printing Office
Washington
1988

H 920-7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9640

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

> a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
>
> b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
>
> c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
>
> d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities of individuals.
>
> e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

William Z. Slany supervised the planning of this volume. Compilation was directed by N. Stephen Kane. John P. Glennon directed final preparation of the volume. Lisle A. Rose prepared the compilations. Kay Herring, Bret Bellamy, and Suzanne E. Coffman prepared the lists of names, abbreviations, and sources. Vicki E. Futscher performed the technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. The Twin Oaks Collective prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

Contents

Preface III

List of Unpublished Sources VII

List of Abbreviations XI

List of Persons XV

The United Nations

General United States policy in the United Nations 1

United States interest in the admission of qualified applicants to United Nations membership and the issue of Chinese representation 263

United States policy regarding the Law of the Sea 513

United States policy regarding Antarctica 607

United States interest in the scientific exploration of outer space 723

United States policy regarding the International Geophysical Year 784

Index 787

List of Unpublished Sources

Department of State

1. **Indexed Central Files.** Papers in the indexed central files of the Department of State for 1955–1957 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote.

2. **Lot Files.** Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627 and Lot 63 D 123

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

Current Economic Developments: Lot 70 D 467

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

IO Files: Lot 60 D 113

Consolidated files of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs for 1955–1957. (Includes materials from old Lot 58 D 17.)

IO Files: Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of U.S. Delegations to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly for 1945–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

IO Master Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, comprising the official U.N. documentation and classified Department of State records on U.S. policy in the U.N. Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and ad hoc committees for the period from 1946 to date.

L/SFP Files: Lot 68 D 47

Files of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Political Functions.

OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for 1953–1960, as maintained by the Operations Staff of the Department of State.

OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Ottawa Embassy Files: Lot 64 F 89

Files of the U.S. Embassy in Canada, 1956–1958.

P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661

Subject files containing OCB and NSC documents retired by the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for 1947–1963.

S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385 and Lot 62 D 430

See entries under OCB Files above.

S/SA Files: Lot 61 D 333

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's staff meetings during 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237

Subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs for 1946–1957.

UNP Files: Lot 62 D 170

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to date.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Project Clean Up

Project 'Clean Up' collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953–1961.

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant, 1952–1961, including records of Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray.

Special Assistant for Science and Technology Records

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, 1957–1961, including records of James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, and International File.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Conference Files, FRC 59–83–0065

Lot 60 D 627: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Conference Files, FRC 59–83–0067

Lot 63 D 123: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1955–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Current Economic Developments, FRC 72 A 6248

Lot 70 D 467: Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication *Current Economic Developments* for 1945–1969, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs.

S/SA Files, RG 59, FRC 65 A 987

Lot 61 D 333: Files of documents relating to the International Geophysical Year for 1954–1958, retired by the Office of the Science Adviser.

UNP Files, FRC 71 A 5255

Lot 62 D 170: United Nations subject files, 1947–1960, as maintained by the Office of United Nations Political Affairs.

List of Abbreviations

A, airgram
AA, Afro-Asian
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
C, Office of the Counselor, Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CEP, Chile, Ecuador, Peru
ChiCom, Chinese Communists, i.e., People's Republic of China
ChiNat, Chinese Nationalists, i.e., Republic of China
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CSAGI, Comite Special de l'Annee Geophysique (Special Committee of the International Geophysical Year)
CY, calendar year
del, delegation
Delga; DelGA, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Dento, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Denver White House
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Dept, Department
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DOD, Department of Defense
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary Dulles when away from Washington
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council, United Nations
EE, Eastern European; Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Emb, Embassy
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
FE, Far East; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
Gadel; GADel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GC, General Committee, United Nations General Assembly
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GOC, Good Offices Committee; Government of Ceylon
GOI, Government of India
GOJ, Government of Japan

GRC, Government of the Republic of China

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State

HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile

ICC, International Control Commission

ICJ, International Court of Justice

ICSU, International Council of Scientific Unions

IFC, International Finance Corporation

IGY, International Geophysical Year

ILA, International Longshoremen's Association

ILC, International Law Commission

ILO, International Labor Organization, United Nations

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/ARA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

L/C, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims, Department of State

L/EUR, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State

L/T, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State

L/UNA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State

LA, Latin America

MCI, Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere

NGO, nongovernmental organization

NSC, National Security Council

NZ, New Zealand

OCB, Operations Coordinating Board

ODA, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OSA, Office of South American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

PAO, Public Affairs Officer

PermSec, Permanent Secretary

reftel, reference telegram

res, resolution

RG, record group

RIAS, Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor (Radio in the American Sector)

ROK, Republic of Korea

RPA, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SC, Security Council of the United Nations

SEATO, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

Sec/Def, Secretary of Defense

Sec/Navy, Secretary of the Navy

Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences

SPA, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development

SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations

TAB, Technical Assistance Board, United Nations

TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyvza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)

Tedul, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to Secretary of State Dulles when away from Washington

telecon, telephone conversation

TO, table of organization

Toden, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Denver White House

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences

U/FW, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Office of the Under Secretary of State

U/LS, Special Assistant for Law of the Sea, Office of the Under Secretary of State

U/OP, Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State

U.K., United Kingdom

UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation

UN, United Nations

UNC, United Nations Command

UNCOP, United Nations Corps for Observation and Patrol

UNCURK, United Nations Command for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF, United Nations International Children's Fund

UNKRA, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

unn, unnumbered

UNO, United Nations Organization

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

urtel, your telegram

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USDel, United States Delegation

USGADel, United States General Assembly Delegation

USIA, United States Information Agency

Usito, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Information Agency

USN, United States Navy

USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

U.S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

WE, Western Europe; Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

WEU, Western European Union

List of Persons

Adams, Sherman, Assistant to the President

Adams, Ware, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from September 19, 1956

Allen, George V., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, January 24, 1955–July 26, 1956; Ambassador to Greece, October 12, 1956–November 13, 1957; appointed Director of the United States Information Agency, November 15, 1957

Allen, Ward P., United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 14, 1955

Allison, John M., Ambassador to Japan until February 2, 1957; Ambassador to Indonesia from March 13, 1957

Alphand, Hervé, French Representative at the United Nations September 1955–August 1956; thereafter French Ambassador to the United States

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, April 1955–September 1956; Consultant to the President from June 1957

Armour, Norman, Jr., Staff Assistant at the Mission at the United Nations until May 22, 1955; thereafter Adviser on Political and Security Affairs at the Mission

Arneson, R. Gordon, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, June 30–September 15, 1957; thereafter Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Bacon, Ruth E., United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Barco, James W., Senior Adviser on Political and Security Council Affairs at the Mission at the United Nations until June 16, 1955; thereafter Counselor of the Mission

Becker, Loftus, Legal Adviser of the Department of State from June 13, 1957

Belaúnde, Víctor A., Peruvian Representative on the United Nations Security Council, June 1955–June 1957

Bell, Laird, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University of Chicago; Alternate Representative to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Bender, Albert F., Adviser on Legal and Political Matters at the Mission at the United Nations until April 8, 1956; thereafter Senior Adviser on International Organizations and Legal Matters at the Mission

Berding, Andrew H., Assistant Director of the United States Information Agency until March 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 28, 1957

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Special Assistant for Charter Review to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Boggs, Marion W., Director of the National Security Council Secretariat
Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 1955–August 1957
Bronk, Dr. Detlev W., President of the National Academy of Sciences
Brown, Elizabeth Ann, Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Brownell, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General of the United States
Bunche, Ralph J., Under Secretary, Office of Under Secretaries Without Department, United Nations Secretariat
Bunker, Ellsworth, President of the American Red Cross through 1956; Representative at the Eleventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly; Ambassador to India from March 4, 1957

Carías Castillo, Tiburcio, Jr., Honduran Representative at the United Nations through August 1957; Honduran Ambassador to the United States from October 15, 1957
Carnahan, Albert Sidney Johnson, Democratic Representative from Missouri; Representative to the Twelfth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
Chechetkin, Igor V., member of the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
Cook, Charles D., Adviser on Political and Security Affairs to the Mission at the United Nations until June 16, 1955; thereafter Deputy Counselor of the Mission
Couve de Murville, Maurice J., French Ambassador to the United States until September 1956
Crosthwaite, Ponsonby Moore, Minister of the British Mission at the United Nations and concurrently British Deputy Representative at the United Nations
Crowe, Philip K., Ambassador to Ceylon until September 27, 1956
Cutler, Robert L., Administrative and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until April 1955 and again from January 1957

Daniels, Paul C., staff member in the Office of South American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from autumn 1957
Davis, Richard H., member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, December 4, 1955–January 13, 1957
De Margerie, *see* Jacquin de Margerie
DePalma, Samuel, Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, October 9, 1955–April 8, 1956; Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, April 8, 1956–August 25, 1957
Dixon, Sir Pierson J., British Representative at the United Nations
Dreier, John C., Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States; concurrently Acting Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from May 15, 1956
Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eastland, James O., Democratic Senator from Mississippi
Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister until April 6, 1955; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, April 6, 1955–January 10, 1957

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States
Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 11, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 14, 1957

Farley, Philip J., Deputy to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until October 1957; thereafter Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs to the Secretary of State
Fedorenko, Nikolai T., Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Flemming, Arthur S., Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until February 1957
Fobes, John E., Director of the Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from September 25, 1955

Glazebrook, George P. de T., Minister at the Canadian Embassy through 1956
Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Goodpaster, Colonel Andrew J., USA, Staff Secretary to the President; promoted to Brigadier General, January 1957
Gough, Betty C., Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Affairs, Department of State; temporarily attached to the Mission at the United Nations during sessions of the General Assembly
Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 14, 1955–February 27, 1957; Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization from March 1957
Guiringaud, Louis de, French Alternate Representative at the United Nations, October 1955–August 1957

Hagen, Dr. John P., Naval Research Laboratory, Department of Defense
Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to the President
Hammarskjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Hanes, John W., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until April 8, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Harlow, Bryce N., Administrative Assistant to the President
Hartley, Virginia, Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Hays, Brooks, Democratic Representative from Arkansas; member, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
Heeney, Arnold D.P., Canadian Ambassador to the United States until May 1957
Herrington, William C., Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, Office of the Under Secretary of State
Herter, Christian A., Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 14, 1957–February 21, 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State
Holaday, William M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Holland, Henry F., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until September 13, 1956
Hoover, Herbert J., Jr., Under Secretary of State until February 1957
Hughes, Rowland R., Director of the Bureau of the Budget until April 1, 1956
Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury until July 1957

Humphrey, Hubert H., Democratic Senator from Minnesota; member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; member, Government Operations Committee; Representative to the Eleventh Regular Session of the General Assembly

Iguchi, Sadao, Japanese Ambassador to the United States until March 1956
Irwin, Wallace, Director of the Office of Public Affairs at the Mission at the United Nations until August 1957; thereafter Director of Public Services at the Mission

Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, Director-General of Political and Economic Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, June 1955–July 1956
Jandrey, Frederick W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from July 14, 1957
Jones, John Wesley, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until February 14, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Kase, Toshikazu, Japanese Observer at the United Nations August 1955–December 18, 1956; thereafter Japanese Representative to the Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly
Key, David McK., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until July 31, 1955
Khalidy, Awni, Iraqi Representative at the United Nations through 1955
Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Kidron, Mordecai R., Israeli Deputy Representative at the United Nations
Killian, Dr. James R., Jr., President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; member of the President's Science Advisory Committee
Kirlin, Florence, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, August 30–November 30, 1955
Kissick, Harold G., Director of the Office of International Conferences, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Koo, V.K. Wellington, Chinese Ambassador to the United States through 1956
Kulazhenkov, Anatoliy G., Deputy Director of the Department of American Countries, Soviet Foreign Ministry, from 1957
Kuznetsov, Vasili V., Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Labouisse, Henry R., Jr., Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
Lall, Arthur S., Indian Representative at the United Nations
Lay, James S., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Lloyd, Sir John Selwyn Brooke, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from December 1955
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Representative at the United Nations
Lord, Mary P. (Mrs. Oswald B.), Representative on the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council; Alternate Representative to the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly
Lyon, Cecil B., Director of the Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until June 28, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, June 28, 1955–May 10, 1956; Ambassador to Chile from May 15, 1956

MacArthur, Douglas II, Counselor of the Department of State until December 1956; Ambassador to Japan from February 25, 1957

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1, 1957

McClurkin, Robert J.G., Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, until January 30, 1955; Director, January 30, 1955–January 6, 1956

McElroy, Neil H., Secretary of Defense from October 1957

MacKay, Robert A., Canadian Representative at the United Nations from August 1955

Macomber, William B., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, January 10–November 16, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1955–August 15, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from October 21, 1957

McSweeney, John M., Adviser on Security Council Affairs at the Mission at the United Nations until July 31, 1955; Senior Political Adviser at the Mission, July 31, 1955–April 8, 1956

Malik, Y.A., Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., Republican Representative from Massachusetts

Martin, Paul, Canadian Minister of National Health and Welfare until 1957; Canadian Representative at the Tenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Maza, José, Leader of the Chilean Liberal Party and Senator in Parliament through 1956

Meeker, Leonard C., Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until April 3, 1957; thereafter Acting Deputy Legal Adviser

Menon, V.K. Krishna, Indian Minister without Portfolio, 1956; Minister of Defense, 1957

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 6, 1956; Ambassador to Canada from May 23, 1956

Merrow, Chester E., Republican Representative from New Hampshire; member, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Mewshaw, Franklin L., member of the Political and Security Affairs Staff of the Mission at the United Nations until December 1, 1957; thereafter Adviser on Political and Security Affairs at the Mission

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., First Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party until July 4, 1957; Minister for Foreign Affairs until June 1956

Monsma, George N., Officer in Charge of International Organization Affairs, Office of Regional American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until May 16, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Inter-American Organizations, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

Morton, Thruston B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until February 29, 1956; Republican Senator from Kentucky from January 3, 1957

Muniz, João Carlos, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States until June 1956

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Nutting, Anthony, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until November 4, 1956

Ordonneau, Pierre, Adviser on Security Council Affairs at the French Mission at the United Nations

Owsley, Charles H., Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Oraganization Affairs, Department of State, from September 9, 1956

Pastore, John O., Democratic Senator from Rhode Island; Representative to the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Pearson, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs until June 1957

Persons, Major General Wilton B. (USA ret.), Deputy Assistant to the President

Phillips, Christopher H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until 1957

Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until April 1, 1957

Popper, David H., Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 14, 1955; Consul and Deputy Representative to International Organizations, Geneva, from August 12, 1956

Prochnow, Herbert V., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, November 1955–November 1956

Pyle, Howard, Administrative Assistant to the President

Quarles, Donald A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development until August 1955; Secretary of the Air Force, August 1955–April 1957; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 1957

Ramsbotham, P.E., First Secretary and Head of Chancery of the British Mission at the United Nations until 1956

Rankin, Karl L., Ambassador to the Republic of China until December 30, 1957

Raynor, G. Hayden, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until June 19, 1955

Roberts, Peter, Foreign Affairs Officer in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, June 3, 1956–July 14, 1957; thereafter information specialist in the Bureau; Acting United Nations Adviser in the Bureau, summer and fall 1956

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Special Assistant to the President until December 31, 1955; Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization; Vice Chairman (representating the President) of the Operations Coordinating Board, 1955–1956

Salt, Barbara, First Secretary of the British Embassy until November 1955; Counselor of the British Embassy, November 1955–April 1957

Sarper, Selim R., Turkish Representative at the United Nations until July 1957

Sebald, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until March 14, 1957; Ambassador to Australia from June 7, 1957

Sisco, Joseph J., Staff Assistant in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until May 22, 1955; Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, May 22, 1955–July 1, 1956; Officer in Charge of General Assembly and Security Council Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, July 1, 1956–January 27, 1957; thereafter Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

Sobolev, Arkady A., Soviet Representative on the United Nations Security Council; Acting Representative at the United Nations until April 1955; Representative at the United Nations, April–November 1955

Sprague, Mansfield D., General Counsel of the Department of Defense

Staats, Elmer B., Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board

Stassen, Harold E., Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and Chairman of the Foreign Operations Council until June 30, 1955; Special Assistant on Disarmament to President Eisenhower from March 19, 1955; Deputy Representative to the United Nations Disarmament Commission from August 2, 1955

Sweeney, Joseph M., Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State, until summer 1956

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from July 16, 1957

Trujillo, José Vicente (Vincente), Representative of Ecuador at the United Nations; Chairman of the Latin American caucus in the United Nations

Tsiang, Tingfu F., Republic of China Representative at the United Nations

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Republican Senator from Michigan, 1928–1951

Wadsworth, James J., Deputy Representative at the United Nations

Wainhouse, David W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until September 11, 1955; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, July 20–October 7, 1956

Walmsley, Walter N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from October 8, 1956

Waterman, Alan T., Director of the National Science Foundation

Watrous, Livingston D., Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs, Office of South American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from May 19, 1955

Wilcox, Francis O., Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until September 6, 1955; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense until October 1957

Yingling, Raymund T., Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State, until October 9, 1957; thereafter Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems

Zakharov, Alexei V., Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956

Zaroubin (Zarubin), Georgi N., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Zorin, Valentin A., Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1955 and from October 1956

THE UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS [1]

1. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Hammarskjöld) and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge), New York, May 17, 1955 [2]

SUBJECT

Charter Review

In his discussion on other subjects with the Secretary General this morning, Amb. Lodge referred to Mr. Hammarskjold's proposed preface to the repertory of U.N. practice. He recalled that the Secretary General proposed to say that in view of all the circumstances, he found valid arguments for a decision at the 10th Session of the General Assembly in favor of a Charter Review Conference but leaving open for the time being the question of when the conference should be convened.

Amb. Lodge indicated that he thought it was undesirable for the Secretary General to take any stand at the present on the question of charter review which might be regarded as negative. We were in favor of a Charter Review Conference and we did not wish to see developing a negative attitude.

Mr. Hammarskjold said that he did not feel his reference to the Charter Review Conference in his proposed preface [3] would be taken as negative. Its purpose was simply to get the idea abroad that the time for the conference was still an open question. He feared that there was a certain amount of sentiment developing which took for granted that a conference would be called immediately. He was aware that the United States did not favor an immediate conference and thought that his remarks fitted into our viewpoint. He had real doubts about what a Charter Review Conference could accomplish and feared that issues would be raised which would be highly controversial and unprofitable to discuss. It was clear that his general feeling was negative to the idea of a conference.

---

[1] For previous documentation on U.S. policies in the United Nations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume III.

[2] Source: USUN Files, IO, Charter. Confidential. Drafted by Barco.

[3] Telegram 779 from New York, May 13, reported that Hammarskjöld supplied the Mission with a draft text "of preface to repertory of practice of United Nations" designed to defer a Charter review meeting by at least 1 year. Hammarskjöld argued that deferral would "fit into US election schedule" and might also avoid "all-out Soviet opposition Charter review." The text of this preface was transmitted in telegram 780 from New York, May 13. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/5–1355)

Amb. Lodge again expressed his view that it was desirable to stimulate interest in a conference and that a report by the Secretary General now favoring even in general terms deferment would not have the desired effect.

---

2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, May 17, 1955—5:05 p.m.

682. Your 779, 780.[2] Department continues believe Secretary General should not try prejudge decision tenth GA on holding review conference and that his proposed suggestion GA decide hold conference but leave date open out-of-place in preface factual and non-controversial volume background materials. You should point this out to him, indicating while our ultimate position may possibly be along lines his proposal, we doubt wisdom his making suggestion at this time. You should not make major issue our reaction since, as you know, we do not ourselves envisage conference before 1957 and are currently considering what GA action most suitable view this fact and our position favoring GA decision hold conference. Except for penultimate paragraph, draft preface entirely acceptable.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/5–1355. Confidential. Signed for the Secretary by Wainhouse.

[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

3. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, June 2, 1955—7 p.m.

850. Re Charter review. Dixon (UK) called on me today to discuss, among other things, Foreign Office's instructions concerning Charter review. These instructions have gone out to all UK posts in UN member countries.

The UK is opposed to taking any definite decision at the 10th GA concerning the convening of a Charter review conference. They hope that the outcome of the discussions at the next session will show the Charter to be sufficiently flexible as is. They would probably accept a decision only to the effect that the 11th GA should decide the question of whether to convene the conference.

UK Delegation pointed out, without in any way committing themselves or even advocating it, that, if there are any parts of the Charter on which there is hope of adopting amendments, the procedures in Article 108 of the Charter[2] could be used. Their interpretation of this article is that the GA, in regular session, could put forward an amendment to the Charter by a ⅔ vote. This would, of course, have to be followed by normal ratification processes. They believe such a procedure is better suited for achieving specific objectives, such as change in procedure for admission of new members or for increasing the size of the Security Council. They regard it as definitely undesirable to open up the whole Charter for discussion at this time and presumably in the foreseeable future.

The UK missions in all of the member countries are also instructed to try to discourage representatives from raising the question of Charter review in their speeches at San Francisco. They have some doubts about the success of this operation but they intend to make a good try at it.

As I told Dixon, it is obvious that we are quite far apart on this question. On thinking over the UK idea, it seems to me they miss the whole point of our position which is that it is possible on certain issues to build up so much pressure in world opinion that the Soviets are less likely to veto a particular amendment. Under the UK suggestion for Article 108 procedure, to which they do not commit themselves, you could not achieve such a build up of pressure. The Article 108 procedure would, in fact, prevent the maximum use of public opinion forces. It would leave the Soviet attitude to be determined solely on the basis of the more regular forces at play during an assembly session.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/6–255. Confidential; Priority.

[2] Article 108 of the U.N. Charter reads: "Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council."

I intend at next opportunity to ask British point blank whether they would stand with us on revision of membership requirements under Article 108 procedure as they suggested. When they reject this proposal in addition to turning us down on Charter review, they should be feeling at least slightly penitent and they may just be willing to go along on non-member participation.[3]

Lodge

---

[3] Telegram 721 to New York, June 6, reads as follows: "Your 850. Similar representations made Department by British Embassy Friday. Embassy officer told no change US position favoring decision hold conference. Memorandum conversation being pouched. Mission will shortly receive request initiate conversations this matter other friendly UN delegations in order to effect an exchange of views. Response UK representations should await assessment situation basis outcome these conversations and similar talks to be undertaken our Missions abroad." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/6–255)

---

4. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA–8550 *Washington, June 7, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Tenth General Assembly Agenda Item Concerning Charter Review

Reference is made to CA–5098 of March 17, 1954.[2]

It will be recalled that under Article 109 of the UN Charter, the proposal to call a review conference is automatically on the agenda of the tenth General Assembly when it convenes this September. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, many states, disturbed by the major-power veto, attached great importance to this Charter provision, but such few expressions of opinion as have come to the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/6–755. Confidential. Sent to 46 posts and repeated to 7 others.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.1/3–1754) For a summary of the U.S. position on Charter review in 1954, see the statement by Dulles and the editorial note, in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. III, pp. 187–195.

Department's attention to date do not indicate a comparable reaction today. For example, Australia, a strong supporter of this provision at San Francisco, has approached us and is, we understand, approaching Canada, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and New Zealand to express doubts about a decision at this time to hold a conference.

In this country there is widespread public interest in the question of a review conference. A Senate subcommittee has been holding hearings on the question for the past year, and both the Secretary and Ambassador Lodge have stated publicly that we favor a review conference. Most recently, on May 3, Ambassador Lodge told the Senate subcommittee: " . . . [3] the United States should support the holding of a Charter Review Conference. A Charter Review Conference held at the proper time is necessary." In January of last year, the Secretary stated before the same subcommittee that "the United States expects to favor the holding of such a review conference."

Under Article 109, a decision to hold a review conference is to be taken at the tenth General Assembly by a majority vote and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Therefore, with a view to sounding out the Foreign Office's position on this question and explaining ours, the Mission is requested, unless it perceives objections, to discuss informally with the Foreign Office the statements of the Secretary and of Ambassador Lodge quoted above. It should point out that Article 109 speaks of "reviewing", not of "revising", the Charter, and emphasize that it is a review conference, which may or may not lead to revision, that we have in mind. The Secretary himself has warned against any attempt to rewrite the Charter, and has stated that the "United Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all." The Mission should also indicate that it is our belief that a review conference offers possibilities of accomplishment—first, through procedural agreements which would not involve the amending process, and second, through agreement on a limited number of amendments, which the U.S.S.R. might be induced to ratify by the force of world opinion in support of them.

Specifically what in our view these agreements or amendments should be we are not yet prepared to say, and we would expect that other governments are in a similar position at this stage. Later, however, we anticipate extensive consultations on any proposals we might wish to make and, we would hope, on any proposals that others might be considering. In this way useless and perhaps disruptive public debate of proposals that fail of general acceptability might be avoided.

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

It is also our belief that the review process itself could increase general understanding and support of the United Nations by making clear, on the one hand, the flexibility and potentialities of the Charter as it stands and, on the other, the limits beyond which sovereign states are still unwilling to go in undertaking multilateral commitments.

If the question arises of what we consider to be the "proper time" mentioned by Ambassador Lodge, the Mission should indicate that we have not yet taken a position on timing; that we regard this as a matter for the General Assembly to decide and that, in so doing, the latter will presumably take into account the time required to prepare for a conference. FYI. The Secretary has indicated that he does not desire a conference until after 1956. End FYI.

In addition to any indications of whether the Foreign Office attitude is favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to a decision by the tenth General Assembly to hold a review conference, and of how firm this attitude is, the Department would, of course, be interested in any views the Foreign Office may have on the exact nature of possible Assembly action and on the timing of a conference. The Department would also be interested in receiving the Mission's estimate of the amount of local public interest in a Charter review conference.

USUN is being requested to make a similar approach to friendly UN delegations in New York.

FYI. We understand your British colleague has been instructed to make known to the Foreign Office his Government's opposition to any definite decision at the tenth GA concerning the convening of a review conference and also to attempt to discourage emphasis on this question in the speeches at the San Francisco commemorative meeting.

Dulles

---

5. Editorial Note

Between June 20 and 26, the United Nations convened at San Francisco in Commemorative Meetings marking the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Charter. These meetings were purely ceremonial; no substantive business was conducted by either the General Assembly or the Security Council.

President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and the Foreign Ministers of most of the member nations attended the Commemorative Meetings. The President addressed the Meeting on June 20, and Secretary Dulles on June 24. Their speeches are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1955, pages 3–10.

While at San Francisco, Secretary Dulles also held a series of bilateral and multilateral talks with various Foreign Ministers, concentrating particularly on discussions with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union concerning preparations for the forthcoming Geneva Summit Conference of the four heads of state; see volume V. Extensive documentation on the preparations for and discussions at the San Francisco Commemorative Meetings is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 458, 460, 471, 481, 482, and 492; *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Comem Mtg SF; *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199; and *ibid.*, Central File 310.1.

---

6. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, August 3, 1955—10 a.m.

80. Re Charter review. USUN finds reaction here to holding of Charter review conference lukewarm even among those favoring conference, while many others have not yet adopted any policy, preferring to await further developments. There is growing tendency, stimulated in part by countries such as UK who oppose conference, to view it with skepticism. If unchecked, this trend could make it almost impossible to get support for our position when question comes up in Assembly.

USUN efforts to date have met with following criticisms:

(1) US position is too vague with reference to nature of action conference should take. A large number of members have asked us what proposals we have to offer other than Ambassador Lodge's suggestion re membership veto. This latter proposal is not considered sufficient justification in itself for a conference since Russian agreement to the amendment would constitute agreement to a majority vote on membership.

(2) US position not sufficiently specific re timing of conference. Delegations ask whether we would support SYG's proposal. Al-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/8–355. Confidential.

though we have stated that we are flexible as to time, other delegations have not been put at ease by these statements.

In view of fact that many UN members are not yet firm in their positions but are beginning to question advisability of conference, it would seem that the only way to counteract any tendency to oppose conference would be by US adoption of more definitive position. Therefore, I request that the Department consider taking such steps as an announcement of at least one or two specific proposals which have a chance of success, and the setting of a specific date for the conference. Department may question an early announcement on ground that it jeopardizes the position, but refraining from doing so may, under present circumstances, make it impossible for us to have a conference at all.

Re date of conference, we could set either a specific date or support SYG's proposal in order to make clear to everyone that we are not pushing for an early conference.

USUN urges that some action along the lines indicated be taken promptly unless the Department has reservations about its position favoring a conference.

Wadsworth

---

7. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Phillips) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, August 10, 1955.

DEAR CABOT: You will by this time have received the Department's telegram No. 56 of this date,[2] which reflects the upshot of a long meeting held yesterday with the Secretary to discuss the subjects of Charter review and membership (including non-member participation). During that meeting (at which Fran Wilcox was also present) the Secretary made it quite clear that he regards membership as the key problem presently confronting the UN, and that his thinking on the question of a Charter review conference is largely conditioned by his estimate of the necessity or utility of such a conference in helping to break the present membership deadlock, which he fears is progressively strangling the UN.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Secret.

[2] Telegram 56, August 10, reported that the Department was currently reassessing its position on Charter review with particular reference to the membership question, which was regarded as the crucial substantive issue. Should means be found to break the existing deadlock over membership the Department might not be disposed to press for an early Charter review conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/8–355)

For this reason, he decided to hold up a telegram which we had drafted, setting forth a clear position on the Charter review conference question to be negotiated with the British and French, pending further exploration of possible solutions to the membership impasse. In this connection, the Secretary now appears to be thinking in terms of a broad package deal including virtually all outstanding applicants, plus Spain but with the exception of the divided states and certain of the more flagrant of the satellites. I need hardly say that this information should be very closely and carefully held until there has been further opportunity to explore the possibilities. [3]

I am sorry that we have been unable to provide you with any more concrete guidance on Charter review, but that is the way it has worked out. I did not at yesterday's meeting sense any strong feeling on the part of the Secretary that we should press ahead for a specific decision by the Tenth Session to hold a Charter review conference at a predetermined time and place if in fact the prevailing sentiment of the other Members is against such a decision. On the other hand, he did seem favorably disposed toward the idea of establishing a "preparatory commission" of some sort to give continuing consideration to the feasibility of convening such a conference, as well as to the possible time, place, and terms of reference thereof. From what we know of the Interim Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on the subject of Charter review, they would appear to be similarly disposed.

I might add that the consensus of the meeting appeared to be clearly in favor of deferring any further discussion of the non-member participation idea until after we have explored more thoroughly the chances of achieving a break in the membership deadlock.

Sincerely yours,

Christopher H. Phillips [4]

P.S. Since drafting the foregoing I have seen a copy of the Secretary's letter to you on non-member participation and Charter review.[5] That letter was dictated by the Secretary following yesterday's meeting and further reflects his views on these subjects.

---

[3] A handwritten notation at this point in the source text reads: "Caveat to all readers!"

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

[5] Not printed.

---

8. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

Washington, August 11, 1955.

CA–1225

SUBJECT

Tenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

1. The tenth regular session of the General Assembly is scheduled to convene in New York on September 20. Enclosed for your information is the Department's check list of items certain or likely to arise at the session (document SD/A/337/Rev.1).[2] Items are arranged according to their probable allocation to the plenary meetings of the Assembly and its seven Main Committees. Items not bracketed are included in the provisional agenda which was circulated by the Secretary General on July 22, or have subsequently been proposed for inclusion in the supplementary agenda which will be circulated by the Secretary General not later than August 31. Bracketed questions may be proposed for consideration as separate items or raised in connection with the discussion of certain agenda items. As in previous years we would appreciate any information you may receive regarding any items which the Government to which you are accredited is likely to propose for inclusion in the agenda. However, we are anxious to avoid giving any impression that we wish to stimulate the introduction of new items.

2. We are planning, as in previous years, to consult informally with other friendly governments in advance of the Assembly concerning significant agenda items. Consultations will be held on the basis of our tentative views in order that we may be able to take the views of other governments into account in the formulation of our final positions. We shall, therefore, between now and the convening

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–1155. Confidential. Sent to 54 posts and repeated to 11 others.

[2] Dated August 1. (*Ibid.*, IO Files, SD Series, 1955–1958)

of the GA, send several communications setting forth our tentative positions on a number of issues which you will be asked to discuss with the government to which you are accredited. We shall parallel your approaches with consultations, through USUN, with permanent delegations in New York and in some cases with diplomatic representatives in Washington. In accordance with the suggestion of a number of Missions we shall enclose with certain of these communications, particularly those dealing with technical subjects, suggested texts of aides-mémoires which you may wish to present to the Foreign Office. With regard to certain items which will be considered by the Political Committees of the GA, we would prefer that they be discussed informally with Foreign Office officials, although you may, in your discretion, also present an appropriate written statement if you consider that such a procedure is likely to be most productive.

3. Outlined below are the Department's tentative positions on a number of items which will be dealt with in the Political Committees or in plenary sessions. You are requested, in your discretion, to outline these views to the Foreign Office and to report its reactions as soon as possible. As noted above, you should indicate that these positions are tentative and that we shall wish to take account insofar as possible of the views of other friendly governments in determining our final positions. Any significant information you receive should be cabled if it is not likely to be received in the Department by September 9 if sent by air despatch. (Detailed background information on most of the issues you will be asked to discuss may be found in the Annual Reports of the President to Congress on US Participation in the United Nations.)

(a) President of the Tenth GA

Jose Maza of Chile is the only candidate, and the consensus appears to be that a Latin American should be elected this year. In accordance with our usual policy with respect to Latin American candidacies for UN posts, we shall wish to ascertain the view of the Latin American caucus before taking a final decision. (For your information, while the caucus has not yet met on this matter, it appears that Maza will be the Latin American candidate and we would of course support him.)

(b) Elections to UN Councils [3]

Background information on these elections is outlined below. The Department is actively considering its position and you will be informed as soon as possible of decisions reached. (We shall, of course, support Latin American countries to replace Latin Americans, but in accordance with our usual policy we shall await the views of the Latin American states before deciding for whom we shall vote. We shall oppose the election to the Councils of Soviet bloc candidates. The Big Five have always been represented on ECOSOC and it is axiomatic that the United States will be reelected.)

Security Council. The GA will elect three non-permanent Members for two-year terms to succeed Brazil, New Zealand, and Turkey whose terms expire on December 31, 1955. Cuba is the only announced candidate to succeed Brazil; Australia to succeed New Zealand; and the Philippines and Poland to succeed Turkey.

Economic and Social Council. The GA will elect six countries for three-year terms to succeed Australia, Venezuela, India, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and the United States whose terms expire on December 31 of this year. Canada is a candidate to succeed Australia; Costa Rica and Brazil to succeed Venezuela; and Indonesia to succeed India. Greece is a candidate for the seat of either Yugoslavia or Turkey, and Yugoslavia is running for reelection. We understand Turkey may seek reelection and that Thailand may also become a candidate. In addition, it is possible that a Soviet satellite may seek Yugoslavia's seat which was occupied by Soviet bloc Members until 1953.

Trusteeship Council. The GA will elect two states for three-year terms to succeed El Salvador and Syria. Guatemala is a candidate to succeed El Salvador. Burma and Liberia are candidates for Syria's seat and the incumbent is seeking to be reelected.

(c) Treatment of Indians in South Africa

This item has been included in the provisional agenda again this year pursuant to the resolution adopted at the last Assembly session. That resolution (a) suggested to the Governments of India, Pakistan and South Africa that they seek a solution of this question by direct negotiations; (b) suggested that the parties designate a Government, agency or person to facilitate contacts between them and assist them in settling the dispute; (c) decided that if the parties failed to reach agreement on the foregoing suggestion within six months, the Secretary General should designate a person for the purposes specified; and (d) requested the Secretary General to report to the forthcoming

---

[3] Documentation on this topic is *ibid.*, Central Files, 320/ and 330/; *ibid.*, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Elections; and *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, U.S. Mission Correspondence and UNESCO. See also Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations file for records of telephone discussions between Dulles and Lodge on this topic during and before the meetings of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Sessions of the General Assembly, 1955–1957.

Assembly session. The Secretary General is expected to report that the parties failed to reach agreement in accordance with (b) above and that he therefore (in July) appointed Mr. Luis de Faro (Brazil) to facilitate contacts between them and assist them in settling the dispute.

We understand that the Indian Government is prepared to agree to a postponement of further discussion of this issue until the eleventh GA session (1956) to permit sufficient time for Mr. de Faro to exercise his good offices in accordance with the resolution adopted last year. We would support action to this effect. We continue to believe that the only real hope for a settlement of this dispute lies in direct negotiations between the parties.

(d) Race Conflict in South Africa (Apartheid)

A Commission of three individuals [Santa Cruz (Chile); Bellegarde (Haiti); Laugier (France)][4] established by the GA in 1952 was requested by the last session of the Assembly to keep this problem under review and to report to the forthcoming session. While the Commission's report is not yet available it is clear that it will again report failure to make any progress toward a solution.

As in previous years the United States will not play a leading role in the consideration of this question. We intend, however, to point out that from the outset we questioned the wisdom of establishing the Commission. The experience of the past three years has demonstrated that this body is not in a position to play a useful role. We therefore see no utility in its continuance. Because we consider that singling out South Africa for criticism and censure neither improves the situation in South Africa nor contributes to the success of United Nations efforts to promote respect for human rights, we would look with favor on a generalized proposal along the lines of a resolution adopted in 1952, which proclaimed general standards of conduct in the field of human rights (with particular emphasis on race relations), or possibly a proposal for some arrangement providing means for the voluntary exchange of experience on racial questions between countries having such problems. We believe that such an approach would be more likely to obtain constructive results than a purely political approach directed exclusively at South Africa.

---

[4] Hernan Santa Cruz, Dantes Bellegarde, and Henri Laugier. Brackets in the source text.

(e) Korea

The participants on the UN side at the Korean Political Conference (Geneva, 1954)[5] stressed in their report to the last GA that agreement had not been reached because the Communists refused to agree on procedures for genuinely free elections under UN supervision. The Ninth GA (a) approved the report; (b) reaffirmed "that the objectives of the UN remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area"; (c) expressed the hope that progress towards these objectives could soon be achieved; and (d) requested the Secretary General to include the question of Korea in the provisional agenda of the forthcoming session.

There has been no indication that the position of the Communists has changed—specifically that they are willing to accept the principle of genuinely free elections under United Nations auspices. In these circumstances we believe that no useful purpose would be served by further UN discussion at this time of the question of Korean unification and that the GA should confine any action merely to a renewed expression of hope that progress toward the achievement of UN objectives in Korea can soon be made, and to taking note of the annual report of UNCURK.

(f) Chinese Representation

We shall, of course, continue actively to oppose any efforts designed to change the representation of China in the General Assembly. As last year, we shall take the position that the Assembly should decide not to consider any proposals designed to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. (For your information, by taking the foregoing procedural position and avoiding votes on the substance we anticipate that we should be able again this year to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support and with minimum difficulty.)

(g) Atomic Radiation

Although scientific data available to the United States indicates that properly safeguarded nuclear testing does not constitute a threat to human health, we believe that all possible information should be made available to all nations as a basis for their own evaluation of the problems of radiation. The United States has therefore proposed that the following new item be included in the Assembly's agenda: "Coordination of information relating to the effects of atomic radiation upon human health and safety". Our explanatory memorandum (which the Secretary General will circulate to all UN Members) includes the following principal points: (a) we recognize that widespread concern exists regarding the question of atomic radiation and its effects upon human health and safety; (b) we note that competent scientists in the United States and other countries are making intensive studies of this question and that although a large amount of scientific data relating to this question already exists, this information has not been systematically assembled and internationally disseminated; and (c) we believe that the United Nations is the appropriate agency to collect, assemble, and make available this information.

---

[5] For documentation concerning the Geneva Conference on Korea, April 26–June 15, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume XVI.

We intend to seek GA endorsement of an appropriate resolution which will (a) establish a small UN Committee (composed of technical representatives appointed by a few Governments) which would receive and assemble radiological information furnished by States Members of the UN or the specialized agencies; (b) request the Committee to transmit from time to time as appropriate such data to UN Members for their information; and (c) call upon States Members of the UN and the specialized agencies to cooperate in making available to the Committee (1) reports on observed levels of radiation, and (2) the results of studies of radiation effects upon human health and safety already under way or later undertaken by their national scientific bodies or by government authorities.

(For your information, we strongly believe that the terms of reference of the UN Committee should be confined, as indicated above, to the assembly and dissemination of radiological data. We would actively resist any efforts to expand the terms of reference in such a way as to permit the Committee to carry on an independent investigation and evaluation of radiation effects since (a) pressure might be exerted upon us to disclose classified scientific data and we would be accused of non-cooperation if we refused; and (b) this might open the door to politically motivated studies designed to prove the "harmful effects" of test explosions.)

(h) Disarmament

The meetings of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission (France, Canada, USSR, UK, US) will be resumed on August 29 and may continue during the GA session. Moreover, the disarmament question is on the agenda of the Four-Power Foreign Minister Meetings scheduled to be held in Geneva in October.[6] In these circumstances it seems clear that it will not be appropriate for the GA to consider the disarmament question until the latter part of its session. Barring some unforeseen development, we anticipate that it may not be prudent for the GA to engage in a detailed substantive debate of the question, and action might well be confined merely to a request that the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee continue its efforts and to an expression of hope that progress can be made during the forthcoming year.

---

[6] For documentation, see volume V.

(i) Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

This question was considered by the last GA as a result of United States initiative. The resolution adopted on December 4, 1954[7] inter alia (a) noted that negotiations were in progress for the establishment of an International Agency to facilitate the use by the entire world of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind; (b) expressed the hope that the Agency would be established without delay; (c) suggested that the Agency (when established) should negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the UN; (d) suggested that UN Members be informed of progress achieved in the establishment of the Agency; and (e) decided that an international technical Conference of Governments (UN and specialized agency Members) should be held, under UN auspices, to explore means of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through international cooperation and, in particular, to study the development of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation protection, and fundamental science—in which international cooperation might most effectively be accomplished.

The forthcoming Assembly session will have before it a report submitted by the Secretary General concerning the international technical Conference which convened in Geneva on August 8. In addition, the United States and presumably other governments will report on progress made in their countries during the past year in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The United States, inter alia, will report that we have now increased to 200 kilograms the amount of fissionable material which we will make available to other countries for the development of their own programs in this field; that we have concluded bilateral arrangements with a number of countries, making available to them varied amounts of fissionable material; and that we and seven other countries (UK, France, Canada, South Africa, Portugal, Australia, and Belgium) have prepared a draft agreement providing for the establishment of the International Agency. The draft agreement for the Agency will be made available to all UN and specialized agency Members for their comments, if possible prior to the convening of the GA. (For your information, negotiations with the USSR with respect to its possible membership in the Agency are continuing.)

---

[7] Reference is to Resolution No. 810 (IX), "International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy," adopted at the 503d plenary meeting of the General Assembly on December 4, 1954. For text, see United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 21 (A/2890), *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Ninth Session from 21 September to 17 December, 1954*, pp. 4–5.

We believe that it would be appropriate for the GA to (a) note with satisfaction the report submitted by the Secretary General concerning the technical conference; (b) note with satisfaction the reports of governments concerning their activities in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and in particular the progress toward the establishment of the International Agency; (c) express the hope that the Agency will be speedily established; and (d) reaffirm the suggestion expressed in the GA resolution last year that the Agency negotiate as soon as possible an appropriate form of an agreement with the UN.

Dulles

---

9. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly[1]

SD/A/C.1 *Washington, August 24, 1955.*

OVER-ALL U.S. POSITION WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET TACTICS AT THE TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Problem

The USSR will undoubtedly seek to capitalize on the "spirit of Geneva"[2] at the 10th General Assembly. The Soviet "peace offensive" will be very much in evidence as the USSR attempts to convince the Members that by its recent "deeds" it is now the leader in the quest for world peace. It will seek to build confidence in Soviet intentions and generate pressures on the West, particularly the United States, to make concessions of its own. The new Soviet attitude and demeanor will be reflected in the nature of the items introduced at the United Nations as well as in the debates. Except on the Chinese representation issue, Moscow will probably avoid locking horns directly with any of the Western powers, and for the first time since 1946, its courtship of other delegations may extend to the United States as well.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–2355. Confidential.

[2] Reference is to the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, July 18–23, 1955; see volume V.

The United States must maintain the initiative for peace, security, and justice which it seized at Geneva under the leadership of President Eisenhower. We should welcome this new attitude on the part of the USSR and the relaxation of tension resulting from Geneva. On the other hand we should point out that this present session of the General Assembly as well as the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting offers a good testing ground for the USSR to prove its intentions. We should calmly and factually stress the point that the free world must adopt a "wait and see" attitude and not relax its vigilance.

United States Position

1. The United States should seek to hold the initiative seized at Geneva as the accepted leader for peace, security, and justice. This should be reflected not only in statements by its spokesman but in constructive proposals in all United Nations activities.

2. The United States should welcome the new Soviet attitude and demeanor.

3. The United States should point out that this session of the General Assembly and the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers offer the Communist bloc excellent opportunities for new "deeds" consistent with the "new spirit".

4. The United States should calmly and factually point out that nothing has yet occurred which justifies the free world relaxing its vigilance or substantially altering its programs of collective security.

5. In the present atmosphere the United States should refrain from initiating "cold war" items. However, every charge against the United States should be forcefully met and any relevant Communist vulnerability calmly and factually exploited.

6. From a procedural standpoint, the United States should not oppose the inclusion in the agenda of a Soviet resolution of the omnibus type.

10. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA–2022 *Washington, September 8, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Tenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly—Committees II and III. (Reference Circular Instruction No. CA–1225[2])

Circular instruction No. CA–1225, August 11, 1955, supplied information as to preliminary United States thinking on political issues likely to arise at the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, scheduled to convene on September 20. The present instruction deals with United States views on the economic and financial topics to be discussed in Committee II of the General Assembly and the Human Rights and Social topics scheduled for discussion in Committee III. This material is supplied for your information and for use in answer to inquiries by officials of the Government to which you are accredited.

Committee II—Economic and Financial

Item 1. Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)

The United States Delegation to the 20th Session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) abstained on a resolution recommending that the General Assembly (GA) invite United Nations (UN) members to transmit to the Secretary General not later than March 31, 1956, their views on the experts' recommendations with respect to the establishment, operation, and management of the proposed SUNFED and also the establishment of an ad hoc committee to analyze these comments by governments and submit such interim report as it may be in a position to make. The United States supports the creation of a fund for economic development grants when progress toward world-wide internationally supervised disarmament has released funds for that purpose, but we have maintained that it is premature to set up SUNFED at this time. Our abstention, joined in by Australia and the United Kingdom, on the ECOSOC resolution was motivated by our feeling that the preambular portion of that resolution contained inaccuracies and by our reluctance to see set up an ad hoc committee of governments to study this question, even though that committee would be specifically barred from committing any member government.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–855. Official Use Only.

[2] Document 8.

It is anticipated that the United States Delegation to the GA will abstain on any proposed resolution by that body to implement the recommendations of ECOSOC. Should an effort be made to proceed even farther toward the creation of a SUNFED at some definite date in the near future or to set up a committee of governments with broader powers than those called for in the ECOSOC resolution, the United States would attempt to have such proposals withdrawn or modified. In any discussion with the government to which you are accredited on this subject, you should emphasize that the United States feels it would be unwise to take definite steps in the direction of setting up a SUNFED before progress made in the direction of world-wide internationally supervised disarmament has released funds adequate to ensure that the new body would be able to cope adequately with the need it is intended to meet. A premature or abortive establishment of SUNFED with insufficient funds would be unfortunate and could result in a serious setback to the cause of assisting under-developed countries to hasten their economic development.

Item 2. International Finance Corporation (IFC)

At the Ninth General Assembly a resolution was passed calling upon the International Bank to draft statutes to govern the proposed IFC and to bring about agreement among its members on the statutes. ECOSOC was requested to report on this matter to the GA at the latter's Tenth Session. The ECOSOC report notes that the draft Articles of Agreement have been prepared and that progress has been made toward the establishment of the Corporation, which is to have not less than $75,000,000 in subscribed capital and not less than thirty participating governments in order to begin operations. It is anticipated that a resolution will be passed by the Tenth GA similarly noting progress toward the establishment of IFC and looking forward to its actual coming into being as soon as practicable.

The United States Government has completed the legislative action necessary for its adherence to IFC and has expressed itself in favor of the early commencement of operations by that body. It will, therefore, support a GA resolution of the type indicated.

Item 3. Assistance to Libya

A GA resolution passed at the Eighth Session places the question of UN assistance to Libya on the agenda of the forthcoming Tenth Session and requests the Secretary General to make a special report in the matter. While the United States Government is in favor of assistance to Libya and has, in fact, contributed substantial aid to that country on a bilateral basis, it is felt that the UN as such should not assume particular responsibility for financial assistance to Libya nor should the UN specify, as has been proposed, that assistance to Libya be rendered "in conditions which will not detract from that country's independence". This Government feels that the question of assistance to Libya must eventually take its place in the general context of assistance to under-developed countries and that the fact that Libya was, so to speak, brought into existence by the UN as an independent country, does not endow the UN with a special continuing responsibility for it.

Item 4. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)

The United States sees no policy issues arising this year with regard to UNKRA, and assumes that GA action will be confined to general endorsement of the program and the hope that outstanding pledges may still be made good. If the question is raised, it may be stated that the United States has more than fulfilled terms of its own pledge. The United States contribution of approximately $92 million represents about 67 per cent of the total contributions (the original United States pledge was at a 65 per cent figure). Unless other contributions are substantial (which is frankly not anticipated), it may be assumed that UNKRA's present task is to make effective use of its remaining resources.

Item 5. Technical Assistance

The United States anticipates no policy issues this year in technical assistance. It is assumed there will be a general endorsement of the program. The organizational issue seems to be settled for the time being; the United States agrees with TAB and agency officials who hope no fresh organizational proposals will be made for some time. The ECOSOC resolution on administrative problems is satisfactory.

Committee III—Social, Humanitarian and Cultural

Item 6. Draft Covenants on Human Rights

We will repeat our intention not to sign or ratify these Covenants when completed and will express our views on technical drafting points. [3]

---

[3] The official U.S. position on the draft international covenants on human rights was elaborated in position paper SD/A/C.3/191, August 26, in which Secretary Dulles' statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 6 was quoted in justification and explanation of the U.S. position. Secretary Dulles stated:

"The present Administration intends to encourage the promotion everywhere of human rights and individual freedoms, but to favor methods of persuasion, education and example rather than formal undertakings which commit one part of the world to

(Continued)

Item 7. Human Rights Advisory Services

We will support the adoption of the resolution approved by the Economic and Social Council authorizing the Secretary-General to provide UN advisory services (expert assistance, fellowships and scholarships, seminars) in the general field of human rights, including assistance previously authorized on women's rights, discrimination and minorities, and freedom of information.

Item 8. Freedom of Information

The United States will support proposals to further freedom of information, including provision of advisory services (see above). The consideration of the draft Convention on Freedom of Information is not anticipated at this session, but if it is considered, the United States will vigorously oppose its completion, pointing out that (a) the Convention would incorporate and give UN approval to undesirable restrictions which will have the effect of retarding rather than promoting freedom of information, and (b) the failure of repeated UN efforts since 1948, when this draft was begun, demonstrates that effective agreement is impossible.

Item 9. Draft Convention on Nationality of Married Women

We will vote against the completion of this draft Convention because (a) the nationality problem should be considered as a whole, and better results can be obtained by referring the draft to the International Law Commission for its information (this Commission has already begun a study of nationality as a whole), and (b) a separate convention on women necessarily neglects related matters of fundamental importance to the family, such as the situation of children born to parents of differing nationality. It may also be noted that the substance of the draft does not provide full equality, whereas United States law makes no distinction between the spouses in nationality rights and naturalization.

Hoover

(Continued)
impose its particular social and moral standards upon another part of the world community, which has different standards. That is the point of view I expressed in 1951 in relation to the Japanese Peace Treaty. Therefore, while we shall not withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on Human Rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would now select as the proper and most effective way to spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty to which this nation has been dedicated since its inception. We therefore do not intend to become a party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate."

A copy of this position paper is in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, 10th GA, P Books, Committees 1–6.

11. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly[1]

SD/A/341 *Washington, September 10, 1955.*

CHARTER REVIEW

The Problem

Under Article 109(3) of the Charter, the proposal to call a Charter review conference is automatically on the agenda of the tenth session. At this session a simple majority, rather than the two-thirds majority required in other years, is sufficient, together with the vote of any seven members of the Security Council, for a decision to hold a conference. While outright opposition to the idea of a review conference is not anticipated except from the Soviet bloc, reservations about a decision at this time to hold a conference do exist, particularly among Commonwealth, West European, Scandinavian, and "neutralist" members. No strong demand for a conference has been voiced by any substantial number of states. The Secretary General has suggested that a decision might be left open for future consideration. This suggestion has had a rather favorable reception. Proposals have also been made to defer any decision until a later session. A few states have expressed support for a decision to hold a conference in the near future, so that the possibility of proposals for a conference in 1956 cannot be precluded. A much larger number of states, however, have indicated a preference for 1957 or 1958 or for leaving the date open at this time.

United States Position

1. The United States desires a decision in principle by the tenth General Assembly to hold a Charter review conference, leaving the date and place open, and establishing a preparatory commission to report to the eleventh session. Because 1956 is an election year, the United States does not want such a conference held before 1957, and since it is impossible to forecast accurately what conditions may then prevail, maximum flexibility with respect to timing is in the United States interest. A conference held under inauspicious international circumstances would almost certainly prove counter-produc-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, 10th GA, P Books, Committees 1–6. Confidential. A notation on the source text reads: "This is an interim paper subject to revision on the basis of consultations now in progress. It will be supplemented by instructions concerning the composition and terms of reference of the proposed preparatory commission and by a draft resolution."

tive, and the chances for a successful conference would undoubtedly be enhanced if certain areas of general agreement can be developed through consultations before a conference is actually convened.

2. Since, aside from the Soviet bloc, the British and French are the most strongly opposed to an Assembly decision at this time to hold a conference and since their views will undoubtedly carry great weight with other "doubtful" states, we are seeking agreement with them in particular, and with other friendly members as well, on a generally acceptable formula. From the United States standpoint, such a formula would consist of a GA decision to hold a conference and to establish a preparatory commission of government representatives to make recommendations to the eleventh session on the time and place of such a conference.

3. Once agreement on a formula is reached we shall seek to encourage a geographically representative group of small and middle-sized states to sponsor a resolution based upon this position.

4. We are endeavoring to develop general support for the adoption of this resolution directly in plenary.

5. We should continue to avoid being drawn into debate on the substantive aspects of Charter review, since in the absence of firm US positions on these questions, such debate would be premature and possibly harmful.

6. We should oppose any proposal to hold the conference in 1956, and unless our preferred formula is generally unacceptable, which seems unlikely, any proposal to defer the decision on holding a conference.

Comment

The United States believes a review conference offers possibilities of accomplishment both through procedural agreements not involving the amendment process and through general agreement on a limited number of amendments which world opinion might induce the USSR to ratify. The United States also believes that even if no changes result, review of the Charter would be useful in making clear its flexibility and potentialities, on the one hand, and, on the other, the limits beyond which sovereign states are still unwilling to go in undertaking multilateral commitments. The United States does not envisage that a review conference would undertake to rewrite the Charter or to change the basic character of the Organization.

Outside the United States, interest in a Charter review conference does not appear to approach that in this country. There is skepticism regarding the possibilities of accomplishment at a review conference under present circumstances. Not only is Soviet refusal to ratify anticipated in the case of such questions as the veto. Member states generally are not seen as willing to undertake additional commitments at this time to strengthen the United Nations in the political and security field, and it is recognized that amendments in the economic, social, and colonial fields desired by the anti-colonial and under-developed countries are not likely to secure the requisite ratification of all the permanent members of the Security Council, quite aside from the USSR. Weaknesses in the United Nations are generally attributed not so much to the Charter as to the policies of member states, and a review conference is not thought to offer any remedy for this situation. On the other hand, there is concern that a review conference might increase rather than lessen international tensions, both between the free world and the USSR, and within the free world.

At the same time, a general reluctance to oppose the idea of a review conference is observable outside the Soviet bloc, and a formula that assures, so far as possible, that the conference will not be held under adverse circumstances and only after extensive consultations on the substance of Charter review have laid the groundwork for a productive meeting should prove generally acceptable. In this event, it should be feasible to handle the item directly in plenary. This procedure has the advantage of keeping to a minimum any discussion of substance at this stage. We ourselves are not yet prepared to engage in such discussions, and it is likely to confirm rather than relieve apprehensions about the holding of a conference, with respect both to the Soviet re-action and to "colonial" and domestic jurisdiction issues. Substantive discussion, under these circumstances, might well prove prejudicial to a decision in principle by the tenth General Assembly to hold a conference.

12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, September 16, 1955—7:03 p.m.

179. Charter Review. Reference your 283,[2] September 14, suggest following text possible resolution be discussed UK delegation:

"Mindful that Article 109, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that if a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly, such a conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council,

"Noting that no such Conference has been held,

"Believing that it would be desirable to review the present Charter in the light of the experience gained since the establishment of the United Nations ten years ago,

"Recognizing that such a review should be conducted under auspicious international circumstances,

1. Decides that a General Conference to review the Charter should be held;
2. Decides to establish a Preparatory Commission for the General Conference, this commission to be composed of representatives of . . .[3] (discussed below)
3. Directs the Preparatory Commission, in consultation with the Secretary General, to prepare and submit to the eleventh

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/9–1455. Confidential. Signed by Wainhouse for the Acting Secretary.

[2] Telegram 283 contained a draft text of a possible resolution on Charter review informally handed to Mission officials by members of the U.K. Delegation. The resolution reads as follows:

"*Having considered*, in accordance with Article 109(3) of the Charter, the question of holding a general conference of the members of the UN for the purpose of reviewing the Charter:

"*Decides* that it would be desirable to hold such a conference at an appropriate time;

"*Further decides* to appoint a committee consisting of 5 permanent members of Security Council plus six others to advise the General Assembly regarding the question of fixing an appropriate time and place for the conference, taking into account the need to hold the conference in the most favorable circumstances;

"*Requests* the advisory committee named above to report to the General Assembly when it is able to make a positive recommendation regarding a time and place for the conference or at the latest to the XVth Session."

The British further suggested the composition of the proposed committee as follows: Chile, Colombia, China, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Telegram 283 also stated: "Above was given to us as representing UKDel's thinking in effort to arrive at compromise between US and UK positions. Crosthwaite informed us that the balance had been very carefully worked out and any substantial change would probably meet with difficulty in the Foreign Office." (*Ibid.*)

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

regular session of the General Assembly recommendations relating to the date, place, or anization, and procedures of the General Conference."

Believe text takes account UK interest in flexibility in timing and importance favorable circumstances while permitting decision in principle conference should be held. In our view these terms of reference permit commission to recommend time of conference or postponement of decision on date if desirable.

Believe commission should be more broadly representative than UK proposes. Suggest 17 member commission along these lines; Subject, of course, to consultation with other delegations:

Five permanent members of SC;
Three Latin Americans (possibly Colombia, Argentina, Cuba);
Four Arab-Asian (possibly including India, Egypt, Thailand or Philippines, and Indonesia or Burma);
Two Western Europe (possibly Norway and Netherlands);
One Old Commonwealth (possibly Australia or Canada);
One Soviet bloc (possibly Czechoslovakia or Poland);
Greece or Turkey.

These nominations take into account most careful preparatory work on Charter review has been done by Australia, Netherlands and Canada, and countries that have expressed interest include Argentina, Egypt, Philippines, and Thailand.

Hoover

---

13. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 26, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 22. US draft resolution Deptel 179 [2] was shown to Crosthwaite and Ramsbotham (UK) today. Their preliminary reaction was negative. They pointed out that our first operative paragraph goes considerably beyond their language (Usun 283), [3] which merely refers to desirability of holding conference at an appropriate time, and that it will prove controversial. We stressed that our proposal would enable preparatory commission, bearing in mind need for auspicious international circumstances, to defer fixing exact date and if necessary merely to request extension its mandate at 11th session.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/9–655. Confidential.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 2, *supra.*

UK feels however that it is undesirable to take firm decision in principle now or to orient preparatory commission toward early decision as US draft would do.

There was inconclusive discussion of possibility adding language along lines "when international circumstances are auspicious" to our first operative paragraph. UK also indicated they prepared consider modifying their proposal so as to require report of Advisory Committee by XIIIth rather than XVth session. Question was also raised as to need obtain decision of SC under our proposal since it constitutes decision as specified Article 109(3), whereas presumably UK proposal does not require Council action.

Before USDel discusses US text with other delegations, believe Department may wish review US text in light probability UK will continue take negative view, which we believe is shared by a number of other delegations.

Lodge

---

14. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 30, 1955—10 a.m.

Delga 38. Re Charter review. UK has requested our views on their redraft of Charter review resolution.

"Mindful that Article 10 [*109*], paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that if a general conference of the members of the UN for the purpose of reviewing the Charter has not been held before the 10th annual session of the GA, such a conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the GA and by a vote of any seven members of the SC;

"Believing that it is desirable to review the Charter from time to time in the light of the experience gained in its operation;

"Recognising that such a review should be conducted under auspicious international circumstances;

"Decides that a general conference to review the Charter should be held at an appropriate time;

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/9–3055. Confidential; Priority.

"Further decides to appoint a committee consisting of __________ to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing a time and place for the conference;

"Requests the Committee to report to the GA with its recommendations at its XIIIth session."

Regarding second preambular paragraph, UK indicated it might be willing drop phrase "from time to time."

If we accept language operative paragraph 1, UK says this will constitute their agreement to take decision in principle hold Charter review conference and to follow up GA action with SC action in accordance with Charter. They will make public statement to this effect at appropriate time as well as tell others of their position on this point.

Department will note that operative Paragraph 2 does not include word "preparatory" and that committee would consider question of fixing time and place but not organization and procedure of general conference. Also, committee would report at XIIIth Session rather than XIth.

UK also believes our list of 17 for commission "packed with pro-Charter review proponents." Specifically they suggest different Arab state in substitution for Egypt and dropping Philippines, Greece, Turkey, and Indonesia or Burma from list. Agree that 3 Latin Americans should be on, though not necessarily those we have on list.

UK favors early consideration of this item.

Wadsworth

---

15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, October 1, 1955—12:45 p.m.

Gadel 12. Re: Charter Review. Reference Delga 38, September 30. Dept considers UK redraft while it goes some way meeting our views in effect decision to decide view phrase "at an appropriate time" end first operative paragraph, which detracts clear decision in principle hold conference. Dept also considers UK redraft would actually still postpone review conference too long. Conference under UK formula not likely be held before 1960 since suggested committee would undertake no preparatory work, and preparations would therefore have to be made after decision in 1958 on time conference.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/9–3055. Confidential. Signed by Wainhouse for the Secretary.

Delegation therefore requested seek UK agreement omission "at an appropriate time" operative paragraph one UK redraft; addition end second operative paragraph phrase "and its organization and procedures"; and substitution XIIth for XIIIth in third operative paragraph. Delegation should point out these changes UK redraft necessary our standpoint avoid impression conference postponed indefinite future and same time would meet UK objection decision hold early conference since could not possibly be held before 1958 if committee does not report until XII session.

Delegation should also point out notation in preambular paragraph two US draft in keeping language Article 109(3). However we not prepared insist this point. Similarly, would prefer see "from time to time" omitted preambular paragraph three UK redraft since it somewhat out of keeping Charter context resolution, but this point not essential.

Re composition committee, delegation should make clear our list still tentative and subject further consideration both here and in consultation other delegations.

Dulles

---

16. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 5, 1955—10 a.m.

Delga 52. Re: Charter review. Mr. Bell and staff met with Dixon and UK staff on Charter review resolution. UK agreed accept all Department's suggestions except deletion of phrase "at appropriate time" in operative paragraph 1. Specifically, they agreed to deletion phrase "from time to time" in second preambulatory paragraph, the addition of phrase "and its organization and procedures" at end operative paragraph 2 and substitution XII for XIII in third operative paragraph. In addition, UK suggested substitution of word "shall" for "should" in operative paragraph 1 to strengthen appearance of decision.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/10–555. Confidential; Priority.

Since operative paragraph 1 constitutes UK agreement to take decision in principle hold Charter review conference and follow up GA action with SC action, we believe UK has met Department's basic objective. Mr. Bell and staff informed UK we would recommend that Department concur. I concur in this recommendation.[2]

Lodge

---

[2] Gadel 23 to New York, October 5, reads as follows: "Dept concurs your recommendation Delga 52, October 5, though would still prefer omission 'at an appropriate time' and continues believe phrase may give us trouble in future." (*Ibid.*)

---

17. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, October 11, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 78. Re Charter review.

1. Timing of GA debate. We propose agree to US [*UK*?] suggestion that debate be scheduled for October 20 or 21. (Nutting is returning to London on October 22 and he wishes make initial UK speech emphasizing that resolution constitutes decision in principle hold review conference. This designed meet public opinion elements in UK which favor Charter review.)

2. Composition of committee. UK will agree to a committee of 15 as follows:

Five permanent SC members.
Latin America—3 (Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic).
Western Europe—2 (Norway and Netherlands or Belgium).
Old Commonwealth—1 (Australia, Canada or New Zealand).
Soviet Bloc—1 (Czechoslovakia).
Arab States—1 (Lebanon).
Asians—1 [*2*] (India and Philippines or Thailand).

UK leaves to us selection as between Thailand and Philippines. (We propose delay decision on this until after SC election.) UK will ascertain Benelux choice as between Netherlands and Belgium, and Commonwealth choice as among Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/10–1155. Confidential.

UK opposes inclusion of Burma or Indonesia and Turkey or Greece. They argue that both Asia and Europe are adequately represented in above slate and that inclusion these countries would lead to demand for greater representation other areas (specifically Latin America) and result would be committee unwieldy proportions. UK points out that viewpoint Burma and Indonesia is represented by India and there would be no reasonable area basis for inclusion either. They feel that inclusion Greece or Turkey would be resented as an effort pack committee with Europeans.

Bell and staff recommend we be authorized agree to committee of 15 outlined above, on understanding we will be free suggest at later time addition 1, 2 or possibly 3 countries if negotiating situation so requires.

3. Sponsorship of resolution. UK believes it highly important that we maintain strict control on resolution and has concluded best way ensure this is confine sponsors to UK and US alone. They point out that if any additional sponsors are added, it will be difficult resist including India and this could lead to considerable difficulty. UK does not believe it would be prudent have resolution sponsored by 1 or 2 small countries on ground that no matter how carefully countries are selected we can not be sure that they will resist undesirable amendments if going should get rough in GA.

Bell and staff recommend we be authorized accede UK suggestion.

We have agreed, at UK request, meet with them at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon to iron out remaining tactical points. Request Department's views on above soonest.

Lodge

---

18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, October 12, 1955—5:06 p.m.

Gadel 39. Re Delga 78, October 11. Dept has no objection scheduling debate Charter review item October 20 or 21 as UK desires provided agreement on appropriate Committee composition and sponsorship can be reached with UK and provided necessary preparatory work obtain maximum favorable vote agreed US-UK draft resolution can be accomplished within this short time.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/10–1155. Confidential. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

Re composition Committee: 1) Dept strongly prefers Netherlands to Belgium and not prepared agree latter which completely negative Charter review. In context UK Committee 15, with Belgian membership Committee would have six members opposed Charter review, five in favor, and four moderates. 2) Dept does not, consider 17 more unwieldly group than 15 and continues believe Turkey or Greece, Burma or Indonesia, should be included. India not considered representative Far Eastern states and Dept sees no basis view inclusion Turkey or Greece, and particularly former, would be "resented as effort pack Committee with Europeans". Dept's slate, not counting five permanent members SC, would consist two Far Eastern, two Middle Eastern, one Balkan, three European, one Commonwealth, three Latin American, and our view represents proper geographic balance.

Re sponsorship: Dept cannot see any rationale justify cosponsorship US-UK alone resolution clearly concerning entire UN membership, and believes such limited sponsorship would prove counterproductive. Nor can Dept see any insuperable difficulties keeping strict control resolution if appropriate number geographically representative sponsors added US, UK. View its announced opposition Charter review, would not anticipate Indian insistence cosponsor. However, order avoid this issue, proposed Committee membership could be disregarded and limited number geographically representative countries approached basis general reliability and interest Charter review.

Dulles

19. Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, Mission Headquarters, New York, October 13, 1955, 9:30 a.m.[1]

US/A/M(SR)/36

[Here follows discussion of Security Council and ECOSOC elections.]

Charter Review

Mr. Sisco then took up the question of Charter review which he noted would be debated in plenary session possibly next week. Mr. Sisco recalled that the question of Charter review was automatically on the agenda of this GA and that, for this Assembly only a decision on the subject required only a majority vote in the GA plus the concurrence of 7 members of the Security Council. Mr. Sisco observed further that there was a great deal of interest in this country on the subject of Charter review. He pointed out that the Congressional Subcommittee which studied the question had left the decision up to the Executive Branch. Our position was that while we favored a decision in principle to hold a review conference, we wanted to leave the date and place open and to create a preparatory committee which would recommend to the twelfth GA the date, place, organization and procedures for the conference. We hoped in the debate, Mr. Sisco said to avoid substantive discussion of specific proposals for the amendment of the Charter.

Mr. Sisco went on to review the attitude of other governments on this question. He said that with the exception of certain Latin American states there was no strong view in favor of an early review conference. The majority of the delegations, however, favored agreement in principle for such a conference. At the same time, many countries were highly skeptical that such a conference could achieve anything constructive under the circumstances existing in the world today. The view was widely held, Mr. Sisco observed, that it was not the Charter which was at fault but the political situation in the world.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Master Files, US/A/M(SR)/1—. Secret.

Master Files of the extant Minutes of U.S. Delegation Meetings during the various Sessions of the U.N. General Assembly from 1946 to 1961 are in two locations: the IO Master Files at the Department of State and the USUN Files at New York. The Minutes of Delegation Meetings from the First through the Eighth Session of the General Assembly (1946–1953) were given the designation US/A/M/CHR 1–281. Beginning with the Minutes of the First Meeting of the Delegation to the Ninth General Assembly, September 21, 1954, the designation was changed to US/A/M(SR)/1—.

For the 1955–1957 period, these files are incomplete, as the Minutes of the 4th, and 7th to 22d Meetings of the Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly (September 17–December 14, 1957) are missing. Apparently no formal Minutes of these Meetings were ever drafted. However, the USUN Files in the Mission at New York do contain detailed draft notes on those Meetings not formally accounted for.

Mr. Sisco called attention to the draft resolution (document US/A/3754, October 12[2]) which the British had agreed to co-sponsor with us. There were two problems, Mr. Sisco said. The first was the question of other co-sponsors. The United Kingdom wanted to limit co-sponsorship to our two countries, arguing that it was essential that tight control be maintained over the wording of the resolution. The United Kingdom feared that if other countries co-sponsored, it would be more difficult to resist textual changes. Mr. Sisco said that while we were in agreement with the UK on the need to resist changes we felt that on such an important question as this we should seek to get other co-sponsors who would not be likely to try to make substantive changes. We were working along these lines now, Mr. Sisco said.

The second problem which arose in connection with our resolution had to do with the composition of the Preparatory Committee. Mr. Sisco called attention to Delga 78 of October 11, which listed a group of states drawn from the major geographical areas who would be acceptable to the UK as members of the Committee. Agreement on this list would lead to a committee of 15 countries. The Department desired to add two more states, namely either Burma or Indonesia in order to give Asia greater representation and either Turkey or Greece to give the same to South Eastern Europe. The UK, Mr. Sisco pointed out, disagreed with our view, arguing that Asia and South Eastern Europe were adequately represented in the slate of 15 and that the inclusion of Burma or Indonesia and Turkey or Greece would lead to a demand for greater representation especially from the Latin Americans thus resulting in an unwieldy committee. Mr. Sisco pointed out that we had reached a point of impasse with the British on this question, *they* insisting that a committee of 15 was adequate and *we* insisting upon a committee of 17. Mr. Sisco suggested that we now needed authority to be a little more flexible.

---

[2] This draft resolution reads as follows:

"*Mindful* that Article 10 [*109*], paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that if a general conference of the members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter has not been held before the 10th annual session of the General Assembly, such a conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council;

"*Believing* that it is desirable to review the Charter in the light of the experience gained in its operation;

"*Recognizing* that such a review should be conducted under auspicious international circumstances;

"*Decides* that a general conference to review the Charter shall be held at an appropriate time;

"*Further decides* to appoint a Committee consisting of ________ to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing a time and place for the Conference, and its organization and procedures;

"*Requests* the Committee to report to the General Assembly with its recommendations at its XIIth Session." (USUN Files, US/A/3731–3765)

Mr. Bell pointed out that there was no great enthusiasm among any but our own delegation for Charter review. He noted that Mr. Sisco had successfully worked to the point where the British were willing to accept our views but that we had reached a sticking point on the size of the committee. Mr. Bell endorsed Mr. Sisco's view that we should seek enough flexibility in our negotiations with the British on this point to recede to a committee of 15, if this were absolutely essential.

Ambassador Lodge commented that he was personally very enthusiastic about the possibilities implicit in the idea of Charter review. He felt that the two or three years which would lapse before a Charter review conference was convened offered us tremendous psychological possibilities to expose the Soviet position and to put them in an embarrassing situation.

Congressmen Hays and Merrow agreed with Ambassador Lodge about the potential value of Charter review discussion. Senator Pastore also concurred, pointing out that our position on the admission of new members made it especially important for us to continue agitating for constitutional changes on the membership question. Ambassador Lodge agreed with this observation pointing out that in countries like Italy and Spain the communist position could be seriously damaged by exposing their stand on membership.

Miss Gough commented that in reaching a decision on the membership and the size of the preparatory committee it would be necessary to keep the Chinese representation issue in mind. If we should succeed in obtaining agreement to add Burma or Indonesia to the committee in return for dropping Greece or Turkey, the number of countries recognizing Communist China would be relatively greater. Miss Gough suggested that if we included Burma or Indonesia on the committee we should include a second country which did not recognize Communist China. Mr. Barco pointed out that it would be necessary also, in deciding how the committee would be constituted, to keep the balance between those who favored Charter review and those who did not. Mr. Sisco pointed out that while the Burmese were not against Charter review, they were not as enthusiastic as either Greece or Turkey. Ambassador Lodge commented that what we needed was authority from the Department to adjust the number of committee members, keeping in mind these two points. Ambassador Wadsworth suggested that we might also tell the British that we would accept their idea of a committee of 15 if they would go along with our desire for additional co-sponsors. It was agreed that Mr. Bell would request the Department for authority to make the necessary adjustments.

---

20. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 4, 1955—9 p.m.

Delga 220. Re Charter review. Following draft resolution tabled today by Canada, Ecuador, Iraq, Thailand, United States, and United Kingdom:

Begin text. Mindful that Article 109, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations provides that if a general conference of the members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter has not been held before the 10th annual session of the General Assembly, such a conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council;

Believing that it is desirable to review the Charter in the light of experience gained in its operation;

Recognizing that such a review should be conducted under auspicious international circumstances;

Decides that a general conference to review the Charter shall be held at an appropriate time;

Further decides to appoint a committee consisting of Australia, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, France, India, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States, to consider, in consultation with the Secretary General, the question of fixing a time and place for the conference, and its organization and procedures;

Requests the Committee to report to the General Assembly with its recommendations at its twelfth session;

Requests the Secretary General to complete the publication program undertaken pursuant to Resolution 796(VIII) and to continue, prior to the twelfth regular session of the General Assembly, to prepare and circulate supplements, as appropriate, to the United Nations organs. *End text.*

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/11–455. Limited Official Use.

Prior to tabling resolution, we informed Lall (India) that only suggestion made by Menon (Delga 203)[2] which we could accept would be striking out word "the" before "experience" in second preambular paragraph. We stressed resolution has good chance of getting very broad support and expressed hope India would be able to vote in favor.

At co-sponsors meeting today Crosthwaite (UK) reported that Scandinavians somewhat cool to resolution and may have to abstain. Khalidy (Iraq) said he had not sounded out many of his colleagues but expressed view it had good chance getting Arabs support.

Lodge

---

[2] Delga 203 reported a conversation among V.K. Krishna Menon, Sir Pierson Dixon and Wadsworth "to receive Menon's comments on our Charter review resolution." After indicating that he would seek instructions from New Delhi as to the Indian position on the resolution, Menon made three suggestions concerning textual changes. (*Ibid.*, 310.1/11–255)

---

21. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 17, 1955—2 p.m.

Delga 303. Verbatim text. Subject· Charter review. In discussing yesterday with UKDel the revision of joint draft resolution on Charter review which comes up today in GA plenary, USDel worked out with UK following draft of Charter review resolution for Security Council:

"The Security Council, mindful that Article 109, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations provides that if a general conference of the members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly, such a conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council,

Having considered resolution (blank) (x) adopted by the General Assembly on November (blank), 1955, in which the Assembly decided that a conference to review the Charter of the United Nations shall be held at an appropriate time,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/11–1755. Official Use Only.

Expresses its concurrence in the Assembly's decision, as set forth in resolution (blank) (x) of the General Assembly."

Believed it would be desirable to include preambular paragraph on Charter Article 109, and requested inclusion of words "at an appropriate time" in second preambular paragraph. It was agreed that Council action would consist of concurrence in decision to hold a Charter review conference, having in mind the terms set forth in the Assembly's resolution.

It was agreed that only one action by the Council would ever be necessary, and that the Council would be considered to have given its consent in advance to whatever decision the Assembly might make later concerning the time and place of a review conference.

Re joint draft resolution for GA, decided with UK and other co-sponsors to add following brief and simple paragraph at end of resolution: "Transmits this resolution to the Security Council."

Wadsworth

---

22. Draft Report Prepared by Lincoln Bloomfield, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs [1]

Washington, February 9, 1956.

SUBJECT

Report on "Evaluation of Role of US in 10th General Assembly"

Problem

To analyze objectively the effect which the 10th Session has had on the international position of the United States, particularly upon the factors of prestige and general reputation in the American role of world leadership, both in and out of the United Nations. To draw appropriate conclusions from the analysis and, where feasible, to suggest possible courses of action for the immediate future.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Studies US Policy re UN. Confidential. The source text is undated, but was subsequently identified as having (Continued)

Note on Method

This analysis involved initially a study of all pertinent documents such as agenda, telegrams between the delegation and Department, resolutions, voting records, written reports where available, press clippings and public opinion analyses for the entire period, and such foreign public and press reactions as have been reported. Interviews were held with the seven committee executive officers, the four geographic liaison officers, press officers, delegation advisers, correspondents, and selected desk officers in the Department.

Introduction

This study grows out of a sense of official concern at the recent widespread criticism of the American position and performance at the 10th Assembly. It aims at objective self-scrutiny with a view to possible corrective action. At the same time, such an evaluation must be made in proper perspective. For example, caution must be applied to sweeping claims that in the United Nations the United States either wins monumental diplomatic victories or suffers irreparable diplomatic defeats. It is necessary to discriminate between gains or losses which have significant public and foreign impact, as against local episodes in the Assembly setting that may seem equally important to those who lived through them, but have little lasting or widespread effect. Another order of distinction is between difficulties that grow out of the substance of American foreign policies, i.e., strategic, and those caused by the way we execute such policies, i.e., tactical. A final prefatory caution is against viewing all such problems as suddenly acute or suddenly remediable. Often they have persisted over a period of years. Sometimes they grow out of larger conflicts of interest that will produce tensions at other levels so long as the larger conflicts persist. And in some cases they reflect the American constitutional system, or partisan domestic policies, or the

---

(Continued)
been drafted on February 9; see footnote 2, Document 24. Sent to Niles Bond, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs; John E. Fobes, Director of the Office of International Administration; D. Vernon McKay, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs; James F. Green, Deputy Director of the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs; and Harold G. Kissick, Director of the Office of International Conferences, all of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. In a covering note, dated February 15, Bloomfield wrote: "The attached report, which is slightly revised from the earlier draft, has been reproduced in anticipation of a meeting which Messrs. Wilcox and Phillips plan to call to discuss its contents and its implications for future action. You will be notified of the time of the meeting. No distribution of the report is being made outside this Bureau for the present." No record of the proposed meeting hereunder reference has been found. An earlier draft of this report, dated January 31, 1956, and sent by Bloomfield to Wilcox is in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Studies US Policy re UN.

free range of public and press criticism in this country—that is to say, the "disabilities" under which diplomacy must labor in a free democratic society.

Sometimes public criticisms tend to cancel each other out or reflect primarily the political bias of the source. On the Chinese Representation issue, for example, the US position is portrayed by some as a victory (e.g. *Watertown Times*), and by others as increasingly costly to US prestige (*Christian Science Monitor*). Hostility toward the UN often colors estimates of US performance (although it may be the other way around in this case, since Gallup polls in the same period reported *80%* support of the UN, compared with only *59%* a year ago and 55% in 1954).

The effort below is to sort out the various problems for US diplomacy that arose in the 10th Assembly, with these *caveats* in mind.

Discussion

1. General evaluation:

The aftermath of the 10th Assembly has produced an unusual degree of *generalized criticism* of American performance in the UN, coupled with concern about the future effect of current trends on this nation's role in the organization. Two major external factors significantly affected that role at the 10th Assembly: (a) the increased cohesiveness of the Arab-Asian neutralist, anti-colonial coalition as a result of the Bandung Conference, including noticeable trends away from the US position by such peripheral states as Liberia, along with growing defection of stragglers from the Latin American bloc; and (b) the "softer" attitude of the Soviet Union, at least for a part of the Assembly session. Undoubtedly both the Bandung and "Summit" meetings influenced the situation in New York (although both factors can equally be seen as projections of earlier trends and possibilities, rather than brand-new forces). At the same time, they have not been used by friendly critics to excuse defects in the American position, but rather as reasons why American diplomatic failures can less and less be tolerated. This point of view is often linked to the theme that the 10th General Assembly was simply a landmark along a path of general deterioration in the US position in the UN.

A consensus of the generalized criticism encountered both internally and in the public prints would read somewhat as follows: the United States lost ground at the last Assembly, largely through its own doing. It displayed unusually weak and wavering leadership, particularly on important issues, and often abdicated the leading role to the UK, India or the Soviet Union. It misdirected its energies by expending unbalanced efforts on relatively unimportant points, often succeeding only in irritating its friends. It tended to take rigid stands and seemed to lack adequate flexibility for the necessary diplomatic give-and-take. It beat tactical retreats after such retreats had lost their political value. It does not know how to give in or lose gracefully. It failed to consult or collaborate adequately with its Allies (or, conversely, overwhelmed them with multiple and overly-insistent approaches). It abused its predominant position among, e.g., Latin American states, our usually staunch supporters in that area and in Europe felt keenly the inconsistency and confusion surrounding certain American positions and our failure to give a decisive lead. We firmed up our policies much too late. Our liaison was ineffective and took place at too low levels. Asian representatives still detect a real or imagined sense of American racial superiority. US public relations and propaganda tended to be gauche and counter-productive. Increased numbers of American abstentions suggest to some that bilateral relationships alone give shape to US interests. On the whole, US policy in the UN was characterized as generally negative and aimed almost exclusively at warding off policies and programs we do not support.

On the other hand, some internal views depict the US as having done "not badly" in the face of positions that were unpopular, and having employed skillful tactics on some items where there was a lack of fixed policy.

Generalized public and press criticism pursued variations of some of the same themes, often tinged with partisan attitudes; the US is characteristically "defensive" in its "wavering, quibbling, half-hearted support of the UN . . . [2] ever fearful of doing anything that might look to some nervous right-winger on Capitol Hill as a concession to Moscow" (*Cincinnati Enquirer*). The US "mechanical majority" has come to an end with the "stunning defeats" we suffered and our "failure of leadership" (*New Republic*). The US is widely thought to have the power to control the outcome in the UN, but does not (*Christian Science Monitor*). We blundered because the "men at the top" did not stop to think about what they were doing (W. Lippmann).[3] "The role of absentee is out of character for the US. On every major issue . . . the US should take a stand. To straddle is to invite contempt" (*New York World-Telegram*). Small nations are showing a new spirit of independence vis-à-vis the US (Philadelphia *Inquirer*). American diplomacy was "clumsy . . . . We shall be missing a bet if we do not view the experience of this fall as a cue to re-examine our tactics for winning friends and influencing people" (*Washington Post*). The US "has not played a wholly creditable role" in condoning "ward politics" (*Lynchburg News*).

---

[2] All ellipses are in the source text.

[3] Walter Lippmann, nationally syndicated political columnist.

Abroad, both the *London Times* and the Indian press agreed that the US has lost control of the small powers, and that its influence in the UN is on the wane.

The prevailing opinion was summed up in the *Chicago Daily News:* "US prestige took a beating". Our only victory was in keeping the Chinese Communists out. "US stubborness" is to be condemned. We damaged ourselves on the whole range of issues—colonialism, atomic energy, disarmament, and membership. An echo of this estimate is summed up this way in the *Manchester Guardian:* "The most important changes, which this Assembly has reflected rather than caused, are a weakening in the guiding force of the United States and the rise of India as a unique arbitrator". For instance, the Latin American states "no longer leap in on Mr. Lodge's cues". Or, according to Tom Hamilton in *The New York Times:* US failures at the 10th Assembly merely reflected the declining American position due to the growth of neutralism (for which we are responsible), the widespread suspicions our policy toward Chinese representation arouses as to our "reliability" and "good judgment", and the resentment of anti-colonial powers at our alleged colonial attitudes.

Only a small *minority praised the U.S. role: e.g.: the "matchless* team" of Lodge–Nutting held the initiative successfully (*NY Journal American*).

Internal estimates of regional reactions tend to go to the fundamental conflicts of world political interests. Generally speaking, the Near Eastern States had no new or special fault to find with the US voting record, but the entire relationship remains colored by the Arab conviction that the US is still pro-Zionist, and the belief, sharpened at Bandung, that the US is more pro-colonial than ever.

Far Eastern states reportedly have doubts as to the basic course the US is following and the way we meet problems of interest to them at the UN. The 10th Assembly, particularly the membership "deal", reportedly raised some disturbing questions about the consistency of American anti-communism. On the credit side, to some Far Eastern states, a policy of abstention is apparently a good one for the US to follow, as in the Irian dispute.

Latin Americans feel we are taking them too much for granted, either neglecting them or insensitively trying to command their support. The addition of new members is seen as foreboding a further weakening of Latin solidarity with the US, particularly on economic issues.

European states were reported as sensing that US relations with them are closer in the NATO setting than in the UN. They felt we "overdid it" on most issues, and are increasingly impatient with the test of Chinese representation the US applies to every issue, whatever its merits. Needless to say, they are increasingly concerned with the UN's anti-colonial bias.

It will be noted that these criticisms summarized on the last few pages are usually directed, not toward the substance of American policies, but far more often toward the tactics of formulating and executing those policies. There was, to be sure, considerable private and public comment on substantive policies. But in the main, the correctives that have been suggested bear either on improved tactics (in the broadest sense), or on broad national postures, such as the overall American attitude toward East-West political warfare in the UN, toward the colonial revolution, and toward the way in which we try to mediate between international and domestic political demands.

These general critiques, while helpful in confirming the existence of overall trends and public moods, need to be evaluated in the light of the concrete issues at the 10th Assembly. Before doing this, however, a glance at the voting record is instructive.

2. *Voting Record*

The voting record at the 10th Assembly does not have impressive significance as a real measure of parliamentary power, since there were a number of unanimous or top-heavy votes on critical items (e.g., Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Radiation Effects, SUNFED, etc.) which do not reflect the sizeable differences that actually existed on these subjects. For example, the vote of 56 to 7 on disarmament can be seen variously as a propaganda victory for the US or a "vote against sin", but in neither event does it reflect the private feelings of 56 other governments regarding the US position on disarmament. The votes on admission of new members took place after the "deal" was arranged and do not show the conflict that previously existed (although the 50 or 51 votes received by the four satellites did not indicate much moral support for the continuing US distaste that was simultaneously being registered).

On East-West issues, the vote to postpone consideration of Communist Chinese representation passed 42–12–6 compared to 43–11–6 in 1954, and 44–11–2 in 1953, suggesting a slight slippage. The motion to delete the "decision in principle" to hold a Charter Review Conference failed 14–35–9; this may be compared to the vote of 15–28–9 in 1953 to delete mention of Article 109. The difference is insignificant, but the resolution as a whole passed 43–6–9, compared to 54–5–0 in 1953.

The US was on the losing side or on the fence on a number of important colonial or related issues. The inscription of the Algerian item was the most significant, representing as it did the overturning of a General Committee recommendation, and an indication of the numerical majority the anti-colonial coalition can muster against strenuous opposition: 27–28–5. On Apartheid, with the US abstaining, the vote was 41–6–8. In 1954 it was 41–10–10, and in 1953 38–11–11. Renewed declarations in favor of trusteeship for Southwest Africa carried 43–2–9 with the US abstaining, an increase of 3 in favor and a loss of one among those opposed compared with 1954 (40–3–11). A sharp example of anti-colonial parliamentary strength was the vote of 34 in favor of transmitting the Rev. Scott's[4] statements to the Committee on Southwest Africa, with 6 opposed and 14 (US) abstaining. Forty-five voted in favor of examining the progress achieved by Non-Self-Governing Territories, with the US and 11 other western states abstaining. And the assertion of General Assembly competence to decide when administering authorities could cease to transmit information passed 33 to 16 (US)–12, little change from the vote of 33–12–5 in 1954. A sharper instance of the fall-off of pro-colonial strength was the vote to approve cessation of reporting on Surinam, which passed 21 (US)–10–33, compared with the vote on Greenland in 1954 (45–1–11).

The American-inspired resolution curtailing further the powers of the Administrative Tribunal[5] passed 33–17–9. (The 1954 resolution,[6] which was not entirely comparable, received 52 favorable votes.)

The 16 additional members are bound to have an important impact at the next session in terms of colonial issues (probably 10 "anti" out of the 16) and on cold war issues (possibly 12 anti-West or neutral out of the 16). But it is difficult to single out the 10th Assembly as signalling a sharp change in the voting pattern in terms of US interests. It can be said that the trends toward neutralism in the East-West conflict, toward greater accretions of anti-colonial strength, and toward anodyne resolutions on important issues that can pass unanimously, continue to follow a consistent pattern.

---

[4] The Reverend Michael Scott was Director of the Africa Bureau in London and frequently testified before various U.N. committees on South West African tribal matters.

[5] Reference is presumably to Resolution 957 (X), "Procedure for Review of United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judgements . . . ," adopted at the 541st plenary meeting of the General Assembly on November 8, 1955. For text, see United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A–3116), *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth Session from 20 September to 20 December, 1955*, pp. 30–31.

[6] For documentation on U.S. interest in the U.N. Administrative Tribunal in 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. III, pp. 312 ff.

3. Critique According to Specific Issues

United States policies and/or tactics with respect to several issues at the 10th Assembly have evoked widespread criticism, both internal and external.

It might be pointed out that according to official American expectations prior to the Assembly, the United States would win victories in the sense of gaining maximum credit for taking the initiative on two items: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and Information Regarding the Effects of Radiation (see *Current Foreign Relations*, September 21, 1955[7]). Our expectations as the rest of the agenda were apparently modest, anticipating that we would either steer a middle course, block undesirable results, or appear to be impartial. At the same time, however, such responsible papers as *The New York Times* had forecast that the 10th Assembly would be "the most momentous in the history of the organization". The *Boston Post* said the session would "make or break" the UN, and the same idea was given currency by the *Newark News, Washington Post*, and *Portland Oregonian*. Such apocalyptic views of continuing diplomatic operations rarely produce mature public understanding of the process.

a) *Membership*. The great bulk of public and press criticism was focussed on the membership issue, and the "package deal" that ultimately seated 16 new members.

In general, the American press supported the package deal itself as "realistic" and a major step toward universality: "A good horse trade", as the *Washington Star* said. But this country's role harvested sharp criticism on almost every side. As to policy, a few critics saw us as pusillanimously abandoning principle in another "Munich" (32 of 37 letters received by Department, Scripps Howard papers, Constantine Brown, *New Bedford Standard-Times, St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, William Meany), while others condemned our fastidiousness over Outer Mongolia as "stiff-necked" (e.g. *Providence Journal*).

But the vast majority of public criticism had to do with US tactics—the way we handled ourselves and our interests in the bargaining process. The general feeling was that this country "has been out-maneuvered, out-played, and left in a most unhappy position of being neither practical nor principled" (*New York Herald Tribune*). We were seen as having tried futilely to play it both ways (*Washington News*), blundering into a Soviet trap because of our "cowardice", (*Washington Post*), aimlessly zigging and zagging (*Christian Science Monitor*), overreacting to right-wing domestic pressures and overlooking the rule that you can't beat somebody with nobody (T.

---

[7] *Current Foreign Relations* was a weekly classified publication circulated by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State to bureaus, offices, and posts abroad for policy guidance and information.

Hamilton, *NY Times*), and falling into the trap we ourselves had dug (W. Lippmann).

The *Indianapolis Star* wrote "Whoever (was calling the US signals) ought to be benched". (See also *Long Island Newsday, Commonweal, Nation*.)

The US representative's press conference statement that Outer Mongolia could not "make the grade" was viewed as a tactical error, undermining the impression US policy was attempting to convey (Arab Parsons, *NY Herald Tribune*).

A detailed post-mortem in the *Reporter* by William Frye[8] of the *Monitor* says the membership issue, while "not a colossal American diplomatic snafu", showed "inept American leadership", and failure to settle on either principle or practical politics lost us considerable prestige and credit.

Such disparate voices as the *New York Post*, George Sokolsky,[9] and the *Los Angeles Times* agreed that Russia was the victor, holding the ace of Japan, and the US, with only the deuce of Outer Mongolia, the loser, Russia taking full credit for the seating of the other sixteen. (See also *Boston Herald, Christian Century, Hartford Courant, Norfolk Virginia Pilot*, et al.) The Indian press gleefully echoed this judgment. Only the Hearst press felt the US had won a victory.

US Delegation officers generally agree that the US abdicated its leadership on the membership issue by failing to have a timely policy that was clear-cut and consistent, appearing to be paralyzed when flexible action was called for, and underlining what appeared to other nations to be our "righteous hypocrisy" by urging them to dirty their hands to achieve the end we came to share, while trying to keep our own skirts immaculate.

According to FE, some Far Eastern states are concerned at our acquiescence on the four satellites and, by implication, on the dropping of Japan. (Japan is reported as now in doubt as to US ability to achieve Japanese goals, and as contemplating postponement of a new bid until it is "independent of all blocs".) Near Eastern spokesmen feel no one appreciated the "subtlety" of the US position, seeing only that we were abstaining on the package proposal while the Russians voted in favor, and won the kudos.

On balance, it is hard to recall as disturbed a reaction from so many quarters to the techniques and skill of American diplomacy on a single issue in the UN. It is not uncommon for a policy stand to be widely criticized. But the target here was not primarily policy, but strategy and tactics. Americans apparently hate to see their diplomats flounder in a test of skill.

---

[8] Reference is to the *Christian Science Monitor*.

[9] Syndicated national columnist.

b) *Security Council Elections.* Running a close second to the membership issue in terms of the volume and intensity of criticism, was the protracted fight over the Security Council seat involving Poland, the Philippines and Yugoslavia.

Public approval of the US stand as sound in principle, and helpful in showing that we do not dominate our allies, was expressed by *The New York Times*, Joseph C. Harsh in the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Lynchburg News, Worcester Telegram* and *Spokane Spokesman.*

But a considerably larger number were critical, usually on the grounds that a great nation was making itself look small by making a mountain out of a molehill, "getting in so deep we can't get out", "bulldozing our allies", and reaping ill-will out of all proportion to the real size of the issue; "Why crack the whip over our wavering allies, when the issue doesn't really matter?" (*Christian Century*). Also *Boston Herald, Kansas City Star, Nation, Providence Journal, Washington Post, Kansas City Times, Milwaukee Journal, Philadelphia Bulletin* and many others.

The *Des Moines Register* charged that the US precipitated the deadlock by repudiating the "Gentlemen's Agreement". To Barry Brown (*Providence Journal*) the failure of the US to agree to compromise on Yugoslavia when Poland was dropped signified "an automatic reflex—an expression of a desire to beat the Russians just for the sake of beating them . . . a dead end into which American policy instinctively runs". The *St. Louis Post Dispatch* wrote that the US Delegation "has been frittering away its prestige".

Only Senator Jenner [10] was heard to criticize the US for "letting down" the Philippines.

The consensus within the Department was that this was an instance of a policy getting out of hand in that the original commitment did not envisage the US making a do-or-die stand, without the support of its major allies, in opposition, not to a Soviet satellite state, but a friendly power, i.e., Yugoslavia. Apart from the unplanned over-engagement of US prestige, additional criticism arises from the refusal of the US to go along with the majority on the "Eastern European seat". The UK apparently took a certain relish in proving to us how difficult it is to secure a ⅔ vote without their support. It is felt that we should save our ammunition for important substantive items, and learn to lose gracefully in such procedural issues as elections. The one regional estimate on the credit side represents the Far Eastern states as in complete support of the US stand on the Philippines; FE feels the detachment of Indonesia from India in the voting on this item was of real importance.

---

[10] William Jenner, (R.–Ind.).

c) *Disarmament.* With this and succeeding issues, the quantity of domestic press comment falls off drastically. Although the resolution[11] that passed was officially represented as a victory for the US, the press did not generally share this view. According to the *Special PS Report on Disarmament,*[12] while the majority of the press was favorable to the President's "open skies" proposal, a majority of the general public is opposed to it. (43% of those polled felt its acceptance would make a surprise attack on the US more likely, while only 13% thought it would make it less likely.)

Delegation officers felt that while US policy was "uncertain" at the 10th Assembly this fact was successfully concealed. Such critics of the US proposal as the Indians and Scandinavians suppressed their private criticisms of what they called the UN "non-disarmament" plan, and in this case a weak position turned out satisfactorily, with credit given the US delegation for skillful handling.

d) *Cyprus.* Because of its special nature, this issue is isolated from other inscription problems (Algeria and Western New Guinea) and from colonial issues.

Press comment was divided. *The New York Times* applauded the US vote against inscription. The *Portland Oregonian*, on the other hand, wrote: "The role of the US in the ugly Cyprus question does not arouse our pride. This country has again placed military expediency and old ties with Britain above ethical and legal requirements of the UN Charter".

Delegation officers feel the US was forthright and emerged relatively unscathed.

Needless to say, Greece was unhappy with our stand. The Netherlands was unable to understand why we could not have taken the same position on the inscription of Western New Guinea. No real criticism has been encountered on US tactics.

e) *Algeria.* Most newspapers (according to *PS Studies #113*[12]) felt the final vote to inscribe was a violation of the Charter. On the other hand, the *Des Moines Register* saw US policy as "weak and wobbly . . . when it should have been clear and fearless". (This sort of comment is fairly typical of the domestic press on colonial issues where the US appears to it to be "trimming" rather than taking a doctrinaire anti-colonial stand.)

---

[11] Reference is presumably to Resolution 914 (X), "Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of all Armed Forces and all Armaments . . . ," adopted at the 559th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on December 16, 1955. For text, see United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A-3116), *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth Session from 20 September to 20 December, 1955*, pp. 5–6.

[12] Presumably a report prepared by the Political Studies Division of the Bureau of Public Affairs.

According to some internal estimates, the US did not lose ground with the anti-colonial powers by supporting France, although the French were resentful that our support was not more vigorous. But other officers felt we suffered by contributing to the portrayal of the US as a pro-colonial power. The vote on inscription was also seen as demonstrating the growing authority of small powers in the changing power-patterns of the Assembly. "Most" other delegations reportedly disagreed with our legal stand on the question of competence, and believed that our decision was ad hominem and inconsistent with the stand we have taken on, e.g., South-African items. The sharpest criticism of this nature comes from FE sources, where our abstention on Irian, which was "understood", could not be reconciled with our negative vote on Algeria.

f) *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*. On this and the next two items the opinion has been voiced that the US dissipated the initial strength of its positions by a rigid initial insistence on restrictive and unpopular features such as limiting the participants, requiring us ultimately to swallow changes which were of real prestige significance to other countries, and for which we got no credit and considerable blame.

Again, estimates vary. It was agreed, in retrospect, that we were unrealistic in thinking we could control the formation of the agency, with hand-picked membership. Not only the Indians and Soviets, but also the Scandinavians, Mexicans, Dutch, New Zealanders, Israelis, etc. were unwilling to accept the Statute on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, or the provision that only recipients of materials would be subject to inspection. The final result was that the US had to accept (a) four additional sponsoring powers (Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the USSR), (b) provision for the Secretary General to study the agency's relationship to the UN, and (c) invitations to all governments to a conference to consider the final text.

Some officers felt we were adequately flexible in making timely concessions. According to others, we were overly rigid, grudgingly giving way under pressure from our friends, and as a result, forfeiting the credit and goodwill we deserved for an important lead.

g) *Effects of Radiation*. This item, also billed in advance as a primary US initiative, was believed by some of those involved to have lost its punch because of US insistence on restricting the membership of the committee. Although our position was defensible on its merits, in retrospect we were seen as honestly mistaken in our concern over the qualifications of participants, since four more were added in a process of "log-rolling" in which the US again had to appear to be blocking a role for others which they felt important to their prestige. While we were able to defeat a Syrian-Indonesian amendment to ban nuclear tests and a Russian amendment to include the Chinese Communists, the Latin Americans, for instance, were particularly indignant at the narrowness of the participation we had proposed.

h) *Charter Review*. This was the third instance of the US having to give way under pressure for enlarged participation of a committee, based on prestige considerations in the minds of friendly states. However, despite the lukewarm attitude of the Assembly as a whole to the US interest in a Review Conference, it was believed that by minimizing the US tactical role and eventually accommodating US policy to the prevailing atmosphere, we came out "not badly".

i) *Economic Development*. Ninety percent of the Committee II discussion centered on the question of economic development of underdeveloped countries. According to *Current Economic Developments* (Dec. 20 [13]) the Soviet bloc "continued to exhibit apparent reasonableness in their analysis of international economic problems and at the same time strongly emphasized their concern for the problems of the under-developed countries, particularly their efforts at industralization".

The US, while well-equipped on Technical Assistance and actively supporting the International Finance Corporation, had planned to continue its opposition to SUNFED "pending savings from disarmament", and there has been some internal criticism of the way the US handled this item. It was felt that we were constantly on the defensive, largely because of our "weak", "vacillating" or "fuzzy" position. In ECOSOC the US had abstained on setting up an Ad Hoc Committee to study the question, a proposal which is considered by delegation officers to have been innocuous. But the Assembly delegation was given the same position to take, because of Treasury opposition. The delegation was thus felt to be "forced" to make its own decision to support the Ad Hoc Committee. US indecision was apparently obvious to others, and of course the internal effect of having the delegation override its instructions is harmful. There is agreement that the Department should have taken a firmer stand with Treasury at the time the instructions were drafted. As it was, this is considered another instance of US half-heartedness and foot-dragging on a highly popular item.

j) *Racial Issues*. As with several other items, the UK played a far more active role on *Apartheid* than the US. The same was true with respect to Indians in South Africa, although the US reportedly reaped some credit for voting in favor of the Indian resolution.[14]

---

[13] *Current Economic Developments* was a classified internal publication of the Department of State. Published semimonthly between 1945 and 1974, it was circulated to various Bureaus and offices as a policy and information guide. (Washington National Records Center, *Current Economic Developments:* FRC 72 A 6248) This collection of reports was released in *Foreign Relations, Current Economic Developments, 1945–1954,* microfiche publication.

k) *Korea*. Delegation staff estimates no losses and no gains. We had intended to minimize debate as unhelpful at this time, and apparently invited the skepticism of e.g., India by standing pat on anodyne reaffirmations of principle. (It is difficult to see what else we could have done.)

l) *ECOSOC Elections*. According to delegation officers, the US policy of holding back until the last minute before making a commitment to a candidate irritated both the potential candidates, and the US' final choice. We vacillated between Indonesia and Afghanistan and also between Brazil and Costa Rica, even though Brazil was much the better candidate, and even after we knew that a majority of the Latin American nations favored her candidacy.

m) *Self-Determination*. The US delegation was able to bring a number of the have-not nations to agree to an amendment to paragraph 3 of Article I of the draft covenant that might have satisfied US overseas business interests. However, the US neither introduced nor voted for it, and even though it embodied changes we had sought, it was adopted over US opposition 33–12–13. In this case, as in other cases where the US eventually votes against humanitarian measures on such subjects as slavery, forced labor, etc., because they are in convention or treaty form, some officers feel important foreign policy considerations are being sacrificed to domestic policy at a net loss to the national interest. (But the Legal Adviser's Office, for example, considers that our opposition to the self-determination draft language was based on dissatisfaction with the text, and uncertainty whether it would indeed be satisfactory to the business community.)

n) *Administrative Tribunal*. The debate to amend the Statute to provide for judicial review was conducted on a rational level and the ammunition used on both sides was largely restricted to legal arguments. The US position was reasonable and based on precedent, but there was stiff resistance on all sides largely because of the remaining emotional undercurrents created by the past history of this issue. Majority support was, however, mustered for the US position as a result of strong US political pressure behind the scenes, and the active support and lobbying of the UK. While the results seemed to leave no hard feelings, there was a general feeling among delegation advisers that success on this item sapped the support for US positions on other administrative issues, such as the level of the budget.

---

[14] Reference is to Resolution No. 917 (X), "Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from the Policies of *Apartheid* . . . ," adopted at the 551st plenary meeting of the General Assembly on December 6, 1955. For text, see United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A–3116), *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth Session from 20 September to 20 December, 1955*, pp. 5–6.

o) *Other Administrative Items.* While the US position on numerous other items in the Fifth Committee, notably on salary and budget increases, did not command majority support, this appeared to be due less to sharp governmental differences than to the increasingly strong position of the Secretary-General with the majority and his willingness to put it to a test regardless of whether his proposals had the support of the larger contributors, notably the UK and the US. The United States did not appear to enjoy the previous privileged position of a confidant of the SYG and his staff on important issues. While the old relationship did not eliminate public disagreement it did minimize unnecessary public divergencies and friction. While some initiative on US part to re-establish more effective relations can help, one of the basic problems is that, while the Secretary-General appears to want to keep administrative matters under close review and supervision, he is not himself accessible enough to the Fifth Committee because of other demands on his time, and the officers who represent him in Fifth Committee matters often cannot speak authoritatively for him and do not seem to have much latitude for independent action.

4. *"Internal" Problems.*

Among both departmental and public critics of the US performance at the 10th Assembly, there was agreement that our participation was handicapped by one or more administrative shortcomings that do not bear on the substance of our policies or on our diplomatic tactics.

a) *Timing of US preparations.* A perennial difficulty that underlay much criticism of the US role in the 10th Assembly was the repeated lateness in determining our positions and communicating them to friendly governments in good time. Many difficulties in liaison, such as the multiplicity of US approaches to foreign capitals, waste of diplomatic effort and ammunition, and irritation of other delegations and governments, would be obviated or lessened if the US could come up with timely positions and consult with other nations at the time they are formulating instructions to their own delegations. Unfortunately (though often understandably) it is frequently on the most sensitive issues that the US appears unable to make up its mind in sufficient time to accumulate needful international understanding and support. (The Department apparently realized in advance that restricting the composition of the peaceful uses negotiating group, for instance, would not succeed in New York, and would thus have to be changed on the ground, always a painful process.)

This general problem of timing is too well known to require further elaboration.

b) *Multiplicity of Diplomatic Representations.* Several regional sources complained of unnecessary multiplication of approaches to other nations. In several cases we made representations to delegations in New York, embassies in Washington, and to the foreign offices as well, resulting in over-use of pressure, causing resentment and loss of good-will, and implying lack of trust of the particular General Assembly delegation, the foreign embassy in Washington, or the US Embassy in the country concerned.

Both EUR and ARA felt we had squandered diplomatic efforts in repeated approaches to other nations for support on UN questions that were of relatively minor importance. This tended to inflate the UN problems out of proportion and used up our limited stock of ammunition, at times on questions where nothing could have been accomplished regardless of the pressure we brought to bear. Sometimes this tactic forced friendly delegations to stiffen their positions on matters on which they had not felt strongly at first.

c) *Liaison.* There was, as has often been the case before, some dissatisfaction with the arrangements within the US delegation on communicating with other delegations. The regional advisers felt it was a mistake to assign liaison officers on the basis of subject rather than area. On the other hand, staffs of some committees who claim they rarely see the liaison officers, were pleased to have the use of one.

Some officers in this Bureau deplore IO's inability to select the liaison officers and "having to take whoever is free". And at least one of the senior regional advisers has complained that he was used, in effect, as an "errand boy", thus losing the confidence of senior members of his "client" delegations who were quick to note his lack of participation at high levels in the US Delegation.

Findings

1. Of 11 basic substantive issues at the 10th Assembly, in 9 cases the substance of US *policy* did not command wide approbation: (a) Membership, i.e., previous US opposition to "package" deal, and continuing US opposition to Outer Mongolia; (b) Security Council elections, i.e., US rejection of the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement; (c) Disarmament, i.e., the feeling on the part of some members that our inspection proposal, while good, is insufficiently pointed to disarmament; (d) Algeria, and colonial issues generally, where we are usually damned by both sides; (e) Charter Review; (f) SUNFED; (g) Self-Determination and US abstention from treaty-drafting involving human rights; (h) the Administrative Tribunal; and (i) the perennial

issue of Chinese representation, where our supporters increasingly chafe under the US position and deplore the overriding importance we attach to it.

But in 5 of the 9 cases in which US policy itself was criticized, the most intense criticism was actually directed toward the *tactics* this Government employed in executing its policy: Membership, Security Council elections, SUNFED, Self-Determination and Algeria.

In the other four cases where US policy was something less than universally popular, adequate tactics seem to have done much to preserve our standing: Disarmament, Charter Review, Administrative Tribunal and Chinese Representation.

Conversely, while US policy on two other issues—Peaceful Uses and the Effects of Radiation—were generally applauded, US tactics appear to have caused loss of credit and prestige.

The ideal is of course sound policy and effective tactics. If policies are unpopular or difficult to put across, sovereign importance attaches to tactics.

From the record of the 10th Assembly one might conclude that efficient, consistent and mature tactics can offset the disadvantages inherent in an unpopular policy. But one can also conclude that no tactical approach, however skillful, can compensate for policies which are unattractive to a significant number of other governments. Probably the truth lies somewhere between the two.

2. There are two underlying causes of US "unpopularity" in the UN at the present time which do not grow out of specific American policies, attitudes or tactics:

a) A primary psychological factor that is always present is resentment at the power, wealth and predominant position of this nation. It affects the attitudes of enemies, neutrals and allies alike. This is an inescapable consequence of the world power situation. It is a "built in" characteristic of such relationships, and little can be done about it other than on the surface. The sooner we accept this fact of life, the less handicapped we will be by a sense of chronic uneasiness and guilt that we are not smaller, or that we are not "loved".

b) Another persistent cause of difficulty for the US in the UN stems from the demands of the cold war, i.e., the necessity for the US to maintain a firm position vis-à-vis the force of world communism. So long as that force threatens our values and, at times, our existence, we will not be able to minimize it to the extent desired by those who would prefer we not assume a posture of vigorous resistance. Under these circumstances we cannot have the unqualified support of neutralist nations. We can, however, decide whether certain emphases *in the UN setting* on the cold war are fruitful for US interests, or whether they are counter-productive. Our purposes are not well served by choices based on other than a rational evaluation of the net loss or gain to the national interest of such tactics.

3. Other causes of US "unpopularity" *do* relate to specific American policies which do not command wide and ungrudging support in the UN:

a) is the complex of *cold war policies* referred to above.

b) *Colonial policy*. The US could probably pick up large-scale support in the UN, and ease its troubled national conscience in the bargain, if it adopted a doctrinaire anti-colonial position across the board. To do so would, of course, be to abdicate the bulk of our other responsibilities and commitments, not to mention our judgment. Thus, we will doubtless have to continue to maneuver precariously and thanklessly between two conflicting forces in the UN. It might be that we could find a way to reconcile our verbal policies, which tend to alienate the colonial powers, with our action policies, which tend to alienate the anti-colonial powers. But there is not much real latitude for American policy here under present conditions, and it would be wise to realize that we are not going to win any popularity contests on the colonial issue within the framework of our present overall policy structure.

c) *Economic development*. Unless the US is prepared to commit significantly larger sums of money than at present, the underdeveloped countries will probably remain generally dissatisfied with our performance. Even within the limits imposed by an election year, it would be desirable to explore new avenues for US leadership in this field, with particular reference to the joint statement of December 9, 1955, by the members of the US Assembly Delegation. It must be remembered, however, that even if we raise the ante appreciably, it will not necessarily buy us the affection and respect of the recipients or their support in the cold war. It might increase their stability and viability, and we should perhaps be content with that important objective when and if we can raise our bid. In this connection it is well to keep in mind that a significant increase in the French standard of living over the past few years seems to have made no real dent in the Communist vote. The uncomplicated notion of "belly communism" may contain a fallacy, and the US should devote more thought to the ideological and prestige issues of passionate concern to the under-developed countries which may be equally important in fixing their political orientation.

d) *Self-Determination, Human Rights, etc.* This area involves a whole set of symbols which in the UN tend to evoke emotional responses from the non-Western world. It is quite true that the West gave those symbols whatever meaning they possess today, and that the Communists repudiate the real values that underlie them. Nevertheless the argument in the UN is not always a rational one. There, these symbols are imbedded in the concrete human rights issues on which countries stand up to be counted: Self-determination, Apartheid, Human Rights Covenant, etc. So long as the US appears to oppose such symbolic affirmations, however good our reasons, we are not going to look good either to doctrinaire libertarians, or to the non-Western countries to whom they are of such acute concern.

d) [*sic*] *Chinese Representation*. It has become quite clear that in demanding support on this generally unpopular issue, we are draining the reserves of goodwill and solidarity which we would like to have available to us on other matters. The US cannot tamper with its present policy on this subject, but we should recognize clearly its underlying effect as a chronic irritant and factor for divisiveness.

4. Thus, there is a hard core of US policies which encounter strong opposition in the UN on political, strategic, economic and ideological grounds. If the policies designed to advance our grand strategy are based on sound principles, or at least on realistic balancing of domestic and international political imperatives, there is obviously little room for change in them, and certainly they should not be changed for the sake of popularity alone. At the same time, it must be understood that, barring such substantial change, it is fruitless to search for miracles, or rabbits that can be pulled out of a hat to offset the basic impact of these policies on other nations.

It may be, however, that in the realm of tactics and the handling of procedural issues, there is more room for maneuver in the American position.

5. Procedural

a) *Elections*. At least twice in recent years (1951, 1955) we have become involved in extraordinary difficulties in Assembly sessions because of our unwillingness to countenance the election of an Eastern European state to a non-permanent Security Council seat. The validity of the US position rested on principle—the manifest inability of a Soviet satellite to satisfy the requirements of Article 23, Paragraph 1; and on expediency—the desire to keep a second Soviet vote off the Council. These arguments were weakened by the fact of Security Council impotence, the inconsistency with election of Soviet satellites to other posts, and above all by the understanding of many other states that this particular seat was to go to an Eastern European state. Unfortunately, in both cases the fight turned out to be with our closest allies rather than primarily with our enemies.

The fact that the US has now tacitly approved the election of four more satellites to the UN, in combination with the above considerations, suggests that our interests might be best served in the future if a new agreement is reached with respect to the election of non-permanent seats, possibly in connection with a move to expand the Security Council's membership, so that in the future we can be guided on this prestige-laden procedural issue by the legitimate wishes of each recognized grouping, rather than pressing for an independent candidate against the opinion of the majority.

(Any future decision to vote in favor of a Soviet bloc candidate for the Security Council will have to be taken in conjunction with present US policy not to vote for Soviet candidates for any UN post whatever, a policy that strikes some observers as "toughness" at a minor level of diplomatic courtesy which is not necessarily matched at the level of major policies.)

b) *Inscription.* Questions of inscription usually represent policy rather than procedural decisions, but if they are considered at least partly procedural it might help to clarify our problem. Inscription on the agenda usually relates to the question of domestic jurisdiction, most commonly in the colonial field. Neither the US nor, for that matter, the UN as a whole has ever decided on legal grounds whether the threshold of Article 2(7) is crossed at the point of inscription, debate, or recommendation. The US has modified its earlier insistence on the freedom of the Assembly to discuss, by voting against inscription of such issues as Algeria and Cyprus. It is right and proper that political rather than legal considerations should guide us in making what are essentially political decisions of this nature. However, Asian countries, for example, saw our vote against inscribing the Algerian item as contradicting the neutrality we proclaimed when we abstained on inscribing the Irian item. On the other hand, our vote against inscribing the Cyprus item was generally understood, except by Greece, as based on genuine concern for the pacification of the problem.

An announced policy of favoring or at least not opposing inscription of any item that is at least arguably of an international nature, and then dealing with it on the merits, might have the advantage of restoring consistency to the moral position first enunciated by Senator Vandenberg, and might undercut the special pressures that are always applied to us on close questions of jurisdiction. This would also enable us to maintain our pragmatic position, which avoids rigid and restrictive interpretation of Article 2(7), but retains flexibility to decide on Assembly action in each case on its merits.

6. Tactics

This comes in two parts:

a) The presence of the cold war in the UN runs directly athwart another powerful set of currents which involve the neutralist movement, the economic and human rights drives, and the motif of anticolonialism which seems to be the dominant trend in the UN today.

In this context, a growing majority of countries entertain a set of expectations about the US which would probably require us, as suggested earlier, to dispense with the cold war, satisfy economic and social demands to a far greater extent, and support the anti-colonial coalition on colonial issues. Our inability to do these things automatically detracts from our leadership position in the present parliamentary setting of the UN. But it is still possible to win support for issues of importance to us, as we have demonstrated in the past, by the use of tactics which imply that we view our relations with other countries as co-equal, respectful, conciliatory, and friendly, yet vigorous enough, when appropriate, to give the necessary lead.

So far as the cold war is concerned, while the bulk of the membership wishes us to subdue our anti-communism, we have compelling national reasons for emphasizing it on appropriate occasions. When we do so purposefully it is because it serves our larger interests, only remembering that the price we pay is to annoy a significant number of other governments. But when we do so unnecessarily or gratuitously it apparently seems petty and childish to our friends, and exacerbates relations with the neutrals. We cannot have it both ways, at least not in the UN.

b) In the realm of detailed tactics there may be significant room for improvement. Numerous criticisms have been noted regarding the failure of the US: to prepare its positions on important issues in time to undertake advance negotiations with friendly governments with either adequacy or timeliness, to conform our public statements to the immediate ends we are pursuing, to conduct liaison with other delegations in ways which are productive rather than counterproductive, to improve our press relations, to prepare the delegation on each item in sufficient time, to limit and aim our diplomatic representations with accuracy rather than using the shotgun method involving three centers of negotiation, to distinguish between matters of little and major importance to us and of little and major importance to other governments, to execute our policies on the ground with skill, consistency, and self-confidence, and to learn to give up, give in, or lose on relatively unimportant matters, with any degree of grace. At least some of these seem to be within the range of rational and purposeful control by the Department, and might well be intensively re-examined in order to improve our posture before the next General Assembly.

Summary of Conclusion

Barring basic changes in major contemporary US policies in the UN, this country is going to be the target of a certain amount of resentment and dissatisfaction. If the strategy reflected in those policies is sound, it would be wise for us to forget about winning popularity contests (which is a questionable desire for a great power anyway) and concentrate a great deal harder on procedural and tactical improvements. If it is important to our vital interests to appear tough and unyielding in pursuing our ends, the only sensible course is to stop worrying about the affection of others, and concentrate on maintaining our prestige in the sense of reputation for power, as the British did when the Royal Navy rather than the US Strategic Air Command kept the peace.

If this is unacceptable, as it undoubtedly is in the light of our national temperament, then we must either give way on some of the basic "core" issues, or extract every ounce of profit we can from the field of tactics. As suggested, there seem to be many opportunities available for offsetting tactics in the areas of elections, diplomatic consultations, press relations, attentiveness to the wishes of others, magnanimity, hospitality, and all the other lubricants and amenities of diplomatic (and human) relationships.

Recommendations

It is beyond the scope of this paper to recommend remedial action in detail, but it is suggested that early attention be given to the following possibilities:

a) We should take the initiative without delay to sponsor an agenda item for the next Assembly session to expand the membership of the Security Council and ECOSOC in order to account for the increased membership. We should not allow this bid, which aims importantly at Asia, to go by default to the USSR. We are aware of the difficult political problems involved, but the inevitability of this action suggests that the US plan now to get full credit for taking the initiative.

b) Perhaps as part of the expanded Council membership, we should support a clear understanding of geographic allocation on the non-permanent Security Council seats, putting a stop to the perennial squabble over the Eastern European seat. This might be done informally, or possibly through a declaration or resolution. Our policy should then be to accept the candidate of each bloc for the appropriate seat, as a general rule.

c) We should consider whether a larger allocation of the current and projected US economic aid appropriation could not be channeled to multi-lateral programs (on the assumption that, particularly in an election year, a significant increase in the appropriation is unrealistic). We might meanwhile be blueprinting new economic programs that the US could at some other time advance in the UN, as well as new approaches in the social and human rights fields which would represent American values and concepts most meaningfully to those countries which misread our purposes.

d) We should re-examine the consistency of our position regarding Article 2(7) and perhaps undertake consultations looking to a more satisfactory consensus, before the 11th Session.

e) We should revive earlier programs for intensive advance diplomatic consultations, and utilize all existing intra-departmental and intra-governmental machinery to ensure that US policies are determined sufficiently in advance so that they can be executed intelligently and with profit to this country.

f) We should take steps to improve drastically the state of press relations in New York, possibly by assigning the Department's top press officer to the next General Assembly delegation.

---

23. Letter From the Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (Eastland) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, May 1, 1956.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has been taking testimony for the last two weeks which now indicates very clearly that Chief Delegate Arkady Sobolev of the USSR delegation to the United Nations and his staff have exceeded the scope of their authority in their drastic efforts to persuade, force and coerce the nine Russian seamen who found sanctuary here in the United States to return to the Soviet Union.

Yesterday's testimony, for instance, indicated that two members of Mr. Sobolev's staff, and obviously under his direction, went into the room of one of the sailors, Viktor Solovyev, in the George Washington Hotel, New York City, and locked the door behind them. This act of violence, illegally practiced, caused terror in the heart of a young man who came here seeking asylum.

I would like to quote the following question and answer as he testified here yesterday:

"Mr. Morris (Counsel): Is there anything that the committee can do to make your living more secure at this time?

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Dels, USSR.

"Mr. Viktor Solovyev: I think it would be good that the Soviet officials would be restricted in their activities so that they would not do whatever they want in this country. They are given now full freedom to act as they want and they are using this freedom to full extent now.

"Mr. Morris: Do you still feel frightened Viktor?

"Mr. Solovyev: I still feel a little bit frightened and, of course, they can still come to me, but now I think with all of the publicity we have got and all which I told the committee, I feel more secure."

Last week the subcommittee took testimony which indicated that two Soviet citizens, who appeared to be members of the Soviet delegation, paid an unsolicited visit to Paterson, New Jersey, and called on two other seamen there, purchased three bottles of vodka and seven bottles of beer, and stayed in the humble home of these two seamen until 6:00 a.m., when the four left without explanation. Little more than twenty-four hours later, three of these four, including the two sailors, were aloft in flight to Soviet Russia.

The two Russian seamen at that time had almost two weeks' pay coming to them at their factory. They each had a small bank account, all of which was abandoned. The landlord of the seamen described in graphic detail the condition of the boys' room the following morning. He stated that the room was in wild disorder, with rugs rumpled, beds in disarray, records and pictures torn and shattered, and most significant of all, the shirt and undershirt which one of the seamen had been wearing at 5:30 p.m. was torn and bloody.

Since these hearings have commenced, the subcommittee has been deluged with demands that we do something in order to prevent the repetition of these terrible instances of terror in the United States.

We are weighing this evidence with a view toward strengthening the legislation that is now in existence; but, before we arrive at our conclusions in this whole matter, I am writing to you on behalf of the subcommittee to ask you to call formally upon the United Nations to do everything in its power to prevent further wanton abuse of the hospitality of the United States by Chief Delegate Sobolev and his staff. As the Secretary of State himself pointed out last week, such arrogant misconduct is in direct violation of the terms of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations.

Very sincerely yours,

James O. Eastland

P.S. I am enclosing a copy of yesterday's testimony, and I direct your attention to page 3 wherein Mr. Solovyev testified that he was invited to go to the Park Avenue headquarters of the United Nations to see Mr. Sobolev. [2]

---

[2] Attached but not printed. Lodge replied to Senator Eastland the same day as follows: "Thank you for yours of May 1 which, of course, I have read with close attention. There can be no doubt that the type of conduct you describe is reprehensible in the extreme and I cannot condemn it too strongly. Policy on questions of this kind, must, of course, be made in Washington and I am consequently transmitting your letter immediately to the State Department." Lodge transmitted copies of both his and Senator Eastland's letters to Wilcox on May 1 without comment. Copies of Lodge's letter to Eastland and to Wilcox are *ibid.*

---

24. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

Washington, May 4, 1956.

DEAR CABOT: Some weeks ago the Secretary asked me for suggestions of possible ways to strengthen some of our policy positions in the UN, with particular reference to the next session of the Assembly. I know of your own interest in looking for new initiatives the US can properly undertake, and for our part, we want to do everything we can to strengthen your hand in New York.

We have done some preliminary staff work on the problem in this Bureau, [2] and the result is a set of short studies on the problem areas we felt to be most fruitful.

We would like to go over our tentative findings and recommendations with USUN and with the other bureaus of the Department,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Strengthening US Participation in UNGA. Confidential.

[2] On March 22, Bloomfield circulated a memorandum entitled "Action Program for Improvement in US Participation in the United Nations General Assembly" to 28 persons in the various offices of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and in the Office of the Legal Adviser for International Organization Affairs. Bloomfield wrote that as the result of a meeting in Assistant Secretary of State Wilcox's office on March 20, it was decided to "move ahead without delay" in carrying out this action program. Bloomfield added that "It was agreed that the report dated February 9, 1956 entitled 'Evaluation of Role of US in 10th General Assembly' [Document 22] would be considered as general background for all teams.' "

According to Bloomfield's March 22 memorandum, four teams were established, each composed of five to six members and several alternates headed by a steering member, except for Team 4 which was composed of nine members and several alternates. The several team members were from the various offices in the Bureau of

(Continued)

to see if we can get some proposals to the Secretary at an early date. You will find that some of our suggestions parallel the ideas you have been advancing, and doubtless other proposals will come to mind as we jointly review the problem.

As indicated in the attached, it would be most helpful to have your reactions, and for you to name a member of your staff to meet with us on this as soon as convenient.

With warm personal regards,

Cordially,

Francis O. Wilcox [3]

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [4]

Washington, May 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

Program to Strengthen US Participation in UN General Assembly

I. The Secretary recently expressed to me his interest in finding new ways to strengthen the overall US diplomatic position in the UN, particularly in the General Assembly.

IO has undertaken a preliminary survey of the problem, and has arrived at some tentative conclusions. I have outlined them below, and attached hereto the papers on which they are based.

We would very much appreciate your collaboration in formulating some final recommendations. I would be grateful if, after reviewing this material, you could designate a representative with whom we could discuss this matter, with a view to early submission of agreed recommendations to the Secretary. [5]

(Continued)
International Organization Affairs. Team 1 was assigned responsibility for drafting a paper on "Relations in the UN with the Uncommitted Countries," Team 2 on "US Cold War Policy in the UN," Team 3 on "Procedural Policy Questions," and Team 4 "International Operations and Practices." (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Studies US Policy re UN)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[4] Also sent to Prochnow, Holland, Merchant, Sebald, Allen, Bowie, McCardle, and Phleger.

[5] No record of any such meeting has been found. However, on June 13, Wilcox circulated a further draft memorandum for the Secretary on the subject. In a covering memorandum sent to Lodge and the same addressees cited in footnote 2 above,

II. IO's tentative recommendations can be summarized as follows:

1. *Economic:* The US should channel a small portion of its foreign aid through a UN economic development fund. The US should also increase its dollar contribution to the UN technical assistance program.

2. *Colonial:* The US should give maximum effect to its support of the principle of self-determination wherever feasible. (See also No. 4, *Inscription.*)

3. *Social:* The US should make exceptions to its policy of non-adherence to international conventions in the human rights field, in order to support conventions on slavery and forced labor, which would be drafted within the framework of US treaty policy.

4. *Inscription:* The US should affirm its traditional policy that inscription and discussion do not constitute "intervention" under Article 2(7). It should favor inscription except where major national interests dictate precluding a UN hearing on grounds of political unwisdom. The US should leave itself free to judge substantive issues on their merits, and explore the possibility of a "pigeon-holing" procedure to avoid substantive Assembly action where desirable.

5. *Cold War Policy:* While remaining prepared to counter vigorously any Soviet attacks in the UN, the US should tailor its psychological strategy in the UN to the prevailing atmosphere, in order to secure maximum support from other nations.

6. *Elections:* The US should as a general rule accept the candidates agreed upon by recognized groupings of nations. The US will probably have to accept the allocation of a seat to the satellite bloc in the councils in order to secure enlargement of the Security Council and ECOSOC. In any event, the US should not engage its prestige in opposition to such candidates where the majority of members believes the seat to be allocated by custom and agreement, and should not automatically oppose Soviet candidates.

7. *Internal:* Where possible, all high-level decisions should be taken sufficiently in advance to permit at least two full weeks of intense pre-GA consultations; position papers should contain maximum and minimum positions; a special evaluation should be made before the Assembly of priorities in terms of engaging US prestige; relations with new non-communist members should be cultivated without delay. (Detailed recommendations as to delegation organization, liaison, etc., are contained in the Team 4 Paper, Tab E.)

Wilcox wrote: "We profited very much from the collaboration of the representatives you designated in response to my memorandum to you of May 7 on this subject. I believe the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary represents a general consensus of the meetings that were held, and I would appreciate it if you could let me know of your concurrence *no later than Tuesday, June 19.*" (Both in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Studies US Policy re UN). The various geographic and functional bureaus submitted additional revisions to the June 13 draft; memoranda containing these revisions are *ibid.*, Central File 310. In addition, draft revisions of the Team 1 and Team 2 papers, dated June 15, are *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Studies US Policy re UN.

8. *Press Relations:* A special effort should be made to strengthen relations with the working press in Washington and New York. (Details in Team 4 Paper.)

III. The above recommendations grow out of the following assumptions and estimates:

1. The apparent loosening of Soviet pressures in the world, combined with the rising demands and expectations of a growing number of nations, have raised some difficult problems for US diplomacy in the UN. The trends have been accelerated by the new Russian pose of reasonableness, the coalescence of the Bandung powers, and the increasing emphasis by a growing majority on UN action in the economic, social, colonial, and human rights fields.
2. As leader of the global anti-communist coalition, the US is required to maintain certain basic policies toward the communist world, involving the continuing exposure of communism's threat to freedom. The US will also continue to oppose the seating of Communist China. These policies tend to receive diminishing support in the UN so long as other nations continue to downgrade the threat of Soviet aggression or covert penetration.
3. The US cannot and should not take rigid and doctrinaire stands on the colonial issue, either in favor of the anti-colonial majority, or in favor of our close allies who administer dependencies.
4. Within this basic framework, the US should reexamine the possibilities of strengthening its position through action with respect to: 1) the economic, social, cultural, and human rights areas; 2) procedural problems arising from election, inscription on the agenda, and the like, which have been the source of disproportionate complications for US diplomacy in the recent past; 3) internal "housekeeping" mechanisms and techniques involving preparation and execution of US policies, and 4) the tactics and tone of US psychological strategy in the UN, from the standpoint of the productivity or counter-productivity of such tactics in the achievement of overall US policy goals.

[Tab A][6]

ACTION PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Team I: Relations in the UN with the Uncommitted Countries

Problem

The present study is concerned with the problem of how the United States can improve its standing with the underdeveloped and anti-colonial countries in the United Nations. The three focal points of the problem are thoroughly familiar:

---

[6] A notation on the source text indicates that it was revision 2 of the Team 1 paper, May 7.

(1) These countries are seeking to raise the living levels of their peoples; they look to the United Nations for assistance in doing this, and their attitudes toward other countries in the UN are conditioned by the positions taken by the latter in the fields of economic aid and technical assistance.

(2) They seek national status and prestige; they resent any appearance of condescension, especially from the colonial powers (among which they are inclined to include the United States), and they are suspicious of U.S. actions which seem to support colonialism or to be opposed to the principle of self-determination.

(3) As a matter of both national politics and individual psychology, given their background of both political dependency and racial insecurity, they are extraordinarily sensitive to international actions which seem to them to involve values of human worth and dignity; and they find it hard to reconcile the liberal traditions of the U.S. with its reluctance to support certain kinds of international action in the field of human rights.

These three themes are inter-related. The underdeveloped countries desire economic aid both to raise the level of living of their peoples and to enhance their national prestige. Yet they are exceedingly sensitive about accepting aid under conditions which, in their view, might in some way be thought to compromise their national independence. Above all, they are apprehensive lest economic aid develop into "economic colonialism." At the same time, they recognize that progress in political independence and prestige, and also in human rights, depend as a practical matter upon economic development, for which they need aid.

The situation we face is this. In recent years, whereas we have found it necessary to emphasize the cold war in the United Nations, the underdeveloped countries have found the cold war increasingly remote, and tend to judge the U.S. by its concrete responses to the claims they increasingly assert. Our problem is acutely complicated by the new initiatives of the Soviet Union along this entire front.

It thus appears that improvement of U.S. standing in the United Nations with the less-developed, anti-colonial states needs to be sought in connection with four sets of issues:

(1) Economic Aid
(2) Technical Assistance
(3) Self-Determination and Colonial Policy
(4) Human Rights

This paper deals with each of these in turn.

1. Economic Aid

U.S. opposition to the proposal to establish a special economic development fund within the United Nations has for several years been highly unpopular among the less developed countries and has, to a considerable degree, over-shadowed the large contribution which the U.S. is making and continues to make toward the development of these countries. The underdeveloped countries have thus far refrained from throwing their weight behind a proposal to establish such a fund immediately only because they hope for eventual U.S. support and because they realize that without U.S. support such a fund could not attract enough money to make it significant. Many countries in this group have become impatient with what they consider U.S. delaying tactics and have advocated setting up the fund immediately on the theory that the U.S. would not be able to resist the strong moral pressure to join in rather than incur blame for allowing the plan to fail. Thus far a more reasonable view has prevailed. However, recent indications that the Soviet Union may be preparing, as part of its new tactics, to support such a fund raise a serious problem of policy.

The U.S. position in the Second Committee of the General Assembly, in ECOSOC, and in the regional economic commissions would be greatly improved if this country expressed its willingness to channel a portion of its foreign aid through a development fund tied into the United Nations system. Such a fund need not correspond to the structure and purposes of the special fund already proposed and discussed in the United Nations. As was the case with the IFC, the U.S. could significantly influence the conditions for the new fund if it were willing to make a substantial contribution to it—provided the structure envisaged was sufficiently multilateral to satisfy those less developed countries which, for various reasons, prefer multilateral to bilateral aid. There is a danger that, unless the U.S. takes a step of this kind, such a fund will be established with the support of the Soviet Union. In this event, the United States might then find itself faced with a serious dilemma: whether to continue to refuse support and thus invite invidious comparisons with the USSR, or appear to yield to pressure in following the lead of the USSR.

2. Technical Assistance

Continued U.S. participation in the technical assistance program of the UN cannot be a complete substitute for a multilateral fund as described above. Yet the value of such participation is beyond a doubt. UN technical assistance has the virtue of being a going program. It is proving effective in performance. It is unquestionably making friends for itself among the underdeveloped countries.

To the extent that the UN technical assistance program involves social as well as economic development, it operates directly in the area of human worth and dignity. This area, quite as much as that of material living levels, is of crucial importance in underdeveloped countries. It is also an area of development in which the West is strong and can make the UN strong. The community development and social welfare programs of the UN strike at this problem. U.S. support of this type of work helps very much to lift the shadow of materialism from our reputation in countries like India.

A U.S. proposal to increase its contribution provided other countries did the same would unquestionably be welcomed by the less developed countries, especially if this were coupled with a move to increase the proportion of equipment and supplies in the program. From the standpoint of both demonstrated need and administrative feasibility, the proposal is sound, provided other countries can assume their 50 per cent share of the increase. If carried out on the U.S. side by diversion of a small portion of our bilateral aid into multilateral channels (a U.S. increase of only some $10–15 million would be involved), the political advantages become extraordinarily persuasive. The U.S. in this connection should be prepared to undertake appropriate diplomatic negotiations with the larger contributors in order to bring the plan to success.

3. Self-Determination and Colonial Policy

The question of self-determination is one of the most complex in the United Nations and has caused us very considerable difficulties, not only in the General Assembly, but also in the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights, where unacceptable resolutions on political and economic self-determination have been discussed for several years. The United States is fundamentally sympathetic with the principle of self-determination. We took the initiative in making it a cardinal principle of the Charter, and we want to see it applied wherever feasible to well-defined groups of people just as soon as they are politically capable and economically viable.

The United States attitude towards the colonial question as a whole continues to be as stated by Secretary Dulles: "There is no slightest wavering in our conviction that the orderly transition from colonial to self-governing status should be carried resolutely to a completion."

The United States has, however, run into certain difficulties in its attempts to steer a middle-of-the-road course between the colonial and anti-colonial states and this position has won the United

States few friends and is often ascribed to lack of principles or policy. Some of the difficulties arise from the necessity of taking a public position on colonial issues, many of which could be dealt with more effectively through confidential diplomatic channels. Furthermore, because of the fact that the United States administers a trust territory and five non-self-governing territories, it is an administering member along with the colonial powers in the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Its status as an administering member and its strategic interest in some of the dependencies place additional pressure on the United States to maintain a common front with the colonial powers, but our basic support for the principle that peoples who are capable and desirous of sustaining independence and self-government are entitled to it is not changed by the necessities of policy.

It may be argued that while we may not be able to achieve complete consistency in our policy on all colonial questions, it might be possible to achieve a greater degree of consistency in the matter of inscription of items on the agenda of the General Assembly while leaving ourselves free to judge the substance of each issue on its own merits.

The tempo of change in the relationship between non-self-governing territories and the metropolitan powers has accelerated in recent years, and the United Nations has become an increasingly active participant in what has been termed the revolution of the colonial world against the European West. The colonial issue cuts across other political and regional patterns in the United Nations, with the result that it has an increasingly significant influence on the success or failure of the United States in achieving its ultimate objectives in the United Nations.

The United States has incurred some criticism by the necessity of balancing the implementation of its policies towards its NATO allies on the one hand and its policies towards the underdeveloped countries on the other. It has been difficult, for example, to explain and justify differences of policy regarding the inscription of such items as Cyprus, North Africa, and Netherlands New Guinea in the last two General Assemblies. If we could make a determined effort, through consultations with other governments well in advance of the next General Assembly, on certain specific issues likely to arise, such as Cyprus, North Africa, and Netherlands New Guinea, it might well result in a greater appreciation of our adherence to the basic principles of self-determination for peoples capable and desirous of sustaining independence or self-government.

4. *Human Rights*

Human rights questions have great symbolic value for many of the less-developed countries, and their delegations consistently seek a position of leadership in this field. The reluctance of the United States to support certain kinds of human rights proposals, in the face of our avowed championship of human rights, puzzles these countries and arouses their suspicions. Recent developments in the United States (such as the desegregation controversy) feed these suspicions.

In some cases, especially where governments tend to be unstable and constitutions change frequently, an international legal commitment is regarded by these governments as the only means to assure continuous recognition of a human rights principle. The Latin-American enthusiasm for conventions frequently reflects fear that substantial gains may be lost over-night if left to individual governments.

For the 1956 General Assembly, we may find ourselves in a serious situation unless we can assume a positive position against forced labor and slavery. A draft convention on slavery is to be acted on at a conference in Geneva in August, and one on forced labor will undoubtedly take form in the ILO Conference in June. It would help greatly if we could participate actively in the final drafting of these conventions and be in a position to sign and ratify them if satisfactory texts are achieved. This would, of course, require a decision by the Secretary to make an exception to our policy of non-adherence to conventions in the area of human rights. In any event, we should avoid restating in the UN or the ILO that we will not sign or ratify conventions on forced labor or slavery irrespective of the final text approved.

The United States has gained some good-will in the field of human rights in the UN during the past several years as a result of our initiative in pressing for the adoption of a UN human rights action program. The UN General Assembly adopted the U.S.-sponsored resolution last year to authorize a program of advisory services in the field of human rights. U.S.-sponsored resolutions for annual reports on human rights and studies of specific aspects of human rights were adopted by the Human Rights Commission this year.

Further attention to the importance of persuasion, education and publicity in this field (rather than the treaty process) may be provided by the United States encouraging a general debate in the UN General Assembly Third Committee, perhaps every two years, on human rights progress. This might be based on the UN Yearbook on Human Rights or on some other documentation prepared by the Secretariat.

Recommendations

The United States should—

1. Express its willingness to channel a small portion of its foreign aid through an economic development fund tied into the United Nations system.

2. Express its willingness to increase its dollar contribution to the UN technical assistance program at a continued 50:50 ratio to the contributions of other countries.

3. Give increased emphasis to community development and social welfare programs both bilaterally and multilaterally.

4. Achieve a greater degree of consistency in the matter of inscription of items on the agenda of the General Assembly, while leaving itself free to judge the substance of each issue on its own merits.

5. Make a determined effort, through consultations with the governments concerned well in advance of the next General Assembly, on certain specific issues likely to arise, such as Cyprus, North Africa, and Netherlands New Guinea, with a view to securing greater understanding of U.S. adherence to the basic principles of self-determination for peoples capable and desirous of sustaining independence or self-government, as well as of the limitations on U.S. policy in specific cases.

6. Support conventions on slavery and forced labor, as exceptions to general U.S. policy of non-adherence to conventions in the area of human rights, which would be drafted within the framework of US treaty policy.

7. Make plans for a general debate in the 1957 General Assembly on human rights progress. This might be based on the UN Yearbook on Human Rights or on some other documentation prepared by the Secretariat. Such a debate in 1957 would be a test of the potential value of periodic review in the General Assembly of human rights progress.

[Tab B][7]

ACTION PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Team II: United States Cold War Policy In The United Nations

Problem:

To re-examine in the light of past experience and new developments United States cold war strategy and tactics in the United Nations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and to recommend adaptations of United States strategy and tactics calculated to yield us the maximum net political and psychological advantage in the work of the next General Assembly.

1. Cold War Limitations in the U.N.

There was little difficulty, prior to the Geneva Summit Conference, in defining "the cold war". A hostile and aggressive Soviet Union, claiming to be the target of a world-wide conspiracy led by the United States, appeared to threaten the safety of free world nations generally. It bore the onus, in whole or in part, for seriously raising tensions (the Berlin blockade, the hate campaign against Tito, the Korean War). In the United Nations it obstructed the search for peaceful solutions to outstanding problems and made virtually no contributions to the work of progress and development carried on by numerous United Nations bodies and specialized agencies.

Thus, while the chief antagonists in this cold war were the United States and the U.S.S.R., free world sentiment was generally polarized against the Soviets. In the United Nations the chief issues showed a Communist vs. anti-Communist, or Soviet bloc vs. free world, division. United States leadership was vital and generally accepted, and our delegates could in truth speak "on behalf of the free world".

Whatever active and latent features may characterize the cold war today, it has clearly undergone great changes. It now no longer develops along a direct U.S.–U.S.S.R. front; it is no longer as virulent and menacing; it occurs in a different global context. The Soviet Union has at least temporarily abandoned its open aggressive and obstructive tactics; it has adopted a conciliatory demeanor and demonstrated its intentions (whatever their motivation) to contribute through international organizations and bilaterally to the needs of the outside community.

---

[7] A notation on the source text indicates it was revision 2 of the Team 2 paper, May 7.

In this situation problems and preoccupations lying primarily in the free world orbit have come to the fore. In the United Nations, Communist vs. free world divisions no longer are dominant. Divisions among free world groupings have increased as former colonial, underdeveloped countries have asserted their strength and independence. A whole series of issues has developed in which our West European allies are opposed by the "uncommitted" (or anti-colonial) nations. We thus have very painful choices to make, while the Soviet Union is pretty much free to court the emergent power (in the United Nations forum) of those uncommitted countries by lending them support.

In cold war terms, the United States is here engaged in a contest with the U.S.S.R. for the friendship and political support of countries whose policies are conditioned by their recent independence from colonial rule and by their economic development needs. The new-found Asian-African sense of independence has expressed itself in foreign policies more or less neutralist, producing a regional leader in India whose influence is effectively on the order of a new "great power".

Neutralism signifies more or less unwillingness to take sides in the cold war between the Soviet bloc and the United States-led Western Alliance. The cold war is seen by neutralist countries less as a crucial ideological and moral contest than as a great-power struggle. Helping one side or the other places the new independence in question, arouses fears of embroilment in world war, and is less compelling than the manifold tasks of national social, economic and technical development.

In the parliamentary forum of the United Nations General Assembly, the anti-colonial or neutralist "defectors" from the previous free world line-up now have the balance of votes and the inclination to defeat, or make effectively unprofitable, initiatives of a cold war character whether raised by the United States or the Soviet bloc. This situation, together with the Geneva Spirit and other evidences of "relaxation", helps explain the unprecedented absence in the Tenth Assembly of a Soviet cold war agenda item. Our own position papers reflected the restraint necessarily imposed on cold war initiatives, and also took account of the evident distaste among our closest allies for engaging their prestige in such efforts. The Secretary General, it may be noted, has on several occasions inveighed against the use of the United Nations forum for propaganda purposes.

2. Basic Assumptions for U.S. Cold War Policy in the U.N.

Taking account of the above considerations, the following basic assumptions are made:

(1) Soviet Communist over-all policy has not changed. It continues to be expansionist, aimed at ultimate communization of the world. It is fundamentally opposed to U.S. policies and objectives, and in this sense the cold war is still on.

(2) Soviet strategy appears to regard the East-West alignment in Europe as a cold war stalemate, and has opened up a new front in Asia and Africa.

(3) There has been an accompanying change in Soviet tactics, calling for relatively peaceful, non-violent but competitive co-existence with the Western powers and the United States in particular. The new Soviet emphasis on economic and cultural cooperation with other countries will continue.

(4) The Soviet bloc has already employed these tactics in the United Nations, and may now intensify them. In general, they are manifest in attitudes of reasonableness, a greater degree of cooperation, and friendly relations with non-communist delegations. In particular, they are designed to neutralize, or capture the leadership of, the so-called uncommitted and underdeveloped countries. The traditional East-West "cold war" tactics of the communist bloc will probably not be revived in the United Nations. The growing Asian-African anti-colonial sentiment will be sympathetic to the new Soviet tactics.

3. Conclusions

(1) There is a consequent need for substantial adjustments or changes in United States tactics in the United Nations. While recognizing that we are still engaged in a vital ideological competition with Soviet communism, we must not reflect an attitude of public hostility to the communists in the United Nations merely to demonstrate that we are hostile and that we recognize their threat to the free world.

(2) We must emphasize the rational and the constructive and avoid labelling our policy and programs as merely "anti-communist". They should express our ideals of freedom, justice and progress, and demonstrate that they promote the economic well-being and legitimate political aspirations of all peoples.

(3) In the contest for allegiances among the Asian-African group, United States policies will prove appealing insofar as they appear to promote the interests and welfare of these peoples. Where we must pursue courses of action which are unpopular, we should stand up to criticisms on their merits and not attempt to dismiss

them as manifestations of the cold war—unless, patently, they are such.

(4) We should analyze in the light of the above considerations all those matters which are expected to come before the next General Assembly and devise tactics for each item, consistent with the positive, over-all United States posture, and calculated to yield a net political advantage to the United States. These tactics and general posture should be understood and applied by the United States Delegation in the 11th General Assembly whenever they will contribute to the above objective.

4. Recommendations

In the next Assembly, barring a change in the situation, the working group believes that:

(1) The United States should not take the initiative in placing a cold war item or items on the agenda. The necessary support would be doubtful at best and costly in terms of United States prestige and success on other items. If the cold war is again to be hotly pursued in the United Nations, the onus for reviving it should be left to the Soviets.

(2) The United States should as a rule abjure cold war tactics in handling of matters before the Assembly, in the interest of conserving good will and the prestige of our leadership needed to build up a record of substantive achievement. At the same time we must continue to restate the facts about communism whenever desirable. When Western positions come under fire, Soviet participation may assume a cold-war character warranting a reply in kind. But if the complaints or criticisms are neither originated by the Soviets nor obviously aggravated by them, our basic posture must reflect a willingness to discuss the issues on their merits. This position will leave room in our tactics generally and in debate for reasserting those established United States policies and principles which are fundamentally opposed to the policies and principles espoused by the Soviet Union. It will not leave room for over-drawn or gratuitous charges. In support of this tactical line, the United States delegation in informal-official social contacts should observe normal, if minimum, diplomatic courtesies toward Soviet bloc representatives.

(3) At the same time it is recognized that over-riding considerations of our national policy toward Soviet communism may require a cold war emphasis on appropriate occasions in the Assembly. For example, we might find it expedient to exploit opportunities to discuss the division of Germany or the suppression of freedom in the East European satellites. The frequency and degree of our engagement on such matters must, however, take account of the

price we may have to pay in the negative reactions of many other delegations.

(4) We must, however, be fully prepared for any Soviet reversion to cold war strategy or tactics. We should, for example, prepare a strong case on Soviet colonialism, to rebut possible Soviet exploitation of Western colonial problems arising in the General Assembly. Accordingly, we should decide:

(1) on which agenda items the United States is likely to be vulnerable to cold war tactics; and

(2) on which items the Soviet bloc is vulnerable; and prepare factual materials and themes to support rebuttal or offensive opportunities, so as to achieve a net gain within whatever limits the cold war may be fought in the Assembly.

[Tab C][8]

ACTION PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN US PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Team 3: U.S. Policy on the Inscription of Items in the Agenda of the GA

Problem:

The position which the U.S. has taken on the inscription of certain strongly contested items in the agenda of the G.A. has strained our relations with a number of governments and created confusion as to our motives. This paper examines the feasibility of adhering to a legally and politically defensible policy on inscription which could be applied consistently to individual items without prejudice to our position on their merits or substance.

Discussion:

In the face of strong pressure from our allies and increasing concern over the Assembly's recent tendency to go beyond Charter limitations on its competence to deal with matters involving domestic jurisdiction, the U.S. departed from its traditional policy on inscription by voting against the inscription of the Algerian question at the Tenth Session on the ground that the action sought was beyond the Assembly's competence. At the same time we took a varying stand on other items, abstaining in the case of New Guinea and opposing inscription in the case of Cyprus, on grounds other than Article 2(7). In other cases where questions were raised by others as to the applicability of Article 2(7) we supported inscription. Regardless of our estimate as to the applicability of Article 2(7) to these cases, the result of our apparent inconsistency was to raise questions as to our motives and to strain relations with a number of governments who felt that our approach was based more on expediency than on what they deem to be sound legal and political considerations.

---

[8] A notation on the source text indicates that it was revision 1 of the Team 3 paper, May 2.

A variable policy on inscription is bound in the long run to place increasing strains on our relations with these and other governments and to damage our prestige in the U.N. Our position would be improved by adherence to our traditional policy that a vote on inscription is without prejudice to the ultimate question of the Assembly's competence, which can only be determined after the substance of a question has been discussed and the point has been reached where a decision must be taken as to what action, if any, the Assembly should take on the matter. Consistently applied, such a policy would enable us to divorce our stand on inscription from our position on the merits of any item and thus permit us to promote the concept of free discussion in the U.N. which we regard as essential to the Organization's growth and effectiveness and which a large majority of its members strongly endorses.

Having made clear that our stand on inscription is based on overriding legal and political considerations based on our interpretation of applicable Charter provisions, we would then be free to adopt whatever position we deem advisable with regard to any subsequent discussion or action on such items. It would be possible in appropriate cases to oppose action on such items on grounds of Article 2(7) or any other ground without having incurred the onus of appearing to discriminate against particular Members on their request for a hearing in the Assembly. In fact, if we maintain a consistent attitude on inscription and support the concept of free discussion, we should be in a strong position to support our allies on matters of substance in cases where we share their views.

Such a policy would be legally defensible and generally understood by most Members. It would ease the conflicting pressure to which we are subjected on questions of inscription and would enhance our prestige in the Assembly. It is recognized that the national interest or other vital political considerations may in some cases require the United States to cast a negative vote or to abstain on inscription. This should be done only as a last resort, however, and on grounds other than Article 2(7). (See attached analysis of Article 2(7).)

In some cases discussion alone achieves the primary objective of the sponsors of an item by enabling them to meet domestic political pressures to "take the matter to the UN". Experience indicates that it is sometimes possible to obtain general agreement to take only pro forma action on an item or even no action at all once the matter comes up for debate. It would greatly facilitate the disposition of items in this manner if there were a general understanding that not every matter inscribed in the Assembly's agenda need result in any formal action or even debate. Aside from the need to find a practicable device to shelve matters on which the majority of the Members would prefer not to take a stand, such an understanding would appear to be necessary in order to enable the Assembly to cope with its agenda, which tends to expand at each session and is usually burdened with several items carried over from previous sessions on which it is generally agreed that no action is feasible as well as a number of items of no general interest to the Members.

Neither the Charter nor the rules of procedure require that any particular action be taken on any item. It should therefore be possible to devise a noncontroversial procedure to permit the "pigeon-holing" of such items on the basis of general agreement, and preferably without amending the rules.

Another source of friction in the Assembly is our failure to support certain decisions as to the substance of items which are favored by Members in a position to make a reasonable claim for our support. The U.S. has generally voted in accordance with its convictions as to the merits of issues. However, in a few cases we have avoided taking a stand by abstaining in order to avoid offending particular governments or to shield ourselves from adverse domestic political pressure. While the practice of abstention is justified whenever this government determines it to be in its interest, a decision to abstain on the vote on an important matter should be weighed carefully in the light of its consequences for our prestige and influence in the Assembly.

Recommendations:

1. That the U.S. affirm its traditional policy that inscription and discussion of an item do not fall within the scope of "intervention" prohibited by Article 2(7) of the Charter and that, having done so, we should not oppose the inscription and discussion of any item on the basis of that Article;

2. That, although the above policy does not preclude our opposition to inscription on the political ground of unwisdom of discussion, the United States should as a matter of policy vote in favor of inscription of proposed items except in rare cases where the

national interest and considerations of international peace and security dictate a negative vote or abstention on grounds other than Article 2(7); and

3. That we promote general understanding of the desirability and feasibility of "pigeon-holing" items once inscribed which are of no general interest or on which most members would prefer not to have to take a stand.

Attachment:

Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter: Its Application in the G.A.

[Subattachment][9]

ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: ITS APPLICATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Problem:

To examine United States policy in the United Nations General Assembly with respect to Article 2(7) of the Charter, as this policy affects the overall United States standing in the United Nations.

The Interpretation of Article 2(7)

In addition to the assignments to the General Assembly of specific functions under various Articles of the Charter, such as those dealing with the admission and expulsion of Members, the elections of the membership of various United Nations bodies, and the consideration of reports and the budget, the competence of the General Assembly extends generally to matters which may be proposed under Articles 10, 11, 13 and 14. With respect to matters falling within the scope of these articles, the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 may operate to restrict the Assembly's competence. A decision as to the effect of Article 2(7) in each instance depends upon the facts of the particular case, as these facts may bring the matter within the scope of Article 2(7).

Article 2(7) reads as follows:

> "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

---

[9] A notation on the source text indicates it was drafted on April 19.

This paragraph constitutes one of the key provisions of the Charter. It employs terms which do not have a precise, rigid meaning and which permit of a certain flexibility in their application. Nevertheless, the paragraph is a part of a legal text, a treaty to which all the Members of the United Nations are parties, and the language must be susceptible of an interpretation which in its general outlines will not vary, and which will be consistently applied in the same manner to the diverse matters which are brought before the General Assembly. This interpretation should be one which takes into account the general sense of the language of the paragraph read in the context of the whole Charter, and in the light of the intentions of the Charter drafters.

Article 2(7) prohibits United Nations *intervention* in matters which are essentially *within the domestic jurisdiction* of any state. Thus, this paragraph has no applicability to activity of the General Assembly which falls short of intervention. And General Assembly action which would constitute intervention is not affected by this paragraph with respect to matters which are not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

The term "intervention" in international law has a particular accepted meaning, denoting "dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state, affecting the latter's political independence or territorial integrity." [10] Although it may be arguable that this technical meaning of the term should be the one which should be employed in interpreting Article 2(7), [11] the adoption of this meaning would not appear to accord with the intention of the Charter drafters. Dictatorial interference by the United Nations could not be effected by United Nations recommendations, and would seem to be limited to action by the Security Council in the exercise of its powers to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, under Article 2(7) enforcement measures under Chapter VII are specifically excluded from the scope of its provisions. As is clear from the records of the San Francisco Conference, Article 2(7) was intended to apply to the activity of other organs of the United Nations possessing only the power to recommend.

In determining what should be regarded as constituting intervention by the Assembly, a proper interpretation consistent with the plain meaning of the word would appear to place the procedure of inscribing an item on the Assembly's agenda, as well as the discussion by the Assembly of that item, outside the scope of "intervention". To place an item on the agenda is a simple act of procedure which can be done by the Assembly without prejudice to the ultimate decision that it may take with respect to its competence concerning the matter. It is clear from the San Francisco records that it was intended that the power to determine competence was to be exercised by the Assembly itself. In order to reach a decision as to its competence, the item must necessarily be discussed; discussion cannot therefore be regarded as an activity falling within the prohibited area of United Nations "intervention". It may also be noted that such an interpretation that discussion should not constitute intervention takes into account the view expressed by Senator Vandenberg at San Francisco that the General Assembly should be "the town meeting of the world".

---

[10] Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (1950) 770. [Footnote in the source text.]

[11] For example, Lauterpacht takes the position that the term "intervention on the part of the United Nations must be interpreted by reference to the accepted technical meaning of that term. It [Art. 2(7)] excludes intervention conceived as dictatorial, mandatory, interference intended to exercise direct pressure upon the State concerned." I Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law* (Seventh Edition 1948) 378.

On the other hand, Goodrich and Hambro reject this narrow technical interpretation. Goodrich & Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations* (1949) 120. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

Under the Charter, the Assembly's recommendations with respect to matters brought before it under Articles 10, 11, 13 and 14 derive whatever force they may have from the degree of unified world opinion which may lie behind them. These recommendations have no legally binding effect, and it would thus attribute a too broad meaning to the term "intervene" to adopt the general conclusion that all recommendations of the General Assembly constitute intervention. A determination as to which recommendations of the General Assembly should be regarded as intervention must depend upon the text of the recommendation as it relates to the matter under consideration. In general, however, it would seem clear that generalized recommendations addressed to all Members of the United Nations urging that heed be paid to particular Charter principles, for example, could not be regarded as intervention. On the other hand, in a case involving an essentially domestic matter, a recommendation addressed to a particular state calling for modification of a particular place of legislation might be regarded as intervention. Or a recommendation that sanctions be instituted against a particular state might also be regarded as intervention with respect to a matter considered to be essentially domestic.

As has been noted above, Article 2(7) has no application to a matter which is not "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". To determine that a matter is or is not essentially domestic must depend upon a consideration of whatever international aspects the matter might have. One criterion which should be employed is the relation which international law, including international agreements, has to the matter under consideration. This criterion is derived from the statement of law made by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory opinion relating to the case of the Nationality Decrees in Tunisia and Morocco. In that case the Court found that the matter submitted to it was not one solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a single state because the question involved the interpretation of international engagements which had been undertaken by the parties concerned. Thus, a question which arises out of a failure of a country to live up to treaty obligations, such as a Charter obligation, or which requires an inquiry into treaty relations for its solution cannot be claimed by any one party to the treaty to be one which is essentially within its own domestic jurisdiction. In addition to questions requiring consideration of treaties or general international law, there may occur, as was pointed out during the Hearings on the United Nations Charter before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,[12] questions which have their origin within the domestic affairs of a single country, but which may have grown to proportions which have brought about international repercussions and thus have become of the legitimate concern of the United Nations Organization. For example, matters falling under the human rights provisions of the Charter may be of this sort. It is thus not possible to spell out before hand with rigid precision those matters which must fall within the category labeled essentially domestic. The question is an essentially relative one and in each case must depend upon an assessment of the international aspects of the matter.

United States Practice in the General Assembly

United States practice in the General Assembly with respect to items which involved a consideration of Article 2(7) has for the most part been consistent with the interpretation of Article 2(7) outlined above. With the exception of the Algerian Question at the Tenth General Assembly, the United States has never opposed the inscription or discussion of an item on 2(7) grounds.

At the first, second, and third Assembly sessions the United States supported inscription and discussion of the item concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain. At the first session during debate on the item, the United States representative, stressing the importance of the principle of non-intervention laid down in Article 2(7), proposed a resolution inviting the Spanish people to form a new and acceptable government in Spain. Subsequently the United States supported the resolution which was finally adopted by the Assembly containing provisions designed to secure a change of government in Spain.

---

[12] Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 79th Congress, pp. 309–312. [Footnote in the source text.]

The United States has consistently supported inscription and discussion of the item on treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, and in no case has its failure to support proposed resolutions or parts of resolutions been on 2(7) grounds.

At the third session, the United States supported inscription and discussion of the item on observance of human rights in the USSR, (the Chilean wives item), and also supported the resolution which was adopted, recommending to the Soviet Union Government that it withdraw certain measures.

The United States supported the inscription and discussion of, and the resolutions adopted under, the item on the observance of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. During the debate on inscription of this item, the United States representative took the position that discussion could not normally be construed as intervention within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the Charter.

The United States has made no objection on 2(7) grounds to inscription and discussion of the Moroccan and Tunisian Questions nor has it opposed any of the resolutions under these items on 2(7) grounds.

With respect to the item concerning race conflict in the Union of South Africa, the United States has consistently voted for inscription and discussion of the item. The United States position on the applicability of Article 2(7) to this question has, however, been slightly beclouded by the statement made by the United States representative in the General Committee at the eighth and subsequent Assembly sessions. In connection with the vote for inscription of the item, the United States representative has noted that "an item of this character invites questions about the competence of the General Assembly under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. The United States has observed with increasing concern the tendency of the General Assembly to place on its agenda subjects the international character of which is doubtful." During consideration of this item at the seventh and eighth sessions, the United States voted against a South African motion of no competence, noting that the motion would preclude even discussion of the item. The United States supported the resolution adopted under this item at the seventh session embodying a generalized approach of calling upon Member States to conform with their Charter obligation respecting human rights. On other resolutions on this question which have been adopted by the Assembly, the United States has abstained, resting its abstention on grounds other than Article 2(7).

At the tenth Assembly session the United States voted against inscription of the Algerian Question, citing Article 2(7) in explanation of its position. The United States representative, while recalling "that a vote on the inscription of an item is without prejudice to the ultimate question of the Assembly's competence", explained that because of the action to be sought in the General Assembly under the item, that of encouraging fundamental changes in composition of the French Republic, the item fell under the provisions of Article 2(7) of the Charter. In spite of the rationale which was advanced in support of it, this vote against inscription on 2(7) grounds constituted a departure from the traditional United States position.

A study of the practice in the General Assembly reveals a tendency on the part of many Members to express varying interpretations of Article 2(7) from case to case, as the political factors of each case may dictate. As has been shown by the review of United States practice, the United States has been quite consistent in applying one interpretation to almost all of the cases. The legal interpretation of Article 2(7) is one which has the same meaning for all situations, and should not be subject to modification in response to pressures which may on occasion be brought to bear. To apply this provision inconsistently not only undermines our own integrity in the United Nations but also has the effect of arousing the antagonism of these States who may not on occasion have been favored by us with as flexible an interpretation.

Recommendations

1. On the basis of the interpretation outlined above, under which inscription and discussion of an item proposed for the Assembly's agenda do not fall within the scope of United Nations "intervention" prohibited by Article 2(7), the United States should not on 2(7) grounds oppose inscription and discussion of any item.

2. A position that inscription of an item should not be opposed on 2(7) grounds does not preclude the possibility of opposing inscription on the ground of the unwisdom of discussion, in the rare case in which the facts might clearly support such a position.

[Tab D] [13]

ACTION PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Team 3: U.S. Policies on U.N. Elections

The Problem

The problem is to reexamine U.S. policies on U.N. elections to determine if any changes are advisable and, in particular, to ascertain whether it is possible to eliminate or minimize frictions and disputes with U.S. allies, and with majority sentiment, over these elections.

Background

Geographic Allocation of Seats and Area Candidates

U.N. elections generally are based upon geographic patterns which have developed for various U.N. bodies. The United States has normally accepted or acquiesced in these patterns, realizing that in the absence of overriding reasons such as significant changes in U.N. membership, suggested alternatives would be strongly resisted.

Many groups (i.e., Latin America, Western Europe, British Commonwealth and Arab League) have adopted a policy of reaching area agreement on candidates for seats allocated to them. The United States and others have normally supported the candidate selected for election by these areas.

The above practices have greatly facilitated U.N. elections and minimized resentments of the various geographic groups which consider the question of their representation on U.N. bodies to be primarily a matter for themselves to decide without outside interference. The chief disadvantage of the practice of supporting candidates selected by an area for seats belonging to it is that it restricts freedom of choice. For this reason it is questionable whether the areas which have not firmly established the practice (i.e., Asia and the Far East) should be encouraged to do so, or whether the United States should become committed to accepting area candidates in all instances.

As a result of the admission of many new Members at the Tenth Assembly, there will undoubtedly be pressure for revisions in the present geographic patterns for at least certain organs and also for increases in their size. The Members will desire that the revised patterns be adhered to unless and until new circumstances warrant changes.

---

[13] A notation on the source text indicates that this was revision 1 of this paper, May 2.

U.S. Policies on Soviet Bloc Candidates

In applying the above practices, the United States has excepted Soviet bloc candidates. It is normal U.S. policy not to vote for such candidates. The question whether to abstain or to campaign and vote against a candidate from this bloc has depended upon the circumstances of each case.

a. *Policy of Abstention*—In some instances (as, for example when the Big 5 have traditionally been elected to U.N. bodies, such as ECOSOC), the United States has normally not raised objections to the election of a Soviet bloc candidate and if a vote has been taken, has abstained. In these cases the United States has not voted in favor on the grounds that the conduct of the members of the Soviet bloc is such that they are not entitled to be represented on U.N. bodies and in the belief that there might be domestic opposition to U.S. support for candidates from that group. At the same time the United States has abstained rather than cast a negative vote because it has concluded that in these particular cases its interests have not been sufficiently at stake to make an issue out of the elections and because even if it did oppose, its position would not carry.

The policy of abstention has not kept Soviet bloc candidates from being elected since most countries have continued to support such candidates on the ground that each area in the United Nations should be represented on the various bodies and that the election of a country does not connote approval or disapproval of its government or conduct. Moreover, the U.S. policy on U.S.S.R. candidacies has certain disadvantages. First, it creates problems for the United States in its efforts to obtain the election of candidates of the Republic of China. One of the most effective arguments in seeking support for the latter is that the permanent members of the Security Council have traditionally been reelected to various other U.N. bodies. However, it is difficult for the United States to advance this argument in the case of China when it is unwilling to support Soviet candidacies. Second, this policy fails to take into account the fact that we are better able to deal with some situations if the U.S.S.R. is represented on certain bodies. For instance, if a Soviet national were not a member of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions or of the Contributions Committee, it would be more difficult for us to cope with the issues involved in Committee Five of the Assembly.

b. *U.S. Opposition to Certain Soviet Bloc Candidates*—In certain instances, the most notable being the Security Council elections, the United States has vigorously opposed Soviet bloc candidates. It has opposed their election to the Security Council on the ground that they were not qualified for a seat on that organ and that it was definitely in United States interest to obtain the election of a friendly country. It has also taken the position that the 1946 "gentleman's agreement", which allocated one seat to "Eastern Europe", was a commitment for the first election only. During last year's election the United States stressed that no Far Eastern country had ever been elected to a non-permanent seat and that this situation should be rectified by electing a country from that area to the seat originally allocated to Eastern Europe.

In the case of these Security Council elections the U.S. position has prevailed except in the election last year, when the United States had to accept a compromise under which the U.S. candidate is to serve for only half a term. However, in an effort to elect its favored candidate, it has been necessary for the United States to engage its prestige through the most intensive campaigns in New York, Washington and foreign capitals. This has been necessary because most other U.N. Members, including the UK and other close allies, have disagreed with the U.S. view that the "gentleman's agreement" of 1946 was a commitment for the first election only and have also felt that in any event the question was not of such importance that it should be made a major issue.

In the election last year Poland was defeated and the need to elect a Far Eastern country to a non-permanent seat was partially met. However, in other respects the election was unfortunate. First, after Poland withdrew, the election became a contest lasting for over thirty ballots between two friendly countries (Yugoslavia and the Philippines), with the United States waging a vigorous campaign for the latter; second, because many of our closest allies, including the UK, opposed the U.S. position; and third, because in the end, the United States was not entirely successful, despite its efforts, since it had to accept the election of Yugoslavia for one year. This experience points up the need to obtain the support of the UK and other Western European countries if the U.S. position on elections requiring a two-thirds vote is to obtain the necessary support.

When the question of increasing the number of non-permanent seats of the Council in the light of the admission of many U.N. members is considered, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to demand that one non-permanent seat be reserved for the Soviet bloc and to prevent the adoption of any amendment to increase the size of the Council unless this demand is met. It is believed that most Members will agree to the allocation of one seat to the satellites and that if the United States opposed such an allocation, they would hold it rather than the U.S.S.R. responsible for blocking an increase in the number of non-permanent seats.

Policy of Support for Candidates Which Share U.S. Views on Major Issues

Whenever there is a choice as between two or more candidates for a particular post (as occurs most often in the case of Asian candidates), the United States has usually supported the candidate most likely to support the United States on major questions. In view of the particular importance of the Chinese representation issue, wherever feasible it is U.S. policy to support and encourage a candidate which supports its position on that issue. This policy has encountered growing resentment in UN bodies.

In some instances, the candidate favored by the United States has been successful. However, U.S. ability to support and elect its candidates is limited because, as noted above, on many occasions there is only one candidate for a particular seat and this candidate has the general support of its own area. Moreover, even when it can choose between two or more candidates, the candidate favored by the United States does not always have the requisite support of others.

Recommendations

1. The United States should in the future continue its normal practice of adhering to geographic patterns generally agreed upon by UN members for various bodies and posts. In the case of those areas which have developed the practice of reaching agreement upon their own candidates, the United States should generally continue its policy of supporting such candidates. However, it should not encourage other areas which have not yet developed this practice to do so, and should not become committed to accepting area candidates in all instances.

2. The United States should recognize that the admission of a number of new members at the close of the Tenth Session will require changes in the geographic allocation of seats and increases in the size of many bodies. The United States should support such changes where justified.

3. Where the election of a Soviet bloc candidate would not adversely affect United States security interests, and where the UN Members have accepted a geographic pattern which would allocate a seat to a Soviet bloc candidate, the United States should normally be prepared to vote for (but not campaign for) such a candidate, but should examine each case to determine its position. (In this connection it should be realized that in order to obtain Soviet agreement to any amendments to the Charter enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC, it will, in all probability, be necessary to agree upon geographic patterns which reserve seats for the Soviet bloc.)

4. The United States should make every effort to avoid differences with its close allies on UN elections and should seek to avoid active campaigning or engagement of US prestige unless important US interests are substantially involved and unless it has a reasonable chance of success.

5. It is assumed that the United States will continue wherever feasible to support and encourage candidates which support the United States on major policy issues, including the Chinese representation issue.

[Tab E][14]

ACTION PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Team 4: Internal Operations and Practices

The Problem

While the content of policies primarily determines their acceptability in the General Assembly, the internal operations and practices of the Department and the United States Delegation also have important effects on their success. The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether improvements can be made in U.S. internal preparations, diplomatic liaison, delegation operations, and public relations, which may reduce unnecessary frictions with other governments, maximize U.S. leadership, and in general utilize our diplomatic instruments most effectively.

Preparation of U.S. Positions

A. *Timing:* While recognizing that it is often necessary to defer top-level decisions on important positions until the last moment, experience shows that the result is frequently to create difficulties in accumulating adequate support for those positions in time for their effective execution. At the tenth session the delay in firming up the U.S. position on the admission of new members may have contributed to U.S. difficulties with the question.

The enlarged United Nations makes it imperative that early decisions be taken on the maximum number of items. For the coming General Assembly sessions we should seek to have all high-level decisions made in sufficient time to permit at least two full weeks of intensive pre-Assembly consultations.

---

[14] A notation on the source text indicates that this was revision 2 of the Team 4 paper, May 7.

B. *Preparation, Review and Approval of Position Papers:* Position papers for the General Assembly have now, on the whole, been reduced to a reasonable length and the format and content include most of the important elements. We should continue to strive for further improvements. Position papers should more clearly delineate issues and give a picture of the anticipated negotiating situation in the General Assembly, i.e., initiatives and attitudes of other states. Such an analysis will help to ensure that the original position adopted by the United States is a reasonable one which, if implemented effectively, has a good chance of receiving the broad support of others. We should try to avoid initial positions which we know will require substantial modification as a result of anticipated pressures. In order to give the Delegation greater flexibility it would be desirable, wherever possible, to include in the position paper a maximum and minimum U.S. objective.

C. *Evaluation of U.S. Positions:* An overall review of the position papers should be made prior to the opening of the General Assembly in order to determine which issues, if any, are of sufficient importance in terms of the national interest to warrant full engagement of our prestige. A system of priority should be established with respect to the gradation of United States interests on specific items in order to eliminate the tendency to "twist arms" on issues of secondary importance.

Scope, Timing, and Method of Diplomatic Consultations

A. The pre-General Assembly circulars to the field are useful and should be continued.

B. With respect to certain of the new members of the United Nations, a systematic program of developing our relations with them should be initiated at an early date. First, the geographic bureaus should be requested at an early date to provide brief papers which (1) identify the general posture which the new members can be expected to take within the United Nations and, if possible, on the more important specific key issues; (2) indicate any particular factors which should be borne in mind in conducting negotiations with the new members; and (3) any concrete suggestions as to the steps the Delegation might take to establish good relationships with them. For example, ARA might be asked to comment on the degree to which the Latin American group will wish to associate itself with Italy, Spain and Portugal in the General Assembly and whether it would be to our interest to encourage a closer or looser association. Secondly, the desk officers should contact the respective embassies here in

Washington to make inquiries as to the individuals who will be handling U.N. matters. This would be followed up with discussions of a more technical and organizational nature between foreign representatives here and IO officers with a view to providing background material and such assistance as may be desired. Thirdly, USUN might be asked to begin to develop such contacts on a systematic basis. Fourthly, a separate circular should be sent asking our embassies to make informal contacts with foreign representatives responsible for United Nations matters. (Mr. Hickerson in a letter to Mr. Wilcox indicated he has already undertaken this step with Finnish representatives.)

C. In view of the later opening date for the General Assembly, the United States should support the Secretariat's efforts to initiate early pre-session consultations. The Department should be prepared to send a limited number of officers to New York two weeks in advance of the General Assembly, if necessary, to assist in intensive negotiations. We should at an early date determine our own preference as to the allocation of items to the various committees as well as an acceptable order within those committees. We should also be prepared to advance pre-General Assembly preparations to the point where we are ready to consult on the basis of concrete draft resolutions on agenda items expected to arise first in each Committee. Efforts should be made to arrive at a consensus on organizational questions, particularly slates, so that the elections will be largely pro forma and completed in an expeditious manner.

D. The enlarged membership will make U.S. diplomatic liaison tasks more difficult and place an even greater premium on its effective organization and conduct. The liaison system used at the Tenth Session was an effort to benefit from past experience. In general it operated quite well. Nevertheless, certain deficiencies continued to hamper effective liaison and we should be prepared to suggest practicable improvements for the Eleventh Session.

There were three regular meetings of the staff where guidance was given to liaison officers and, whenever necessary, emergency meetings of the staff were called at the United Nations Headquarters. However, there were a number of instances during the Tenth Assembly when delays, for a variety of reasons, in getting high-level tactical decisions in New York put the United States at a disadvantage. The U.K., as a general rule, was able to move faster, and we abdicated our position of leadership to them in too many instances. Within a 77-nation United Nations, it will be vital that tactical decisions be taken and passed on to liaison officers early enough to make effective implementation possible.

E. There is also need for avoiding duplication of diplomatic representations which were evident last year on the question of the

Security Council election and the Administrative Tribunal item. We should avoid making representations when there is little chance of success. We should be particularly careful in selecting the locale of such representations for there have been instances where the actual decision-making power resided in the foreign representative in New York, while our representations were being made needlessly either in Washington or in the field. Moreover, multiple representations (New York, Washington, the field) on the same subject often irritate one or more points of contact, without commensurate advantage to the United States.

Organization, Composition, and Use of United States Delegation

A. *Organization:* A concerted effort was made at the Tenth Session to give officers the opportunity to become an integral part of the Delegation. Permanent working groups attached to each of the committees were established. This system worked reasonably well and should be retained. The delegation was fairly well informed through delegation meetings held twice weekly and to which every member of the staff was invited. There were also regular staff meetings three times weekly where developments in each committee were reviewed and coordinated approaches to various problems of diplomatic consultation were worked out.

Committees 2, 3, and 4 were each assigned one Liaison Officer who assisted the Committee Executive Officer and Delegate. The Executive Officer operated essentially as the substantive technician and the liaison officer as the leg man. They provided the continuity in the Committee. It was not considered necessary to assign a Liaison Officer to Committees 5 and 6 since these two committees were able to draw upon the general liaison officer group in the limited instances of need. The liaison officers in the aforementioned committees operated across the board with all delegates and were not limited to any particular region. Committee 1 and the Ad Hoc Political Committee each had assigned to them several liaison officers who operated both on a regional and overall basis within their respective committees. Each of the political committees also had one Foreign Service officer of ambassadorial rank to act as a liaison officer in an across-the-board manner. Nevertheless, there was a tendency to concentrate on representatives of the areas with which they were generally familiar and our liaison with other areas suffered accordingly.

On the basis of the experience of the past Assemblies, the following similar arrangement should be made for the Eleventh Session; (1) Individual liaison officers assigned on an across-the-board basis to Committees 2, 3, and 4, with Committees 5 and 6 drawing upon the general liaison officer group in case of need; (2) Liaison officers assigned on a geographic basis in the two political committees, the number depending on the coverage which may be expected of the particular individuals assigned.

B. *Use of Senior Advisers:* One problem at past Assemblies has been that the experiences and capabilities of senior advisers have not always been utilized to the fullest extent. In order to correct this situation, it is recommended that the following be adopted for the Eleventh Session: (1) one ambassador, preferably with previous G.A. experience, be designated a senior adviser and chief of liaison with overall responsibility for coordinating all liaison work within the seven committees and the plenary body. He would report directly to the Counselor and the United States Representative, and he would be responsible for overall liaison guidance, after consultation with individual executive officers. He would ensure that we were not neglecting any delegations or expending our prestige needlessly. He would also be assigned at least one item in one of the political committees on which he would be United States spokesman. He would be named alternate representative on the United States delegation; (2) that a second high ranking (Class 1) Foreign Service Officer with broad experience be assigned to the First Committee as a senior liaison officer and senior adviser.

Such a system would help to utilize their experience more fully. As senior advisers they should be drawn into the delegation's top-level planning and should meet regularly with the Counselor and the United States Representative. This would offset the disadvantageous use of inexperienced public members of the delegation in important negotiations with experienced professionals from foreign delegations.

C. *Information to the Field:* U.S. posts abroad are kept informed generally of General Assembly developments through *Current Foreign Relations* (secret weekly) which carries a comprehensive roundup at the beginning and end of each session and separate stories during the session on outstanding questions; the *State Department Bulletin,* which carries the texts of important resolutions and U.S. statements; the daily *Wireless File;* and information telegrams and airgrams on matters of particular interest to specific posts. FE and NEA pouch to their posts the U.N. pages from the daily *Secret Summary.* Most posts also receive the airmail edition of the *New York Times.* Overall coverage would therefore seem adequate.

At one time, USUN pouched on a selective basis its daily unclassified summary, or relevant portions of it, to interested posts. This practice was discontinued in 1953, and with the cut in the reporting staff at the Mission and the consequent reduction in detailed reporting, its reinstitution does not seem warranted except, possibly, to those posts sufficiently large to have one officer whose primary responsibility is UN developments. Posts generally have little interest in the day-by-day developments in committee, except where they may be directly concerned. In such cases, no pouched summary can meet the principal complaint by the field in the past, that information sent by air arrives too late to be really useful.

It appears, therefore, that more extensive information to the field on General Assembly developments should be on a selective basis. Three suggestions can be made in this connection:

1) On occasion in the past, progress reports have been prepared on a weekly or bi-weekly basis by the regional bureaus directed toward the particular interests of the posts served, and these bureaus might consider instituting this practice on a more regular basis.

2) Were the *Wireless File* again to be reproduced and circulated in the Department, it would be possible to keep an accurate check on what information has gone by this vehicle to the field, and to supplement as and where necessary. In the past, the *Wireless File* has carried résumés of U.S. and other important statements, summaries of significant resolutions, and even the full text of resolutions where their importance warranted it. Presumably, this is still the case, but since the *Wireless File* is no longer circulated, it is impossible to tell where the gaps, if any, are.

3) Where approaches have been made to other governments on General Assembly matters, the posts concerned should be promptly informed of the outcome in the General Assembly. Such information might be sent on a routine basis by the Policy Reports Officer if no action is desired. Otherwise, if any expression of appreciation or other discussion with the Foreign Office seems indicated, the officer responsible for the original instruction should follow through.

D. *Selection of Staff for General Assembly:* In view of the fact that the Wriston program is now in full swing and a greater number of experienced officers can be expected to go to the field in the next year or two, it is essential that a maximum effort be made to give more officers the opportunity for protracted General Assembly experience. This is particularly true with Executive Officer positions, where certain individuals have had two or more years of valuable experience but can be expected to go to the field sometime after the Eleventh General Assembly. At this coming session we should plan, wherever possible, to bring new officers to the General Assembly as assistants to experienced Executive Officers so that the former can take over at subsequent Assemblies. (This might of course involve increased funds.)

Press

With a view to ensuring that the United States gets the best possible press, it may be desirable to attempt, prior to the General Assembly, to identify the substantive items on which the United States should make a particular effort to develop broad and positive publicity and the cases on which our rule ought to be kept to a minimum publicly.

We should continue to try to cultivate the best possible informal relations in Washington and New York with the press, both domestic and foreign. Consideration might be given to the possibility of instituting background briefings and more informal daily contacts through such means as periodic background briefing sessions. Consideration should be given to the extent to which key members of the delegation might be utilized at such briefings. One possible device is informal luncheon meetings with selected correspondents.

In this general connection, thought should be given to the question of how relations with the responsible NGOs might be improved.

Representation

In order to assure a consistent posture by key delegation members in their general public relations during the Assembly, consideration might be given to briefings of the delegation to assure their most effective expression of U.S. attitudes and policies, particularly in the case of public members. This would be aimed at ensuring purposeful and consistent individual behavior toward particular foreign groupings, such as Asians, as well as toward Communist representatives and others, in official sessions, informal gatherings, public functions, press contacts, etc.

A systematic plan for the use of representation funds should be devised. Informal gatherings should be planned *early* in the session so that friendly contacts can be made before it is necessary to secure support on specific items.

Recommendations

1. If possible, all high level decisions on General Assembly items should be taken in sufficient time to permit at least two weeks of intensive pre-GA consultations.
2. Position papers should include a maximum and minimum objective with a view to giving the United States delegation greater tactical flexibility, and should contain an estimate of the attitudes of other delegations.
3. An overall review of all the position papers should be made to determine the limited number of issues on which the United States should engage its full prestige.
4. A systematic program of developing United States relations with new free world members of the United Nations should be initiated at an early date.

5. During the two-week pre-GA consultation period, we should seek agreement on all organizational questions (slates, allocation of items to committees, etc.) and on concrete resolutions on agenda items which will be considered initially by the respective committees. The Department should send a few officers to USUN to assist in the pre-GA negotiations.

6. Individual liaison officers should be assigned to Committees 2, 3, and 4 to operate on an overall basis. An adequate number of liaison officers should be assigned to each of the political committees to operate on a regional basis.

7. Consideration should be given to the possibility of designating one career ambassador with previous General Assembly experience as Alternate U.S. representative, to serve as Chief of Liaison and senior adviser with overall responsibility for coordinating liaison work in the plenary and the seven committees.

8. The policy Reports Officer or desk officers, as appropriate, should as a regular practice inform posts of the outcome on an item on which the United States has made diplomatic approaches in the field; the regional bureaus might institute regular weekly reports to the field; and we should seek to have the *Wireless File* circulated in the Department.

9. In view of the Wriston program, we should make a particular effort to train officers as assistants to experienced Executive Officers whom they will have to replace at subsequent Assemblies.

10. A systematic plan for use of representation funds should be devised as well as a systematic program as to Delegates' attendance at informal get-togethers, Committee meetings, and official functions.

---

25. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (Eastland)[1]

New York, May 8, 1956.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: This is in further reply to yours of May 1.

Yesterday, May 7, I called on Secretary-General Hammarskjold upon his return from the Palestine area and conveyed to him the view of your Subcommittee (which I wholeheartedly share) that the United Nations should do everything in its power to prevent further abuse of the hospitality of the United States by the Soviet representative, Mr. Sobolev.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Dels, USSR.

I also pointed out to the Secretary-General the declaration of the Secretary of State that such abuse of the privilege of residence in the United States by the Soviet Delegation contravened the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations.

I assume that your Subcommittee has noted that the Secretary of State in his note of April 25, 1956,[2] to the Soviet Embassy called upon the Government of the U.S.S.R. to instruct Ambassador Sobolev and his staff henceforth to adhere to their recognized functions.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.[3]

---

[2] The note under reference was delivered to Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zaroubin by Merchant in connection with the departure from the United States on April 7 of five former seamen from the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*. The note reads in part:

"It has been determined after thorough investigation that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations assumed authority and engaged in activities with respect to the seamen which are incompatible with the status of the Soviet Delegation. In this regard the conduct of Alexandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin was particularly objectionable. Ambassador Arkady Sobolev himself insisted on intervening." The note is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1956, pp. 765–766.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

26. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics[1]

Washington, May 25, 1956—4:19 p.m.

820. Understand LA caucus New York has agreed "in principle ad referendum" proposal include on agenda Eleventh General Assembly this fall question of amendment UN Charter to enlarge Security Council (through increase nonpermanent seats) and ECOSOC and amendment Statute of International Court of Justice to enlarge Court. Caucus due meet end May after views LA governments known. LAs apparently concerned that as result admission

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/5–2556. Limited Official Use. Priority. Pouched to USUN. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

new members degree LA representation on these bodies likely decrease unless they are enlarged.

Amendments come into force when adopted by two-thirds of members General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds UN Members including all permanent members SC.

Proposed LA agenda item creates difficulties for us since it includes Court which we believe should not be expanded. USUN so informing LA delegations New York. In view desirability Foreign Office also be aware our views on Court and other bodies before instructing its representative request you discuss matter with it along following lines:

1. US shares LA concern over need increase size certain UN organs in light increase UN membership and is of course sympathetic LA desires have adequate representation UN bodies. US prepared support consideration by Eleventh Assembly of enlargement Security Council and ECOSOC and presently favors amendment Article 23 to increase nonpermanent SC seats from six to eight and amendment Article 61 to increase ECOSOC seats from eighteen to twenty-two.
2. US would strongly oppose consideration by 11th Assembly of increase permanent Security Council seats. This question has serious implications for status of Council and its operations, likely embroil Assembly in difficult collateral issues, and could delay action on increase non-permanent seats. Pleased LAs not proposing increase permanent seats.
3. Agree with LAs no change composition Trusteeship Council necessary.
4. Believe Court should not be enlarged. In view fact Court sits en banc and takes decisions by Court sitting as whole increase beyond present size of fifteen which is already unusually large for Court which sits en banc would hinder its proper functioning. Moreover fifteen sufficient assure in accordance Article 9 Court's Statute representation in body as whole of main forms civilization and principal legal systems of world. Therefore if Latin Americans submit agenda item on enlargement Councils hope no reference will be made to Court.

FYI Only. LAs have four judges on Court. Term of one (Ugon of Uruguay) does not expire until 1961 and three others (Cordova of Mexico, Moreno Quintana of Argentina and Guerrero of El Salvador) not until 1964. While problem therefore not immediate LAs probably fear if Court not enlarged there may be pressure in future reduce seats now held by LA judges to enable election additional judge from Arab-Asian group which besides Chinese Member has only two judges. Department anticipates some redistribution existing pattern would in fact be sought and there is no assurance LAs would be able maintain four judges. Therefore possible LAs will strongly urge increase in size Court. Report any indications which will assist Department gauge strength LA sentiment this matter. End FYI.

LAs also considering agenda item on enlargement International Law Commission. Enlargement this body would not require Charter amendment but simply revision Commission's Statute adopted by Assembly. If Foreign Office raises matter indicate Department still studying question and has reached no decision.

Dulles

---

27. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (DePalma) to the United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Howard)[1]

Washington, June 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

Advance Consultations with New Members of UN

As you know, UNP has in recent weeks with the cooperation of the other bureaus, made a study and recommendations designed to improve US participation in the United Nations General Assembly.[2] One phase of the study had as its purpose to ascertain whether improvements could be made in US internal preparations, diplomatic liaison, delegation operations and public relations which might reduce unnecessary frictions with other governments, maximize US leadership, and in general utilize our diplomatic instruments most effectively.

A major recommendation emerging from the study was that a systematic program of developing our relations with certain of the new members of the United Nations should be initiated at an early date.

As a first step in such a program it would be useful to have a brief paper from each bureau on each new member state in the area setting forth the major factors to be taken into account with respect to its participation in the United Nations. Such topics as the following might be included:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6–656. Confidential. Also sent to the U.N. Advisers in the Bureaus of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon) and European Affairs (Roberts) and to George N. Monsma.

[2] See Document 24 and attachments thereto.

1. An estimate of the general posture which the new member can be expected to take within the United Nations and its probable relationship to the US and other major states or blocs of states within the UN.
2. An estimate of the new member state's probable position on the specific issues or types of issues of greatest concern to it.
3. An indication of any particular factors which should be borne in mind in conducting negotiations with the state and any concrete suggestions as to the steps the Delegation might take to establish good relationships.
4. The names of individuals in the embassy here other than the ambassador who will be handling UN matters.

In addition, if there are broad factors relating to the region as a whole rather than to specific countries, it would be useful to have a brief over-all memorandum concerning US relationships in the UN with the geographic regions as they are affected by the admission of new members. In the case of ARA, for example, there are no new member states but comments would be helpful regarding the degree to which the Latin American group will wish to associate itself with Italy, Spain and Portugal in the General Assembly and whether it would be in our interest to encourage a closer or looser association.

As a possible aid to an analysis of probable attitudes of the new member states, a check list of items expected to arise at the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly is attached along with a check list of new members.[3]

The Committee which is coordinating the study has requested that these memoranda be completed by June 15 if feasible.

---

[3] Neither found.

---

28. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, June 8, 1956—10 a.m.

1072. For Wilcox from Lodge. Draft circular on enlargement UN Councils.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/6–856. Secret; Niact.

[2] The draft circular telegram under reference has not been found. However, a summary of this document with an attached excerpt was sent to Ambassador Lodge on June 6, by Richard F. Pedersen of the Mission to the United Nations. According to (Continued)

1. Seriously question prudence of proposed circular telegram which commits US now in effect, to a "gentleman's agreement" on allocation of seats in Security Council which would be without qualification and could therefore only be reversed in very serious emergency.

2. It seems unwise to tie our hands down indefinitely in face of unpredictable future circumstances. So-called gentleman's agreement of London[3] about Eastern Europe has already been great bother to US.

3. While we will no doubt ultimately have to accept some kind of understanding on Eastern European seat as part of enlargement, we should not commit ourselves now and give our bargaining power away. At this state we could leave definition Eastern Europe vague and express our position on allocation seats as tentative thinking without saying we would agree to "understanding" on any allocation. We should not be taken for granted on specifics.

4. There is little doubt that Middle and Far Eastern countries will be dissatisfied with formula for one WE and one FE seat contained in circular telegram. India has in effect told us that they intend to resist FE (mytel 991[4]).

5. There is no doubt that there is shift of power away from Europe and towards Asia due not only to population but also to growth in national productivity and that we must not lend color to the often uttered criticism of US that we are restraining political development and appearing to support outgoing regimes. If we take rigid position, our influence will be diminished to vanishing point and Russians will have the bargaining position.

6. Even if I felt formulas in circular telegram were correct (which I do not) I would be opposed to tying myself down to them firmly insofar as other nations are concerned because I would want to retain some maneuverability, some flexibility, some bargaining position.

(Continued)
Pedersen, the draft circular telegram set forth the U.S. position on enlargement of the Security Council by two members, the Economic and Social Council by four members, with no increases in either the Trusteeship Council or the International Court of Justice. According to Pedersen, the proposed circular telegram "also states that we will subscribe to an 'understanding' (preferably not a more formal 'agreement') that one seat in the Security Council will be reserved for Eastern Europe. This means (a) a seat for the Satellites and possibly Yugoslavia, but not including Turkey, Greece, Austria or Finland, and (b) an 'understanding' which will grant them the seat without time limitation." (USUN Files, IO, Councils, Memb)

[3] See the Minutes by the United States Delegation to the Five-Power Informal Meeting, held at London, January 9, 1946, and the related memorandum by David H. Popper in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 141–147 and 209–210.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 350/5–1756)

7. I recommend that we merely announce interim positions the way we have been doing and say in effect we presently would support an increase of two in Security Council, one for Western Europe and one for Far East. This would let us see how cat was going to jump and throw our weight accordingly.

Wadsworth

---

29. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, June 15, 1956.

DEAR CABOT: I am enclosing a copy of the draft circular on the enlargement of United Nations councils which has been revised to take account of your views (Usun 1072[2]). You will note that our embassies would be limited, for the time being, to indicating in response to queries that the United States is prepared to support an increase of two in the number of non-permanent seats in the Security Council (one each to Western Europe and the Far East). The present draft makes no reference to the geographic allocation of the seats as a whole.

While we agree that perhaps now is not the time to commit ourselves on an understanding regarding the allocation of a seat to the Soviet bloc, we nevertheless believe it will be necessary, very likely well before the opening of the General Assembly, to discuss in detail the allocations question as a whole. I cannot imagine that any of the regional blocs will limit their discussions in the ensuing weeks to the question of the number of seats. Equally, and possibly more important, to them will be the question of how the seats are to be distributed so as to protect their own interests and at the same time to secure Soviet assent to an increase in the Council. We can expect that an overwhelming majority will insist on one Council seat for the Soviet bloc in the firm belief that this is the minimum price that will have to be paid for Soviet agreement. In fact, I foresee the danger that we might be confronted with the choice of agreeing to such an allocation under Soviet pressure or thwarting the will of the majority. Unless we are prepared to state concretely and in detail our views on both the size of increase and the allocation of seats, which I believe are inseparable, we will not be able to exert maximum influence on others in order to achieve a solution which fully meets our views.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, SC, Membership. Confidential.

[2] *Supra.*

I have not discussed this letter with the Secretary since we now appear to be in substantial agreement regarding our proposed circular message. We shall, of course, defer transmittal of the circular until we have your reaction to the revised text.

Cordially yours,

Francis

[Enclosure]

Draft Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[3]

On December 14, 1955, sixteen countries were admitted to the United Nations (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania, and Spain). It is anticipated that the question of amendments to the U.N. Charter to enlarge certain organs in view of this increase in membership will be considered at the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, scheduled to convene in November of this year. Various proposals are already being discussed among U.N. Members and the Latin American countries are now considering the submission of an agenda item. The United States is prepared to support an appropriate agenda item on this question.

Amendments to the Charter come into force when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

The following sections include essential background information on this problem and also a summary of the present U.S. positions. The Embassies are not requested to take any initiative on the basis of this circular. However, if approached by the Foreign Offices regarding U.S. views, the Embassies to which the circular is sent for action are authorized to inform the Foreign Offices along the lines indicated below.

---

[3] The source text indicates that the telegram was to be sent to 74 missions.

1. *Security Council.* Under Article 23 of the Charter, the Security Council consists of five permanent members (Republic of China, France, U.K., U.S. and U.S.S.R.) and six non-permanent members elected for two year terms. A retiring member is not eligible for immediate reelection. The six non-permanent members at the present time are Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Iran, Peru, and Yugoslavia. (The latter was elected on the understanding that it would withdraw at the end of 1956 and that the Philippines would be elected to serve the unexpired portion of its term.)

There are two principal inequities in the present allocation of seats. First, despite the fact that a number of countries from the Far East have been admitted to the United Nations since 1946, this area has never been allocated a non-permanent seat. Second, only one seat is allocated to Western Europe, whereas a substantial number of new members from this area have been admitted to the United Nations.

If the question of the enlargement of the Security Council is considered at the Eleventh Session, the present position of the Department is to support an increase of two in the number of non-permanent seats (one Western European and one Far Eastern), bringing the total of such seats to eight.

The United States would strongly oppose consideration by the Eleventh Session of an increase in the number of permanent seats on the Security Council. This question has serious implications for the status of the Council and its operations, would be likely to embroil the Assembly in difficult collateral issues, and could delay action on an increase in the number of non-permanent seats.

2. *Economic and Social Council.* Under Article 61 of the Charter the Economic and Social Council consists of eighteen members, elected by the General Assembly for a term of three years. A retiring member is eligible for immediate reelection. The Charter does not designate any countries as permanent members but in fact the five permanent members of the Security Council have always been reelected to ECOSOC.

In addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council, the following countries are presently members of ECOSOC: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Yugoslavia.

If the question of the enlargement of ECOSOC is considered at the Eleventh Session, the present position of the Department is to favor an increase of four in the number of seats, bringing the total to 22.

In considering the question of the enlargement of ECOSOC, it should be kept in mind that one of its primary functions is the coordination of the economic and social activities of the U.N. and the Specialized Agencies. This function cannot be undertaken by a body that is too large for effective operation. A body of 22 would be manageable, though it comes close to being unwieldy in size. An even larger body would make more difficult ECOSOC's operation and extend the length of the Council's meetings excessively.

3. *Trusteeship Council.* Article 86 of the Charter provides that the Trusteeship Council shall consist of: a) those Members which administer trust territories; b) such of those Members which are permanent members of the Security Council as do not administer trust territories; and c) as many other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Council is equally divided between those members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not. The present members of the Trusteeship Council are Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, New Zealand, U.K., and the U.S. which administer trust territories; China and the U.S.S.R., which are members of the Council because they are permanent members on the Security Council; and Burma, Guatemala, Haiti, India and Syria, which are elected members.

The United States believes that Article 86 is a sound provision and should be maintained without change. Under this provision, the last session of the General Assembly elected Burma to the Trusteeship Council as the seventh non-administering member after Italy was admitted to the United Nations and automatically became the seventh administering member of the Trusteeship Council, bringing the total number of the Council members to fourteen.

4. *International Court of Justice.* Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the Court "shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law." Article 3 provides that the Court shall consist of fifteen members. Article 9 states that the electors (the General Assembly and the Security Council) "shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured."

The United States believes that no change should be made in the size of the Court. In view of the nature of the Court's work and its special judicial procedures, an increase in its present size, which is already unusually large for a Court which sits en banc, would tend to hinder the proper functioning of that organ. A Court of fifteen, moreover, is sufficient to assure, in accordance with Article 9 of the Statute, the representation in the body as a whole of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world.

The present Court consists of; Hackworth, U.S.; Abdel Hamid Badawi, Egypt; Guerrero, Salvador; J. Basdevant, France; Winiarski, Poland; Zoricic, Yugoslavia; Klaestad, Norway; Read, Canada; Hsu Mo, China; Armand-Ugon, Uruguay; Kojevaikov, Russia; Khan, Pakistan; Lauterpacht, Great Britain; Quintana, Argentina; Cordova, Mexico.[4]

"FYI—If the Court is not enlarged there may be pressure in future elections to reduce the number of seats now held by other areas in order to enable the election of an additional judge from the Arab-Asian group which besides the Chinese member has only two judges. The US is not committed to supporting the existing pattern at future elections. The Department anticipates that some redistribution of the existing pattern would in fact be sought, and there is no assurance that other areas would be able to maintain their present number of judges. It is therefore possible that these areas will urge strongly an increase in the size of the Court. The Embassies should report any indication which will assist the Department to gauge the strength of the sentiment concerning an increase in the Court. End FYI.

For LA posts: This circular is intended to supply further background in connection the Department's circular 820 of May 25."[5]

---

[4] Green Hackworth (President), Abdel Hamid Badawi (Vice President), Jose Gustavo Guerrero, Jules Basdevant, Bohdan Winiarski, Milovan Zoricic, Helga Klaestad, John E. Read, Hsu Mo, Enrique C. Armond-Ugon, Feodor Ivanovich Kojevaikov, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Lucio M. Moreno Quintana, Roberto Cordova.

[5] Document 26.

---

30. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)[1]

New York, June 20, 1956.

DEAR FRANCIS: Thanks for your letter of June 15.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, SC, Membership. Secret.

I am afraid that my telegram of June 7 [*8*][2] did not make my position altogether clear, even though it seemed to me at the time that I had been somewhat repetitious about our retaining freedom of action.

When I say that we should keep the situation fluid, it means that we should not have our Embassies tell foreign governments in advance, but that we should follow the practice that we have followed ever since I have been here, notably in the case of the Korean Armistice resolution and many others, of turning the whole thing over to me when it reaches this stage to play the hand in the way which is most advantageous to the United States, working, of course, in accordance with policy directives from Washington and in close and constant consultation.

I see a very good chance that the hand could be played so as to make the Soviet Union do the dirty work and wouldn't that be nice?

For all these reasons, I not only oppose a rigid understanding about an Eastern European seat; I would oppose any commitment on the subject at all at this stage.

This means that I would rather not have any kind of circular telegram go out.

Sincerely yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.[3]

---

[2] Document 28.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

31. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, July 27, 1956.

SUBJECT

Strengthening US Participation in UN General Assembly

1. You requested me after the last General Assembly to explore ways of strengthening the general US diplomatic position in the UN, specifically in connection with the forthcoming Assembly session.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Strengthening US Participation in UNGA. Confidential.

We have made a thorough evaluation of the 10th Assembly, and an analysis of the current trends in the UN as they affect American interests. On the basis of this analysis IO has developed some action recommendations designed to improve the overall US posture.

2. The attached recommendations are selective in that they do not attempt to cover the entire range of policy operations, or to reaffirm existing policies. In the case of colonial policy I understand you will be receiving recommendations separately, based on an S/P study.[2] On disarmament, although we fully recognize the desirability of, for example, an "educational campaign" for new UN Members in the face of new Soviet tactics, it was felt that this matter can best be handled through the present channels.

3. The attached recommendations have been fully discussed with USUN and other bureaus. Because a number of the recommendations represent changes in existing policy, it has not been possible to secure complete agreement on all points, and the paper should be regarded as IO's response to your request, rather than as a cleared Departmental staff study.

There was, however, general agreement on a number of points. P, E, and NEA were in agreement with the substance of all the recommendations, as was S/P, subject to the reservation that the US should be entirely consistent in its policy on voting in favor of inscription. Other areas agreed with the majority of recommendations, but dissented in a few cases, as follows:

On recommendation 1 (Economic), ARA and FE dissent. On recommendation 2 (Inscription), ARA and EUR dissent. On recommendation 3 (Human Rights), L dissents, and FE, on the contrary, wishes it strengthened. On recommendation 4 (Elections), there is complete agreement. On recommendation 5 (Psychological Strategy), there is agreement, except for some additional suggestions from FE, and Ambassador Lodge's feeling that the US might wish to inscribe a "cold war" item for purposes of educating Members who may be misled by current Soviet poses. On recommendation 6 (Organizational), there is agreement except that FE questions the impact on Far Eastern states of relations with new Communist members (subparagraph d).

4. I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss this paper with you at your early convenience.[3]

---

[2] Not further identified.

[3] No record of such a conversation has been found.

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Strengthening US Participation in UN General Assembly

Analysis:

The following assumptions and estimates form the basis for the recommendations proposed:

1. The US position in the UN has been complicated by the new Russian pose of reasonableness, the coalescence of the Bandung powers,[4] and the increasing emphasis, by a growing UN majority, on multilateral action in the economic, social, colonial, and human rights fields.

2. In this new setting, two basic factors will tend to limit the ability of the US to command a comfortable margin of political support in the UN:

a) *The Communist Issue:* While the Cold War seems increasingly remote to many nations, the US is required to maintain certain basic policies toward the communist world. In the UN these involve: continuing exposure of communism's threat to freedom, emphasis on collective security against possible Soviet aggression, and vigorous opposition to the seating of Communist China. These policies tend to receive diminishing support so long as other nations continue to downgrade the communist threat to the free world.

b) *The Colonial Issue:* On this issue, which preoccupies many UN members, affirmations of traditional US attitudes tend to displease the colonial powers, while US actions often alienate the anti-colonial nations. At the same time, the US is quite properly unable to adopt inflexible stands either in favor of the anti-colonial majority, or of our European allies who administer dependencies.

3. Given the above framework, within which the US enjoys restricted maneuverability, this study has focussed on those areas where the US seems to have more flexibility: a) the economic and social field; b) procedural problems arising from elections and inscription of agenda items, both of which have caused disproportionate complications for US diplomacy in the recent past; c) the tactics and tone of US psychological strategy in the UN; and d) internal

---

[4] Reference is to the countries that participated in the 29-nation Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955.

procedures and mechanisms to improve the preparation and execution of US policies.

4. It is recognized that other foreign policy considerations must enter into final decisions on the recommendations that follow. We estimate, however, that in the time ahead the UN will represent an increasingly vital sector in the battle for the allegiance and support of politically undecided nations, and that action along the following lines could significantly enhance US influence and standing in the UN.

Recommendations:

1. Economic

The US would improve its position in the UN by asserting leadership in the creation of a UN economic development fund, and/or in a substantial expansion and development of the UN technical aid program. Both these proposals are under detailed study elsewhere in the Department, and specific recommendations will be submitted at an appropriate time.

2. Inscription

a) The US should affirm its traditional policy that inscription and discussion of an item do not fall within the scope of "intervention" prohibited by Article 2(7);

b) The US should, as a matter of policy, vote in favor of inscription except in rare cases where vital interests require us to oppose or abstain;

c) Where the US opposes or abstains on inscription, the argument should be based on the political ground of unwisdom of UN consideration—i.e., that such consideration will not be helpful in contributing to a solution of the particular issue—or on US neutrality with regard to an issue, rather than lack of legal competence;

d) A US vote in favor of inscription should be understood to be without prejudice to the US retaining full freedom to support actively one party or another in committee debate, and if necessary to oppose any Assembly *action* on grounds of legal incompetence, but without having placed itself in the position of appearing to block a *hearing* on international grievances;

e) The US should promote the acceptance of a process of "pigeon-holing" items once inscribed which are of no general interest, or on which most members would prefer not to have to take a stand.

3. Human Rights

The US should make an exception to its policy of non-participation in international conventions in the human rights field, in order to support a convention on slavery as well as a forced labor convention, both to be drafted in a manner consistent with US constitutional provisions.

4. Elections

a) The US should make every effort to avoid differences with its close allies on UN elections, and should seek to avoid active campaigning or engagement of US prestige unless US interests are substantially involved, and there is a reasonable chance of success.

b) Where the election of a Soviet bloc candidate would not adversely affect US security interests, and where a generally accepted geographic pattern clearly allocates a given seat to the Soviet bloc, the US should normally be prepared to vote for (but not campaign for) the Soviet Union, and to consider voting for a satellite candidate after examining each case carefully. (The US will probably have to accept a geographic pattern which reserves seats for the Soviet bloc, in order to secure Soviet agreement to any Charter amendment enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC.)

5. Psychological Strategy

a) In order to secure maximum support for US policies in the altered UN atmosphere, the US, while remaining prepared to counter vigorously any renewed Soviet attacks in the UN, should not itself take the initiative in placing "cold-war" items on the agenda, but should leave the onus to the Soviet Union. The US should abjure gratuitous "cold-war tactics", while continuing to restate the facts about communism whenever appropriate. In social contacts it should observe normal, if minimum, diplomatic courtesies toward Soviet bloc representatives.

b) When major policy considerations require, the US should continue to use the UN to expose Soviet bad faith or intransigence in such deadlocked situations as the division of Germany or the status of Eastern Europe. In such cases US tactics should be carefully tailored to the prevailing atmosphere, and the possibility should be accepted of negative reactions on the part of other member nations.

c) The US should be fully prepared for any Soviet reversion to former "cold-war" tactics, and should have in reserve, for use as appropriate, a strong case on, for example, Soviet suppression of nationalism, interference with free communication, slave labor, or Soviet colonialism.

6. Organizational

a) In order to develop the strongest possible international support for US positions on the most sensitive agenda items, top-level decisions should be taken in sufficient time to permit a minimum of two weeks of intensive pre-Assembly consultations. Considerably earlier decisions would be desirable on the bulk of agenda items.

b) An overall review should be made of US position papers to determine the limited number of issues on which the US should engage its full prestige.

c) Position papers should include a maximum and minimum objective, to give the US delegation greater tactical flexibility.

d) Relations with new non-communist UN members should be cultivated with a view to developing support and understanding for US positions. We should be responsive to approaches from new communist members to the extent that appears profitable for the US.

---

32. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth)[1]

Washington, August 20, 1956.

DEAR JERRY: I would like to draw your attention to the memorandum of conversation between Miss Salt and Mr. Wainhouse on August 10,[2] pouched to USUN on August 13. In this conversation Miss Salt expressed the hope that we would come out rather firmly in favor of an increase of two in the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council and also take a firm position against enlargement of the Court. The British feel that it is important to hold the line on these matters.

We have noted that since the Latin American countries and Spain submitted agenda items there have been few reports of conversations in New York on the enlargement of UN organs. We assume that this is because other delegations are not interested in discussing the issues now. In any case, we would appreciate your comments on Miss Salt's approach to us, since I think we are bound to give her a reply.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, US Mission Correspondence. Confidential.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 330/8–1056)

We agree with Cabot's view that we should make no commitments at all at this stage on the allocation of seats. We also would like to see the increase limited to two seats. However, we fear that there will be strong pressure from some members for a larger increase and that this pressure is apt to grow. The question is how we can seek at this time to hold the line to two while still leaving some flexibility in our position.

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

33. Letter From the Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)[1]

New York, August 27, 1956.

DEAR FRAN: Thanks for your letter of August 20 drawing my attention to the memorandum of conversation between Miss Salt and David Wainhouse. The last time we talked here with the British about enlarging the councils was with [name deleted] on August 1 with the French also present. At that time we agreed that it might well be possible to persuade the Latin Americans not to press their items on enlarging the ICJ and the ILC. We also thought it might in the end be desirable to put off the whole question of Council enlargement until next year. Jim Barco reported this in a letter on August 2 to Niles Bond.[2] I think we would be wise to wait for [name deleted] return before we make any new efforts to get the Latins not to press their ILC and ICJ items. [Name deleted] can base his approach on the need for keeping the agenda within manageable limits, and possibly be more effective than the three delegations in such an approach.

As far as enlarging the Security Council is concerned, our position continues to be as Cabot described it in his telegram No. 1085 of June 12.[3] So long as the Indians and the Soviets refuse to commit themselves there seems little we can do but retain a flexible position. Cabot's view on the allocation of seats in the Security Council, with which we all agree, also has the effect of inhibiting us to some degree from coming out "rather firmly" on the Security Council question at this time. Moreover, we have made our general views rather widely known. Now is a good time not to stir up any hornets' nests.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Councils, Membership. Confidential.

[2] Not found.

[3] Not printed.

If the British have any new ideas we would be interested in hearing them. But from here it still looks like the Security Council question will not really be settled until the last minute in the General Assembly and that the wisest course would be to consult [name deleted] again before taking new action on the Court and Commission.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

James J. Wadsworth[4]

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

34. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA-2288 *Washington, September 11, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Revision of the United Nations Contributions Scale—11th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Toward the close of the 10th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, sixteen countries were admitted to membership. It was then too late to re-examine the already approved scale of assessments for the calendar year 1956. The Committee on Contributions, therefore, was requested to study and recommend the level of contributions of the new members. The results of its deliberations are contained in the Report of the Committee (UN document A/3121). In brief, the Committee, with a dissent from the United States national member, recommended appropriate percentage shares for the new members in accordance with relative capacity to pay and then revised the already approved scale for 1956 to incorporate the new shares in a new 100% scale. Fifty members (including 10 new members) received reductions. The United States is one of those not changed.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1156. Limited Official Use. Sent to 65 posts; repeated to 8 others.

In view of the interest stemming from the record made by the United States member of the UN Committee on Contributions the following advance explanation of the position to be taken by the United States at the 11th Session of the General Assembly on the Report of the Committee is presented.

At your discretion it is requested that you bring these views to the attention of the government to which you are accredited and inform the Department of the reaction.

1. The United States will oppose the Committee's recommendation because

a. After review and analysis of the Committee report the Department believes that the Committee went beyond its authority, in view of the fact that the 10th General Assembly set a contributions scale for 1956, 1957, 1958, and of Rule 161 which provides: "The scale of assessments, when once fixed by the General Assembly, shall not be subject to a general revision for at least three years, unless it is clear that there have been substantial changes in the relative capacities to pay."

b. The Committee's recommendations in effect constitute a general revision for which the Committee should have had political guidance from the General Assembly, guidance which the United States considers is indispensable in view of a substantial increase in the number of UN member states.

2. The United States objective in opposing the Committee's somewhat mechanical recommendation is to obtain adequate consideration of all factors affecting cost sharing by the General Assembly so that it can give appropriate instructions to the Committee. The United States considers that the significant increase in the number of UN states makes it appropriate and, in our view, necessary that the General Assembly consider all factors including possibly even a reduction in the maximum share of one-third.

3. The Department recognizes that a general revision of the scale of assessments is a significant issue and that the UN members may not, at the 11th General Assembly, be prepared to consider and accept a general revision. Therefore, the United States tentative position would be that the present scale of contributions should be maintained during the interim until full scale review of assessments in 1958, or earlier as decided by the General Assembly. During this interim, assessments against new members should be established and collected outside of the scale and be placed in the category of miscellaneous income, to be used in reduction of all member assessments. The three members (Canada, New Zealand and Sweden) who

now pay more per capita than the United States and have been promised relief should be allowed a "per capita credit" against their assessment. Such credit could be considered a first charge against miscellaneous income.

The advantage of this interim arrangement is that it would retain status quo the relative position of *all* countries' assessments until a general revision is discussed, agreed upon, and put into effect. In contrast, the Committee would grant reductions in the shares of only forty of the old members paying between the minimum (.04 through .08) and the maximum. Such changes tend to accentuate and sharpen inequities (even though small), and make later complete revision more difficult. Countries which may be over-assessed would receive benefits not necessarily in proportion to their over-assessment. Countries which are under-assessed receive unwarranted relief and later correction will be doubly difficult to make.

If you deem it appropriate, you may emphasize that the Soviet Union has been under-assessed in the United Nations scale and remained so in the current 1956 scale. The recommendations of the Contributions Committee would accentuate this situation.

For your information, the reasons for the United States position are:

A. It is hoped to achieve a solution which avoids the reduction of the Soviet share while the United States remains at 33⅓%. Domestic opinion does not appear ready to accept a reduction in the Soviet share while the United States share remains constant even though, in the eyes of other United Nations members, capacity to pay of the United States remains far above its assessment.

B. Maintenance of the present scale does not prejudice the future but leaves the way open for further consideration of various alternatives at a time when other new members (Japan and Germany) and their contributions may introduce new factors.

C. The initial opinion of the Department is that General Assembly action foreshadowing a change in the United States share is not likely this year. Until now, there has been no discussion of this possibility. The United States has been quiet on this point for two years since its share was reduced to 33⅓%. Preparation of the ground is necessary before thinking in other countries will accept a new movement to lower the ceiling for the United States percentage. It is reasonable to aim, as a minimum, for a full discussion of this matter at the 12th Session of the General Assembly, followed by Contributions Committee deliberations during 1958, and final Assembly action at the 13th Session of the General Assembly. Whether this timetable can be speeded up can be judged only after exchanges of view with selected governments and a general testing of opinions.

The final United States position on this issue will be determined in October and will take into account any reports of reactions of other governments.

Dulles

35. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA–3343 *Washington, October 17, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Eleventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

1. The eleventh regular session of the General Assembly is scheduled to convene in New York on November 12. Enclosed for your information is the Department's check list of items certain or likely to arise at the session (SD/A/348/Rev. 1).[2] Items are arranged according to their probable allocation to the plenary meetings of the Assembly and its seven Main Committees. Items not bracketed are included in the provisional agenda which was circulated by the SYG on September 13, 1956, or have subsequently been proposed for inclusion in the supplementary agenda which will be circulated soon. As in previous years, we would appreciate information you may receive regarding any items which the Government to which you are accredited is likely to propose for inclusion in the Agenda. However, we are anxious to avoid giving any impression that we wish to stimulate the introduction of new items.

2. We are planning, as in previous years, to consult informally with other friendly governments in advance of the Assembly concerning major agenda items. Consultations will be held on the basis of our tentative views in order that we may be able to take the views of other governments into account in the formulation of our final positions. We shall parallel your approaches with consultations, through USUN, with permanent delegations in New York and in some cases with diplomatic representatives in Washington.

3. Outlined below are the Department's tentative positions (except A, B and E below) on a number of items which will be dealt with in the political committees or in plenary sessions. You are requested, in your discretion, to outline these views to the foreign office and to report its reactions as soon as possible. As noted above, you should indicate that these positions are tentative and that we shall wish to take account, insofar as possible, the views of other friendly governments in determining our final position. Any significant information you receive should be cabled if it is not likely to be received in the Department by November 1 if sent by air despatch. (Detailed background information on most of the issues you will be

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–1756. Confidential. Sent to 68 posts and repeated to 10 others.

[2] Dated October 9, not printed. (*Ibid.*, IO Master Files, SD Series, 1955–1958)

asked to discuss may be found in the *Annual Report of the President to Congress on U.S. Participation in the U.N. for 1955.*)

A. President of the Eleventh G.A.

Prince Wan of Thailand is the only candidate, and his election appears certain. The United States strongly favors his election and has informed other UN members of its position.

B. Election to the International Court of Justice

The General Assembly and the Security Council must elect a judge to fill the vacancy on the International Court of Justice created by the death of the Chinese judge, Hsu Mo, whose term of office runs until February 5, 1958. The United States strongly supports Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, the Chinese nominee, and has made its views known to other UN members. Dr. Koo is known to be well-qualified, and there is a tradition that a national of each of the five permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected to the Court.

C. Elections to UN Councils

Besides the usual elections to select three states for the Security Council, six states for the Economic and Social Council, and two states for the Trusteeship Council, the G.A. will hold an election in 1956 to fill the second half of Yugoslavia's term on the Security Council. Following a long contest between the Philippines and Yugoslavia at the tenth G.A. in 1955 for election to the Security Council, Yugoslavia was elected on the understanding that it would resign from the Council at the end of this year and that the Philippines would be elected to serve for the remainder of the term. The United States accepted this understanding and assumes that it will be honored.

The Department is actively considering its position with respect to the other elections, most of which present no problem. In accordance with our usual policy, we will support Latin American candidates to replace Latin Americans and will await the views of the Latin American states before deciding for which Latin American to vote. Background information on the elections to the three Councils follows:

Security Council—The G.A. will elect three non-permanent Members for two-year terms to succeed Belgium, Iran, and Peru, whose terms expire on December 31, 1956. Iraq and Colombia are the only announced candidates to succeed Iran and Peru, respectively. There are three candidates for the Belgian seat: Italy, Sweden, and Spain. We consider that the choice of the West European candidate is a matter in the first instance for the West Europeans to decide and hope that they will reach a decision in time to avoid an open contest in the G.A.

Economic and Social Council—The G.A. will elect six countries for three-year terms to succeed Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Norway, Pakistan, the USSR, and the UK, whose terms expire on December 31, 1956. The five permanent members of the Security Council have always been represented on the Economic and Social Council, and it is therefore assumed that the UK and the USSR will be reelected. Poland is the Soviet-bloc candidate for the Czechoslovak seat. Mexico and Finland are the sole announced candidates for the Ecuadoran and Norwegian seats, respectively. Pakistan desires to be reelected but Ceylon also has announced its candidacy for this seat.

Trusteeship Council—The G.A. will elect two states for three-year terms to succeed Haiti and India, whose terms expire on December 31 of this year. Both states are running for reelection. Liberia also has announced its candidacy for the Indian seat. The Department has taken no definite position as yet on this slate.

D. Enlargement of UN Councils

Sixteen Latin American States, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, [*sic*] Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, and Spain have proposed for inclusion on the Assembly's agenda the question of amending the UN Charter to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council and consequently the number of votes required for Council decisions. The same states plus another Latin American country, Mexico, have requested that the agenda also include the question of amending the Charter to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. Six Latin American members, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Haiti, and Spain have proposed for inclusion on the agenda the question of increasing the membership of the International Court of Justice to increase the number of judges. In addition, the same sixteen Latin American states which proposed the item on the enlargement of the Security Council (listed above) and Spain have asked that the agenda also include the question of increasing the membership of the International Law Commission. These items have been submitted in light of the substantial increase in UN membership.

Amendments to the Charter and to the Statute of the Court come into force when adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the UN members, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Statute of the International Law Commission, which was established by the Assembly, can be amended by the Assembly.

We recognize the need to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in view of the increase in UN membership. We also recognize the need to avoid their becoming unwieldy in size. For the present we wish to maintain a flexible position on the size of any increases. If you are asked about our position, you should indicate that the addition of two non-permanent seats to the Security Council, making a total of eight such seats, and an increase of four in the Economic and Social Council, bringing the membership of this body to 22, would seem to us reasonable. FYI. We are not prepared as yet to discuss how these new seats would be allocated geographically. End of FYI.

We do not see any need for an increase in the International Court of Justice and have made our position known to others. A Court of fifteen is sufficient to assure representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world, and any increase in its size would tend to hinder its effective functioning. Moreover, the Statute provides that when the Court includes no judge of the nationality of a party to a case brought before the Court, the party may choose a judge, who takes part in the Court's decision on terms of complete equality with the regular members of the Court. We have not made any definite decision as to a possible increase in the membership of the International Law Commission. We have open mind on the matter.

Should the question of increasing the number of permanent seats on the Security Council be raised, we would strongly oppose its consideration at this time. It has serious implications for the status and operations of the Council and could more properly be considered at any general conference to review the Charter. Moreover, consideration of this question would almost certainly raise difficult collateral issues.

E. Chinese Representation

We shall, of course, continue actively to oppose any efforts designed to change the representation of China in the General Assembly. We shall take the position that the Assembly should decide not to consider any proposals designed to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. We have been informed by the UK that it will support this moratorium formula for the entire session. FYI—By taking the foregoing procedural position and avoiding votes on the substance we anticipate that we should be able again this year to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support and with minimum difficulty. End FYI. We assume each Embassy will solicit support, as appropriate, for the above position.

F. UN Membership

The Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia will be admitted to the UN in an early plenary meeting of the Assembly. We view, with concern, the continued exclusion of qualified applicants, including Japan and the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam, as a result of past vetoes of the Soviet Union. The United States strongly hopes that Japan will be admitted at this session. We will continue to support the candidacies of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. We are opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia. FYI—The United States last year abstained both in the Assembly and in the Security Council on all Soviet satellite applicants, including Outer Mongolia. While the United States is opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia, whether we would vote in the negative or abstain in the Assembly would depend upon the circumstances in which the issue is raised. End FYI.

G. Indians in South Africa

The tenth General Assembly urged the parties (India, Pakistan, Union of South Africa) to pursue negotiations with a view to bringing about a settlement and requested them to report to this session. The Indian and Pakistan offer to negotiate was rejected by the South Africans.

We assume this item will again be inscribed by the Assembly. We continue to believe that the only real hope for a settlement of this dispute lies in direct negotiations between the parties. While not playing a leading role on this item, the United States is prepared to support a moderate resolution to this effect.

H. Apartheid

Last year the Assembly decided to discontinue the Commission of three individuals whose efforts since 1952 had been to no avail in finding a solution to this problem. We continue to oppose racial discrimination in any form, and in our statements before the Assembly this year, as in the past, we expect to make this clear. We view with concern the continued implementation of *apartheid* in South Africa.

Nevertheless, we doubt that either censure or condemnation of one member nation or the establishment of more UN machinery is likely to improve the racial situation in South Africa or contribute to the UN objectives in the human rights field. The United States therefore hopes that the discussion of this question will be kept within a moderate framework.

l. Antarctica

India has submitted for Assembly consideration an item entitled, "The Peaceful Utilization of Antarctica". The Indians have suggested that "the General Assembly should call upon all States to agree and affirm the peaceful utilization of Antarctica for the general welfare and in particular to agree that that area shall not be used in any manner that would promote the increase of world tensions or extend to this area the influence and the effects of existing tensions".

The United States' position on inscription has not yet been determined. However, we can see no need to raise the question of Antarctica in the United Nations at this time and doubt the wisdom of doing so. While the Government of India apparently wishes to avoid raising the question of territorial claims, we doubt if this can be avoided entirely. This could lead to exacerbation of existing rivalries among claimants of Antarctica territory making even more difficult an eventual solution to the problem. Moreover, we doubt whether any constructive ends can be served by UN consideration at this time, especially since the agenda for this session is already heavy. We fail to see any legitimate basis for what we understand to be the Indian concern over possible use of the Antarctic region for nuclear testing. As we have indicated previously, the United States has no present intention or plan to use the Antarctic as a nuclear testing site. We wish to underline, however, that the United States doubts regarding the discussion of Antarctica in the United Nations does not mean that the United States has modified its desire to further international cooperation in the Antarctic, and the Indians and others are aware of past U.S. efforts to this end.

FYI—We would welcome an Indian decision to withdraw the item or agree to postponement of its inscription at this session. Since the Latin American caucus decided recently to oppose inscription of this item, it is not definite that the Indians intend to press for inscription. While having doubts as to the advisability of UN consideration at this time, the United States has sought to avoid getting out in front on this issue. We wish to avoid bearing the onus of preventing the inscription of the item, and we have sought to leave the UK, Old Commonwealth and Latin America a free hand in organizing opposition to inscription. The United States can be more flexible in its approach to this problem since we have not made any claims to territory nor have we recognized the claims of others. Should this matter eventually be inscribed, our present tentative view is that the objectives of the United States in the Antarctic and our interests there would not be adversely affected by the adoption of a resolution which was limited to a carefully worded UN declaration in favor of peaceful utilization of the Antarctic. End FYI.

J. United Nations Relief and Works Agency

Pursuant to the resolution adopted last year, the Assembly will again review the report of the Director of the Agency and the annual budgets. The United States has not determined its specific position, pending the receipt of the reports which are expected sometime in early November. As in the past, it is our hope that this item can be limited to a discussion of UNRWA activities without getting involved in a difficult political debate on the Palestine item.

K. Disarmament

FYI—A comprehensive review of U.S. disarmament policy is now underway in preparation for meetings of the Disarmament Commission and for the Assembly itself. We do not expect this review to be completed in time to permit extensive consultations with most governments prior to the opening of the Assembly. End FYI.

Meanwhile, you may indicate that in keeping with the recommendation of the 10th Assembly, the U.S. is making a careful study of such measures of adequately controlled disarmament as may be feasible in the near future and pending agreement on a more comprehensive system of reductions and limitations of conventional and nuclear armaments with necessary inspection and control. The disarmament negotiations during the past year, while failing to achieve such concrete progress toward a comprehensive agreement, have been useful in pointing up areas where progress might be made in the foreseeable future.

L. West New Guinea (West Irian)

Fifteen Arab-Asian members (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) have requested that the Assembly consider the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea. First considered at the Ninth Session where an Indian sponsored resolution (opposed by the Netherlands and favored by Indonesia) failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority, this question was also inscribed on the agenda of the Tenth Session. At that session the Assembly took note of a Netherlands–Indonesian announcement that negotiations on certain outstanding issues would be resumed and adopted a resolution expressing the hope that the negotiations would be fruitful and that the problem would be settled peacefully. However, these negotiations failed to achieve a settlement and Netherlands-Indonesian relations have deteriorated steadily.

Although you should take no initiative on this issue, you may in response to questions indicate that the U.S. intends to maintain its policy of neutrality with regard to the handling of this issue in the General Assembly. FYI—This position is based primarily on our estimate of the importance of avoiding involvement in an emotion-charged dispute between two nations friendly to the United States. We shall refrain from stating any views on the merits of the case. End FYI.

M. Cyprus

This item appears on the provisional agenda at the request of Greece which at the past two sessions has sought to obtain the Assembly's endorsement for its view that the people of Cyprus should be granted the right of self-determination. At the Ninth Session there was a consensus that extensive discussion might only exacerbate the situation and the Assembly adopted unanimously a motion stating that for the time being it did not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus and decided not to consider the matter further. At the Tenth Session the Assembly, again influenced by a general desire not to inflame further our already tense situation in Cyprus and between the Greek and Turkish Governments, rejected the inclusion of this question on its agenda by a vote of 28 (US)–22–10. At that time the U.S. stated that it opposed inscription because the situation called for quiet diplomacy rather than public debate, but reserved its right to support inscription later if that would advance the purposes and principles of the Charter.

In addition to the item suggested by the Greeks, the UK has submitted an item of its own on this question entitled: "Support from Greece for Terrorism in Cyprus".

FYI. It is not yet clear whether, by the time this subject comes up for consideration at the GA, the situation will remain essentially deadlocked as at present or whether some constructive element will have been injected which would influence the Assembly's approach to the problem. We continue to hope that the governments principally concerned will utilize the intervening time to work out some basis for an eventual accommodation of views and that the issue will, accordingly, not be considered appropriate for extensive discussion at the GA. End FYI.

You may indicate that we assume the governments principally concerned will be reviewing their attitudes and positions on this question prior to the opening of the Assembly and that we hope this review will be fruitful. For this reason we have not as yet formulated our position regarding the inscription of these items. We continue to believe that this problem must be solved by agreement among the governments directly concerned. We hope other delegates at the GA will share our view as to the importance of allowing the parties most concerned adequate time to seek a basis for an eventual agreement. This might require the Assembly to delay its consideration of this matter until the latter part of the session.

N. Algeria

Serious nationalist outbreaks beginning in November 1954 have given rise to concern especially among Arab-Asian states which in 1955 requested that an item on Algeria be placed on the agenda. The inscription of the Algerian question by a one vote majority caused the French delegation to walk out of the Assembly at the last session. France returned only after the Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote a motion stating that "The GA decides not to consider further the item entitled 'The Question of Algeria' and is therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda of the 10th Session". The French position is that consideration of this question by the UN is precluded by Article 2(7) of the Charter on the ground that Algeria is an integral part of France and any Assembly discussion would constitute interference in its domestic affairs. The item appears on the provisional agenda for the coming session at the request of 15 Asian-African states who claim that the situation has worsened since last year and can no longer be ignored by the Assembly.

Although we have not yet been informed of the final lines of the action contemplated by the French, we would anticipate that France will again strongly protest inscription and that the vote is expected to be close. FYI—The US does not contemplate any action being taken by US missions on this issue, however, until it has received more information concerning the French position. End FYI.

O. Korea

As in past years, the Korean question will automatically be on the agenda pursuant to the previous Assembly's resolution which reiterated the UN objectives in Korea and decided to place the item on the Agenda of the 11th session. The item contains two sub-items: (a) the report of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and (b) report of the Government of India on ex-prisoners of the Korean War.

Although we continue to maintain that Korean unification pursuant to the objectives of the UN is a vital and urgent matter and shall again express our willingness to negotiate whenever the Communists agree to cooperate in realizing the UN objectives by permitting genuinely free elections, we do not anticipate an extended debate at this session on the question of Korean unification. The

UNCURK report raises no issues requiring Assembly consideration. In these circumstances Assembly action may be confined to noting the UNC report and reaffirming UN objectives in Korea.

We have no reason to believe that any substantial number of Members are concerned with respect to the status of the Korean armistice, which the UNC is continuing to observe. Some inquiry might be made, however, regarding the withdrawal of the NNSC last June from the north and south. The background of this problem was reported in Circular Usito 529, May 25, 1956. [3] Should this issue be raised, you should use the information in that instruction as appropriate.

We know of no problem concerning the ex-prisoners of the Korean War who were taken to India in the custody of the Indian Red Cross pending resettlement in "neutral" countries. During the past year, those ex-prisoners who desired to be settled outside of India have left that country, and those remaining in India are presumably settled there.

P. Soviet Omnibus Item

It has been Soviet practice in recent years to put forward what has come to be known as an "omnibus" resolution which sets forth current Soviet propaganda objectives. It may be expected that any such proposal will be couched in seemingly moderate and reasonable terms calculated to attract the support of those delegations anxious to see a lowering of East-West tensions.

Although we remain ready to cooperate with the Soviet Union and other governments in concrete measures to facilitate a peaceful solution of the various outstanding issues, we believe it is important that the Soviets not be permitted in the guise of an innocuously worded resolution to obscure vital issues and to gain credit for a willingness to negotiate sincerely which is not supported by concrete evidence.

With this in mind, we shall of course examine carefully any Soviet proposal along these lines and will wish to cooperate closely with all non-Soviet delegations on procedures for dealing with any such proposal which are best calculated to maintain our common objectives.

For the Chief of Mission

It is suggested that you make available, at your discretion, this circular to the Embassy PAO for *background information only.*

---

[3] Not printed.

For Latin American Posts Only

The Department is preparing Spanish translations of selected parts of the above circular which the Embassy may wish to present to the Foreign Ministry.[4]

Dulles

---

[4] On October 24, the Embassy in the United Kingdom in despatch 1007 transmitted the "UK Views on Principal Items" at the Eleventh General Assembly; on October 29, the Embassy in Sweden reported in telegram 498 that the Swedish Cabinet had tentatively approved positions on 17 anticipated issues at the General Assembly; on October 30, the Embassy at The Hague reported in telegram 669 that it had discussed the tentative positions on the checklist contained in instruction CA-3343 with the Foreign Office and had received a number of specific comments. (All *ibid.*, Central File 320)

---

36. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, October 26, 1956.

DEAR CABOT: I have been hoping to talk with you regarding our position on the UN contributions scale. Certainly we should discuss this matter before the briefing of the Delegation to the 11th General Assembly.

Meanwhile, I am asking several people here in the Department to meet with me on Tuesday, October 30, for an exchange of views based on the attached paper. You may wish to discuss it in a preliminary way with Mr. Fobes of the Bureau who will be in New York several days next week, and with Mr. Bender of your staff.

Sincerely yours,

Francis

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO Financing. Limited Official Use. A handwritten note by Wilcox on the source text reads: "P.S. If you plan to be in Washington for the cabinet meeting next Friday [November 2] we might organize a meeting so as to get your views. It's very important since it cuts across our participation in the whole UN system." No Cabinet meeting was held prior to November 16. In a memorandum to Sherman Adams, Maxwell M. Rabb, Secretary to the Cabinet, wrote on November 15 that "we have just learned this morning that Mr. Hoover will be going to the United Nations to make a speech at 11:15 tomorrow morning, and therefore, neither he nor Mr. Lodge will be able to attend the Cabinet meeting." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers) Regarding the Washington meeting, see Document 38.

[Attachment] [2]

UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTION SCALE

Problem:

The present position of the United States concerning the United Nations contributions scale is that (1) the Report of the Contributions Committee should *not* be adopted, but rather that (2) the detailed discussion of changes in the scale because of new members should be postponed until the 12th General Assembly and that (3) changes in the present scale should be voted only at the 13th General Assembly. It is proposed that the United States ask at the 11th General Assembly that the issue be kept open and flexible, and that we only intimate that possibly we may want a reduction in our percentage. The effect of such postponements, of course, is to throw contributions of new members into "miscellaneous income" which will serve to reduce everyone's contribution, including that of the United States.

This "delaying" position coupled with uncertainty as to our motives and aims is highly unsatisfactory. Even very friendly countries say that we must make our intentions known, that they cannot agree to postpone decision on an issue where they, in effect, may be turning down certain immediate savings for themselves.

Alternatives:

1. That the U.S. say nothing about the Contributions Committee report in which case its approval would be assured.
2. That the U.S. indicate it is not going to seek an ultimate reduction in its one-third assessment but that the recommendation of the Contributions Committee be deferred until the present scale has run its originally anticipated 3 years (through 1958).
3. That the U.S. will seek a reduction to around 31 per cent and press for immediate action in this respect.
4. That the U.S. will seek at the 12th General Assembly a decision in favor of a reduction in the U.S. percentage. The Contributions Committee would then be instructed to recommend to the 13th General Assembly a new scale implementing this decision. Meanwhile receipts as a result of new memberships could be collected outside the 100 per cent scale and treated as miscellaneous income with all members sharing in proportion to their percentage of the present scale.

---

[2] No drafting information is given on the source text, but presumably it was drafted in IO.

Factors:

The factors to be explored in arriving at a U.S. position would include U.S. relations with other UN members, Congressional and public opinion and support of the UN system, U.S. percentage of contributions to voluntary programs and the specialized agencies and timing, with particular regard to the possibility of approval of Japanese membership and the unlikelihood that there will be any future large scale membership changes which would make a U.S. reduction as "painless" as the present time.

---

37. Memorandum From Richard F. Pedersen of the Mission at the United Nations to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

New York, October 29, 1956.

SUBJECT

Enlargement of Security Council

1. The UK Delegation has concluded that if the US and UK take the initiative in obtaining 30–40 sponsors of a resolution we can obtain an enlargement of the Security Council *this year*, and by *2 only*. They seem convinced that the USSR and India are the only real opponents to a solution this year and that a large Latin American and European sponsorship can be obtained. They think it important to resolve the issue now so that the permanent member question cannot be effectively raised.

2. Our role in this question requires decision on one key point: Whether we will ultimately agree to an allocation of one seat to the "satellites," described by the UK as the "Warsaw Pact" powers, or only to "Eastern Europe." The UK is prepared to agree to a "satellite" seat and assumes we will also. The Department also seems prepared to agree to a "satellite" seat on the assumption this is the only way to achieve agreement on an enlargement and that we do not want to be put in the position of blocking it.

3. Objections you have previously sent to the Department about its position have applied to the tactical point of when we reveal our hand rather than to the policy.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, SC, Membership. Secret. Pedersen was a member of the Political and Security Affairs Staff at the Mission.

4. The dramatic new events in Eastern Europe[2] throw considerable doubt on the feasibility or desirability of agreeing to a "satellite" or "Warsaw Pact" allocation of an Eastern European seat. They also make the USSR case for such an agreement much weaker. Our experience in the past 10 years with the so-called "London Agreement" also argues against any US commitment to allocate the Eastern European seat to the Soviet candidate in advance.

5. The argument for agreeing to such an allocation is (1) that other non-communist countries will think the communist bloc deserves an extra seat in an enlarged Council and will blame us if the USSR refuses to ratify an enlargement because of US refusal to agree to such an allocation, and (2) that two Soviet-controlled votes in a 13 member Security Council would not present us with any real difficulties.

6. On balance I think the disadvantages of agreeing to a "satellite" seat outweigh the disadvantages of not agreeing, although we will undoubtedly receive considerable criticism.

Recommendations:

(1) That we continue to maintain a flexible position on the size of the increase (2 but not ruling out 3), in order to appeal to those desiring enlargement.

(2) That you recommend to the Secretary that the U.S. agree only to an allocation to Eastern Europe, undefined, and that this agreement not be made public until tactical considerations here make it desirable to do so.

(3) That the U.K. should be informed of this decision, when made, at the earliest possible time and that we urge them to take the same attitude, arguing on the basis of the changed situation in Eastern Europe.

(4) If the USSR remains adamant on a "satellite" seat in the GA and we are not supported by the UK, we would have to re-examine this policy at the last minute. However, any signs of weakness before then would be fatal to the objective.

---

[2] Reference is to the uprising in Hungary that broke out during the third week of October 1956.

38. Memorandum From the Senior Adviser on International Organization and Legal Matters to the Mission at the United Nations (Bender) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

New York, October 31, 1956.

SUBJECT

US Contribution to UN Budget

Attached is a letter from Francis Wilcox dated October 26[2] enclosing a discussion paper on the contributions question which was prepared for a meeting held in Washington yesterday. He suggests that he should talk to you about this matter prior to the briefing of our GA Delegation.

Jack Fobes, who was at the Washington meeting (which was attended by Phillips but not by Wilcox), has reported that the consensus concerning the position we should take in the GA was as follows:

1. The US should not strongly attack the Contributions Committee's report but should rather express regret that other possible approaches to the problem were not considered by the Committee.
2. The US should oppose the retroactive application of the Committee's proposed new scale of contributions to 1955 and 1956. We should argue that the old scale should apply until action has been taken by the GA and that contributions received in the meantime should be treated as miscellaneous income. If we succeed on this, we can save a million dollars.
3. The US should accept with regret the Committee's proposed new scale for 1957.
4. The US should take the position that, because of new factors in the situation—primarily the increase in membership—the GA should consider the whole question of the contributions scale at the 1957 GA and should consider the reduction of the US percentage to 30 per cent. Accordingly, the US would ask that the Contributions Committee be instructed to prepare for discussion purposes at the 1957 Assembly a scale based upon a US contribution of 30 per cent (30 per cent is just about the figure we would reach by prorating among the older members the contributions of the new members including Japan).

Recommendation

Since the contributions question will probably come up by the beginning of the third week of the GA, it is essential that we establish a final position as soon as possible. Accordingly, I would like to convey to the Department as soon as possible any reactions you have to the foregoing proposal. In my opinion, the proposal is sound in view of the reactions we have had from other governments with respect to the report of the Contributions Committee.[3]

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Financing. Limited Official Use.

[2] Document 36.

---

[3] Bender's recommendation was incorporated in Delga 160 from New York, November 22, following further discussions with Fobes and other members of the Department. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-2256)

---

39. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 9, 1956—5 p.m.

486. For Acting Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re enlargement SC.

1. There has been dramatic change of attitude here toward USSR in last few days as result its armed intervention in Hungary. US policy toward allocation seats in an enlarged SC as set forth in draft paper dated October 29, 1956[2] should be re-examined with this in mind.

2. I recommend US policy be to agree ultimately to an informal allocation of one seat to Eastern Europe but not to agree that it should be a "satellite" or "Warsaw Pact" or any other Soviet handpicked seat.

3. We should inform UK soonest that this will be our policy and urge them to adopt same attitude, abandoning current willingness support "Warsaw Pact" seat. We should also inform French.

4. We should continue to maintain in public complete flexibility on our attitude toward any "understanding" on an Eastern European allocation until circumstances in GA make it desirable to commit ourselves publicly.

5. We should maintain flexible attitude toward size of enlargement continuing to talk 2 but not ruling out 3 if pressure develops.

6. I recognize USSR may try seize US refusal to support "satellite" allocation as justification blocking increase. They would then try to turn Afro-Asian ire against US on grounds we are blocking agreement by refusing legitimate Soviet request. They could un-

---

[1] Department of State, Central Files, 330/11-956. Confidential; Priority.
[2] Not found, but see Document 37.

doubtedly receive some support this thesis among states who would argue guarantee second Communist seat statistically justifiable.

7. This risk seems reasonable take in view arguments on other side: (1) in light experience of "London gentleman's agreement", it clearly undesirable commit US vote to Soviet candidate in advance as impossible predict changing situation; (2) current unrest in Eastern Europe weakens USSR argument for any particular group of states; (3) geographical allocation Eastern Europe perfectly defensible as normal approach as contrasted USSR proposed "ideological" allocation.

8. On balance I believe our interests best served by this recommended policy and that there is good chance both that USSR can be made to accept Eastern Europeans allocation and that if they do not we will not receive primary onus of preventing enlargement. Flexible US attitude recommended in (5) above toward size increase will help in maintaining good will for US.

Lodge

---

40. Editorial Note

On November 16, Acting Secretary Hoover delivered an address before the Eleventh General Assembly entitled "The Tasks of the Eleventh General Assembly." See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 26, 1956, pages 835–838.

Secretary Dulles indicated in mid-October his wish to address the regular session of the Eleventh General Assembly, and arrangements were made for the Secretary to give his speech on November 15. However, Dulles was stricken by severe illness during the first week of November and was confined to the hospital for several weeks.

41. Note From the Soviet Mission at the United Nations to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

New York, November 21, 1956.

The USSR Mission to UN presents its compliments to the US Mission and, further to its (own) note #483 of October 29th,[2] has the honor to communicate the following:

Beginning on October 23rd, mobs of hostile elements gather regularly each day at the USSR Delegation building in New York and conduct anti-Soviet demonstrations. Crowds of malicious hooligans block the entrance of the Mission building to employees, raining abuses on them. Instances occurred where hooligans who were gathered at the building shouted indecent remarks in Russian and English addressed at diplomatic representatives arriving at the Soviet Delegation building for meetings with the chief of the USSR 11th General Assembly delegation.

On November 19th a group of people, breaking off from a picket line, hindered (prevented) a diplomat of a UN member country from getting into a taxi on leaving the Soviet Mission building.

On November 7th, during a diplomatic reception on the occasion of the USSR national holiday, a crowd of malicious hooligans gathered on the adjacent sidewalks and also directly at entrance of the Mission building hindered the entrance of invited guests. Swearing, shrieks and various kinds of threats were also addressed at them. In the Mission building windows were broken on the first and second stories of the working offices and the walls of the building were soiled with paint.

The USSR Mission to UN, in informing the US Mission to UN of this matter, considers it necessary also to bring the attention of the US Mission to the fact that each such demonstration at the building of the USSR Mission to UN, by elements hostile to the Soviet Union, is favorably lighted in the pages of the American press and radio, which often directly incites the conducting of such demonstrations hostile to the Soviet Union.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Dels, USSR. A notation on the source text reads: "Direct Translation: USSR Mission Note #518" with the date.

[2] Not found; a summary was transmitted in telegram 440 from New York, October 29, which stated in part that the Soviet note charged "attempts by demonstrators in front of Soviet delegation office on October 28 to damage delegation office. Note also protests against other demonstrations during past week." The telegram added that "USUN has requested full police report re Soviet charges." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/10–2956)

The conducting of daily hostile demonstrations at the building of the USSR Mission to UN hinders the normal diplomatic work of the Soviet Mission to UN. They also create a threat to the safety of Mission employees.

The USSR Mission to UN notes that the measures taken by the New York City police authorities are clearly insufficient for the protection of the USSR Mission to UN from hostile demonstrations conducted in the immediate vicinity of the Mission building.

The reason for this appears in the first place to be that the American authorities concerned allow the conduct of daily demonstrations directly at the Mission building and its entrance.

As a result of the stated (facts), the USSR Mission to UN requests the US Mission to UN to take measures, through the competent American authorities, to prevent the occurrence of such hostile demonstrations on the sidewalks in the immediate vicinity of the building and entrance of the USSR Mission to UN and thus to enable the USSR Mission to UN to fulfill its diplomatic functions, as guaranteed by the Headquarters Agreement between the US Government and the UN.

---

42. Discussion Paper Prepared for a Meeting of the Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly[1]

US/A/3764 *New York, November 21, 1956.*

UN SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

Question

The question presented is how the percentage contributions (a total of 6.36 per cent) to the United Nations budget of the sixteen new members admitted to the United Nations last year should be distributed among the sixty "old" members.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, Folder 3760. Official Use Only. No drafting information is given on the source text. However, it is evident that the paper was based on the decisions reached at the Washington meeting of October 30, see Document 38.

Background

1. Ever since the United Nations Preparatory Commission, the United Nations has accepted the principle that assessments should be based broadly upon capacity to pay. The United States has always objected to a strict application of this principle to its assessment.

2. On the basis of this principle it was first proposed that the United States pay 49.89 per cent of the budget. However, the initial assessment approved by the Assembly in 1946 was 39.89 per cent, and it remained at that level until 1950.

3. In 1952 the Assembly accepted the principle that the contribution of the highest contributor should not exceed 33.33 per cent after January 1, 1954. Since that date the United States assessment percentage has remained at 33.33 per cent.

4. The 1955 General Assembly decided that the scale of assessments (including the United States at 33.33 per cent) should remain fixed for three years, namely, 1956, 1957, and 1958. This scale is indicated in the first column of Annex A.

5. The Contributions Committee of the Assembly—an expert committee—met this spring to fix the contributions of the sixteen new members who were admitted after the scale of assessments was fixed at the last General Assembly. This Committee not only fixed the percentage for the new members but also recommended that the percentage assessment of the new members totalling 6.36 per cent be consolidated into the scale by reducing percentage shares of all "old" members except (a) the United States and (b) about twenty countries which pay an assessment of less than .08 per cent.

6. The Contributions Committee recommended that the new scale which is indicated in the second column of Annex A be made retroactive to 1956 and also be applied in 1957 and 1958.

7. The new scale, while affording no relief to the United States, gives to the Soviet Union a percentage reduction of 1.54 per cent which will result in a saving to it of about $750,000.

Attitude of Other Governments

An intensive canvass of the situation both by our embassies in all world capitals and discussions with delegations in New York indicate that a clear majority of delegations generally support the report of the Contributions Committee. This is not surprising since most countries will receive a reduction in their contributions if the new scale recommended by the Committee is adopted. Further, almost all maintain, on the basis of the capacity-to-pay principle, that the United States is under-assessed.

The attitude of other delegations can be expected to harden on this subject when they recognize the magnitude of the cost involved in financing the United Nations Emergency Forces and that these costs will be assessed on the basis of the normal scale of assessments. They undoubtedly will not view kindly a United States effort to reduce its percentage assessment at a time when large new costs are being incurred.

United States Proposal

To meet the situation, we propose in the Fifth Committee to take the position that, although we disapprove the report of the Contributions Committee, the United States will, subject to Congressional approval of the necessary appropriation for its contribution, accept the scale recommended by the Committee for the year 1957 provided:

1. That the scale is not made retroactive to 1956. This means that new members' contributions toward 1956 expenses will be treated as miscellaneous income, and this will save us about $1 million. It will, of course, mean that other members will receive a reduced credit.
2. That it is agreed that the next session of the General Assembly will review all the principles affecting the scale of assessments and, in particular, the arbitrary assessment of the highest contributor. We will state that, at the next session, we will press for a reduction of our contribution to 30 per cent.

Non-Financial Factors to be Considered

1. It should be recognized that the payment by the United States of a large percentage of the United Nations budget adds to its influence in the organization. During the past year both the Syrian and Indian Delegations have mentioned to us the possibility of reducing the United States assessment to 25 per cent in the near future, and these two delegations normally are interested in reducing United States influence in the United Nations.
2. The allocation of professional posts in the United Nations Secretariat among nationals of members is based roughly upon the percentage contribution of the member. Thus, if we reduce our percentage contribution, we automatically will reduce, over a period of time, the percentage of the United States nationals in professional posts.

Annex A

UNITED NATIONS SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR 1956, 1957, AND 1958

Member State	*Percentage fixed by GA in 1955*	*Percentage recommended by Contributions Committee*
Afghanistan	0.06	0.06
Albania		0.04
Argentina	1.28	1.17
Australia	1.80	1.65
Austria		0.36

Member State	*Percentage fixed by GA in 1955*	*Percentage recommended by Contributions Committee*
Belgium	1.38	1.27
Bolivia	0.05	0.05
Brazil	1.20	1.09
Bulgaria		0.14
Burma	0.11	0.10
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	0.53	0.48
Cambodia		0.04
Canada	3.63	3.15
Ceylon		0.11
Chile	0.33	0.30
China	5.62	5.14
Colombia	0.41	0.37
Costa Rica	0.04	0.04
Cuba	0.30	0.27
Czechoslovakia	0.92	0.84
Denmark	0.72	0.66
Dominican Republic	0.05	0.05
Ecuador	0.05	0.05
Egypt	0.40	0.36
El Salvador	0.06	0.06
Ethiopia	0.12	0.11
Finland		0.37
France	6.23	5.70
Greece	0.22	0.20
Guatemala	0.07	0.07
Haiti	0.04	0.04
Honduras	0.04	0.04
Hungary		0.46
Iceland	0.04	0.04
India	3.25	2.97
Indonesia	0.56	0.51
Iran	0.30	0.27
Iraq	0.13	0.12
Ireland		0.19
Israel	0.17	0.16
Italy		2.08
Jordan		0.04
Laos		0.04
Lebanon	0.05	0.05
Liberia	0.04	0.04
Libya		0.04
Luxembourg	0.06	0.06
Mexico	0.77	0.70
Nepal		0.04
Netherlands	1.25	1.15
New Zealand	0.48	0.43
Nicaragua	0.04	0.04
Norway	0.54	0.49
Pakistan	0.60	0.55
Panama	0.05	0.05
Paraguay	0.04	0.04
Peru	0.16	0.15
Philippines	0.45	0.41
Poland	1.70	1.56
Portugal		0.25
Romania		0.50

Member State	*Percentage fixed by GA in 1955*	*Percentage recommended by Contributions Committee*
Saudi Arabia	0.07	0.07
Spain		1.14
Sweden	1.59	1.46
Syria	0.08	0.08
Thailand	0.18	0.16
Turkey	0.69	0.63
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	2.02	1.85
Union of South Africa	0.78	0.71
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	15.28	13.96
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8.55	7.81
United States of America	33.33	33.33
Uruguay	0.18	0.16
Venezuela	0.47	0.43
Yemen	0.04	0.04
Yugoslavia	0.40	0.36

---

43. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

Washington, November 22, 1956—3:30 a.m.

429. UN contributions scale. Re: CA–2288, September 11. US position UN contributions scale now modified from that set forth reference circular. GA discussion begins Monday, November 26, with vote next day. Unless you perceive objection request you approach Foreign Office urge immediate guidance its New York delegation to support following compromise:

(1) US accepts scale recommended by contributions committee to be applied beginning January, 1957, but not retroactively to 1956.

(2) New members would make contributions toward 1956 outside scale and funds thus realized would be treated as miscellaneous income to reduce 1957 requirements and hence level of assessments of all members. Under this plan addressee countries receive relief their 1957 assessments varying $1,120 to $2,240. No such relief available under contributions committee plan.

(3) GA would agree debate bases of cost sharing at 12th Session including consideration reduction arbitrary percentage largest con-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–2256. Official Use Only. Sent to 20 posts.

tributor. Such debate would result new instructions to contributions committee for its 1958 deliberations.

Hoover

---

44. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, Mission Headquarters, New York, November 22, 1956, 9:30 a.m. [1]

US/A/M(SR)/53

Ambassador Lodge opened the meeting and gave the floor to Miss Gough who announced the schedule for the day. The general debate would be resumed and in the afternoon; the Secretary General might deliver his Middle East report to the General Assembly. If not, the general debate would continue. Mr. Barco pointed to the possible need for us to make a statement when the Secretary General delivers his report. In such a statement it might be desirable to give an expression of our support and adherence to the Secretary General's report.

Ambassador Lodge told the Delegation that he had been in Washington yesterday and had brought back the President's best wishes to the members of the Delegation. The President had been most emphatic about the need for the British and French to get out of Egypt immediately.

Mr. Bender made the presentation on the matter of the United Nations scale of assessments. Mr. Bender's remarks referred to the discussion paper which had been distributed to the meeting as Document US/A/3764 dated November 21, 1956. The principal issue was how the percentage contributions of the sixteen new members should be distributed among the sixty "old" members in the light of the Contributions Committee report recommending reductions for all significant contributors except the U.S. The U.S. position was to have the new members' contribution treated as miscellaneous income this year, and to obtain a subsequent revision in the scale of assessments which would bring our share down to about 30%.

Mr. Fobes suggested that if the Secretary General asks for an advance contribution to the costs of the United Nations Expeditionary Force our problem in putting across the U.S. position on assessment would be much more difficult. Mr. Fobes had already had some questions—some countries were asking whether our stand on the Committee report would have any bearing on our contributions to U.N. voluntary programs.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Master Files, US/A/M(SR)/1—. Confidential. Drafted on November 26.

Ambassador Jones[2] reported that his staff had surveyed the attitudes of other members of the Fifth Committee. The best we could expect would be that revision be delayed for another year. There should be a better chance of reducing the U.S. contribution next year.

Ambassador Lodge related that when Senator Vandenberg[3] was a member of the U.S. Delegation serving on the Fifth Committee, he had told Mr. Lodge that the "capacity-to-pay" concept had been authored by Mr. Paul Appleby, a U.S. national in the Secretariat. Senator Vandenberg had found himself confronted by a formula whereby the United States would pay one-half the costs. In Senator Vandenberg's view, this had caused the U.S. a disconcerting loss of bargaining power. Mr. Vandenberg had finally been able to maintain the position which is still the basis of the U.S. Delegation's stand today. On the size of the U.S. contribution, Ambassador Lodge had originally opposed going below the one-third point because there was a certain psychology in our contributing one-third. He now questioned, however, how we could accept the Soviet's getting a reduction and the U.S. not. He wondered whether we could settle at 31%.

Mr. Bender interpolated that with the election of Japan the total share of new members would be brought to something over 9%. Giving us the benefit of ⅓ of this would result in our assessment coming down to 30%. Senator Knowland[4] reported that the sentiment in Congress was that the U.S. share should be closer to 25%. He felt there would be great resistance to the U.S. not getting a fair share of the reduction. Senator Knowland felt that we all had a job to educate our colleagues in the United Nations, on the nature of our separation of powers, that the Executive branch could not commit the Legislative to any given figure, and therefore that the United States could not be assessed. Only the Congress could appropriate funds. Perhaps we ought to put in our committee statement a disclaimer that any assessment of the United States out of our treasury was automatic. In this context it was well to remember that we contributed in Korea 90% of the resources and something like 90% of the manpower.

---

[2] Richard Lee Jones, Ambassador to Liberia and Alternate Representative at the United Nations, 1956.

[3] Arthur H. Vandenberg (R–Mich.), 1928–1951.

[4] William F. Knowland (R–Calif.).

Mr. Greenbaum[5] thought it was not wise to quote a specific figure of 30%. Why not simply give notice that we were seeking a "reduction"? It would be better not to mention the amount, thereby leaving us maximum flexibility. Ambassador Lodge felt that if we said 30% it did not foreclose our going below that figure. Mr. Fobes cited the exact language of the Department's instructions to the effect that the 30% level would be one of the alternatives and the one for which we would press.

Ambassador Lodge requested Ambassador Jones to draw up a careful statement for the benefit of the other members of the Committee explaining how the United States constitutional system works, emphasizing that the Congress is the only source of money. It should make clear the difference between our system and the parliamentary system where executive and legislative powers are commingled in the same people. Ambassador Lodge urged that Foreign Service Officers whether here or in the field also should undertake to explain how our appropriation system works. We were never committed to any amount until Congress actually appropriated the money. Ambassador Lodge felt that it would be a real injustice if the windfall coming from the admission of the 16 new members did not result in a reduction of our contribution. He had never regarded the "capacity-to-pay" formula as sacred at all, even though we were stuck with it. He urged Ambassador Jones to put the opponents of a U.S. reduction on the defensive.

Senator Knowland reiterated that the feeling in Congress was strong about assessments of the United States for international organizations. He recalled that last year the State Department had made some recommendations and that the Congress had over-turned them. Even though it was under a Republican Administration, the action of Congress had been thoroughly bipartisan. Ambassador Lodge thought that it was important in explaining our system, to demonstrate that when Congress reduced or disallowed a U.S. assessment, we had not "welched" on any agreement; it was simply the way our system worked.

The meeting adjourned at 9:55.

---

[5] Edward S. Greenbaum, lawyer, former army officer, and Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General (1938); Alternate Representative at the United Nations, 1956.

45. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 28, 1956—2 p.m.

Delga 210. Re conversation with Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov and Sobolev (USSR) came to see me on November 27 at their request. They took up following three items:

1. Security Council enlargement.

Kuznetsov said USSR was not enthusiastic about enlarging SC. He referred to exclusion Eastern European representatives from Council and to "violation" gentlemen's agreement on allocation seats in Council. USSR might be prepared go along with increase of two, but could not justify enlargement unless it clear there would be EE seat. There would have to be some kind of understanding or agreement that would be on more definite basis than allocation in past. Sobolev said this did not need to be done in Charter but might be accomplished by GA resolution or report.

I pointed out that, of course, our attitude was so-called gentlemen's agreement had only been applicable for one session but that I understood what they were interested in for future.

I inquired what they meant include in EE. Kuznetsov replied they were thinking of what they called "peoples democracies", including Yugoslavia. In response to further question, he said they had not thought of Greece, Turkey or Finland. I told him I had no instructions on this question but would seek them immediately.

Kuznetsov also asked whether we had considered possible increase in permanent members. I told him we had not and asked what he had in mind, observing there might be number of claimants. Kuznetsov admitted there might be other aspirants but noted that at the present time there was only one big power in UN that was not permanent or non permanent member of SC, and that was India. In subsequent statement referring to an increase to "7 or 8" non permanent members, he implied increase of two might include one non permanent member and India as permanent member.

[Here follows discussion on the election to fill the Yugoslav seat on the Security Council and disarmament.]

Dept's instructions requested on (1) allocation of SC seat to EE (see mytel 486[2]), (2) timing GA disarmament discussions and next session disarmament commission, and (3) US attitude toward discussions with USSR here on disarmament.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/11–2856. Secret.

[2] Document 39.

Lodge

---

46. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, Mission Headquarters, New York, November 29, 1956, 9:30 a.m.[1]

US/A/M/(SR)/55

Ambassador Lodge opened the meeting with an announcement that he had received word last night from the Department that they were making progress and that we should be ready soon to go ahead with new steps on the Hungarian situation, perhaps tomorrow. Miss Gough announced that there would be only one item for discussion at this Delegation meeting, since a number of delegates were busy with negotiations which required shortening the meeting.

On the one item--the Scale of Assessments—Mr. Bender led off the discussion. The issue was that of how the percentage contributions of the new member states to the UN budget would be distributed among the old members. Although opposed to the inequity of the Contributions Committee report, the U.S. Delegation had accepted the proposed new scale for 1957 as recommended in the report. In addition to opposing retroactive application of the scale to 1956, we had objected to the adoption of the same scale for 1958. We favored, rather, a full debate on the scale of assessments at the next session of the General Assembly.

With regard to our resolution presented in the Fifth Committee, the reaction was even less sympathetic than we had expected, despite our own feeling that we had made a real compromise in dropping our opposition to the '57 scale. The only delegations to speak in favor of our resolution were those of the United Kingdom, Canada, Burma, and Iraq. Argentina had spoken against our resolution and the Chinese had not supported us, wanting instead a reduction of their own contributions. Mr. Bender thought it was clear that we could not win our fight against retroactive assessments for 1956 and suggested that we drop it. Committee 5 still wanted to vote the same scale for 1958 but we had a chance to defeat that.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Master Files, US/A/M(SR)/1—. Confidential.

Our instructions from the Department were to accept the scale for 1957 but to make a fight on the 1958 scale and to press for a full debate in the next session.

Ambassador Lodge asked whether he was correct in believing that the Headquarters Agreement had not committed us to any particular percentage contribution. Mr. Bender cited the Charter provision in Article 17 that the General Assembly "shall" apportion the expenses of the organization among the members. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the General Assembly only recommends; its recommendations were not legally binding action. Mr. Bender then called attention to Article 19 of the Charter which provides for withholding the vote of a member nation if its arrears equals the amount of its contributions for the preceding two full years. In this context, it was notable that the Soviet Union had said it would not be bound by any assessment for the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force.

Ambassador Lodge recorded his feeling that the Committee's refusal to vote a share in the reduction to the United States was "outrageously unfair." Senator Knowland wanted it understood that he as a Senator was not bound by any such concept as that prevailing in the Committee. He said that Ambassador Jones yesterday had made it clear that the United States could not be assessed without the consent of Congress. Senator Knowland did not want any misunderstanding later; it must be made clear that the General Assembly could not bind Congress.

Mr. Bender pointed out that if the General Assembly approves the Committee recommendations over our objection, it then becomes at least a question of complying with the General Assembly recommendation. Ambassador Lodge thought the question was rather how much unfairness we could tolerate. The other delegations appeared not to know what they were doing—other things would be affected by refusing the United States a share in the reduction. In terms of dollars our fair share of the reduction would be small. After all we could financially afford to pay 100% of the budget but this in Ambassador Lodge's view, was a matter of principle. Mr. Hoffman asked whether our failure to pay all that the General Assembly had "assessed" us for two years would mean that then we had to get out.

Mr. Bender reminded the delegation that today we would vote against any commitment on the 1958 assessments. Ambassador Lodge said that if we were defeated in Committee, we would take it to the Plenary session. We must educate the other delegations; even with regard to the retroactive scale for 1956. Mr. Lodge's own feeling would have been not to go along. Mr. Bender thought in accepting the 1956 scale we had a better chance of blocking the scale as recommended for 1958. Ambassador Bunker considered the scale "inequitable" and favored arguing it out. Ambassador Wadsworth thought it was also unfair that some fifty other member nations had their contributions reduced while we had not. Ambassador Lodge doubted that the Committee could have handled the matter in a way more offensive to the United States.

In answer to Ambassador Bunker's question, Mr. Bender estimated that our fair share of the reduction would be about $1,000,000. Ambassador Jones was in favor of "standing by our guns". We should give them the facts of life; we ought to let them know now how we stand.

Mrs. Lord asked whether we were authorized to tell the Technical Assistance, UNICEF and other groups what we thought the psychological effect would be on our contributions to other voluntary program budgets. Ambassador Lodge said that in doing so, we must give the idea that we are generous, but not to be imposed upon, not to be discriminated against. Mr. Sears expressed the feeling that it was undignified for us even to talk about it. He was ready to urge that Senator Knowland tell the General Assembly that the United States Congress simply would not vote for any such unfair assessment. Ambassador Lodge thought such a step as Mr. Sears proposed would require some thinking about; it might defeat our purpose. Senator Knowland stressed that we must make the record clear. The Senator promised that he would "raise hell in Congress" and that was the most conservative statement he could make.

Mr. Bender surmised that the figure of 33.1% as the United States share, formerly regarded as a ceiling, was now considered by others to be a floor. The other delegations appeared to be giving no thought to anything but looking out for their own treasuries. Senator Knowland warned that passing the proposed scale would set a precedent and the other delegations ought to know that Congress can get arbitrary too. Mr. Fobes expressed the opinion that we had been able to make ourselves clear about the 1956 and 1957 scales. It would be better to concentrate on gaining votes with regard to the 1958 scale. Ambassador Lodge thought that we need not insist on voting against but we must make our position clear that we cannot defend such a thing before any representative group of Americans. It was folly for the Committee to be bureaucratic when this matter of principle was involved.

Before closing the meeting Ambassador Lodge congratulated Mr. Bunker on his appointment as Ambassador to India, which had been announced by the White House yesterday. Ambassador Bunker said that he was looking forward to a most interesting assignment in India. Ambassador Wadsworth asked Mr. Bunker whether he could take back to New Delhi with him the controversial head of the Indian Delegation. Ambassador Lodge assured Mr. Bunker that he would get immediate confirmation by the Senate if he would do so.

The meeting adjourned at 10:10.

---

47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, December 3, 1956—5:04 p.m.

294. Urtel 486. [2] Dept agrees desirable maintain flexibility respect both East European allocation and size increase SC. However, two-seat increase SC, rather than three, indicated if we to avoid Latin American demand for increase to four, thus open flood gates for further demands other areas. Therefore it our view del should continue talk terms of two-seat increase unless or until becomes evident necessary majority GA favors larger increase.

Dept also agrees allocation seat to Eastern Europe clearly preferable allocation to "Warsaw Pact" countries. Del should argue that (1) commitment based on criterion of "treaty relationship" or of control by one country over another obviously inconsistent Charter and sound policy; (2) allocation one seat East Europe should be geographical rather than ideological, as true in other areas; (3) present situation East Europe requires maximum flexibility be retained re candidacies that area; and (4) recent Soviet actions in Hungary, including stubborn disregard GA recommendations, militates against world community conceding USSR right select incumbent East European seat.

However, in view Delgas 210 and 230 [3] USSR may be expected oppose enlargement plan envisaging allocation to "Eastern Europe" rather than "People's Democracies". Evident USSR plans Phil election issue as leverage and uncertainty EE seat question also affecting support some Latin Americans for Phil candidacy. Dept believes not clear that USSR rather than US would actually bear onus preventing enlargement if USSR blocks increase size SC because our refusal accept Warsaw Pact allocation. Since considerable pressure for enlargement must be anticipated and US relations with other key areas may be very uncomfortable unless enlargement attained, US should not take position at this time which would wholly preclude some eventual compromise. If del finds outcome Phil election endangered or USSR unwilling accept enlargement without assurances and that this position is winning wide support among other dels primarily interested enlargement SC, del should promptly consult Dept.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/11–956. Confidential. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

[2] Document 39.

[3] Delga 210 is printed as Document 45. Delga 230, November 29, reported mounting opposition within various Latin American delegations to the Philippines' candidacy for the Security Council seat being vacated by Yugoslavia. Lodge wrote that Urrutia of the Colombian Delegation "said Soviets prepared accept corollary to present agreement whereby two new seats would go to Western Europe and Asia, with present Yugoslav seat remaining allocated Eastern Europe." (Department of State, Central Files, 330/11–2956)

Dulles

---

48. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, December 6, 1956—9 p.m.

Delga 279. Verbatim text. Re increase in SC. Following is text draft resolution being considered by LA's:[2]

"The GA,

"Having regard to the present increased membership of the UN and to the functions of the SC,

"Considering that, in order to give due regard to the contribution of members of the UN which are not permanent members of the SC to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization, and also in order to give due regard to equitable geographical distribution, it is desirable to increase the number of non-permanent members of the SC,

"1. Adopts the following amendments to the Charter, and submits them for ratification to the members of the UN:

"A. Paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter shall read:

"'1. The SC shall consist of thirteen members of the UN. The Republic of China, France, and the USSR, the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the USA shall be permanent members of the SC. The GA shall elect eight other members of the UN to be non-permanent members of the SC, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.'

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–656. Limited Official Use; Priority.

[2] Delga 273 from New York, December 6, reported, in part, "USGADel understands LA's plan introduce within next day or two draft resolution providing for increase of two in non-permanent seats SC." (*Ibid.*)

"B. In Article 23 the following new paragraph 3 shall be inserted, and the former paragraph 3 shall be renumbered 4:

"'3. Of the two additional non-permanent members first elected after the entry into force of the amendment increasing the size of the SC from eleven to thirteen, one shall be replaced at the next and one at the second regular election thereafter, their terms expiring at the same times as those of the other non-permanent members replaced at those elections.'

"C. Paragraph 2 of Article 27 shall read:

"'2. Decisions of the SC on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of eight members.'

"D. Paragraph 3 of Article 27 shall read:

"'3. Decisions of the SC on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of eight members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under Paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.'

"E. These amendments shall be inoperative unless, within three years from the date of their adoption by the GA, they shall have been ratified as required by the Charter for entry into force.

"2. Urges all members of the UN to ratify the above amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, with the least possible delay;

"3. Decides to fill the seats of the two non-permanent members added to the Council by the above amendments as soon as possible after the amendments have entered into force, and if necessary to hold a special session of the GA for that purpose."

Wadsworth

49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, December 8, 1956—5:26 p.m.

Gadel 56. Re Delga 273.[2] Del authorized at appropriate time join co-sponsors of LA resolution reported Delga 279, conditional on revision draft resolution along lines set forth separate telegram.

Dept does not however concur suggestions in Delga 273 re allocation problem. Suggested preambular and operative paragraphs appear to us ambiguous view absence agreement on present allocation. Possibility cannot be discounted for example, that under this proposal USSR would claim two seats for Eastern Europe since it does not agree on Philippine eligibility succeed Yugoslavia. Moreover, amendment Charter ostensibly (though not in fact) in order give one seat Eastern Europe difficult explain and defend publicly. Our view it desirable establish any system allocations it may be necessary accept in terms allocation all eight non-permanent seats and not just two new seats. We also doubt explicit allocation two new seats only would be acceptable other areas which would then have to continue rely so-called "gentleman's agreement."

Dept further believes proposal in Delga 273 would not "head off" Soviet insistence on agreement covering more specific allocation. Obviously this presents serious difficulties for US, but it appears to Dept we will have to permit spelling out states comprising Eastern Europe if US to avoid onus for Soviet refusal ratify any Charter amendment increasing size SC. On assumption spelling out unavoidable, it our view we should seek least objectionable form for such spelling out. Dept sees four alternative methods by which spelling out could take place.

1. Another "gentlemen's agreement". While an agreement reached between US and USSR or among all permanent SC members would minimize difficulties multipartite negotiation such agreement even if in fact written and publicized has overtones side deal. US would be directly involved in arrangement that fails reflect true situation which is that initiative and drive for agreement meet USSR demands originates with vast majority not including US.

2. Statement by GA President for inclusion plenary record spelling out consensus concerning allocation eight non-permanent seats. This procedure might provide USSR adequate assurance and would permit tacit US acquiesence without direct involvement new "gentlemen's agreement". US could give its assurance if pressed to do so, it would not act contrary to the consensus stated by GA President by

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–656. Confidential; Priority. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

proposing or campaigning for any candidate to deprive Eastern Europe of its seat.

3. GA resolution, together with a consensus statement by GA President spelling out the states considered to be included in Eastern Europe, along following lines:

> "*Desiring* to assure equitable geographical distribution in the representation of non-permanent members on the Security Council,
>
> "*Recommends* that in elections following the coming into force of the present amendments, Member States act on the principle that the following constitutes an equitable geographical distribution: Latin America—2, British Commonwealth—1, Western Europe—2, Eastern Europe—1, Middle East—1, and Far East—1.

4. A GA resolution simply allocating all eight non-permanent seats and spelling out what is meant by Eastern Europe. Advantage procedures 3. and 4. is that US could make clear its position in debate, abstain in the voting out of deference majority view, and then indicate intention be guided by GA recommendation as understood by GA majority. Disadvantage of 4. is may give rise to pressures spell out states comprising other areas besides Eastern Europe.

Statement of consensus or GA resolution tends avoid appearance side deal or US initiative and direct involvement in meeting USSR demands. Both methods can maximize pressure for geographical spelling out rather than a formulation based on criterion "Soviet control". As indicated Delga 272, [3] resolution holds possibility two-thirds majority reversal.

These alternatives presented for Delegation's consideration if and when it becomes clear to Delegation that further adherence original position will place onus preventing enlargement squarely on US. Dept believes Delegation can best assess Soviet position. [4]

Dulles

---

[3] Delga 272 contained the U.S. United Nations Mission's Information Digest No. 116, which summarized the General Assembly's debate on Security Council expansion. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.5/12–556)

[4] In Gadel 57, December 8, the Department made several further drafting suggestions to the Latin American proposals in order to avoid difficulties regarding Chinese representation. (*Ibid.*, 330/12–656)

50. Note From the Soviet Mission at the United Nations to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

No. 556 *New York, December 12, 1956.*

The USSR Delegation to the UN presents its compliments to the US Mission to UN and has the honor to register a protest based on the assault by anti-Soviet hooligan elements on women employees of the Delegation, which took place on December 11th, at 7:30 in the evening, at the corner of Park Avenue and 69th Street. The circumstances of the assault were such that it evidently had been planned in advance, since, at the approach of the group of Soviet employees, one of the attackers stepped out of an automobile standing on the corner and at the same moment another one popped out from the corner of 69th Street.

The attackers attempted to do bodily injury to a Delegation employee who was accompanying the women, A. Nikolaev, and tore his outer clothing. In regard to the three women Delegation employees, the hooligans used abusive censurable expressions. The hooligans were not arrested by the police guarding the Delegation building.

In calling the attention of the US Mission to UN to these hostile and entirely inexcusable acts and to the fact that they went unpunished, the USSR Delegation to UN requests the Mission to take appropriate measures for the protection of Delegation employees and for the prevention of further similar attacks.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Dels, USSR. Translation.

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, December 13, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Longshoremen's Boycott of Communist Freight

PARTICIPANTS

Commissioner Felix, New York City Department of Labor
Commissioner Rothblatt, New York City Department of Commerce
Captain Bradley, Head of the ILA (Int'l Longshoremen's Association)
Mr. Gleason, Organizer of the ILA
Mr. Daniel Goott, Department of State
Mr. Robert Blake, Department of State
James Pratt, USUN

Two State Department officers, Mr. Goott (G) and Mr. Blake (EE) came to New York yesterday for a pre-arranged interview with representatives of the ILA and of the New York City administration for the purpose of discussing the effect which the recently announced ILA boycott of Communist goods will have on official shipments to Soviet and satellite missions in the US. They made it clear to Captain Bradley and Mr. Gleason that the State Department takes no official stand regarding the boycott insofar as it affects commercial cargoes. The only interest of the State Department is to attempt to ensure that official shipments consigned to the Soviet and satellite missions here will not be interfered with. The reason for our concern is the thinly veiled threat which Soviet representatives in Moscow and also in the UN have made to the effect that they will retaliate against our missions in Eastern Europe if their shipments are interfered with here.

Captain Bradley said he now understood the problem. He had been working under the impression that the State Department was going to attempt to persuade the longshoremen to lift the boycott completely. He said, however, that this was a matter which would have to be taken up with the whole ILA membership and promised that he would do so at the first opportunity. This opportunity will come at a meeting on Monday (12/17). He therefore asked if the Department could send him a letter[2] explaining the situation. Mr. Goott and Mr. Blake promised to do so through the medium of Commissioner Felix.

Because an article written by Victor Riesel in the *Daily Mirror* charged that the State Department was seeking to pressure the longshoremen into lifting the boycott completely, Commissioner

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Dels, USSR. Official Use Only. Drafted by Pratt.

[2] Not found.

Felix declared that he had received inquiries from a number of papers and he felt it would be necessary to make a statement on the subject. Accordingly, he and Mr. Goott agreed on a line explaining that the Department's interest was confined to official traffic. This was the origin of stories which appeared in some papers today on the subject.

---

52. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, December 14, 1956—9 p.m.

Delga 350. Enlargement Security Council.

I. UK, France and U.S. delegations agreed today ad referendum on amendment to LA resolution on SC enlargement for joint proposal to USSR. As enlargement SC item continues on GA agenda Monday and inasmuch as clarification final USSR attitude is crucial to smooth handling in GA, UK and France feel strongly we should present this to USSR tomorrow (Saturday). Department's instructions therefore requested tomorrow morning.

Intention in 4-power meeting would be to make further attempt to have Kuznetsov (USSR) produce his own formula and to give him this only if, as we expect, he does not do so. In return for our agreement on EE allocation, three delegations intend to seek USSR commit itself to enlargement by two and no more. Humphrey has already made clear to Kuznetsov that U.S. would not be prepared to reach agreement with USSR on SC question if it maintains adamant attitude on Chinese issue. Introduction this amendment would therefore have to await such clarification. We informed UK and French that we had been authorized to co-sponsor another version of EE allocation with USSR and presume this authorization would apply to a new version if Department approved.

II. Agreed text reads as follows:

"Recommends in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter, that if these amendments become operative, member states should in future elections allocate one non-permanent seat to the countries of Eastern Europe, one additional non-permanent seat to the countries of Western and Southern Europe and one additional non-permanent seat to the countries of Africa and Asia, while preserving in respect to the other five non-permanent seats the pattern of allocation that has prevailed hitherto."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12-1456. Confidential; Priority.

Senator Humphrey and staff strongly recommend Department approve this text without changes. We recognize some parts of text may be subsequently altered by amendments but believe this text would put us in best possible negotiating position.

Text designed to meet following purposes:

1. It relies on Charter provisions as reason for its adoption rather than on fact of increase.
2. It makes recommendation to member states on voting pattern rather than attempting to allocate directly.
3. It specifically mentions Eastern Europe, and U.S. willingness to co-sponsor and speak for should give USSR adequate assurance we are prepared to act in accordance with it.
4. Phraseology "one additional non-permanent seat" is designed to create favorable attitude toward recommendation, particularly with Afro-Asians. This phraseology requires putting Far Eastern and Middle Eastern countries into one grouping, but we feel this phraseology provides negotiating advantage.
5. Foregoing does not list current allocation or future allocation of other non-permanent seats while at same time confirming it. UK is most anxious not to list allocation in straightforward manner as it feels it might lose commonwealth seat if major GA debate rose over such listing.
6. Combination of allocation of seat to EE and preservation of allocation for other five non-permanent seats in pattern which has "prevailed hitherto" protects ambiguity definition Eastern Europe and makes clear that EE seat, if Council expanded, would be Philippines 1957 seat. Word "hitherto" includes election of Philippines. Pattern allocation of other non-permanent seats has never varied. USSR claims EE allocation was broken in 1951 while we have been saying here there was always EE space until Philippines elected.

By this formula we can admit EE allocation has not prevailed without admitting when change was made.[2]

Lodge

---

[2] The Department replied in two telegrams. Gadel 69, December 15, authorized the U.S. Delegation to proceed with consulations on the basis proposed in the amendment reported in Delga 350, provided the amendment was revised to read "One non-permanent seat to the countries of the Far East." The draft amendment "as it now stands does not allocate seat Far East which one of basic considerations our thinking this matter." (*Ibid.*) Gadel 75, December 17, stated: "Dept considers highly desirable that any allocation formula agreed upon be acceptable Far Eastern members. Subject this condition, Dept would accept formulation contained Delga 350 but prefers formulation 'one non-permanent seat to countries of Asia.'" (*Ibid.*)

53. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, December 17, 1956—2 p.m.

1477. Gromyko asked me to come see him this morning at 11 o'clock. He said he wished take up with me orally situation in New York concerning Soviet Mission to UN. On October 29 and again on November 21[2] Soviet Delegation had sent notes to USDel protesting against hostile demonstrations by what Gromyko called "anti-Soviet elements" and requesting that measures be taken by American authorities prevent repetition of what he termed "interference with normal functioning Soviet mission to UN."

Gromyko mentioned that on November 7 windows had been broken in mission and building smeared with paint, that also these "elements" had on some occasions sought forcibly prevent entrance by visitors to Soviet Mission, including representatives other countries. These demonstrations and hostile actions against Soviet Mission New York had every time been heavily played up in sensational form by U.S. press. Despite these two notes U.S. authorities had not taken appropriate measures and these actions which not only interfered with normal work of mission but also threatened security its personnel continued and, according Gromyko, occurred almost daily. If actions were not taken remedy this situation Ministry Foreign Affairs would find it necessary publish facts in this matter, the Soviet notes of protest and, as he put it, failure U.S. authorities take any action. Gromyko said therefore he was asking me request my Government take immediate necessary measures permit normal functioning Soviet Mission in New York, adding Ministry did not wish give publicity this matter here since, he said, it would arouse "legitimate indignation" Soviet public opinion and affect "attitude" of population of capital to Embassy here. I made Gromyko repeat last statement and inquired if that meant demonstrations would be organized against Embassy, pointing out that such demonstrations, including violation diplomatic immunity, had occurred British, French and Israeli Missions here. Gromyko would not go beyond his statement about indignation and attitude Moscow population to Embassy. He emphasized, however, Ministry wished if possible avoid necessity publication [*publicity*].

I told Gromyko I would of course bring his démarche to attention my Government, but I was sure he realized that right of peaceful demonstration or assembly was protected by law in U.S., but that any acts violence or physical interference with normal work Mission, security its personnel was quite another matter and I was sure necessary precautions had been taken by New York authorities. I asked him if there had been any repetition of window-breaking or other acts similar nature against Mission since those November 7, to which he replied in the negative but said that interference with visitors still continued, and he felt there were many ways interfering with normal work Mission apart from acts of what he termed "hooliganism".

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–1756. Confidential. Repeated to USUN.

[2] See Document 41 and footnote 2 thereto.

From what Gromyko said to me apparently Soviets do not intend give any publicity this matter pending receipt of reply to this démarche. Threat of demonstrations against Embassy here in event unsatisfactory reply is unmistakable, but I would strongly recommend that this possibility should not be allowed to affect our reply which should be solely on merits. If such demonstrations occur I can assure Department Embassy will be able take it in stride, although in view emphasis placed by Gromyko on this point in regard Mission New York they might conceivably interfere with normal function Embassy.

I believe in circumstances it would be advisable give prompt reply Gromyko indicating measures that have been taken, which I assume to be case, by New York authorities to permit normal functioning Soviet Mission, and such assurances for future as may be appropriate in circumstances. Gromyko went some length emphasize Ministry's reluctance to publicize, and I believe chief point of démarche was to remedy situation New York. However, in view Soviet resolution UN against us it is conceivable, regardless nature our reply, Soviets intend to work up some demonstrations as part increasing anti-US propaganda here.

Except for Guthrie, I am not informing members staff and hope Department will keep confidential.

Message unsigned

54. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, December 18, 1956—8 p.m.

Delga 370. Re: SC enlargement.

1. Fol is text of draft res submitted by Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, Lebanon, Indonesia, Burma, Ethiopia, Ceylon, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, India and Syria tonight. Not clear whether they intend to ask for priority or allow LA resolution come to vote first:

The General Assembly,

Having regard to the increase in the membership of the United Nations and the developments in the status and role of member states since the adoption of the Charter, and having regard to the nature of the functions of the Security Council,

Considering that, in order to give due regard to the increasing contribution of the generality of member states of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purpose of the organization, and to equitable geographical distribution, it is desirable to increase the number of members of the Security Council,

Considering further that adequate and appropriate increase in the number of members of the Security Council requires an amendment of the United Nations Charter and the resolving of diverse important views and interests, which can be best effected after the necessary studies and discussions have been made,

Decides to appoint a Committee of 15 members to study, in the light of the deliberations of the Assembly, this matter in all its aspects, and report to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly.

2. We plan to do systematic check in morning among Afro-Asian countries on their willingness to vote for increase of two if this resolution defeated (on assumption it will be put to vote first as procedural resolution).

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–1856. Official Use Only; Priority.

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

Washington, December 20, 1956—3:10 p.m.

751. Your 1477. [2] Dept has approached New York Police Commissioner for full report. As much of following preliminary report as you desire may be used as basis preliminary reply Gromyko: [3]

Picketing has taken place at 680 Park Avenue one hour daily since Oct. 24. At all times during picketing adequate detail of uniformed police present plus plainclothes detectives mingling with demonstrators to prevent disorder. Policy keep sidewalk lane clear next to building. During times when conditions normal in vicinity building, two uniformed patrolmen are assigned there at all hours. Special additional radio patrol car assigned to precinct instructed give special attention 680 Park Avenue.

Soviet UN Del reported interference with Soviet diplomats entering building October 26. Investigation revealed misunderstanding. Incident did not in fact take place, but Soviet officials were apprehensive that might.

October 28 two women and one man arrested and charged with having thrown soda bottles at building breaking one pane glass. Representative Soviet Delegation declined press charges. Case dismissed for under United States law complaining witness is required for conviction.

At November 7 reception approximately 150 police were on hand but were unable prevent minor damage. Soviet Del expressed general satisfaction police protection to United States Del in note dated November 9. [4]

December 11 two Hungarian pickets arrested for assaulting one Soviet male officer who was accompanied by three Soviet women in vicinity building shortly after leaving it. However, again charges were dropped because complaining witnesses failed to appear.

You may wish again point out to Gromyko that although peaceful assembly and demonstrations permitted under laws of United States, New York Police Department has assured Federal Government that it will give continued special attention to 680 Park

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–2056. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN. Signed for the Secretary by Robert O. Blake, Acting Officer in Charge of USSR Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

[2] Document 53.

[3] Much of the detailed information that follows was supplied to the Department by the Mission at the United Nations in telegram 532 from New York, December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–1856)

[4] Not printed.

Avenue to prevent any disorderly or unlawful acts threat, and will take prompt and proper police action should any violation of law be observed or brought to their attention in that location. Such unlawful acts, of course, include damage to persons or property, and police responsibility includes assurance of freedom of movement entering or leaving building.

In your discretion you may also add in such language and with such emphasis as you may consider useful that adverse publicity these matters in United States due to wide spread revulsion among all elements of American people to developments in Hungary and that New York Police Commissioner has come under considerable criticism for large sums expended in protection Soviet Delegation.

FYI: Department believes Gromyko démarche related to Striganov call on Murphy Dec. 17 to reject our protest over Soviet interference with access to Legation Budapest.

Copies above police reports and further to be received this subject will be pouched for Embassy's use. Summaries of latter will be cabled. Department is attempting avoid publicity this matter.

Dulles

---

56. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, December 20, 1956—9 p.m.

Delga 386. Re SC enlargement.

1. Necessary votes for LA res disappeared this afternoon with crystallization strong Asian attitude against it. This probably resulted from second firm USSR speech that it did not intend to ratify until Chi rep problem solved and reluctance Asians accept only one new seat. They can see no point in voting for solution not really acceptable to them when they think nothing will come of it anyway. This particularly affects FE states who were previously prepared go reluctantly along.

2. A-A's and LA's have agreed that decision on item should be postponed until after recess. UK and France have agreed also and we have taken position we will support LA attitude as this is their resolution.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12-2056. Confidential; Priority.

3. If item postponed, as now seems probable, issue will undoubtedly receive renewed consideration over recess by all Dels. We plan to consider factors involved and report our further views to Dept tomorrow for consideration in any review Dept intends undertake.

Lodge

---

57. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, December 22, 1956—3 p.m.

1525. Zakharov's reaction to oral statement which I made to him (Embtel 1519 [2]) transmitting information contained Deptel 751 made plain Soviet Government had determined to regard any reply as unsatisfactory and would indicate second possible motivation penultimate paragraph Embtel 1477 [3] correct. I read information contained reference telegram and then carefully checked interpreter who gave completely accurate rendering in Russian. I then emphasized directly to Zakharov assurances received from New York Police Department to continue special attention to Soviet delegation premises in order to prevent any disorderly or unlawful acts which would interfere with their work.

Zakharov then made three points in regard to statement, (1) fact that, what he termed hostile anti-Soviet, demonstrations occurred one hour daily indicated these were not spontaneous but organized, (2) that incident of December 11 when he said Soviet women were insulted and "hooliganism" was committed against male Soviet employee, showed these demonstrations could not be called peaceful, (and here Zakharov gave whole show away by reading from typewritten paper he had in folder) that U.S. authorities obviously do not wish to offer proper protection against hostile demonstrations interfering with work of mission and although, as indicated December 17, Ministry hoped avoid publicity, they now had no recourse in light of information but to publish notes and other material regarding this matter which would not pass "unnoticed" by Soviet opinion and could not but affect attitude of population of capital toward American embassy in Moscow.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–2256. Confidential; Niact.

[2] Telegram 1519, December 21, reported that Bohlen had requested a meeting with Gromyko and was told that he was not available but that Zakharov would see him. It continues "Accordingly, I am seeing him tomorrow morning and will use all material reftel with exception complaints against police, which I feel would be misunderstood and to no purpose. Will report Zakharov's reaction," (*Ibid.*, 310.361/12–2156) Reftel is telegram 751, Document 55.

[3] Document 53.

I told Zakharov I had informed Mr. Gromyko peaceful picketing and demonstrations were permitted by our law, but the information I had given him and the assurances from New York Police Department made it perfectly clear that prompt and effective action would be taken against any disorder or attempt interfere with work Soviet mission; that demonstrations for one hour daily were kept off sidewalk in front of building and that December 11, to which he referred, offenders had been promptly arrested. I said I wished to be entirely clear as to what Soviet Government was asking. In view fact New York authorities had done and would do everything that could be expected to prevent any disorders or interference with work, was Soviet Government in effect insisting that all peaceful picketing should be forbidden by U.S. authorities.

Zakharov at first took refuge in general statement that they wished guarantees of conditions which would not interfere with work of mission and finally, on my insistence, admitted in their eyes any form "anti-Soviet" demonstration in their opinion interfered with work of mission. I told him I could only report his observations to my Government, but I knew that under our law peaceful and orderly picketing kept at a distance from the premises was permitted. I told him I gathered from his remark that Soviet Government had decided give publicity this matter, to which he replied in the affirmative repeating that they had no other recourse but declined to tell me when publication would occur.

On leaving I told Zakharov since no demonstrations occurred here without Government authorization I took it to mean Soviet Government had determined to organize demonstrations, mentioning an incident in connection with demonstrations against British and French which made perfectly plain fact these were well organized affairs. Zakharov, as might be expected, denied this and said it was of course impossible predict reaction population Moscow.

In circumstances I believe we can expect publication at any time and I would like for background to brief American press here, giving them in particular information contained Deptel 741 [*751*] which I believe makes abundantly plain rather exceptional measures taken by New York Police. I would give this for background use only when Soviets publish, and I believe I can rely on correspondents here to observe this.

I believe Department should be prepared release, when Soviets publicize anything on this matter, summary account my discussions with Foreign Office (this and previous message contain all necessary details). I would suggest particular attention to veiled threat of demonstrations as given me by Gromyko and Zakharov which in both cases to effect publication "unwillingness" U.S. authorities take necessary measures would arouse legitimate indignation Soviet public opinion and would not be without effect on attitude of population capital toward American Embassy in Moscow. While foregoing is not absolute quotation since made orally, it is accurate rendition of sense.

It is of course not clear whether threat of demonstrations is bluff or will actually occur. In any event, I believe we would have some advance notice since in order preserve fiction "spontaneous" popular reaction any demonstrations would probably not occur immediately upon publication.

Bohlen

---

58. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, December 27, 1956—5 p.m.

Delga 405. Re SC enlargement (Delga 386, Gadel 76 [2]).

1. Postponement SC enlargement raises possibility new factors may appear in second half GA session. Specifically, there could be move to amend LA resolution to raise size of increase, probably to 3.

2. Our thinking so far has been directed to choice between decision on increase of 2 or increase of 3 or 4, rather than choice between no decision and 3 or 4. Department may now wish to consider whether we would prefer no decision on increase question

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–2756. Confidential.

[2] Delga 386 is printed as Document 56. Gadel 76 to New York, December 20, confirmed an earlier conversation apparently by telephone between Senator Humphrey and Wilcox in which the Department (1) emphasized its strong preference to keep the proposed increase in Security Council membership to two; (2) concurred in the "tactics" to give priority in voting to the Afro-Asian resolution in order to defeat it; (3) urged that if the amendment to the Latin American resolution calling for a Security Council increase from two to three should come to a vote, the delegation seek to defeat it; and (4) recommended that should the delegation doubt that such an amendment would be defeated, call for a 24-hour delay to give the Department and delegation an opportunity to assess whether an increase of three in Security Council membership was more or less advantageous than four. (Department of State, Central Files, 310/12–2056)

at this session, establishment some type committee as recommended in Afro-Asian resolution, or increase to 3 or 4.

3. Re possibility ensuring fourth seat to LA (Gadel 76) we are inclined to think that this could be accomplished, if Afro-Asians were willing to support increase of 4 in principle. We do not feel free to make any inquiries under present instructions, however, as any talk by us indicating possibility moving to larger figure at this time would encourage tendencies this direction.

4. Informal analysis various factors and tactical situation being pouched Pedersen–Sisco.

Wadsworth

---

59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, January 3, 1957—7:42 p.m.

Gadel 85. Re Delga 405. [2] Dept has taken careful look at SC enlargement problem light developments to date and comments contained Delga 386 [3] and 405. Situation appears us as follows:

1. Standpoint US position SC, maintenance present size SC preferable any increase. However with new membership maintenance present size would leave geographic pattern representation clearly unbalanced for number areas and would present serious annual problem making choice among candidates Western Europe and for seat now occupied Philippines. Increase of two, if allocated Western Europe and Far East, would go far remedy unbalance particularly if stature states involved rather than number considered, and would leave US some margin of safety in SC. We understand Asians as strongly opposed increase limited two as British and French are against larger increase.

2. If we were consider larger increase, we could not accept three because would result in Latin America being least adequately represented which clearly not in our interest. Increase of four would not seriously threaten our position provided majority requirement can be kept down and provided fourth seat allocated LA, and would give

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–2756. Confidential; Priority. Signed for the Secretary by Wilcox.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 56.

Asians representation to which they consider themselves entitled. However, any increase beyond two increases chances election members unfavorable US position and management problem in SC. Would also disturb Europeans who fear further shift UN balance of power toward Asian-African bloc. Moreover, even if agreement reached on increase of four there no indication any increase would in fact take place view Soviet threat non-ratification. In this event US would have wasted bargaining position to no avail, and pressure those states anxious for increase would soon be directed toward US reach accommodation USSR on Chinese representation issue, which of course out of question.

3. We would therefore be reluctant consider four unless some reason believe Afro-Asian pressure on USSR could assure ratification. Similarly would be reluctant consider four if UK or French opposition so firm as indicate one or both would refuse ratify, since results would then not warrant split with them this issue.

4. Taking account these various considerations Department believes:

a) Delegation should vote against any amendment LA resolution for larger increase (1) *provided* most LA's and West Europeans, including UK and France, prepared stand firm on increase of two, and (2) *provided* defeat Afro-Asian draft resolution assured. Afro-Asian draft presents serious difficulties, even if amended to refer only to non-permanent seats, since it almost certain resolution would result committee discussion, if not recommendations, on permanent members question, including Chinese representation. While result this tactic may well be adoption no resolution this agenda item, US by support increase two would have shown accommodating spirit and onus for preventing enlargement would be widely shared.

b) If on other hand LA's prepared themselves amend, or accept amendment, their resolution to take account Afro-Asian demand third seat or if defeat Afro-Asian draft cannot be assured, Delegation should consult LA's, UK, and France view to reaching agreement on increase of four with majority requirement of nine votes, fourth seat to be allocated LA's. We could not accept required majority of ten or any rotation fourth seat.

c) Regardless size increase Delegation should continue make clear US will not accept Soviet condition regarding Chinese representation and that unless Soviets withdraw this condition no enlargement will take place. If UK and France strongly resist enlargement beyond two, US should point out possibility firm stand for increase of two will produce greater risk deadlock and thus eventual success Afro-Asian committee proposal. While US will resist committee idea vigorously, might be adopted despite our opposition, thus complicating questions Chinese representation, Commonwealth seat, and permanent seats generally. Therefore if US continues stand by increase two, believe reasonable expect UK and France give us full support re Chinese representation and permanent seats questions.

d) If defeat Afro-Asian text not possible, Delegation should make every effort amend this text so that committee's terms of reference clearly confined non-permanent seats. With this amendment, Delegation should vote for resolution; otherwise it should oppose.

Dulles

---

60. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, January 8, 1957—8 p.m.

Delga 450. Re: Soviet item. [Name deleted] (Secretariat) informed us this afternoon that a letter and documents had been received from the East German government requesting that the information contained therein should be submitted to UN members for consideration under the Soviet item in the Special Political Committee. The letter alleged action by the United States against the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Germany, including radio propaganda attacks, balloons, espionage, subversion, etc. [Name deleted] said that the letter and documents had been transmitted to Pelt, director of the European office of Geneva, who had forwarded them to the Secretary General. Hammarskjold has not yet decided how to deal with the documents and has asked our advice.

We told [name deleted] our immediate reaction was that East German government had no status to request any documentation and that it would be unduly dignifying the documentation for Secretariat to distribute it. [Name deleted] pointed out that the Soviets could and probably would request that the documents be circulated, which then the Secretariat would have to do. I feel Soviets should have to ask for it and Secretariat should not circulate without such a request.

Hasty review East German information given us . . . revealed it consisted of: (a) letter to SYG, (b) memorandum setting forth nature US intervention in GDR, including radio broadcasts (especially RIAS), balloons and espionage, (c) documents supporting arguments in memorandum, including RIAS memoranda, memoranda from Deutsche Innen- und Aussenhandel Co., various types US military and USIA identification cards for German civilians and forms for signature on legal responsibilities of German civilians having access to US classified data, and (d) photo album of "wire tap" tunnel uncovered in Berlin, including pictures of tags and markings showing US original of materials (not to be reproduced but which would be available for consultation).

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–857. Confidential; Priority.

Lodge

---

61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, January 29, 1957—1:36 p.m.

Gadel 124. Re Soviet Item. In connection US tactics and position Department considering following possibilities:

1. In context general statement US policy toward satellites, refute Soviet charges and demonstrate Soviet responsibility for tensions in Eastern Europe, enlisting support and participation in debate from key states in different areas, after which Soviet proposal would be rejected.
2. Following rebuttal of Soviet charges, submit counter-proposals, either in nature of general reaffirmation pertinent Charter principles, specific calls upon Soviets to conform their policies and actions to relevant Charter principles, or establishment of committee with terms of reference authorizing it to study situation in Eastern Europe taking account both of Soviet charges against US and of material regarding effects and aims of Soviet actions and policies in area as put forward in debate.

On balance Department presently inclined favor first alternative, particularly because nothing new in Soviet charges and direct refutation and rejection would keep them in proper perspective of obvious Soviet propaganda move. On other hand if it appeared that decisive vote would not be forthcoming on this basis or that substantial number members, particularly among "neutralists", felt there might be some substance to Soviet charges, we could then consider what type counter-proposal would be most effective.

Depending upon tactical situation, particularly extent to which Soviets press item, it may also be desirable consider whether straight US-Soviet aspects should be played down to point Soviet position makes possible, thereby preserving to maximum continued support for US position this GA by majority UN Members that might be reduced by sharp revival of "cold war" tactics.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2957. Confidential. Signed by Walmsley for the Secretary.

GADel's views requested, together with any indications re interest other delegations in Soviet item and estimate re prospect of developing support for suitable counter-proposals. Department particularly interested in learning which other delegations prepared speak on Soviet item, drawing upon own experience re Soviet activities and tactics in their respective countries.

Dulles

---

62. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, February 12, 1957—10 p.m.

Delga 724. Verbatim Text. Re new Soviet item. [Name deleted] (Secretariat) informed us Soviets submitting new item for inclusion agenda entitled: "Question of Aggressive Actions of US which Creates Threat to Peace and Security". General Committee meets Wednesday afternoon. [Name deleted] says Soviets interested in airing this matter in GC but may not press for inscription.

Following is explanatory memorandum submitted by the Soviets:

"Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the Agenda of the Eleventh Regular Session: Item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Question of aggressive acts by the United States of America constituting a threat to peace and security.

Letter dated 12 February 1957 from the Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to the President of the General Assembly.

New York, 12 February 1957.

Acting on the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR delegation requests the inclusion in the agenda of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly of the following item: 'Question of Aggressive Acts by the United States of America Constituting a Threat to Peace and Security'.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2–1257. Limited Official Use. Priority.

I should be glad if you would take the necessary steps to secure the immediate consideration of this question at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

In accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure,[2] I attach an explanatory memorandum relating to this question.

(Signed) V. Kuznetsov

Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Explanatory Memorandum.

On the basis of the provisions of Chapters I and IV of the United Nations Charter, the USSR delegation, acting on instructions from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, deems it its duty to draw the attention of all states members of the United Nations to aggressive acts by the United States of America constituting a threat to peace and security.

The reason why this question is raised now, when the Assembly is approaching the end of its work, is that recently the United States of America has taken new steps further straining relations among states and increasing the danger of another war.

A serious study of the international situation leads to the inevitable conclusion that whereas the majority of the world's states are anxious to ease the international tension and to wipe out the consequences of the "cold war", the United States Government is pursuing a policy designed to strain and aggravate the international situation and to create a war psychosis.

It was to have been expected that following the measures taken against the Anglo-French-Israel aggression in Egypt and the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East area the United States of America would, together with other states, take further steps to bring the international situation back to normal. That, however, was not the case.

The United States Government has embarked on a policy of further aggravating the situation in the Near and Middle East. The President's message to the Congress of 5 January 1957[3] set forth a programme which cannot but be assessed as designed to effect the direct interference of the United States of America in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in the Near and Middle East, the economic and political enslavement of the peoples of countries in this area and the planning of acts of provocation conducive to war.

---

[2] Rule 20 of the Procedures governing regular and special sessions of the General Assembly reads as follows: "Any item proposed for inclusion in the Agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents or by a draft resolution."

[3] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 6–16.

At the end of January 1957, there was an announcement of new measures taken by the United States to intensify preparations for the unleashing of an atomic war. Ruling circles in the United States not only refuse to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons, but have begun to carry out a plan for the establishment and stationing on the territories of other states of special United States military units, armed with atomic weapons. It is proposed to station such operational units in Western Europe, Turkey, Iran, Japan and, in particular, on the island of Okinawa. It is clear that such actions intensify the threat of a new war.

At the same time, the purpose of these new plans is to avert the principal retaliatory shock from the United States, in the event of the unleashing of atomic war by United States ruling circles, and thus to place under serious threat of a retaliatory atomic attack the peoples of the countries in whose territories it is proposed to station United States atomic military units, i.e., the peoples of the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Japan and other countries.

The recently announced draft military budget of the United States for 1957–1958 shows that military expenditure in the United States is being increased and that the armaments race is being intensified. The draft budget provides for military allocations, unprecedented in times of peace, amounting to 45,300 million dollars, which considerably exceeds similar allocations for 1956–1957, vast as those were.

At the beginning of February 1957, it was announced that the already extensive network of United States military bases on foreign territory would be further expanded. It is stated, in particular, that a new United States base will be established in Brazil, a base for jet aircraft in Pakistan, a large new military base on Taiwan and that the construction of many new air bases is being planned in West Germany. At the same time, existing bases are being feverishly expanded and modernized.

All these activities have been undertaken by the United States at a time when peace-loving countries, particularly the Soviet Union, have effected considerable reductions of their armed forces and have considerably decreased their military expenditure.

Recently, there has also been considerable intensification of aggressive military measures along the lines traced by the North Atlantic bloc and other aggressive military groups headed by the United States. This is borne out, in particular, by the fact that West Germany is being compulsorily remilitarized and that the West

German army is being entrusted with atomic weapons. Moreover, Hitlerite generals are being placed at the head of the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc.

The militarization of West Germany cannot fail to arouse anxiety among all peace-loving countries, for it is well known that the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc have assigned to West Germany the role of the main shock troops in their aggressive plans.

Other recent steps taken by the United States with a view to aggravating the international situation and creating situations endangering the cause of peace are also well known.

The States members of the United Nations cannot disregard the increasingly aggressive measures recently taken by the United States.

The Soviet Delegation accordingly proposes that the General Assembly should consider the item: "The Question of Aggressive Acts by the United States of America Constituting a Threat to Peace and Security".

Urgent consideration of this question by the General Assembly should promote the united efforts of states members of the United Nations to alleviate tension and to improve the international situation".

Request instructions and statement.

Lodge

---

63. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 13, 1957.

SUBJECT

Proposal to Establish a Permanent UN Corps for Observation, Patrol, and Related Functions

Problem:

To consider whether the United States should sponsor a proposal for a permanent United Nations force.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, United Nations General File, 1957. Confidential. Drafted by Bloomfield.

Discussion:

1. Considerable interest has been expressed in Congress and elsewhere in UNEF as the possible prototype or forerunner of a multi-national UN force to deal with political disputes, acts of aggression, armed conflicts, etc. The Governments of Pakistan and Canada are reportedly developing proposals on this subject.

2. The existence of various situations where United Nations observation or patrol might either deter the outbreak of hostilities or facilitate the cessation of hostilities after they have broken out, suggests that the UNEF experience might now constructively be built upon to augment the available tools for dealing with international disputes, particularly those in the non-Communist world. I believe the Department should be prepared with a realistic and feasible plan for presentation at an auspicious time.

3. A proposal for a UN corps should be considered as an adjunct to UN procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes, rather than as a collective security-type fighting force designed to repel military aggression. Anything going beyond this limited role would not be likely to secure acceptance at the present time.

4. Ambassador Lodge feels that the present moment is inappropriate for formal discussions of this idea.[2] Given the tactical situation in the Assembly, and the unresolved questions regarding UNEF, I suggest we be flexible as to timing, but be in a position to make a proposal as soon as feasible. Such a proposal is outlined in Tab A, along with a draft resolution (Tab B) establishing a study committee to make recommendations to the General Assembly. The suggested force might be called UN Corps for Observation and Patrol (UNCOP).

5. Perhaps the best way to stimulate constructive thinking on this matter would be to ask the Secretary General to circulate for general information a memorandum containing proposals based on the attached papers. If you approve, we could work out with Ambassador Lodge suitable timing for such a move, which might be made jointly with Canada and possibly others.

6. It would probably be undesirable to advance this proposal until Israeli forces have completed their withdrawal and UNEF is further deployed. Also, it would be made clear that the present proposal has no direct application to UNEF itself.

---

[2] On January 30, Wilcox sent Lodge a preliminary uncleared draft of a paper proposing a permanent U.N. corps for "observation and patrol". Lodge replied on February 6 that the atmosphere in the United Nations was not right to discuss the idea of a permanent U.N. corps; however, he recommended that studies of the issue continue. Both letters were attached to the source text.

7. EUR, while concurring in the proposal, is concerned at the possibility of participation in the corps by Soviet satellite states, and also possible proposals for utilization of the corps by the Assembly in situations where it might not be in this country's interest. It is believed, however, that the overall advantages of the proposal outweigh these possible difficulties, which could be met by appropriate diplomatic leadership in concrete circumstances.

Recommendations:

1. That, subject to clearance with the Defense Department, Ambassador Lodge be authorized to consult with Canada and other principal allies with a view to having the Secretary General, at an appropriate time, circulate for information a memorandum embodying appropriate portions of the attached paper. The tactics, including preliminary consultations, possible concert with Canada, etc. would be worked out with Ambassador Lodge at the time.[3]

Tab A[4]

UNITED STATES VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBLE UN CORPS FOR OBSERVATION, PATROL AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

Governing Principles

1. Standing arrangements should be developed enabling the UN in appropriate circumstances to provide international military personnel to give "on the ground" support to efforts toward the pacific settlement of disputes by the General Assembly (or Security Council), including the patrolling of disputed boundary lines or areas, supervising and maintaining cessation of hostilities, and observing situations which threaten the maintenance of peace and security.

2. It would be neither a purely "paper" corps on the one hand, nor a large standing force on the other. It might most feasibly take material shape in the form of a UN Corps training center. This might be established within a "neutral" nation, such as India, Sweden, or even Switzerland, possibly by leasing or purchasing an already existing military school facility. Alternatively, it could be located in e.g. Canada, relatively accessible to UN Headquarters. A permanent cadre of UN officers, directly hired or seconded by Member governments, would constitute the permanent party. 75 Member States would be eligible to detail a small number of officers

---

[3] There is no indication on the source text of any action by the Secretary.

[4] Drafted by Bloomfield.

and non-coms for suitable training periods, on a rotational basis. These cadres would return to staff and train elements of company or battalion size within the various national military establishments, such units to be equipped with UN helmets and armbands.

3. Upon call of the Assembly (or Security Council) various of these trained and earmarked units would be immediately available to carry out UN observation and/or patrol duties, the composition of a particular force to be guided by political and other desiderata.

4. It would not at this stage include personnel from the five permanent members of the Security Council, nor would the Security Council or Military Staff Committee have any supervisory role.

5. It would be stationed on the territory of a Member State only with the consent of that State. (This does not imply U.S. acceptance of the doctrine that the consent of a state is legally necessary for the entry of UN forces in any case not covered by Chapter VII of the Charter.)

6. It would constitute new machinery, not continuation of UNEF as such.

7. It would not be regarded as a continuation of efforts of the Collective Measures Committee or efforts under Article 43 regarding military forces for enforcement purposes, but rather as an adjunct of pacific settlement machinery under the Charter.

8. It might be known as "UN Corps for Observation and Patrol" (UNCOP), or possibly "UN Patrol".

Organization

9. It would take the form of a new UN instrumentality, under the administrative direction of a Chief of Staff named by the Secretary General with the consent of two-thirds of the Assembly. The corps would establish its own internal organization, TOs, equipment requirements, tactical doctrine, training and orientation curriculum, communications procedures, staff operations, etc. with assistance of experts seconded from Member States as requested, and with the guidance of an advisory committee of governments.

10. Training and indoctrination would focus on language, inter-unit coordination, observation and patrol techniques, and other special skills essential for a multi-national, non-fighting military body operating under international directives.

Financing

11. Such a force could be financed either by the participating states, through the UN regular budget, or as a special budget. The US doctrine of logistical support for contributing nations, evolved after the Korean experience suggests that the US might wish to

assist financially, and rules out the first alternative. However, such a force would clearly be in the US interest, and we should not leave the full financial burden to the lesser powers. The principle of shared costs should be followed, under the regular assessment scale.

12. The principal cost would be the acquisition and operation of the training center, and support of the permanent party. When units were actually on UN assignments, the UN would cover all expenses other than basic pay, uniforms and personal gear, including small weapons, which would be supplied by the contributing nations, who would receive appropriate credits against their assessments. The UN would pay a standard allowance to troops on patrol assignment. Where a nation furnished manpower but was unable to finance its equipment, a special working capital fund could be established to supply grants as appropriate. Costs would also include airlift and sealift facilities which countries such as the US could be called upon to furnish in actual operational assignments.

Tab B [5]

Draft Resolution Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the contribution which the United Nations Emergency Force has made to the achievement of the purposes of the United Nations Charter in the area to which it has been assigned,

Expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General, to the Advisory Committee, and to Member States for their cooperation and assistance in the establishment and operation of the force,

Believing that the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfillment of its Charter responsibilities in the field of pacific settlement of disputes would be enhanced by agreement upon standing arrangements which would facilitate the ready availability and prompt dispatch, if deemed necessary, of military personnel in support of such efforts toward the pacific settlement of disputes as the patrolling of disputed boundary lines or areas, supervising and maintaining the cessation of hostilities, and observing situations which threaten the maintenance of international peace and security,

---

[5] Drafted by Bloomfield and Vincent Baker of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

Establishes a Committee on United Nations Observation and Patrol, consisting of [ ] [6]

Requests the Committee to consider, in collaboration with the Secretary General and consultation with Member States as appropriate, the feasibility and possible nature of permanent arrangements to facilitate the ready availability and prompt dispatch of a UN corps for observation, patrol, and related duties, and to report its recommendations to the General Assembly by [ ]

---

[6] These and following brackets are in the source text.

---

64. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee to the Mission at the United Nations (Stone) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) [1]

New York, February 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

Permanent United Nations Force

1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Chairman, Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, (CM-415-56), dated 26 December 1956, subject: "Permanent United Nations Force". [2]

2. The Enclosure, USMS/67, is a study presenting the views and recommendations of the U.S. Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee in accordance with the referenced memorandum.

Charles B. Stone, III [3]
Lt. General, USAF

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Armed Forces. Confidential. A covering memorandum from Stone to Charles D. Cook, Deputy Counsel of the Mission at the United Nations, February 18, reads: "I would appreciate your comments on this first draft as to the acceptability of the paper from the Department of State viewpoint, and any suggestions you care to make to improve the paper." No written reply or comments by Cook have been found.

[2] Not found.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Enclosure [4]

STAFF STUDY: PERMANENT UNITED NATIONS FORCE

The Problem

1. To determine the views and recommendations of the U.S. Delegation to United Nations Military Staff Committee on the possible establishment of a Permanent United Nations Force.

Facts Bearing on Problem

2. The U.N. Charter provides for a military force composed of national contingents functioning under the Security Council. This provision has never been implemented because of political differences among the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. United Nations military action in Korea in 1950 was in accordance with Security Council resolutions passed in the absence of the USSR representative, who had boycotted the Council. The United States was the executive agent for the United Nations for the organization and direction of the Unified Command.

4. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950 provided the General Assembly with the necessary authority to take military action in the maintenance of peace when the Security Council failed to function. The current United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was organized under the SYG in accordance with this Resolution.

5. The UNEF is composed of a combination of contingents from member states other than permanent members of Security Council. There is no executive agent, and it is directed by SYG in accordance with broad General Assembly resolutions and with advice of an Advisory Committee. Precedent has been established that the host country must voluntarily accept the force and can dictate the acceptability of national contingents. The United States, though not contributing forces, provides equipment, supply, transport and airlift for UNEF, and maintains liaison with respect to these matters.

6. The UNEF was established as an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES–I) of 2 November 1956.

7. Although the UNEF was organized on an "ad hoc" basis, some members of the United Nations Secretariat and certain United Nations delegates have recently suggested the desirability of extending the status of this force to a permanent or long-range basis.

---

[4] This draft staff study included a table of contents, 13 appendices, and 6 annexes, none of which is printed here.

8. On 7 January 1957, a Resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate (S. Res. 15, 85th Congress, 1st Session) to make the current UNEF a permanent arm of the United Nations.

9. Various other types of forces have been proposed in the past. The "Foreign Legion" concept of internationally-recruited personnel owing allegiance to the United Nations has been prominent among these. Other proposals have been introduced in the Congress of the United States.

Discussion

9. [*sic*] *Proposed Types of Forces*

It may be assumed that any permanent United Nations force would conform in general to one of five types. There are of course many variations which could result from combining some of the characteristics of each. For the purpose of this study, however, only those listed below will be considered. The characteristics of each of the five are tabulated in Appendix F. Background information and a discussion of each are contained in separate appendices as indicated.

a. An "integrated national contingent" force, as envisaged by the United Nations Charter. (See Appendix A)
b. A "unified command" as employed in the Korean action in 1950–53. (See Appendix B)
c. A "Voluntary Reserve" force as proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1950. (See Appendix C)
d. An "international volunteer contingent" force, along lines proposed in a joint resolution introduced in the Congress in 1950. (See Appendix D)
e. An "international police force" as typified by the United Nations Emergency Force employed in Egypt in 1956–57. (See Appendix E)

10. *Basic Considerations*

Proposals for the establishment or use of armed forces under the auspices of the United Nations raise many complicated problems. The military or technical aspects of any concept cannot be wholly divorced from the political implications. An examination of any proposal must be based upon the following major considerations:

a. Effect on national sovereignty.
b. Strategic direction and command.
c. Logistical support.
d. Standardization of equipment and procedures.
e. Integration, including organization and training.
f. Location of forces and bases.
g. Financing.

11. *National Sovereignty*

a. The basic problem in devising a system of collective military measures for the United Nations is to establish an effective force competent to maintain or restore peace, but so limited and restricted that it cannot be used in a manner which would infringe on the sovereignty of the member states. This presents a dilemma.

b. Since the United Nations is not a world government but a treaty organization of independent nations, member states are reluctant to reduce their own national defense resources in favor of a United Nations force without adequate safeguards as to the ultimate use of such international forces. The sponsoring great powers insisted upon the incorporation of safeguards in the United Nations Charter by provision of the veto in the Security Council. (See Annex A)

c. A truly international combat force, i.e., a force operating under a United Nations agency, is a step toward a supra-national government. The desirability or undesirability of a world government is beyond the scope of this discussion. It should be reiterated, however, that the United Nations Charter did not contemplate a world government nor, in fact, have the de facto modifications of the Charter by precedent and usage produced such an institution. Accordingly, the action of each member state in the United Nations is determined on the basis of national sovereignty and self-interest.

d. The current UNEF, though bearing some of the characteristics of an enforcing arm of a supra-national government, does not constitute a threat to the sovereignty of the member states. Certain features operate as restraint on its employment:

(1) Temporary, "Ad Hoc" nature.
(2) Limited size and non-combat capability.
(3) Dependence on the United States for logistical support.
(4) Ability of any contributing state to withdraw its contributions at its discretion.
(5) Requirement in its employment for consent of "governments concerned", not only as to the force itself but as to its composition by nationality, the areas in which it is employed.

e. It is assumed that because of the political cleavage in the Security Council, any force constituted on a permanent basis will be under broad political direction of the General Assembly. This means that ⅔ of the Member States, regardless of their size and strength, will control its actions. Thus there is no assurance that the employment of this force would be in the interest of the United States and it could possibly result in its use to the contrary. Accordingly, some of the above restraints, and possibly others, on its use, should be prerequisite to U.S. support of a permanent status.

12. *Direction and Command*

a. Closely related to the political problem of national sovereignty are the interlocking and often incompatible politico-military issues of political direction, strategic direction, and command.

b. It has been the precedent in both the Korean experience and in the current UNEF operation that broad guidance to the respective forces has been given in the form of Security Council or General Assembly resolutions. These resolutions have been through necessity, general, vague, and subject to interpretation. In the Korea action, these interpretations were made by the United States Government and/or field commanders acting for the Unified Command or the United Nations Commander respectively. In the current arrangement, the Secretary-General freely exercises his judgment in interpreting the intent of the General Assembly resolutions on the disposition and mission of the UNEF in Egypt.

c. In the Korean action, the United States was in a favorable position by virtue of the delegated authority to make politico-military decisions in the conduct of operations. Although the other contributing member states were consulted and kept informed, in practice there was little restraint on the actions of the United States as executive agent. Such actions were not always enthusiastically received and, in fact, were a source of criticism from both contributing and non-contributing member states of the United Nations.

d. The present United Nations operation in Egypt is an entirely different problem since combat operations are not contemplated and most of the decisions are political in nature and must be reached after negotiation. Obviously, a member state as executive agent for the UNEF employment could be placed in a very difficult position. However, if military operations were involved, the Secretary-General without military background and without an adequate command structure, would be unable to execute effective directional responsibility. Further, and more important, it would seem unwise to entrust to one man, acting under extremely broad guidance, subject to a wide variety of acute international political pressure, the authority for the conduct of military operations of any nature involving a sizeable and effective force.

e. In summary, when the mission of a U.N. force is symbolic rather than military and when no enforcement or punitive measures are contemplated, control and direction by a U.N. agency under the General Assembly is not inimicable to the interest of the United States. On the other hand, if the nature, size and composition of the U.N. force were such that military operations could be conducted in enforcement of General Assembly resolutions, it would seem necessary that the United States be assured of more definitive and effective measures of control over its direction.

13. *Logistic Implications*

a. Many of the broad proposals or suggestions for the establishment of United Nations forces do not take into account the overriding logistic requirements to support a force in the field. Of the five types considered in this paper, type E, the current force in Egypt, presents the smallest problem. Even in this case it should be realized that logistic support of this small force, not involved in combat, could not be accomplished without the facilities of the United States in terms of depots, stock-piles, shipping, airlift, communications, and organization structure which were already in existence at the time the force was established, and provided that quick mobility so essential in time of crisis.

b. Logistic support for the U.N. Command in Korea was provided by the United States. This action could not have been accomplished without the logistic complex which was in being in the Far East in 1950. To support a force of comparable size without such facilities would have been impossible on short notice.

c. Attempts to build up a United Nations Force without the use of a world-wide logistic system presently possessed only by the United States would require tremendous outlays in men, money and equipment. The problems in establishing such a system would require years to resolve.

d. Because of its unique situation with overseas bases and military assistance program, the United States is the only member state currently in a position to furnish world-wide logistic support. Such future capability on the part of USSR cannot be ruled out, however. Certain European member states could undertake logistics support in certain areas but not without seriously affecting their own defense commitments. It is evident therefore that the United States will be asked by the United Nations to supply logistic support.

e. There exists at least a theoretical point beyond which United States commitments to the support of a United Nations Force could not be extended without critically weakening its own defense structure. This is a complicated problem, and probably the impact could never be measured in finite terms. Any commitments on the part of the United States to support a U.N. force logistically on a permanent or long-range basis, should be preceded by a determination and the net effect on our own military defense capabilities.

14. *Standardization of Equipment and Procedures*

a. Where an international military force of any size is unified in a single effort, standardization of equipment and procedures presents a difficult problem. Where the force is composed of large national contingents, these problems can be partially solved; for example, the Allied forces in combined operation in World War II and in the present NATO structure. Where the forces are large enough, and where each national contingent relies upon its own logistical facilities extending to and resting upon national industrial bases, the effectiveness of the force is dependent upon unification by command relationship at higher levels. As the size of the national contingents decrease, however, and the jointure of command is at a tactical level, operational problems in equipment and supply, language, staff procedure, and tactical doctrine will become more acute.

b. With respect to a theoretical international force composed of individuals of many nationalities there would be no particular problem other than language barriers, so long as that force was organized and equipped on the existing structure of a military establishment of one nation or small group of nations. On the other hand, to attempt to establish an effective balanced combat force capable of enforcing United Nations actions without accepting an established system as a standard would be impractical. Unless the United Nations or some international organization were in a position to create a military establishment of its own, including production, procurement, etc., such a possibility is clearly ruled out. The cost alone of building an entirely new international establishment is prohibitive.

c. The problem of standardization is obviously closely related to that of logistical support. Standardization problems cannot be solved independently of a solution of the logistical support problems which, as it has been indicated above, must be based on a single or small group of existing national military establishments.

15. *Integration*

a. The term "integration" here means the welding together of the elements of available forces into a single force to accomplish military missions. It is applicable to all size forces whether they be land, sea, or air forces, or a combination of such forces. It is obvious that if a given force, such as UNEF, does not have a combat role, integration is not critical. On the other hand, a force such as envisaged by the U.N. Charter as an enforcing agency cannot be effective without some degree of integration.

b. Where large national contingents are employed and integration has been accomplished within these contingents on a national level, the problem becomes less important. Where small units are brought together, however, there are immediate and serious problems of organization and training, aside from the previously mentioned question of standardization.

c. The organization and training essential to integration of a force requires bases, installations, lines of communications and logistics facilities. If there are large national contingents satellited on national establishments, there is no particular problem. Such activities can be accomplished in respective national territories or in other territories through bilateral agreements between nations. Where the force is composed of small national contingents, widely separated geographically, integration becomes more difficult. Where the force is recruited internationally, the international recruiting agency must obtain such facilities from selected states. This introduces serious political problems.

16. *Location*

a. A major point of difference in the deliberations of the Military Staff Committee and in the debate in the Security Council over the establishment of Article 43 forces in 1948, was the question of location of proposed forces when not being employed. (See Appendix A) Granted that this difference was political rather than technical, there is no reason to believe that the same problem would not arise in the establishment of any permanent force. Actually, the Charter type national contingents concept presents less of a problem in this respect as has been pointed out above in connection with training facilities.

b. It appears that the question of location of forces, including operating bases, could be more easily met under some sort of national contingent force rather than under a U.N.-controlled international permanent force. Thus, the supplying of bases and facilities as a part of the national contributions of the various states would tend to solve both the political and financial problems.

17. *Financing*

a. The experience in connection with financing the current UNEF has demonstrated the reluctance of member states to contribute monies to an international force. Acting on a report from the Secretary-General, the General Assembly on 26 November passed a resolution (A/RES/412) allocating $10,000,000 as an initial outlay to finance UNEF. Subsequently, in Committee 5 of the General Assembly, an extended debate ensued as to how this cost should be distributed. The Soviet bloc flatly refused to contribute to this appropriation on the basis that the so-called aggressors in Egypt should be held financially responsible. Smaller nations, on the other hand, pleaded inability to contribute in accordance with the regular pro-rated assessment scale for U.N. budget. It was finally agreed to recommend that this initial outlay be distributed in proportion to the regular assessments. It was clearly indicated, however, that any subsequent outlays would be subject to further consideration.

b. If this bickering over relatively small financial outlays is to be accepted as a pattern on further financing procedures, any plan for a permanent U.N. Force will have to take into consideration the reluctance of member states to assume financial responsibility.

c. It should be noted that the relatively small annual outlay of an estimated $17,000,000 in fact represents an increase at about 33⅓% of the regular annual UN budget.

18. Current Proposals for a Permanent United Nations Force—see Appendix G.

Conclusions

19. Agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council will not soon be reached in implementation of Charter provisions for a U.N. force.

20. From the technical viewpoint, the "Unified Command" concept under an executive agent state, as employed in Korea, offers the best prospect for an efficient United Nations force.

21. Proposals for an internationally-recruited force owing allegiance to the United Nations under direct control of a United Nations agency are not technically feasible or politically acceptable.

22. Thus far the UNEF is adequate for the express purpose for which it was established. It should not, however, be accepted as a pattern for a permanent force of greater strength and size as a substitute for forces envisaged under Article 43 of the Charter.

23. United States will be expected to contribute logistical support either in part or in full in the event of the establishment of any United Nations force unless the force has been established by the General Assembly sponsored by the USSR contrary to U.S. interests.

24. Currently, most serious suggestions for the establishment of a permanent U.N. force are directed toward an extension of the status of the current UNEF.

25. Proposals advanced for making UNEF permanent should be examined with the following in mind:

a. The U.S. should insist upon a greater voice in the control of the force over and beyond a single vote in the General Assembly.

b. Logistic support of the force by the United States should be granted only under the following conditions:

(1) This support should be limited in terms of supply and services to that which is previously determined as feasible.

(2) The extent of this support and terms of reimbursement should be clearly delineated and defined by agreement with U.N.

Recommendation

26. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the above discussion and conclusions as a basis for establishing a position with respect to a permanent United Nations force.

65. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, February 25, 1957.

Delga 798. Re Soviet item in special political committee. Following resolution introduced by USSR today:

"The GA,

"Noting with anxiety the recent aggravation of the international situation and the deterioration of relations between states;

"Noting that this situation has been caused, among other things, by the subversive activities of the USA and its intervention in the domestic affairs of the people's democracy;

"Considering that the states members of the UN are bound under the Charter 'to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors';

"Recalling that in its Resolution 110 of 3 November 1947 the General Assembly condemns 'all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression';

"Taking also into consideration the fact that the GA on 17 December 1954 recommended to member states the international convention on the use of broadcasting in the interests of peace of 1936 in which the contracting parties;

" 'Mutually undertake to prohibit and, if necessary, to bring to an immediate stop in their respective territories any transmission which could, to the detriment of proper international understanding, instigate the inhabitants of any territory to acts contrary to internal order or security of the territory of one of the high contracting parties';

"1. Condemns the subversive activities of the USA against other states as contrary to the UN Charter and incompatible with the principles of which relations between states should be based;

"2. Calls upon the US Government to cease its subversive activity and its intervention in the domestic affairs of other states on any pretext and to develop its relations with these states in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter."

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/2–2557. No time of transmission is given on the source text.

66. Editorial Note

Following further inconclusive debate, the General Assembly decided not to vote on either the "Latin American" or the "Afro-Asian" resolutions concerning enlargement of the Security Council. Rather, on February 26, the Assembly agreed without objection that consideration of the three agenda items—enlargement of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the International Court of Justice—be postponed to the Twelfth Session.

At the Twelfth Session, it was decided, following statements by the Indian and Ecuadorean Representatives, that in view of the fact that enlargement of United Nations councils was intimately linked to the still-unresolved question of Charter review and amendment, the issue of council enlargement should be further postponed to the Thirteenth Session pending resolution of the Charter review problem.

Further information on the issue of the enlargement of United Nations councils is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1956 (New York, United Nations Office of Public Information, 1957), page 149, and *ibid.*, 1957, page 115.

---

67. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)[1]

Washington, February 28, 1957.

SUBJECT

Explanation of Vote on Soviet Item in UN

The Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on February 27, 1957 rejected, by a vote of 53 to 8 (Soviet bloc), with 11 abstentions, a Soviet draft resolution condemning the "subversive activities" of the United States and calling upon it to cease such activities and "intervention" in Eastern Europe. (This vote compares favorably with past votes in the General Assembly on comparable Soviet complaints.) Eight states were absent.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, United Nations General File, 1957.

Those abstaining were Finland, Yugoslavia and nine Afro-Asians (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen). The abstentions of Finland and Afghanistan are understandable on geographic grounds. While Egypt and Syria have reflected pro-Soviet leanings in recent months, they may have considered it preferable to abstain rather than support the Soviet complaint. Moreover, they, as well as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were undoubtedly looking toward future Soviet support on the Middle East. The remaining Afro-Asians are usually found among the so-called neutralists when "cold war" matters are under consideration in the UN.

Of the eight absent states, two (Hungary and South Africa) have withdrawn from participation in the work of the General Assembly; five are Afro-Asians only recently admitted to membership, two (Jordan and Libya) in December 1955 and three (Morocco, the Sudan and Tunisia) on November 12, 1956. This was the first occasion (setting aside the Hungarian question where broader considerations were involved), that these five were faced with a sharp US-Soviet issue, and they may have refrained from voting because of: (1) ignorance of the issues involved; (2) desire for Soviet support on future Middle East resolutions; or (3) because they may not want to become involved in the "cold war". The Austrian Delegation explained to USGADel that Vienna had instructed the delegation to abstain, at the same time giving it discretion to be absent on a roll-call vote.

In the plenary meeting this morning the Soviet Delegation did not reintroduce its draft resolution, so there was no further vote. Only the USSR and Czechoslovakia spoke in favor of the Soviet position. They were answered by the United States and Brazil. There were no other speakers.

68. Paper Prepared by Virginia F. Hartley of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs[1]

Washington, April 17, 1957.

GA CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE

Background

The tenth GA decided that a Charter review conference "shall be held at an appropriate time," and established a committee of the whole "to consider, in consultation with the Secretary General, the question of fixing a time and place for the Conference and its organization and procedures." This committee is to report to the 12th GA, and the United States must therefore determine the position it is to take in the committee when it meets prior to the 12th session.

The adoption of the tenth GA resolution was in large measure the result of U.S. urging. While only the Soviet bloc strongly opposed the idea of Charter review, there was no pressure for an early conference. Doubt about the possibilities of accomplishment at such a conference in the absence of a more favorable political climate was widespread. Neutralist members were influenced by the Soviet position. They, and others, feared that a conference might exacerbate East-West differences. The anti-colonial and underdeveloped countries saw little chance of amendments they might favor receiving the necessary major-power ratifications. The older colonial powers and more developed countries were apprehensive about the pressures that might build up at such a conference for Charter changes they could not accept. The U.S. in principle strongly favored the holding of a conference, but did not wish it held in 1956—an election year. The British would have preferred to see any decision on holding a conference deferred until 1960.

The GA discussions in 1955 produced very little in the way of concrete proposals for change. Preparatory to these discussions, a Department working group prepared twenty position papers on various substantive aspects of Charter review, but these papers were never finalized nor advanced beyond the working level. (A list of these papers is annexed.[2]) Since 1955, there has been almost no discussion of Charter review in official circles either here or abroad. The Secretary, however, has on a number of occasions, reiterated his interest in the institution of some type of weighted voting in the GA.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Charter Review. Confidential. A covering memorandum by Ware Adams, April 26, reads: "Attached is a paper concerning the Charter review question at the next GA. If it meets with your approval we plan to take it up with the regional bureaus and L in order to get our preparations under way for the meeting of the special committee on the holding of a Charter review conference established by the 10th GA."

[2] Not printed.

Committee's Terms of Reference

The first decision before the committee (and the United States) is whether to favor the calling of a conference. The GA committee is free to recommend to the 12th session against a decision now to hold a review conference on the ground that it is not "an appropriate time" since the "auspicious international circumstances" referred to in the tenth GA resolution do not prevail. If this first decision is negative, the others concerning place, organization, and procedures would automatically be postponed.

The committee's terms of reference as set forth in the tenth GA resolution are procedural and not substantive. However, some substantive discussion may be difficult to avoid. The individual members will have to give at least preliminary consideration to substance in order to reach a position on whether or not the scheduling of a conference is desirable, and this consideration may be reflected in the subsequent committee discussion. Moreover, India at the last GA made specific mention of this committee in connection with its proposal that the composition of the Security Council be studied "in all its aspects." It is therefore not unlikely that India may try to raise this matter in committee despite the 11th GA decision to postpone further consideration of the "enlargement" items until the 12th session.

U.S. Preparations

If the consensus of the UN membership clearly and strongly favors the convening of a Charter review conference in the near future, it would appear difficult for this Government to fail to support such a move in view of our previous statements within this country and at the tenth GA. Moreover, a refusal to review is difficult to defend intellectually and for us to join the USSR, or even all the other permanent SC members, in opposing a conference would appear to many other members as a failure to fulfill what they regard as a tacit commitment given at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

If, however, there is no clear consensus in favor of convening a conference, and there is no indication of one at present, we should weigh very carefully whether the holding of a review conference at this time is really in the U.S. interest. One of our principal concerns—the membership deadlock—has been met, and enlargement of the UN Councils responsive to the increased membership is already on the 12th GA's agenda. There would appear to be little chance of obtaining effective agreement on another principal objective—restricting the use of the veto—not only because of Soviet opposition but also because British and French support for such a move at this juncture seems unlikely. Our own position on this matter has been complicated by the fact that with the growing membership of the UN and the projected enlargement of the SC, a friendly Council will become increasingly difficult to ensure. If a review conference is held, the questions of the permanent seats on the SC and of Chinese representation seems inescapable. While the Charter requirements of a two-thirds vote and ratification by the five permanent members of the SC guarantee us against any unacceptable amendments, long and acrimonious debate of these highly controversial issues could be seriously prejudicial to U.S. and free-world interests.

We should therefore carefully weigh what we could reasonably expect to gain at this time from a Charter review conference against the hazards one presents for us. This calls for a careful review of the 1955 series of draft position papers to determine their adequacy, their continuing validity, and their probable acceptability to others in the present situation. We should then, before finalizing our position for the committee-of-the-whole session, take informal soundings with friendly members and the UN Secretariat to ascertain what if any pressure exists, and where, for holding a conference in the near future.

If it is clear that there is no consensus among the UN membership in favor of a conference now and if we decide not to press for the convening of a conference under these circumstances, the development of detailed positions on place, organization, and procedures of such a conference would be premature.

Committee Session Tactics

Our primary tactical problem when the committee of the whole meets will be to avoid, so far as possible, substantive discussion. To this end, a brief meeting under a strong chairman, who would hold the committee to its terms of reference under the tenth GA resolution, is desirable.

If no strong pressure for a conference in the near future develops, the committee should be able to reach a decision on a negative recommendation with the minimum of discussion. If, however, there are pressures for an early conference, then it would appear desirable to limit the number of meetings of the full committee and to have the questions of place, organization, and procedures taken up in subcommittees, both in order to expedite the work and to minimize the inducement to substantive discussion inherent in a forum of all UN members.

While a meeting early in the summer would probably attract less high-level representation, it might also prolong the proceedings. On balance, it would seem preferable that the committee meet either in late August or early September, just before the GA. This timing would serve to emphasize the committee's procedural character and the need for an expeditious transaction of its business. A meeting during the GA might facilitate an Indian move to interject into the committee the "enlargement" items on the agenda of the 12th session.

---

69. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 10, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position on Calling of a Charter Review Conference

Discussion

The committee of the whole established by the GA at its 10th session to report to the 12th session "on the question of fixing a time and place" for a Charter review conference and on the organization and procedures of such a conference is scheduled to meet on June 3. The 10th GA specifically recognized in its resolution that a review "should be conducted under auspicious international circumstances", and decided to hold a conference for this purpose "at an appropriate time." It was the consensus at the 10th GA that auspicious circumstances did not then exist. It was clearly understood that while the Assembly had taken a decision in principle to hold a conference, its committee of the whole was free to recommend further postponement of the decision on time and place if, in its view, international circumstances were still not auspicious when the time came for the committee to report.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Charter Review. Confidential. Drafted by Virginia Hartley.

The present political climate does not appear any more conducive to positive accomplishment at a review conference than that prevailing in 1955–56. One of our principal concerns in supporting the holding of a conference, the membership deadlock, has been met. Another principal concern, enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to permit more equitable geographic representation, is already on the agenda of the 12th GA. There appears no greater likelihood than in the past that the USSR will agree to any restriction of the veto power, and the raising of colonial and other questions likely to prove divisive for the free world appears certain. Moreover, the Chinese representation issue is certain to give rise to extensive debate at any review conference in connection with the conference's consideration of the over-all composition of the Security Council, which even if the number of non-permanent SC seats has been increased, appears inescapable.

On balance, it appears that the dangers in a review conference at this time outweigh possible advantages. However, if the consensus among other members is clearly in favor of a conference in the near future, it would be difficult, both from the standpoint of principle and in view of our past position on this matter, for the US to fail to support such a move.

Recommendation

That to ascertain their views you authorize the initiation of consultations with other friendly UN members, in which we would make clear that we do not intend to press for a recommendation by the GA committee of the whole setting a specific date for the holding of a conference. If you do not agree with this approach, may we meet with you to discuss this question.

70. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox), Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957, 12:30 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

United Nations Review Conference

Mr. Wilcox handed the Secretary the annexed memorandum,[2] and outlined in more detail the reasons IO tended to be negative toward a charter review conference at this time. Mr. Wilcox said that he had discussed this also with Jim Barco (who is in full agreement with Ambassador Lodge) and that Barco agreed with our thinking. Our conclusion was that the Committee of the Whole should be kept in being, but should be instructed to report again to the 13th General Assembly.

The Secretary indicated that the only two real goals of charter review now would be some system of weighted voting, and the elimination of the veto power (insofar as the peaceful settlement of disputes is concerned) in the Security Council. Now that the new members had come into the United Nations, their entrance was no longer a selling point; and their presence would make any other change more difficult to achieve.

The Secretary also commented that some NGO (as, for example, the US Committee for the UN) would be the proper organization to build up a ground swell for a change such as weighted voting.

The Secretary concluded by suggesting that Mr. Wilcox call in the British and French and inquire of them their attitude toward any movement, through charter review, of achieving such goals as a weighted voting system, with the consequent corollary of a larger role for the General Assembly. The Secretary felt we should maintain a neutral attitude toward the whole matter until we had the British and French views.

The Secretary also commented that there were a number of procedural problems and similar problems which might usefully be considered at any conference such as a charter review conference, but which could be solved without amending the Charter. He felt that this should be borne in mind in any consideration of the objectives to be sought from and the achievements which could be gained by a charter review conference.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113. Confidential. Drafted by Hanes.

[2] *Supra.*

71. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, May 29, 1957—7 p.m.

998. Re re-election of SYG. SYG in recent conversations has alluded several times to possibility he may no longer be SYG next year. Most recent occasion was during report of his visit to Jerusalem. Ben Gurion had referred to SYG's personal role in helping establish peaceful situation in ME and hoped he could do something further next year. SYG told us that he had commented that perhaps he might not be available.

SYG's references have been nothing more than asides. We have no real impression from him whether he seriously thinks of not being candidate for reelection or whether he is indirectly looking for expression of support. We assume latter probably the case. This impression is strengthened by fact SYG is obviously mending his fences with UK, France and Israel.

In view of fact that question is clearly on his mind, suggest I be authorized to tell him soonest in appropriate fashion that we would like to see him continue for another term.[2]

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 315/5–2957. Limited Official Use.

[2] Telegram 935 to USUN, June 10, authorized Lodge to initiate conversations with the British, French, and Chinese Delegations in order to build Security Council support for a recommendation to the Twelfth General Assembly that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld be appointed for another term at the expiration of his current service in April 1958. If such consultations proved fruitful, Hammarskjöld would be informed and the Department and the Mission would work out a plan for approaching the Soviet Union and the other members of the Security Council. The telegram also reported that the Department was unaware of any other acceptable candidate and viewed routine re-election of Hammarskjöld as the best means of avoiding a repetition of the 1950 controversy over Trygve Lie. "In any case his conduct Secretariat and UN affairs merits his early reappointment as mark confidence." (*Ibid.*, 315/6–1057)

Telegram 1055 from New York, June 11, reads: "Re SYG's reappointment—Deptel 935. In view authorization given in Sisco/Menshaw telecon, we will get SYG's assent before discussing question formally with UK, France and China." (*Ibid.*, 315/6–1157)

---

72. Editorial Note

On June 4, Paul Nitze, former Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State and currently a member of the

United Nations Force Project for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sent Francis Wilcox an 18-page paper entitled "Where and Under What Circumstances Might a United Nations Police Force Be Useful in the Future?" In a brief covering note addressed to Wilcox, Nitze commented that "Some of the people in S/P think it a little negative both on the evaluation of the need and on the evaluation of the possibilities of getting agreement to the use of such a force. I would appreciate any comments you might have." (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, General)

Wilcox replied at length on June 6. He stated that Nitze's paper had been circulated in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and expressed pleasure that Nitze had sent a copy to the Policy Planning Staff since the Staff "has an even more direct interest in the background setting" within which such a United Nations force might be used. "I have found that too often the concept of a UN Force is considered in exclusively idealistic terms rather than in light of the world context in which it is expected to function," Wilcox continued. He added that the United Nations Emergency Force created for use in Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956 "required a special political composition designed to meet the needs and to avoid the pitfalls of that particular situation, which well might be inappropriate for any given further situation." Wilcox wrote:

> "Moreover, perhaps a major aspect of the problem is not so much one of how to create a Force in being, as of how much can be done in advance to establish the bases and modalities for quickly setting up a UN Force to meet a specific need when it arises. I have always felt that the concept of earmarking armed forces that evolved in the Uniting for Peace program is a sound way to approach this question. It seems to me that it is more important and politically more feasible to seek to get countries to commit themselves to designate certain units for possible UN use in the future than it is to try to establish a standing UN force located in a specific place. The crucial factor is the willingness of States to designate and hold 'available' certain forces."

Wilcox closed by expressing agreement with Nitze's suggestion that Eastern Europe might well become an area where such a United Nations Force could be employed in a peace-keeping role. "I was particularly impressed with your view that the existence of 'United Nations tools of the type under study can create possibilities for action which the Russians must take into account in their planning.' " (*Ibid.*)

73. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, June 12, 1957—6 p.m.

1065. From Lodge. Reappointment of SYG UN—Deptel 935, mytel 1055.[2]

This morning I informed Hammarskjold of our hope he would be willing accept reappointment, and that I intended consult with British, French and Chinese. Before doing so, however, I had wanted inform him.

Hammarskjold said he was no more a candidate for reelection now than he was candidate for election in 1953. He was willing, as he put it, to be "ordered" to continue or not as members desired. He would be happy either way. He went on to say there should be no ambiguity about position of SYG if he was to be effective, nor could anyone who "sought" post be effective in his opinion. The SYG had to have the strongest backing and therefore it could not be matter of personal ambition. Hammarskjold said he greatly appreciated confidence we had shown in him.

He was quite agreeable to my consulting with the others which I am arranging to do early next week.

Wadsworth

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 315/6–1257. Limited Official Use.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 71.

---

74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, July 11, 1957—11:56 a.m.

27. Re Reappointment of SYG for additional 5-year term. View indications all permanent members SC appear favor reappointment SYG, suggest further discussion with [name deleted] to work out next steps and procedures.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 315/6–2857. Confidential. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

We have noted procedure suggested by [name deleted] (Urtel 1170 [2]). While there may be some psychological advantage for initiative to appear to come from GA, we believe it might be desirable get over SC hurdle at reasonably early date, perhaps some time in August, so that twelfth GA can act expeditiously in opening days of session to appoint Hammarskjold in accordance with Article 97 of Charter. Also, early SC nomination would appear simplify GA action.

While we would wish to discuss this matter subsequently with other SC members, our preliminary view is that brief SC resolution might be introduced by several or all non-permanent members. This would avoid any difficulty which might arise, (i.e. Soviet Union and China as co-sponsors) if big powers were to put forward such proposal.

Dulles

---

[2] Telegram 1170 from USUN, June 28, contained a summary of a conversation between a U.N. official and Wadsworth in which the official stated the opinion that little difficulty was envisaged with the re-election of Hammarskjöld and suggested a procedural timetable in which the General Assembly would swiftly approve its agenda and which would include an item on Hammarskjöld's re-election with the issue taken up and resolved before general debate began in the Assembly. (*Ibid.*)

---

75. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CA–665 *Washington, July 19, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Revision of the United Nations Contribution Scale—12th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

At the 11th Session of the General Assembly it was agreed that early in the 12th Session the General Assembly would review all the factors affecting cost sharing with a view to giving new criteria to the Committee on Contributions to guide them in developing a new scale of assessments for the calendar year 1958.

In view of the interest stemming from the record made by the United States in the discussions on this item the following advance explanation of the position to be taken by the United States at the 12th Session of the General Assembly is presented.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7–1957. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent to 69 posts and repeated to 7 others.

It is requested that at your discretion you bring these views to the attention of the Government to which you are accredited and inform the Department of the reaction.

In light of the following considerations, the United States will press for a reduction in the maximum share to be assessed against the largest contributor from 33⅓ per cent to 30.00.

1. The share the United States should bear is a question of principle, not of what the United States can afford to pay. The United States position, as first stated by Senator Vandenberg in 1946; has always been that, for purposes of the regular United Nations budget, the assessment of the highest contributor is a question of what is right and wise and just as among partners in a common enterprise.

2. The United Nations has accepted this position from the very beginning in fixing the assessment of the highest contributor. In 1946, although it was estimated that relative United States capacity to pay was then 60 per cent and the Contributions Committee proposed a United States assessment of 49.89 per cent, the General Assembly, while agreeing to fix assessments in general "broadly according to capacity to pay", fixed the assessment of the highest contributor (United States) arbitrarily at 39.89 per cent, or roughly at two-thirds of relative capacity to pay.

3. Assuming that the membership of the United Nations had remained the same and that the same arbitrary standard was applied now, as in 1946, to fixing the assessment of the highest contributor, then the United States, now said to have relative capacity to pay of 40–45 per cent, would be assessed two-thirds of that, or less than 30 per cent. Thus, despite the great increase in the relative capacity to pay of the other United Nations members, the United States, at present assessment level of 33⅓ per cent, now pays more in relation to its relative capacity than it did in 1946.

4. Moreover, United Nations membership has not remained the same. Since 1946 membership has increased from 51 to 81, an increase of more than 60 per cent. More importantly, since 1948, when the General Assembly recognized that the assessment of the highest contributor should not exceed 33⅓ per cent, membership has increased from 58 to 81, an increase of about 40 per cent.

5. Such an increase in membership, as a matter of principle and wholly without relation to capacity to pay, should be accompanied in an organization of sovereign equals by a reduction in the maximum assessment share of the regular budget to be borne by any one country.

6. When in 1948 the principle of a one-third maximum assessment on the highest contributor was recognized by the General Assembly and the United Nations had only 58 members, this meant the United States should pay twenty times its membership percentage, which was 1.72 per cent. At present in an organization of 81 members, the United States represents only 1.25 per cent of total membership, and it pays, on a 33⅓ per cent assessment basis, twenty-six times its membership percentage. This increase cannot be justified in an organization of sovereign equals, particularly where there has been a large increase in the capacity to pay of other members in relation to the United States.

7. Additional contributions to the United Nations budget of the first new members admitted since 1950 (sixteen) have been applied to the reduction of percentage contributions of all United Nations members, except the United States, which pay more than a minimum percentage. Considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, plus the principle of equitable treatment for all members, dictates that the United States percentage contribution should now be reduced by application of contributions of the most recent new members.

8. The United States will further propose that the reduction in its percentage share should be accomplished by:

A. Maintaining the percentage shares to be determined for the five countries admitted to membership at the 11th Session of the General Assembly (Japan, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Ghana) outside the calendar year 1957 scale of assessments;

B. Incorporating the percentage shares of the five new members into the calendar year 1958 scale of assessments and reducing the United States share in the same amount (approximately two percentage points) thus maintaining all other countries at their 1957 percentage share except as covered in point D below;

C. Readjusting the relative percentage of other countries on a capacity to pay basis to complete the United States reduction to 30 per cent. It is expected that increases in the capacity to pay of the "Soviet Bloc" countries might be large enough to make it unnecessary to increase the percentage shares of other members; and

D. The foregoing steps would be implemented taking into account the maintenance of the minimum share at .04 per cent and retaining the "Per Capita" principle.

Note: Posts which believe that the following point would cause no offense and would otherwise be appropriate may include it in addition to the foregoing:

For several years the United States Congress and the American public have been giving generous support to a number of multilateral and bilateral programs in the international field which in a variety of ways have helped to achieve the aims of the United

Nations. The cost to the United States of these programs each year is many times the amount of the United States contribution to the annual budget of the United Nations, and this cost has been met willingly—with no feeling that this voluntary action was unfair or inequitable. Sentiment has already been expressed in the Congress that the United States is being unfairly treated in the United Nations on the question of the assessment scale. A continued refusal by the General Assembly to alter the scale may well encourage this sentiment. The United States would hope to see no situation develop in respect to this question which could be a factor in bringing about a negative reaction on the part of the American public toward United States support for both multilateral and bilateral programs.

For Latin American Posts:

Although the OAS contribution scale is based with some modifications on the UN scale, the proposed change in the United States share of UN contributions would have virtually no effect on the OAS contributions scale. You may so state if this question arises. If the proposed reduction in the United States share to the United Nations should prompt other questions concerning the contribution share to the OAS, the latter may be distinguished from the United Nations contribution on the basis of the difference in the facts, i.e. the new members added to the United Nations whereas the membership in the OAS has remained the same.

FYI on the *Note* above: In addition to the huge outlay for bilateral programs under the Mutual Security Act, U.S. contributions to a number of multilateral "voluntary" programs under the UN have been at levels considerably in excess of our "capacity to pay". For example,

(a) UN Palestine Refugee Program—70% of total funds given by all governments, or approximately $21.5 million this year.

(b) UN Children's Fund—55% or about $10 million for the current year.

(c) UN Technical Assistance Program—about 49% this year, or approximately $15.5 million.[2]

Dulles

---

[2] Department of State and USUN Files contain numerous responses to this instruction and to the proposal that it contained. The earliest responses were mixed, but generally unfavorable. Only the Italian Government apparently expressed unreserved support (telegram 405 from Rome, August 1) while The Hague, Pretoria, and Paris expressed skepticism or opposition to the U.S. proposal as either tending to adversely affect the contributions scale of all other member nations (despatch 128 from The Hague, August 16) or a few of the already most heavily burdened (despatch 343 from Paris, September 4).

On September 12, Dulles sent instruction 2462 to 17 posts stating that no reply had been received to the "very strong interest of the United States" in the plan contained in CA–665 and requested "that you make every effort to ascertain the views of the Government to which you are accredited and inform the Department of the reaction." Replies were received between September 17 and December 3, ranging from expressions of outright support (telegram 53 from Luxembourg, September 17, and a memorandum of conversation by John E. Fobes with Kadhif M. Khalaf, Second Secretary of the Iraqi Mission at the United Nations, September 19, 1957) to the outright opposition of such countries as India and Argentina (memorandum from Bender to Lodge, September 27, and memorandum from Wilcox to Rountree, September 26), with other member nations stating a willingness to support the U.S. plan as long as it did not affect the existing financial percentage assigned to the interested country (telegram 923 from Manila, September 9; telegram 582 from Tehran, September 19; and despatch 446 from Havana, December 3).

The telegrams and airgrams summarized above are all *ibid.*, Central File 320; the memorandum from Wilcox to Rountree is *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Memoranda, General, 1957; the memoranda by Bender and by Fobes are in USUN Files, IO, Financing.

---

76. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Soviet Representative to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (Chetchetkin) and the Senior Adviser on International Organization and Legal Matters to the Mission at the United Nations (Bender), New York, July 25, 1957[1]

SUBJECT

Election of UN SYG

In my conversation with Chetchetkin today, he asked whether I thought that Hammarskjold would be reelected. I replied in the affirmative, saying I saw no other candidates in the field and that I knew of no reason why the US would not support Hammarskjold.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, SYG. Limited Official Use.

I asked Chetchetkin about the Soviet position on this matter. He said that the Soviet attitude towards Hammarskjold was "positive" but that no final decision concerning his reelection had been taken by the Soviet Government. He said that he knew of no other candidates for the position.

Chetchetkin then asked whether I thought it would be desirable to have the election of the SYG occur early in the Assembly session. I answered in the affirmative, saying that I thought it would be helpful in connection with a number of decisions to be taken in the Assembly to know as soon as possible who would be the Secretary General for the next five years. I pointed out that, for example, the Fifth Committee would be making recommendations to the Secretary General relating to personnel policy and that, certainly for this purpose, it would be helpful to know to whom the recommendations were being addressed. When I asked Chetchetkin what the Soviet Delegation thought about the timing of the Secretary General's election, he was hesitant about a reply. He said that there were really several important questions which probably ought to be settled first and that, since Hammarskjold's contract did not expire until next spring, there was no urgency about his election. He then said that probably the Soviet attitude on this point would depend upon its attitude towards Hammarskjold's election. If the Soviets favored his election, they might well agree to have the election held early.

Comment:

From Chetchetkin's remarks, I think it quite possible that the Soviets, even though favoring Hammarskjold's election, might think it best to hold off the election until late in the Assembly in order to hold a weapon over Hammarskjold's head. They might well believe he would be more cooperative on items like the Hungarian question if his election was still in abeyance.[2]

---

[2] Telegram 149 from New York, August 1, reported that during a discussion among U.S., U.K., and French officials it was tentatively agreed to have the Security Council convene September 5 to reappoint Hammarskjöld, with General Assembly action to follow. It was also agreed that the U.S. official would meet with a Soviet representative to ensure agreement on the timing. (Department of State, Central Files, 315/8–157)

77. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Hanes) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, July 26, 1957.

SUBJECT

Proposal to Establish a Permanent UN Corps for Observation, Patrol, and Related Functions

Problem:

To consider whether the United States should sponsor a proposal for a permanent United Nations force.

Discussion:

1. Considerable interest has been expressed in Congress and elsewhere, in UNEF as the possible prototype or forerunner of a multi-national UN force to deal with political disputes, acts of aggression, armed conflicts, etc. A number of resolutions have been submitted in the House and Senate calling for the establishment of a permanent UN force for these purposes. The Carnegie Endowment is preparing a study on the prospects and possibilities of creating such a force. The Governments of Pakistan and Canada are reportedly developing proposals on the subject.

2. The existence of various situations where United Nations observation or patrol might either deter the outbreak of hostilities or facilitate the cessation of hostilities after they have broken out, suggests that the UNEF experience might now constructively be built upon to augment the available tools for dealing with international disputes, particularly those in the non-Communist world. I believe the Department should be prepared with a realistic and feasible plan for presentation at an auspicious time.

3. A proposal for a UN corps should be considered as an adjunct to UN procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes, rather than as a collective security-type fighting force designed to repel military aggression. Anything going beyond this limited role would not be likely to secure acceptance in the General Assembly at the present time.

4. We have developed some very preliminary ideas of a possible proposal which are merely illustrative and could constitute a starting point for tentative discussion with the Department of Defense. (Tab

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Armed Forces. Confidential. The date on the source text is handwritten. A notation at the bottom of the source text reads: "Secty approved 8/6/57."

A)[2] A draft resolution (Tab B)[3] establishing a study committee to make recommendations to the General Assembly is also included. The suggested force might be called UN Corps for Observation and Patrol (UNCOP).

5. EUR and FE, while concurring in the proposal, are concerned at the possibility of participation in the corps by Soviet satellite states, and also possible proposals for utilization of the corps by the Assembly in situations where it might not be in this country's interest. FE also further questions whether we could control the situation which could develop over this issue in the General Assembly. It is believed, however, that the overall advantages of the proposal outweigh these possible difficulties, which could be met by appropriate diplomatic leadership in concrete circumstances.

Recommendation:

That you approve this paper as a basis for consultation with the Department of Defense with the objective of arriving at a United States Government position. Ambassador Lodge should then be consulted regarding his views as to appropriate timing. Thereafter, a decision could be reached in light of all available facts as to whether to take the initiative in the United Nations, and if so, when.

---

[2] Presumably the same as the enclosure to Document 79.
[3] See Tab B to Document 63.

---

78. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA-1171 *Washington, August 3, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Twelfth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

The twelfth regular session of the General Assembly (GA) is scheduled to convene in New York on Tuesday, September 17th, 1957. We anticipate that the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly, which convened November 12, 1956, and adjourned temporarily March 8, 1957, will be reconvened earlier in September to consider the report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and to adjourn definitively prior to the opening of the Assembly's twelfth regular session.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–357. Confidential. Sent to 71 posts and repeated to 13 others. An introductory note reads:

(Continued)

A. Composition and Atmosphere

When the 12th GA opens, it will comprise 81 members, including five new members admitted since the opening of the 11th GA and sixteen members admitted by the 10th GA in 1955. The UN has expanded from 60 to 81 members within fifteen months. In this period the number of non-Communist European states increased from ten to sixteen; the number of members from Asia and Africa rose from seventeen to twenty-eight; and the number of Soviet orbit members increased from five to nine. The number of members from the old Commonwealth (4), from Latin America (20) or otherwise classified (4) remained constant.

Several organizational and tactical problems arise from this expanded membership. FYI Members from non-Communist Europe, the Old Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Union of South Africa), and Latin America together with the U.S. total 41, or, theoretically, a simple majority; while members from Asia and Africa mathematically constitute 28 or one-third plus one. In practice, of course, members do not vote solely on the grounds of geographical location. Indeed, such a situation would be undesirable. Nevertheless, the composition of the GA necessitates more than ever that members consult and accommodate themselves to one another if they wish to gain GA approval for proposed UN programs or avoid what they consider undesirable. As a hypothetical example, also FYI, it may be seen that were the US to sponsor a resolution requiring a two-thirds vote for GA adoption and if it were supported by all the Latin Americans, non-Communist Europeans, and Old Commonwealth members, which is not always the case, thirteen more affirmative votes would still be needed if all members cast their votes

---

(Continued)

"This circular discusses the situation anticipated at the twelfth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and several important political issues expected to arise there for the background information of missions in the field. Mission in all friendly countries which are members of the UN are requested in their discretion to make these views known to the governments to which they are accredited, as indicated in the circular.

"All posts receiving this circular are requested to report currently for the information of the Department and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations any information coming to their attention locally pertaining to matters likely to arise in the General Assembly."

Department of State Central File 320 contains a number of telegrams and despatches responding to this circular airgram.

either affirmatively or negatively. Thus, assuming the Soviet orbit and others may be in opposition, at least thirteen affirmative votes would have to be sought from among China (which customarily supports us), Israel, Yugoslavia and the Arab, African, and Asian members, specifically, eleven Arab, three remaining African, and fourteen remaining Asian. End FYI

There has been evidence of some apprehension, particularly among European members with dependent territories, respecting the present composition of the GA. FYI Some of these European governments have expressed the feeling that they can no longer expect objective treatment from the GA on any issue that has "colonial" connotations. End FYI. It is apparent, however, that a substantial number of UN members share (a) a critical attitude in matters affecting dependent areas and (b) a pre-disposition for causes invoking the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination. These views are held by some members in each geographical area and are not exclusive to one.

Most of the major colonial questions which will come before the 12th GA, e.g., Algeria, Cyprus, recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, and the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories, to cite but several, will stimulate expressions of these views. In our opinion, a principal challenge to the GA will be how to encourage desirable progress without exacerbating existing controversies and tensions. Like its predecessors, the 12th GA will also have before it unsettled problems which continue to impede good relations such as those between Israel and the Arab states and those involving South Africa. Unlike them, the 12th GA will also have to consider how to continue to finance the United Nations Emergency Force.

B. Agenda

Enclosed for your information is the Department's check list of items certain or likely to arise at the twelfth session (SD/A/438).[2] Items not bracketed are included in the provisional agenda (UN Doc. 3610) circulated by the Secretary-General on July 19, 1957 or will arise because of previous Assembly decisions. Items bracketed are likely to be submitted for inclusion in the agenda. Posts are cautioned not to discuss bracketed items, unless, in their discretion, consultations on such items would appear auspicious. Items are arranged according to their possible allocation to the plenary meetings of the Assembly or its seven Main Committees. As in previous years, we would appreciate information you may receive regarding any items which the government to which you are accredited is likely to propose for inclusion in the agenda.

---

[2] Dated June 28, not printed. (*Ibid.*, IO Master Files, SD Series, 1955–58)

C. Consultations

We desire, as in previous years, to consult informally with friendly governments prior to the opening of the Assembly concerning major agenda items. These consultations should be held on the basis of our tentative views or general objectives in order that we may be able to take the views of other governments into account when formulating our final positions. In some cases, however, you will observe our position has already been determined (e.g., para. D, items 1, 2, 3, 4, and parts of 5 and 6 below). The items dealt with in this instruction are those which would be considered in the Assembly's political committees and/or plenary; other important items dealt with in the other five Main Committees will be treated in other instructions as appropriate, e.g., CA 665 of July 19th. You are requested, in your discretion, to outline this government's views or objectives to the foreign office and to report its reactions as soon as possible. As noted above, you should state that these views, except as otherwise indicated, are tentative and that we shall wish to take into account, insofar as possible, the views of other friendly governments in determining our ultimate position. Your approach at addressee capital will be paralleled by consultations with the permanent missions in New York through USUN and in some cases with diplomatic representatives in Washington. FYI There may also be consultations on a limited number of items among the members of certain regional organizations, such as NATO. End FYI. Actual negotiations, of course, are centered in New York.

D. U.S. Views

1. 12th GA Presidency and other officers

Candidates for GA President are Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon, and Ambassador Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia. We have informed both New Zealand and Lebanon, in response to their requests for our support, that the U.S. will support Sir Leslie, whose candidacy had gained substantial momentum before that of Dr. Malik was put forward. We would very much regret to see an open contest develop between two such well-qualified candidates, since such a contest could only have a divisive effect in the free world, and it is our hope, therefore, that Dr. Malik will decide not to press his candidacy. (See our circular telegram No. 54.[3])

If asked for our views concerning the composition of the General Committee which is composed of the GA President, the eight Vice-Presidents, and the seven main committee chairmen, you may state we favor maintaining the ratio of 3 Latin Americans, 3 Asians and Africans, 3 non-Communist Europeans, 1 Commonwealth and 1 satellite, with each of the five permanent Security Council (SC) Members elected to a Vice-Presidency. Asian and African members, however, are pressing for four seats. We do not wish to engage in a controversy with Asian and African members over the matter and, therefore, are prepared, in general, to accept whatever may be worked out among interested members.

2. *The representation of China*

We consider it important to secure the largest possible affirmative vote to assure the continued seating of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China in the General Assembly. We shall again take the position that the Assembly should decide "not to consider" any proposals designed to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. FYI By taking the foregoing procedural position and avoiding a vote on the substance, we expect to be able again this year to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support and a minimum of difficulty. Furthermore, we anticipate that the UK will support the moratorium formula for the entire session. End FYI.

For your background, the breakdown of the vote on the U.S.-sponsored resolution "not to consider" Chinese representation at the 11th General Assembly, taken on November 16, 1956 when the UN membership stood at 79, was as follows:

a. *47 states in favor:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

b. *24 states against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

---

[3] Dated July 20, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320/7–2057)

c. *8 states abstaining:* Cambodia, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Posts in those countries which *voted with* the United States should express appreciation for such action and solicit continued support for a like US position in the 12th GA. Posts in those countries which *voted in the negative* (except Copenhagen, Helsinki and Oslo which have received special cabled instructions) should, in their discretion, solicit support for the U.S. position, or possibly an abstention, instead of a negative vote, if it is believed that any useful purpose would be served thereby. Posts in those countries which *abstained* have already received instructions to make appropriate representations, except for Cambodia and Laos. Embassies at Phnom Penh and Vientiane should, in their discretion, take appropriate action if the occasion arises.

For Tokyo: We assume Japan will support the moratorium at the 12th GA, inasmuch as it did so at the UNESCO General Conference, New Delhi, November 6, 1956. (See CA–4565, November 30, 1956.[4]) When occasion arises Embassy should take matter up with Foreign Office in order to confirm.

For Accra: Ghana was admitted to membership on last day (March 8, 1957) of 11th Session. Embassy should ascertain whether Ghana is disposed to support the moratorium formula and should urge Ghana's support for our position.

For Kuala Lumpur: We hope Malaya will support the U.S. position if matter arises after Malaya admitted to UN. In its discretion, post may discuss this matter with appropriate officials together with other matters in circular.

3. Admission of new members

The Eleventh General Assembly requested the Security Council to reconsider the applications of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam and report back to the Assembly as soon as possible. We expect the Council will act on this request prior to the Twelfth Session of the Assembly. It appears highly likely, moreover, that the Council will also have before it a new membership application—that of Malaya, which is scheduled to become independent on August 31. No difficulty with respect to the admission of Malaya is anticipated, though, FYI, it is possible that the U.S.S.R. may try to tie Malaya's admission with that of Outer Mongolia. There are no indications, however, that the U.S.S.R. will forego use of the veto in the case of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam, unless favorable action is also taken on the application of north Korea and north Viet-Nam. End FYI.

---

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 398.43 UNESCO/11–3056)

The U.S. continues strongly to oppose the admission of Outer Mongolia, north Korea, and north Viet-Nam, and the Department has currently under consideration the best tactics to be pursued in the Assembly in the likely event of another Soviet veto in the Council of the applications of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. The United States continues to support the admission of these two applicants and will support Malaya when it becomes eligible.

For Kuala Lumpur: You may inform authorities.

4. *Appointment of a Secretary-General*

The expiration in April 1958 of Secretary-General Hammarskjold's term of office makes it necessary to consider at the 12th GA his reappointment or replacement. The U.S. believes that Mr. Hammarskjold's outstanding record in office warrants his early reappointment.

5. *Elections to U.N. Councils*

Elections will be held at the 12th General Assembly for three seats on the Security Council and six seats on the Economic and Social Council. There will be no elections to the Trusteeship Council this year.

Security Council—The seats currently held by Australia, Cuba, and the Philippines become vacant at the end of 1957. There are three candidates to succeed Cuba, namely: Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. The Latin American preference among these candidates is not yet clear. Canada is the Commonwealth candidate to succeed Australia. Japan has announced its candidacy to succeed the Philippines.

FYI With respect to the Latin American seat, while we would prefer Argentina to Panama, our principal hope is that Dominican Republic neither be the Latin American choice or be elected. End FYI.

We have assured the Canadians of our support for the seat being vacated by Australia.

We have also assured the Japanese of our active support and understand they have received similar assurances from the British. In our view, the election of Japan to succeed the Philippines is not only desirable on its merits but is the best way to meet for the time being the problem of Far Eastern representation on the Council. Moreover, it may possibly help to modify the Soviet attitude on enlargement of the SC.

Economic and Social Council—The terms of China, the Netherlands, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, France, and Egypt end with this year. Uruguay and Chile are the only candidates so far for the seats currently held by Argentina and the Dominican Republic, and we will await indications of Latin American preferences before reaching a decision. The Netherlands is an active candidate for re-election, and we have informed the Dutch of our support of their candidacy.

France and China are also candidates for re-election, and we support both these candidacies. Traditionally the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented on all major U.N. bodies. We are actively campaigning for China's re-election, which we consider of major importance to the maintenance of its international position. With regard to the Egyptian vacancy, we desire that posts not indicate any receptiveness to any particular candidacy at this time. FYI We have suggested to the Philippines that it defer its ECOSOC candidacy (for an unspecified seat) since the only seat currently held by a Far Eastern member that becomes vacant at the end of this year is China's. End FYI.

6. Elections to the International Court of Justice

The terms of five judges end February 5, 1958: Badawi (Egyptian), Winiarski (Polish), Zoricic (Yugoslav), Koo (Chinese), Read (Canadian). We understand that Judges Read and Zoricic will not stand for re-election. Sir Percy Spender (Australian) is a candidate to succeed Judge Read. Professor Gaetano Morelli (Italian) and Professor Jean Spiropoulos (Greek) are candidates to succeed Judge Zoricic. The candidacies for re-election of Judges Koo, Badawi and Winiarski have been formally announced. So far, we have not been informed of any other formal candidacy.

With two exceptions, we have taken no firm positions on these candidacies since the complete roster of candidates will not become available until after August 15. We are undertaking an active campaign, as we did last year, on behalf of Judge Koo, whom we strongly support. We understand that Justice Kuriyama (Japanese) has decided not to be a candidate this year and that Japan is also supporting Judge Koo. We have, also, decided to support Sir Percy Spender. We have made no commitments regarding the other vacancies.

7. Report of the Committee on Charter Review

The committee of all Members established by the Tenth General Assembly to report to the Twelfth Session on the time, place, organization, and procedures of a Charter review conference met on June 3, 1957, and recommended to the Assembly that the committee be continued and requested to report again not later than the Fourteenth Session. This recommendation was adopted by a vote of 67 (U.S.) to 0, with nine abstentions (Soviet bloc). It is anticipated therefore that the Twelfth GA will accept this resolution with the minimum of discussion.

8. Enlargement of UN Councils and the ICJ

Three items on the agenda of the Eleventh General Assembly were postponed until the Twelfth Session after inconclusive debate on the first—increasing the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council. The other two items, which were never taken up, concerned enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and of the International Court of Justice. All three items had originated with a varying number of Latin American members and Spain, and arose out of the new situation created by the greatly enlarged membership of the U.N. The first two involved amendment of the Charter, and the third amendment of the Statute of the Court. The United States was prepared to support the enlargement of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council by two and four, respectively, but opposed any increase in the size of the Court.

The debate at the Eleventh Session made it appear highly unlikely that an increase of the Security Council by only two non-permanent seats would be acceptable to the majority of Members. At the same time, those pressing for a larger increase could not agree on exactly what they wanted. A resolution co-sponsored by a group of African and Asian states called for the establishment of a special committee to study the composition of the Security Council "in all its aspects", thus obviously referring to the permanent as well as the non-permanent seats. The U.S.S.R. made its agreement on any increase conditional 1) on a seat for Eastern Europe and 2) on the settlement in its favor of the Chinese representation issue.

The Department is currently reviewing its position on these three items in light of the developments at the Eleventh General Assembly.

9. Hungary

The 11th GA was recessed subject to being reconvened to consider the Hungarian and/or Middle Eastern items. Following the publication in June of the report of the UN Special Committee on Hungary, established pursuant to the Assembly's resolution of January 10th and composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Uruguay, and Tunisia, the 24 co-sponsors of the above resolution met in New York June 26. They issued a statement expressing their unanimity that the report should be considered by the GA as soon as it was practicable to do so. On June 27, Ambassador Lodge sent a communication to the President of the GA requesting the 11th GA to be reconvened as soon as possible to consider further the Hungarian question. The letter also referred to the conclusions of the Committee confirming forcible Soviet suppression of legitimate efforts of the Hungarian people to achieve liberty and national independence and to the flagrant violation by the present Hungarian authorities of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

Although the date for the reconvening of the 11th GA has not yet been fixed, it presently appears that the meeting will not take place until early in September. In the meanwhile, the U.S. intends to make every effort to maintain public interest in the report.

FYI In general, we believe our objectives at the forthcoming reconvened 11th session should be:

(a) To exploit to the maximum the conclusions of the Special Committee's report as a critical point-by-point refutation of the Soviet version of events respecting Hungary last fall.

(b) To seek adoption of a GA resolution which would put the weight of world opinion, and in particular, Asian opinion, in support of the Committee's report and conclusions which are damaging to the Soviet position in the world.

(c) To maintain at the reconvened 11th session the position already taken by the GA last March when it neither rejected nor approved the Hungarian credentials, but to consult with U.N. Members at the 12th GA convening one week later with a view to determining whether rejection of Hungarian credentials is advisable and, if so, has sufficient support.

(d) To utilize as fully as possible, without endangering our and other Western missions in Budapest, any information suitable for use in Ambassador Lodge's statements which focuses on current repressions and trials in Hungary.

We intend to begin consultations regarding specifics at UN New York with other delegations and particularly the 24 co-sponsors of the resolution of January 10, 1957, which established the Special Committee. End FYI.

Posts concerned please note: In countries whose governments have demonstrated unquestionable sympathy with the general U.S. position on Hungary in their statements and votes at the 11th GA, the Mission may, if questioned about U.S. intentions concerning the Hungarian item at the reconvened GA session, make available on a confidential basis the information summarized in the FYI section above as indicating our preliminary thinking.

10. Disarmament

The current session of the 5 member Subcommittee (U.S., U.K., Canada, France, U.S.S.R.) of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has been meeting in London since March 18, 1957. Negotiations for an initial limited disarmament agreement are still under way. It is unclear at this point whether the Subcommittee will still be meeting or be recessed at the time the 12th GA convenes in September. The U.S. is pressing for a plan embracing a first step agreement which would include reduction of conventional forces and armaments; agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the beginning of transfers of past production to peaceful uses, and, subject to agreement on these, a suspension of nuclear testing while an adequate system of inspection is established to verify the commitments taken; the installation of an appropriate inspection system to provide warning against the possibility of great surprise attack; and the development of a system of international control to verify that the sending of objects into outer space should be for peaceful purposes only.

11. Effects of Atomic Radiation

Czechoslovakia has requested that an item entitled "Effects of Atomic Radiation" be included in the provisional agenda of the 12th GA.

At the 10th GA the U.S. took the initiative by proposing the inscription of an item for the coordination of information relating to the effects of atomic radiation on human health and safety. In December 1955, the Assembly appointed a special scientific committee of 15 member governments (including the U.S.) to collect, review, evaluate, and distribute reports received from governments on (1) observed levels of radiation in the environment and (2) scientific observations and experiments relevant to the effects of ionizing radiation upon man and his environment.

The Committee will hold its 4th meeting this fall when it will begin formulation of its report which is due by July 1, 1958. This report will deal with the data that has been collected on levels of radiation and the effects of this radiation on man and his environment.

In view of the active role already assumed by the UN Scientific Committee, it is not unlikely Czechoslovakia's motive in requesting inclusion of this item is for propaganda purposes, and in particular with respect to advancing proposals for unconditional ending of tests and prohibiting the use of atomic weapons.

12. U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: report and voluntary pledging

Voluntary contributions to UNRWA have been declining to the point where the Agency will probably have to curtail greatly its rehabilitation services to the refugees after January 1958 unless this trend is reversed. In the past, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and France have accounted for over 90% of contributions made to UNRWA (with the United States alone contributing up to 70%). It has generally been recognized that a situation in which so few governments carry the main burden is not a healthy one. We hope that broader and more adequate support for UNRWA will be forthcoming during the pledging session of the ad hoc committee of the whole Assembly which is expected to meet early in October.

13. Cyprus

Two items involving Cyprus were inscribed in the agenda of the 11th GA and were considered simultaneously. The Greek item called for the application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination to the people of Cyprus and the British item concerned support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus. By a vote of 57 to 0 with one abstention, the Assembly on February 26, 1957 adopted an Indian compromise resolution expressing the desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found, and that negotiations would be resumed and continued to this end. Neither Greece nor the UK pressed their own proposals to a vote.

On July 12, Greece requested inscription of Cyprus in the provisional agenda of the 12th GA calling for "the application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination to the people of Cyprus and citing the violation of human rights and atrocities by the British Colonial Administration against the Cyprians."

FYI The Department believes it important in the next several months to focus on efforts toward direct negotiations, under NATO Secretary General Spaak and in other ways, to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, and we hope sufficient progress may be made to avoid the necessity of a GA debate on Cyprus. End FYI. The U.S. still believes a solution to this problem is obtainable by direct negotiations and lies with the parties concerned.

14. Algeria

The 11th GA on February 15, 1957, adopted by a unanimous vote (77–0; South Africa and Hungary absent) a moderate compromise resolution on Algeria co-sponsored by Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines. The resolution expressed the hope that a "peaceful, democratic, and just" solution would be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. On July 18, 21 Arab, Asian and African states requested inclusion of the question of Algeria in the provisional agenda of the 12th GA.

FYI In the event that there has been no significant progress made toward a settlement of the Algerian problem by this fall, it is anticipated that there will be a strong Arab, Asian and African-led offensive in the GA which will demand more forceful action than that taken last February. It is conceivable that negotiations between the French Government and the Algerian rebel leadership looking toward the conclusion of a cease-fire and the implementation of the Mollet Plan will have been undertaken by this fall. Such a development would be of the utmost significance and would serve to deflect in large measure efforts to press this issue too far at the 12th GA. However, the prospects for implementation of the Mollet Plan do not appear to be particularly promising at present. In this connection, it appears that France may now be vulnerable to the charge that it has in considerable measure backed away from or "watered down" the Mollet Plan as outlined in detail by former French Foreign Minister Pineau to the GA last February. This is of importance since the US predicated its position at the 11th GA largely on the ground that this program as outlined offered a reasonable prospect of advancing an Algerian settlement and hence the 11th Assembly should avoid taking any action which might hamper the carrying out of the French program.

The Department has held discussions with French officials in Washington during which we took a friendly but firm line concerning the urgent need for a solution of the Algerian problem. We were informed that France will not oppose inscription of Algeria at the 12th GA. End FYI.

It is suggested that Missions take the following line as appropriate in responding to inquiries concerning the US position on Algeria in the GA: While we would be opposed to the reconsideration of Algeria or any other item in the agenda of a reconvened session of the 11th GA to consider the report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, we expect to favor the inscription and discussion of Algeria at the 12th session. Although we would be opposed to any action at the 12th session which does not seem likely to make a contribution to a solution of the Algerian problem and which might in fact be harmful to the prospects of a peaceful settlement, we are not prepared to say as yet what sort of action the U.S. might support since this will depend in large measure upon developments occurring between now and the consideration of this question in the GA.

[15 and 16. South African Items][5]

(1) The Treatment of Indians in South Africa and (2) South Africa's Racial Policies. When the eleventh General Assembly voted to inscribe these items on the agenda, the Government of the Union of South Africa withdrew its Delegation and announced that it

---

[5] These and following brackets are in the source text.

would continue only token participation in the United Nations until the alleged interference in its domestic affairs was halted or it would be forced to withdraw from the Organization completely. FYI In your discussions with other Governments keep in mind that, as a general rule, we are not prepared to support any action which will give the Union Government an excuse for complete withdrawal. We would hope therefore that action in the Assembly can be moderate and not make the situation more difficult. End FYI.

[15. Indians in South Africa]

The eleventh General Assembly urged the parties (India, Pakistan, Union of South Africa) to pursue negotiations with a view to bringing about a settlement and invited them to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly.

Since no negotiations have taken place, we assume this item will again be inscribed by the Assembly. We continue to believe that the only real hope for a settlement of this dispute lies in direct negotiations between the parties.

[16. Apartheid]

The eleventh General Assembly called upon the Union Government to reconsider its position and revise its policies on *apartheid,* cooperate in a constructive approach by its presence in the Assembly, and asked the Secretary General to communicate, as appropriate, with the Union Government.

Since there has been no progress on this question, we assume it will be inscribed again this year. We continue to oppose racial discrimination in any form, and, in our statements before the forthcoming Assembly, as in the past, we expect to make this clear. We view with concern the continued implementation of *apartheid* in South Africa.

Nevertheless, we do not believe that either censure or condemnation or the establishment of more UN machinery is likely to improve the racial situation in South Africa or contribute to the UN objectives in the human rights field. The United States therefore hopes that the discussion of this question will be kept within a moderate framework.

[17. Soviet Propaganda Item]

It has been Soviet practice in recent years to put forward what has come to be known as "the Soviet item" which sets forth the current Soviet propaganda line. At the 11th GA, the USSR submitted two such items. The first was obviously a defensive reaction to the events in Hungary and was inscribed under the title: "Complaint by the USSR of intervention by the U.S.A. in the domestic affairs of

Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR, and its subversive activity against those states." When the Special Political Committee considered this item near the close of the 11th session it rejected a U.S.S.R. resolution which contained the above charges by a roll-call vote, 53 against, 8 in favor (U.S.S.R. and satellites) and 11 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia). Those absent other than Hungary and the Union of South Africa were: Austria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.

The second item which the U.S.S.R. requested inscribed was a more general propaganda assault upon the U.S. and its allies entitled "Question of aggressive acts by the U.S.A. constituting a threat to peace and security." The General Committee recommended against its inscription (8–6–1) despite the U.S.A.'s willingness to air these charges, and the GA Plenary approved that recommendation.

It may be expected that any new Soviet item and accompanying proposal will be couched in seemingly moderate and reasonable terms calculated to attract the support of those delegations anxious to see a lessening of East-West tensions.

The U.S., of course, remains ready to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. and other governments in concrete measures to facilitate a peaceful solution of the various outstanding issues. We, nevertheless, believe it important that the Soviets not be permitted in the guise of an innocuously worded resolution to obscure vital issues and to gain credit for a willingness to negotiate sincerely when such is not supported by concrete evidence. In this latter connection, we shall wish to cooperate closely with all non-Soviet delegations on procedures for dealing with any such spurious proposals in a manner best calculated to maintain our common objectives.

E. Miscellaneous

All posts, including those receiving circular for information and reporting purposes only, are requested to inform the Department of the composition of the GA delegations from their countries, and particularly of the attendance (including anticipated dates) of very important persons, such as Heads of State, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, etc.

Background information on many of the issues in the U.N. on which you will consult may be found in the *Annual Report of the President to Congress on U.S. Participation in the U.N. for 1955.* (The report for 1956 is not yet available.) Use may be made of the *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* (General Assembly Official Records: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 1, to be published before each regular session), which we hope to distribute to addressee posts, and the U.N. Secretariat's *Everyman's United Nations, 1945–1956*, 5th ed., 1956), if available.

At your discretion, you may make this circular available to the Embassy PAO for *Background Information Only*.

For Latin American posts only: The Department is preparing Spanish translations of selected parts of the above circular which such Embassies may wish to use in their approaches to the respective Foreign Ministries.

For Jidda: This circular also applicable for Yemen. Please consult Yemeni officials when next in Sana'a.

For Kuala Lumpur: At your discretion, you may take appropriate action.

For USUN: At your discretion, you may take any action you desire.

Herter

---

79. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)[1]

Washington, August 20, 1957.

DEAR MR. SPRAGUE: As you are aware, considerable interest has been expressed in Congress and elsewhere in the United Nations Emergency Force as a possible prototype or forerunner to a multinational United Nations Force to deal with such matters as political disputes and actual or potential armed conflicts. A number of resolutions have been submitted in the House and Senate calling for the establishment of a permanent United Nations Force for these purposes.

The existence of various situations where the carrying out of observation or patrol operations by a United Nations body might either deter the outbreak of hostilities or facilitate the cessation of hostilities after they have broken out suggests that the UNEF experience might now constructively be built upon to augment the available tools for dealing with international disputes, particularly those in the non-Communist world.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5700/8–2057. Confidential.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the Department of State is considering whether it would be desirable and feasible to sponsor or support a proposal in the 12th General Assembly for the development of a permanent UN force. The Department has developed some very preliminary ideas of a possible proposal for the establishment of a permanent force along the lines of the attached paper. You will note that the concept which we have in mind is very general in form; it is intended to be only a starting point for tentative discussions with other Departments of Government which might be concerned.

I would suggest that a discussion might be arranged between staff members of the Departments of State and Defense for the purpose of examining these ideas and, if they are found to have merit, of developing them further. If the eventual outcome of the discussions should be an agreed US Government position on the matter, we would propose that Ambassador Lodge should be consulted regarding the desirability of introducing an appropriate proposal in the 12th General Assembly. A decision could then be reached in the light of all available facts as to whether to take such an initiative, and if so, when.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know at your earliest convenience whether the Department of Defense would be prepared to nominate a member or members of its staff to enter into discussions such as I have suggested.

Sincerely yours,

Walter Walmsley [2]

[Enclosure] [3]

UNITED STATES VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBLE UN CORPS FOR OBSERVATION, PATROL, AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

Governing Principles

1. Standing arrangements should be developed enabling the UN in appropriate circumstances to provide international military personnel to give "on the ground" support to efforts toward the pacific settlement of disputes by the General Assembly (or Security Council), including the patrolling of disputed boundary lines or areas,

---

[2] Wilcox's name is typed in the signature block, but is crossed out by hand and Walmsley's name inserted.

[3] No drafting information is given on the source text; a typewritten notation reads: "State Department Draft, August 15, 1957."

supervising and maintaining cessation of hostilities, and observing situations which threaten the maintenance of peace and security.

2. It would be neither a purely "paper" corps on the one hand, nor a large standing force on the other. It might most feasibly take material shape in the form of a UN Corps training center. This might be established within a "neutral" nation, such as India, Sweden, or even Switzerland, possibly by leasing or purchasing an already existing military school facility. Alternatively, it could be located in e.g. Canada, relatively accessible to UN Headquarters. A permanent cadre of UN officers, directly hired or seconded by Member governments, would constitute the permanent party. Member States would be eligible to detail a small number of officers and non-coms for suitable training periods, on a rotational basis. These cadres would return to staff and train elements of company or battalion size within the various national military establishments, such units to be equipped with UN helmets and armbands.

3. Upon call of the Assembly (or Security Council) various of these trained and earmarked units would be immediately available to carry out UN observation and/or patrol duties, the composition of a particular force to be guided by political and other desiderata.

4. It would not at this stage include personnel from the five permanent members of the Security Council, nor would the Security Council or Military Staff Committee have any supervisory role.

5. It would be stationed on the territory of a Member State only with the consent of that State. (This does not imply U.S. acceptance of the doctrine that the consent of a state is legally necessary for the entry of UN forces in any case not covered by Chapter VII of the Charter).

6. It would constitute new machinery, not a continuation of UNEF as such.

7. It would not be regarded as a continuation of efforts of the Collective Measures Committee or efforts under Article 43 regarding military forces for enforcement purposes, but rather as an adjunct of pacific settlement machinery under the Charter.

8. It might be known as "UN Corps for Observation and Patrol" (UNCOP), or possibly "UN Patrol".

Organization

9. It would take the form of a new UN instrumentality, under the administrative director of a Chief of Staff named by the Secretary General with the consent of two-thirds of the Assembly. The corps would establish its own internal organization, TOs, equipment requirements, tactical doctrine, training and orientation curriculum, communications procedures, staff operations, etc. with assistance of

experts seconded from Member States as requested, and with the guidance of an advisory committee of governments.

10. Training and indoctrination would focus on language, inter-unit coordination, observation and patrol techniques, and other special skills essential for a multi-national non-fighting military body operating under international directives.

Financing

11. Such a force could be financed either by the participating states, through the UN regular budget, or as a special budget. The US doctrine of logistical support for contributing nations, evolved after the Korean experience, suggests that the US might wish to assist financially, and rules out the first alternative. Moreover, such a force would clearly be in the US interest, and we should not leave the full financial burden to the lesser powers. The principle of shared costs should be followed, under the regular assessment scale.

12. The principal cost would be the acquisition and operation of the training center, and support of the permanent party. When units were actually on UN assignments, the UN would cover all expenses other than basic pay, uniforms and personal gear, including small weapons, which would be supplied by the contributing nations, who would receive appropriate credits against their assessments. The UN would pay a standard allowance to troops on patrol assignment. Where a nation furnished manpower but was unable to finance its equipment, a special working capital fund could be established to supply grants as appropriate. Costs would also include airlift and sealift facilities which countries such as the US would be called upon to furnish in actual operational assignments.

80. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly[1]

SD/A/434 *Washington, September 2, 1957.*

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CONFERENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING THE CHARTER

The Problem

The Twelfth General Assembly has on its provisional agenda the Report of the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter, established by the Assembly in 1955 at its Tenth Session (Resolution 992).[2] This Committee was created to consider the question of fixing a time and place for a Charter review conference, which the Assembly had decided should be held "at an appropriate time", and the organization and procedures of such a conference, and to report to the Twelfth General Assembly. The Committee, comprised of all U.N. Members, met on June 3, 1957, and adopted by 67 votes (U.S.) to none, with 9 abstentions, a resolution recommending to the Twelfth General Assembly that the Committee "be kept in being" and requested to report again to the Assembly with recommendations "not later than its fourteenth session."

The same Tenth General Assembly Resolution that established this Committee had also requested the Secretary-General to complete the publications program undertaken pursuant to the request of the Eighth General Assembly (Resolution 796)[3] and to continue, prior to the Assembly's Twelfth Session, to prepare and circulate supplements, as appropriate, to the *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs.*

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, 12th GA, Committees 1–6. Official Use Only.

[2] Resolution 992 (X), "Proposal to Call a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter," adopted at the 547th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on November 21, 1955, without reference to a committee is printed in United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/3116), *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth Session from 20 September to 20 December, 1955*, p. 49.

[3] Resolution 796 (VIII), "Publication of documents concerning the drafting and application of the Charter: Preparatory work with regard to the possible holding of a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations in accordance with Article 109 of the Charter," adopted at the 458th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on November 27, 1953, is printed *ibid.*, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/2630), *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its Eighth Session from 15 September to 9 December, 1953*, p. 51.

The resolution adopted by the Committee at its meeting on June 3 requested the Secretary-General to continue this work.

United States Position

1. The United States should support acceptance of the Committee's recommendation by the General Assembly including its request to the Secretary-General and should be prepared either to join in co-sponsoring a resolution to this end or to leave this initiative to others, depending on which appears most desirable from the tactical standpoint.

2. The United States should, if appropriate, make a brief statement of support for the Committee's recommendation at the time this agenda item is considered, reiterating U.S. interest in the holding of a Charter review conference when circumstances are auspicious but recognizing the general consensus that such circumstances do not presently prevail.

3. In view of the nature of the Committee's recommendation and the vote by which it was adopted, consideration of this agenda item in committee does not appear necessary, and the United States should therefore endeavor to arrange for its consideration directly in plenary.

Comment

Article 109(3) of the U.N. Charter provides that if a general conference to review the Charter has not been held by the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session. No such conference having been held by 1955, this question therefore appeared automatically on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly. The Assembly adopted by a vote of 43 (U.S.) to 6 (Soviet bloc and Syria), with 9 abstentions a resolution, co-sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, and five other members, expressing the belief that review of the Charter "under auspicious international circumstances" is desirable and deciding that a general conference to review the Charter "shall be held at an appropriate time." The resolution then established the committee whose report is before the current session of the Assembly. There was general agreement at the Tenth Session that the Assembly's action constituted a decision in principle to hold a review conference and at the same time took into account the necessity for a more favorable political climate than that then prevailing if the potential benefits of a review conference were to be fully realized. Only the Soviet bloc opposed the idea of Charter review, its members stating that they would therefore not participate in the Committee.

It was the general understanding at that time that the Committee had the authority to recommend further postponement of the decision on the time and place of the review conference if in its opinion international circumstances are still not auspicious for the holding of the conference, and the Committee acted on this understanding. The United States, in supporting this action, referred to the general agreement among Committee members that the "appropriate time referred to in the Tenth General Assembly's resolution had not yet arrived" and reaffirmed its belief that the review conference "should be held when circumstances are auspicious." The phrase "no later than its fourteenth session" in the Committee's resolution reflects the U.S. view that the Committee should be free to report earlier if circumstances warrant. The Soviet bloc, contrary to previous statements, participated in the meeting of the Committee but abstained on the resolution, after its members had declared their continued opposition to the holding of any review conference.

While the United States and the United Kingdom were co-sponsors of the Tenth General Assembly resolution, none of the major powers was included among the sponsors of the Committee resolution—Brazil, Canada, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Liberia, and Panama. In view of the fact that Article 109(3) was included in the Charter in deference to the views of the smaller states, it may prove desirable to leave the sponsorship of the Assembly resolution to them.

The vote on the Committee's resolution points to its acceptance by the Twelfth General Assembly without controversial debate, and there have been no indications to the contrary since the Committee's meeting in June. This should permit expeditious handling of the item directly in plenary, which would be consistent with the handling of the original item at the Tenth General Assembly and serve to discourage any substantive discussion.[4]

---

[4] On October 14, the General Assembly took up the Committee's report in the form of a draft resolution endorsing the Committee's recommendations. This resolution, sponsored by Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, and Panama was adopted by a vote of 54 to 0 with 9 abstentions, as Resolution 1136 (XII). For further information, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1957, pp. 113–114.

81. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 11, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy with respect to Soviet Bloc Candidates in the UN

Discussion

In recent years, we have normally followed the practice of abstaining or voting against Soviet-bloc candidates, depending on the circumstances in each case. This has not usually prevented their election, the notable exception being the Security Council, and it has created certain problems for us in the pursuit of other objectives. (See attached memorandum.) Our unwillingness to vote for the USSR has made it increasingly difficult for us to argue convincingly that other members should vote for China's re-election to various UN bodies on which the permanent members of the Security Council are traditionally represented. Moreover, it is to our advantage to have the USSR represented on certain UN bodies, for example, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee on Contributions. The Soviet-bloc candidate is sometimes, because of a particular circumstance, a desirable addition to a technical body from the standpoint of US interests in that body. Where Soviet-bloc candidacies are uncontested and their success a foregone conclusion our refusal to vote for them under any circumstances appears unduly rigid in the eyes of other governments, particularly as the USSR and its satellites do not follow a comparable practice with respect to the US. In the case of Poland, our refusal to vote for Soviet-bloc candidates appears inconsistent with our current policy toward that country. Such problems as these have for some time cast doubt on the wisdom of our continuing to follow a hard and fast line in this matter, and we twice departed from our usual practice in 1956 by supporting a Czech for Vice-President of the IAEA Conference and Poland for election to the Economic and Social Council.

At the forthcoming General Assembly, the USSR will again be a candidate for one of the vice-presidencies (as will the US, UK,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/9–1257. Confidential. The date is from a copy of this memorandum *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, 12th GA Session. Both copies contain spaces for the concurrences of the four geographic bureaus but on neither text are the concurrences indicated. The source text contains the handwritten notation "approved by Secty 9/12/57."

France, and China) and presumably for re-election to the Advisory Committee and the Committee on Contributions. There will as usual be a Soviet-bloc candidate for one of the seven main committee chairmanships. Czechoslovakia is a candidate for election to succeed the Philippines on the Security Council, and Judge Winiarski of Poland is a candidate for re-election to the International Court of Justice. If the usual pattern prevails, all these candidacies will be successful except that of Czechoslovakia for the SC, where Japan is the rival candidate.

Recommendations

1. That we vote for the USSR when it is a candidate for election to a body on which the five permanent members of the Security Council are traditionally represented or to a body where certain US interests are served by having the USSR represented, subject to the possibility of casting a negative vote, a blank ballot, or abstaining if it is decided that circumstances make one of these alternatives desirable in a given case;
2. that we vote for Poland where there is no rival candidate we prefer unless we have special reasons for opposing the specific Polish candidacy; and
3. that we abstain or vote negatively on other Soviet-bloc candidates unless there are compelling reasons for an affirmative vote, in which cases, the Department would decide on an individual basis whether an exception to the general practice should be made.

[Attachment] [2]

QUESTIONS RAISED BY US VOTING POLICY ON SOVIET-BLOC CANDIDATES

FE has from the beginning (September 1953) expressed reservation about the policy of not voting for the USSR in cases where the five permanent members of the Security Council are traditionally represented because of the bearing of this policy on our efforts to maintain unimpaired the Republic of China's standing within the UN as one of the Big Five. In seeking the re-election of China to UN bodies, probably our most effective argument with UN members who are unsympathetic toward the Republic of China is that the five permanent members of the SC are traditionally represented. This argument becomes increasingly difficult to use when it is generally known that we do not vote for the USSR in the same circumstances.

---

[2] No drafting information is given on the source text.

The desirability of continuing this policy has also been questioned in the case of the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the UN Committee on Contributions, and the Narcotics Commission, on the ground that some of our objectives in these particular bodies are served by Soviet or Soviet-bloc participation.

The U.S. Delegation to the Economic and Social Council in 1956 asked for reconsideration of this policy on the ground that it interfered seriously with the Delegation's ability to negotiate acceptable "slates" for the functional commissions and to secure the reelection of China to these bodies.

This question also arose in 1956 in connection with our decision to make exceptions and to support a Czech for Vice-President of the IAEA Conference, as part of a general agreement on the officers of the Conference, and to support Poland for election to ECOSOC, in view of changing Polish-Soviet relations.

It was raised again in 1957 before the spring session of the Economic and Social Council. While EUR did not consider the international circumstances at that time propitious for any change in policy, it was agreed that this question should be re-examined again before the 12th General Assembly.

Our policy of not voting for the USSR or Soviet-bloc candidates has not in most cases, the notable exception being the Security Council, prevented their being elected. Most UN Members believe that each geographic area in the UN should be represented on its various bodies and that the election of a country does not connote approval or disapproval of its Government or its conduct.

With respect to the Security Council, US statements during the recent GA debate on enlargement of the Council commit us to accept the allocation of a seat to Eastern Europe if agreement is reached on a suitable enlargement. The US representative said in the debate that with the proposed increase in the number of non-permanent seats, "it would be possible to provide representation to Eastern Europe without denying equitable representation to other geographic areas." Within this context, he said further that the US "would support an appropriate allocation of all non-permanent seats in an expanded council." The USSR had made clear that it would not support any increase unless provision were made inter alia for representation of Eastern Europe, which, in informal discussions, it defined as including Yugoslavia but not Greece, Turkey or Finland.

While agreement on the allocation of a seat to Eastern Europe would not commit us necessarily to support the Soviet candidate for this seat in an enlarged Council, it would certainly seem to preclude our supporting a candidate from outside the area for this seat. We could of course abstain or vote negatively on an unpalatable candidate from the area, but active efforts to defeat this candidacy would not only almost certainly prove futile but would undoubtedly be regarded generally as contrary to the agreement allocating a seat to Eastern Europe, except in the unlikely event of rival candidacies from within the area.

Though our practice of abstaining or voting negatively on all Soviet-bloc candidates is generally known within the UN, most of the votes concerned are by secret ballot and therefore not likely, where the election of the Soviet-bloc candidate is assured and there is no rival candidate, to attract attention or receive widespread publicity. Moreover, many of the posts involved are of such character that there is little public interest in them.

---

82. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, September 13, 1957.

SUBJECT

Suggestions Regarding Your GA Speech

IO has several suggestions regarding your speech before the General Assembly which we hope help to give added substance to it.

Disarmament:

It was agreed in the meeting in your office this morning that our support for the Four-Power proposals would be stated and reference would be made to the resolution we intend to table. Assuming it will not be possible to get final agreement on the text of the resolution with the UK, France, Canada, Japan and several others, a paragraph along the following lines is suggested:

"The United States stands squarely behind the four-power proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee on August 29.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, 12th GA Session. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco.

"The United States, in concert with other members of this Assembly, will soon submit a resolution to this body embodying the essential principles of four-power proposals. These are reasonable and practicable proposals which we hope all members of the United Nations will support, including the Soviet Union."

Middle East:

We believe a firm restatement of your August 1955 speech along the following lines will help to give your speech a more constructive cast:

"The United States stands ready to make its contribution to the settlement of this important issue provided there is willingness by those principally concerned to make mutual efforts and to take necessary first steps. We stand ready, as friends of both the Israelis and Arabs, to participate substantially in an international loan to enable Israel to pay compensation which is due and which would enable many of the refugees to find a better way of life for themselves. We stand ready to contribute to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would facilitate the resettlement of refugees. We are still prepared to consider sympathetically possible security guarantees, provided other related problems are solved, under the sponsorship of the United Nations to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. We continue to favor a United Nations review at the appropriate time of the status of Jerusalem.

"These things are possible only if the spirit of conciliation prevails. This is our renewed plea—that the spirit of conciliation will soon develop to make possible a renewed effort on these serious issues of the Middle East." [2]

---

[2] Secretary Dulles delivered his speech entitled "Major Issues Before the United Nations" to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly on September 19; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 7, 1957, pp. 555–559.

Tosec 22 to New York, September 21, summarized the initial foreign reaction to the Secretary's speech. On October 4, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, sent to Secretary Dulles an 11-page summary of further foreign reactions. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–457)

---

83. Editorial Note

Following the close of the Resumed Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 14, during which the "Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary" was considered, Secretary Dulles traveled to New York for a series of conversations with various foreign leaders on issues and topics of immediate concern to the Twelfth Session scheduled to open on September 18. The Secretary held a total of 31 conversations between September 16 and 22, including a lengthy discussion with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld on September 20, during which the Secretary said that he "saw no serious difficulty arising in connection with the re-election of the Secretary General. Mr. Hammarskjöld replied that the Soviet Union was causing some trouble; they were making themselves 'interesting' but he did not think their obstruction would be serious." (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/9–1857)

Although an undated master list of memoranda of conversations held by Dulles at New York contains 31 entries, the most complete file of these memoranda found in Department of State files contains only the first 29. (*Ibid.*) *Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, contains only the undated master list, but none of the actual memoranda. The memoranda are listed in a series designated TGA/MC/—.

---

84. Letter From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Adams) to the Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs (Sisco), at New York [1]

Washington, September 24, 1957.

DEAR JOE: In response to your telephone request this morning, I am pouching you herewith the papers pertaining to the idea of a Permanent UN Force. [2] You will note that the paper was approved by the Secretary "as a basis for consultation with the Department of Defense with the objective of arriving at a United States Government position". No such position has yet been arrived at, and all of the enclosed papers should be regarded as informal working papers for internal use only. Our conversations with Defense will continue, of course, with a view to formulating such a position in order that it may then be submitted to Ambassador Lodge for his consideration of the question of timing. Meanwhile, the possible future use of such ideas as may develop out of the conversations with Defense may have been overtaken and altered by the decision already taken by the Secretary General to establish a committee within the Secretariat to study the possible bases for a Permanent UN Force. You know, of course, that Dick Pedersen and I were told by Ralph Bunche that the Secretary General thinks that the General Assembly should not undertake any initiative with respect to a Permanent UN Force at this session, but should instead turn its attention to the financing of the existing UNEF.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Armed Forces. Confidential. A notation on the source text indicates that Sisco was at New York as a member of the Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

[2] A note on the source text indicates that these included Document 77 and the enclosure to Document 79.

Any ideas occurring to you in the Mission will make useful additions to the discussions with Defense here.

Sincerely yours,

Ware

---

85. Memorandum From the Senior Adviser on International Organization and Legal Matters to the Mission at the United Nations (Bender) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

New York, September 25, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Proposal re Reduction of its U.N. Assessment to 30 per cent

We are informed by the Australian and New Zealand Delegations that they will oppose in the Fifth Committee any reduction in the assessment percentage of the United States. This position has been taken despite approaches by our Embassies in Canberra and Wellington. It appears to be based primarily upon financial considerations and to ignore the political aspects of the problem. It fails to take into account the fact that twenty-two new Members have been admitted to the United Nations—an increase of 35 per cent—since the United States contribution was reduced to 33.33 per cent in 1954.

Accordingly, I recommend that you speak to the heads of the Australian and New Zealand Delegations about the seriousness with which we view our proposal. It would be very damaging to us in the Fifth Committee if these Delegations spoke and voted against us.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Financing. Confidential.

In essence, our proposal is the following:

1. That the General Assembly decide, in principle, that the maximum contribution of any one Member be reduced to 30 per cent.
2. That for 1958 the United States contribution be reduced only to the extent that this is made possible by applying the contributions of six new Members which have not yet been incorporated into the scale of assessments. This will permit a United States reduction of about 2 per cent, and incidentally will provide a small reduction for New Zealand, although not for Australia.
3. The reduction of the United States percentage to 30 per cent will be completed in the future only when the admission of new Members or the increase in national income of present Members make this possible.
4. The United States proposal will provide specifically that it will not cause an increase in the percentage contributions of any other Members.

---

86. Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly, Mission Headquarters, New York, September 26, 1957, 9:30 a.m.[1]

US/A/M(SR)/70

Mr. Lodge called the meeting to order at 9:30 a.m. He commented that while the delegates seemed to be able to arrive on time, the staff was appearing later and later for the meetings. He suggested that everyone come to the meetings on time in the future. He then called on Mr. Mewshaw for the day's announcements.

Mr. Mewshaw said that Mr. Sisco would like to have a meeting of all the area political liaison officers following the Delegation Meeting. Mr. Mewshaw then said that general debate will continue through the end of next week, that is until the fifth of October. He suggested that delegates pay special attention to the speech by the Chinese, Dr. Hu Shih, an eminent Chinese scholar and former Ambassador to the United States. Dr. Hu Shih was to be third speaker of the morning in the General Assembly.

Mr. Mewshaw then recalled that the Security Council would meet at 10:30 in the morning in secret session to discuss the renewal of the appointment of the Secretary-General. During the afternoon session today (September 26) the general debate will continue with speeches by the representatives of Bolivia, El Salvador and Sudan. The General Assembly will then consider the recommendations of the Security Council as to the reelection of the Secretary-General. In the probable event that the Security Council gives its unanimous consent, the General Assembly will probably acclaim the unanimous election of the Secretary-General, following which there would be speeches of congratulations. Mr. Mewshaw then reminded the delegation that the Disarmament Commission begins its work Monday (September 30) and that tomorrow (September 27) the Fifth Committee would begin its meetings.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Master Files, US/A/M/(SR)/1—. Confidential.

Mr. Lodge then called on Mr. Bender to present to the delegation the problem of the Scale of Assessments. Mr. Bender began by explaining that the problem of the United States' contribution was important more as a matter of principle than in its actual amount of money. The United States is assessed at 33.33% of the regular budget, and we are proposing a decrease in this percentage to 30%. This question has arisen because of the recent large increase in United Nations membership. We feel that with the admission of the new nations, the percentage of all members, including the United States, should be decreased on a pro rata basis. This principle, of course, would not apply to members paying minimum assessment percentages.

Mr. Bender outlined briefly the background of the problem of payments to the United Nations. Ever since the meetings of the Preparatory Commission in 1945, the United Nations has accepted the principle that assessments should be based broadly upon the capacity to pay. We objected from the very beginning to the applications of this principle to the largest contributor. It was first proposed by the Committee on Contributions that the United States assessment be fixed at 49.89% of the total. After Senator Vandenberg had strongly objected to this large proportion, the initial assessment approved by the General Assembly in 1946 was set at 39.89%. In 1948, an Assembly resolution recognized the principle that in normal times the maximum contribution of one state should not exceed ⅓ of the United Nations expenditures for that year. Despite American efforts to have its percentage reduced, however, our assessment remained at 39.89% until 1950, when certain small deductions were carried out. In 1952, the General Assembly decided that the highest contributor should not pay more than 33⅓% after the first of January, 1954. Since that date, the percentage has remained at 33⅓%.

In 1955, the General Assembly decided that the scale of investments should remain fixed for three years, that is for 1956, 1957, and 1958. This meant that the U.S. percentage for each of the years would be 33.33% of the total. This situation was affected however when sixteen new members were admitted later in the 1955 session. The U.S. anticipated that all of the old members would benefit proportionately by the additional contributions of these new members. However, in the spring of 1956, the U.N. Committee on Contributions fixed the percentages for these new members, recommending that they be consolidated into the scale of assessments by reducing the percentage shares of the old members, except for the maximum and minimum contributors—the United States and some seventeen countries which paid less than 9/10 of one percent. Last year we objected in the Assembly very strongly to this formula, but we finally agreed to a decision by which the Contributions Committee recommendations were accepted for the years 1956 and 1957, but with the proviso that the assessment scale for 1958 be left open for discussion at this Twelfth General Assembly, and that the assessments of Japan, Tunis, Morocco, and Sudan, who were admitted last year, be maintained outside the regular scale of assessments.

Since last year two more new members, Ghana and Malaya, have been admitted. The percentage contributions of the six new members whose assessments have not yet been brought within the regular scale, will come to a total of about 2.11% of the total budget.

During the last Assembly, the United States announced publicly that it would press for a reduction in its contribution to 30% of the total, in view of the admission of all the new members, and we are making this proposal this year.

There are three parts to the U.S. proposal as it stands now:

(a) that, in principle, the maximum contribution for any one state should be 30%,

(b) that the assessment percentages of the six new states be used to reduce the United States percentage, now by about 2%, and

(c) that in the future the United States contributions should be reduced to the level of 30%, as new members join the United Nations and as increases in national income in certain countries require increases in their assessment percentages.

One particular appealing element in the United States proposal is that no other country will have to pay more than previously as a result of the adoption of our idea. We believe that this aspect of our proposal gives it a chance of success.

The attitude of the other governments involved during the Assembly has been generally unsympathetic to the idea of a reduction in the United States percentage contribution. This stems from many factors, among which is the view that the United States can well afford to pay more than its present percentage. There is a widespread feeling that since the relative capacity to pay of the United States is said to be about 42%, we are now paying less than we should. In addition the annual increases in the total dollar budget at the U.N. have required other governments to increase their dollar contributions each year. We have asked the Department to seek support from Foreign Offices through our overseas posts, but it is not clear from the poll whether or not we have a majority for our proposal. Most governments seem to have been afraid to commit themselves, although many Member States apparently have no objection, providing the reduction in our assessment does not lead to an increase in theirs. There is, however, a widespread belief among Western European and Commonwealth nations that it is presently impossible to increase the burden of expenses borne by the new Asian and African nations, and that, therefore, they, the Western Europeans and Commonwealth, will be squeezed as the U.S. percentage is decreased.

Our position is particularly difficult this year, as the expenses to be appropriated for UNEF[2] are estimated to be about $40,000,000 in order to keep the force in action through 1958. The Secretary-General favors a direct levy on Member States to pay for UNEF, but when the states are paying this additional expense, they will not be in a mood to welcome United States suggestions that its regular share be reduced.

Mr. Carnahan asked Mr. Bender what criteria were used to determine what countries, in addition to the U.S., would not share in the 6.3% of the total budget to which the first sixteen new members contributed. Mr. Bender answered that any country contributing less than .08% received no reduction. He then pointed out that the sixteen countries already admitted plus the six admitted last year and this year will bring the new contribution percentages up to 9% of the total budget. Three percent of this could equitably go to reduction of the United States assessment.

Mr. Carnahan then asked if the 33⅓% contribution which we are now paying was a "ceiling" or a "floor", that is, was it considered to be a maximum or a minimum contribution. Mr. Bender answered that it is a ceiling by the terms of U.N. resolutions, but that the average U.N. contributor was more likely to treat it as a "floor" or as a minimum U.S. contribution.

Mr. Lodge then recalled that he had served as the United States Representative on the Fifth Committee during his service as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Fifth General Assembly. At that time, he had talked to Senator Vandenberg who pointed out the two factors in relation to the problem of contributions. First, Senator

---

[2] U.N. Emergency Force was established for service in the Middle East.

Vandenberg said that it was wrong to judge the contributions according to the capacity to pay and, second, that paying a large percentage of the contribution would give us, in the eyes of other delegations, too much influence in the U.N.

Mr. Lodge mentioned that an American statistician named Appleby had put this country on the spot with a great deal of documentation about the gross national product, the total national income, and a great number of economic facts all of which helped to prove that we could pay up to 50% of the total budget, according to the capacity to pay formula. Mr. Vandenberg had made the comment at the time that with such promising facts on the gross national product and our capacity to pay, the other countries would be certainly forced to follow our free enterprise system. However, Mr. Lodge pointed out that the large percentage has been decreasing and there is definitely no evidence that the 33⅓% contribution, now being used, is a floor. Mr. Lodge added that it should not be denied that we gain a certain influence by picking up ⅓ of the total check.

Mr. Lodge pointed out that with the addition of sixteen new members, it would be unfortunate from a public relations viewpoint for us to pay the same contribution, while the others had their percentages reduced, particularly the Soviet Union. He made the comment that he had observed, while he was on the Fifth Committee, that many of the experts were so cognizant of the problems of finance that they lost all sight of political and public relations factors. For this reason Mr. Lodge said we, the U.S. Delegation, were extremely fortunate to be represented on the Fifth Committee by Mr. Carnahan, who has a broad background of political training.

Mr. Carnahan asked how the figure of 49.89%, which was once used as our contribution, was arrived at. Mr. Bender's answer was that the formula was to find something less than 50%, and that it was an arbitrary decision. Mr. Carnahan also asked what the smallest dollar amount came to in the case of nations paying the basic minimum. Mr. Bender answered that those nations paying the smallest percentage amount (.04%) of the present $50,000,000 budget are only assessed $20,000 a year.

Dr. Judd[3] asked if the U.S. reduction of two percentage points was from 33 to 31% of the total U.N. budget, or 2% of our last dollar contribution. Mr. Bender answered that it was from 33 to 31% only. Dr. Judd commented that as a Delegate to the World Health Organization, the same problem had arisen, but he felt that he who had the money should in a sense make his influence felt. Dr. Judd also pointed out that other countries have now regained their prosperity, and that they could indeed step up their contributions.

---

[3] Congressman Walter Judd (R-Minn.) member of the Delegation to the Twelfth General Assembly.

Miss Dunne[4] said although she would prefer to ask many of her questions later in private, she would like to know whether or not the 33⅓% paid by the U.S. was sufficient to increase our prestige and influence over other countries or could it be, she wondered, that we were being hated more and more. Mr. Lodge answered that our country would probably never be liked but that we can at least hope to be respected. An interesting comment, he pointed out, made originally by Senator Pastore of Rhode Island when he was on the delegation is that every time you pull out a paper towel in the U.N., each third towel is paid for by the United States.

Congressman Carnahan asked what would happen to our position if Congress decided by itself to reduce the United States share to what it thought should be the correct proportion. Mr. Bender answered that there was very little that anyone could do if Congress so acted, but that our assessment, once voted by the General Assembly, was at least a very strong obligation under the Charter. Mr. Bender asked Mr. Meeker, legal advisor on U.N. affairs, to comment on this problem. Mr. Meeker replied that the Charter says that each member must pay its share, according to what has been voted by the General Assembly. If a member does not pay its full share, the arrears build up to the point where a country in arrears more than the equivalent of its contribution for a two-year period, loses its right to vote. In our case, a reduction by Congress of the United States percentage of 33 to 31% would not be felt in this respect for about twenty years. The most significant and most distressing part would be, said Mr. Meeker, that we would be in default of our treaty obligations.

Dr. Wells[5] then asked whether or not all assessments were made in dollar currency. Mr. Lodge replied that while all of the payments were not actually in dollars, they had to be 100% convertible currency. He explained that the assessment for UNEF was not yet clear on this point.

Mr. Lodge summarized the discussion by explaining that, although Congressman Carnahan was carrying the major responsibility on the assessments question, many of the staff members might be asked about it, and that it was wise for everyone to understand the problem. Dr. Wells asked, finally, whether the Chinese proportion was based on the population area and capacity to pay of the mainland or only of that of Formosa. Mr. Lodge replied that it was based on the mainland situation, and that because of this, the Chinese paid a large amount of money every year and kept one of the largest staffs of any delegation.

---

[4] Irene Dunne, motion picture actress and member of the Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly.

[5] Herman Wells, President of Indiana University and member of the Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Lodge closed the meeting at ten o'clock.

---

87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 26, 1957—7 p.m.

634. Davis was summoned to see Fedorenko, Deputy Foreign Minister, an hour before my arrival today and given oral statement along following lines:

> "Embassy's attention has already been drawn in past to anti-Soviet demonstrations hampering the work of Soviet UN Mission in New York. Of late these demonstrations consisting of crowds of people carrying on anti-Soviet slander and committing hooligan acts have assumed a systematic organized character.
>
> "The U.S. authorities have not taken measures to prevent these anti-Soviet demonstrations and the Soviet UN Mission is unable to carry out its functions in normal conditions. This is an intolerable situation and the Ministry expects that appropriate steps will be taken by the American authorities to insure conditions guaranteeing normal functioning of Soviet UN Mission."

Davis responded by promising to communicate this statement immediately to Washington but pointed out Embassy was uninformed of conditions against which Soviet protest directed and inquired whether Fedorenko could cite any specific instances of demonstrations or hooligan acts to which Soviet statement referred. Fedorenko replied statement spoke for itself and that he would only emphasize that anti-Soviet campaign had assumed "systematic organized" character. Davis pointed out that so far as Embassy was informed appropriate U.S. authorities had in past afforded protection to Soviet UN Mission. In reply to question whether Fedorenko wished to convey aide-mémoire on this subject, he stated protest was confined to oral statement.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/9–2657. Confidential; Priority. Passed to USUN.

Department will recall that within past year Soviets protested (Embtel 1477, Dec. 17, 1956) once orally in similar fashion to Ambassador Bohlen by Gromyko and again in spring this year by aide-mémoire[2] handed to Davis by Soldatov, chief American section. Although Davis did not ask Fedorenko whether Soviets intended publish protest *fact that he refused give Davis copy of statement from which he* read indicates Soviets may handle as in first instance. However we should be prepared for Soviet publication and appropriate press statement in Washington.

Recommend that an investigation be made and appropriate action be taken in order to avoid possibility that Soviets may wish to retaliate in some form or other.

Thompson

---

[2] Not printed.

---

88. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld[1]

Washington, September 27, 1957.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is indeed significant that the General Assembly by its unanimous vote has acknowledged your valuable contribution to the United Nations during the past five years. This action is eloquent testimony to your skill and to the high regard in which you are held by the members of the United Nations.

Your responsibilities as Secretary-General have been great and your burden as a representative of the General Assembly has been heavy. The General Assembly placed upon you an unprecedented task this past year in charging you with responsibility for implementing various aspects of its resolutions concerning the Middle East.

The United Nations is fortunate in having a Secretary-General who has clearly demonstrated, both here and in missions abroad, his impartiality, his diplomacy, and his devotion to the cause of international peace and security.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, SYG. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that this letter was delivered to the Secretary-General personally by Cook, and that a telegram confirming this fact was sent to the Department on October 1.

I send you my heartiest congratulations on your reappointment.
Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, October 2, 1957—4:13 p.m.

399. Your 634.[2] Following, provided by New York City Police, may be used in whole or part at your discretion in reply to Foreign Ministry: Light picketing has taken place at 680 Park Avenue on weekends since Dec. 1956 and every evening from Sept. 19 to present. During picketing adequate detail of uniformed police has prevented disorder. Police use barricades to keep sidewalks clear of 7 foot land adjacent and parallel to building front. At all times two uniformed patrolmen are in vicinity of building and radio patrol cars assigned to precinct have standing instructions to give it special attention. Soviet UN Delegation has not reported interference or molestation of any kind since Dec. 1956 and occasional inquiries during 1957 by police have met response from Soviets of "no complaint".

Suggest you point out as you did last year (Deptel 751 Dec. 20, 1956 and Embtel 1525 Dec. 22, 1956) that peaceful assembly and demonstrations are permitted under US laws; that New York Police have continued, as promised, to give special attention to 680 Park Avenue to prevent disorderly or improper acts and to ensure freedom of movement for persons entering or leaving building.

You may also wish to request specific instances of "hooligan acts" referred to by Fedorenko (reftel) and to ask if Soviet Government is insisting that all peaceful picketing be forbidden by US authorities.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/9–2657. Confidential. Signed for the Secretary by Henry P. Leverich, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs. Repeated to USUN.

[2] Document 87.

FYI: If Soviets publicize oral protest, Dept will issue press release along foregoing lines.

Dulles

---

90. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 3, 1957—11 a.m.

Delga 99. For the Secretary. Subject: Discussion with Soviets re U.S. contribution to UN. In past two days Soviet delegation in Fifth Committee has taken attitude re U.S. contribution to UN which differs markedly from past.

On afternoon, October 1, Soviets and Czechs were on list of speakers discussing U.S. proposal for reduction U.S. assessment to 30 per cent. Czechs made statement along lines of previous years, strongly attacking U.S. proposal. Soviets, however, withdrew from speakers list and requested meeting with USDel to discuss matter.

Yesterday Ambassador Zarubin and his staff met with Carnahan and advisers. Zarubin stated Soviet Delegation wished cooperate fully with U.S. on scale-of-assessments question and hoped would be possible find solution which would be satisfactory both governments. Then he stated Soviets prepared support reduction, in principle, of U.S. percentage contribution to 38 [*30*] per cent. However, Soviets wished be certain that method whereby that reduction implemented would not create pressure for increase Soviet contribution. After hour's discussion of subject, Zarubin said Soviets would consider matter in their delegation meeting today and would discuss further with Carnahan 3:00 p.m. today. In concluding remarks, Zarubin reiterated desire cooperate with U.S. in every way possible. May be significant that change in Soviet attitude apparently occurred just after arrangements made for Gromyko's meeting with Secretary.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–357. Confidential; Priority.

91. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, October 4, 1957—2 p.m.

688. Department pass USUN. Davis called on Kulazhenkov, acting chief American section, at noon October 4 and read him oral statement facts as outlined paragraphs 1 and 2 of Deptel 399[2] concerning picketing at Soviet UN Mission headquarters.

In reply Kulazhenkov asserted demonstrations were "not peaceful", as Soviet Foreign Ministry had already three times reminded Embassy, and these demonstrations interfered with normal functioning and work of UN Mission. Davis then asked for specific instances of improper or disorderly acts which might be investigated to which Kulazhenkov replied he could not add anything to what Fedorenko had said about demonstrations.

Davis then inquired whether Soviet government was insisting that all peaceful picketing be forbidden by US authorities. Kulazhenkov then stated he considered information concerning measures taken by police authorities as "intention" of US authorities to insure normal conditions for work of Soviet UN Mission and he would so inform his government.

Thompson

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/10–457. Confidential.

[2] Document 89.

---

92. Editorial Note

The Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly took up the question of the scale of financial assessments and contributions for the apportionment of United Nations expenses early in October 1957. The majority of members on the Fifth Committee accepted the United States proposal for a reduction in United States contributions on the understanding that such a reduction would be progressively achieved and would be contingent upon the admission of still other members to the United Nations or on the increase in national income of current members. The United States proposal, as amended in the course of the discussion, was adopted by the Fifth Committee by a vote of 43 to 17 with 17 abstentions, and later at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on October 14, by a vote of 39 to 16 with 13 abstentions. According to draft Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Delegation to the General Assembly held at Mission Headquarters on the morning of October 10, Lodge began by congratulating Representative Carnahan and his associates on the United States Delegation to the Fifth Committee "for succeeding in having lowered the rate of assessments. Mr. Lodge said that last year no headway had been made but that this year in the Fifth Committee the vote was 43–17 in favor of lowering our contribution to 30%." Carnahan replied "that it had been an interesting procedure checking with the Russians as to how they would vote on the question. The Russians had agreed to deliver their vote 'en bloc' but Mr. Carnahan said that we also had to give a great deal of attention to the votes of the smaller countries." (USUN Files, US/A/M(SR)/66–US/A/M(SR)/132)

As a result of the decision in principle to reduce the assessment of the largest contributor to no more than 30 percent over an unspecified number of years, the Committee on Contributions determined to reduce the United States assessment for 1958 to 32.51 percent. The scale of assessment submitted by this Committee to the Fifth Committee was approved unanimously on December 14, by both the Fifth Committee and, subsequently, the General Assembly.

---

93. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President [1]

New York, October 15, 1957.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In your recent letter [2] you asked for suggestions to repair the damage done to our world position by the events at Little Rock. [3] Having reflected, I make these suggestions:

1. That our diplomatic representatives make a sustained effort to extend hospitality to distinguished colored people. This should not be confined merely to US diplomats in colored countries or posts like mine here, where I entertain non-whites regularly. In "white" countries distinguished colored people who may be visiting should

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. The word "personal" is handwritten on the top of the source text by Lodge.

[2] Not found.

[3] Reference is to the disturbances at Little Rock, Arkansas, during September and October 1957, during the racial integration of Little Rock High School.

be given hospitality. I know from experience here how much it means.

2. That some favorable action be taken on a loan to India and, in conjunction therewith, on settling the Kashmir question. India is a key country with much of the non-white world.

3. An affirmative attitude by the US on the subject of multilateral economic aid under the UN would have a tremendously good effect in all of these non-white countries and would tend to counteract the harm of Little Rock.

You may remember that I submitted such a scheme to you—involving no extra cost to the US, to be conducted entirely in harmony with US foreign policy (although our control would not be apparent); getting us about twice as much for our money as we now get under the bilateral program; and which would get us credit for helping an altruistic UN program "with no selfish political strings attached". Under a UN program the services of first-class experts who are willing to *live in the native village* can be obtained at salaries which no equally good US expert would accept.

Ever since I have been here US policy has been negative. This has hurt us.

I am delighted that Secretary Dulles has now approved an affirmative position—including essential features which I had proposed—for us to take at this General Assembly. It still has to be cleared by Treasury, Budget, and the White House staff. There really is no sound argument against it and overwhelming arguments in favor of it. It aims directly at all those countries which are most upset by what happened at Little Rock and is definitely a step in the right direction.

The prestige which the Soviet Union is getting because of its satellites intensifies the importance of effective *non-communist* technical and economic assistance coming in a way which does not look like the US-USSR power struggle.

I would like you to hear me on this subject when it comes to you for decision—if there is any opposition to it.[4]

With warm and respectful regard,

Faithfully yours,

Cabot Lodge

---

[4] President Eisenhower inserted a bracket from paragraph 3, to the end of the text with the handwritten notation: "To Gov. Adams." At the bottom of the page he wrote: "Pls return to my files. DE." The words "if there is any opposition to it" were underlined by the President.

94. Instruction From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

A-113 *Washington, October 25, 1957.*

Joint State–Defense message. Re: Secretariat Plan for Permanent Arrangements for UN Force. In accordance with desires expressed by Bunche as noted in USUN's 411[2] there follows general guidance for your use in event US asked for informal views in connection with Secretariat study.

General US view toward permanent arrangements favors proposals which as first step would look only toward establishing standby arrangements for calling into being, as necessary, appropriate UN force designed for truce observation and patrol-type functions. We do not envisage in this initial step either permanent force in being or standby arrangements for creation and employment of force designed to impose or enforce UN sanctions.

Concerning first-step concept we would visualize need for permanent planning staff to develop necessary plans for calling into being, deploying, and supporting a force as well as developing concepts for operation and training within scope of observation and patrol indicated above. This staff could also devise and/or outline necessary legal agreements and other understandings needed facilitate implementation of decision by UN employ a force.

Would seem to us that principle of consent on part of country or countries to which UN troops are to be deployed must be retained. It would also seem that contributions of contingents to make up force should be planned from nations other than permanent members of Security Council. Neither do we favor continuation of present UNEF as permanent arrangement.

Request you inform Bunche that US informal views are prefaced by understanding that final position US on any specific proposal Secretariat may propose must take into consideration practical aspects of implementation as it may affect US, particularly question of financial arrangements visualized.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5700/10–2557. Confidential. Pouched to USUN.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 320.5700/9–1857)

95. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Adams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)[1]

Washington, November 21, 1957.

SUBJECT

IO Comment on Collective Security Paper

IO will within a week or two be expected to comment on a paper on Collective Security prepared by L–Mr. Becker on the basis of a memorandum drafted by the Secretary, copies of both are attached, directed essentially toward exploration of the idea of an Article 51 Pact.[2] Mr. Owsley attended a working party meeting convened by L yesterday, and we are preparing IO comment, but thought you might like to know now of the existence of the project and of the Secretary's interest in it.

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

#5 *Washington, August 28, 1957.*

1. There is a great need at this time that the free nations should take some further significant and dramatic step to advance the society of free nations along the path of law and order. This is necessary for several reasons.

One reason is the fact that the present system is inadequate. It will deteriorate and may fall apart unless it is strengthened.

Another reason is the fact that nuclear power, which now approaches the power of annihilation, should not be the weapons tool of individual nations but should be made to serve the interests of world order by becoming an impartial and effective deterrent to the international crime of armed aggression. It seems unlikely that this result can be achieved on a universal basis with the Soviet Union. But that makes it the more important that the free nations should set themselves to the task.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Memoranda, General, 1957. Confidential. Also sent to Walmsley and Hanes.

[2] Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides for regional and international collective defense arrangements within the U.N. framework.

Finally, it is always incumbent upon the leadership of the free world to demonstrate a capacity to think and act creatively. We cannot safely stand still, with so much that needs doing. Positive action is necessary in order to counter the dynamic approach of Communism which seeks to build a world-wide international order of its own fashion.

2. Any new step should meet the crying need for (a) a more developed body of international law; (b) more solid and dependable processes for peaceful settlement of disputes; (c) a more effective and dependable system of international force to deter, and if need be resist, those who would violate agreed principles of law, and (d) the organization and control of armament, particularly nuclear weapons.

3. It was expected that some of the developments referred to in No. 2 above would be accomplished through the United Nations. The Charter prescribes certain basic principles of international conduct (Article 2) and contemplates a further codification of international law. It calls for the establishment of air, land and sea military contingents and facilities for the use of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security (Articles 43 and 45). It establishes procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and created the International Court of Justice as the body to which legal disputes should normally be referred.

However, these Charter provisions have fallen short of practice of producing the desired result. This has been largely due to the abuse by the Soviet Union of the veto power and its influence in the organization in favor of stirring up disputes, not settling them. The collective security system contemplated by the Charter has never even begun to be established. Also it seems that the Soviet Union will block any effective control on a universal basis of nuclear, or other, weapons.

4. As a "makeshift" substitute the United Nations collective security system of free world nations has organized a series of collective defense arrangements under Article 51 of the Charter. There are 45 free world nations parties to such pacts which include the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, SEATO, Brussels (WEU), Baghdad, ANZUS, and four United States bilaterals.

5. These arrangements are an important step in the creation of collective security, but they are inadequate in that:

(a) The parties do not uniformly understand and accept the proposition that these arrangements are in fact designed to promote collective security under law. Some of the parties regard these arrangements primarily as political alliances of the old-fashioned type;

(b) The arrangements are not uniform and the applicable international law is not adequately set forth;

(c) Except for the Brussels (WEU) Treaty, there is no control of armaments;

(d) There is no dependable collective mechanisms to assure the coming into play of the security elements;

(e) There is no rationalized approach to the problem of respective contributions to collective security;

(f) The situation is fragmentized by being reflected by a series of ten treaties, and some beneficiaries of present security treaties are not formal parties thereto.

6. Consideration should be given to attempting to bring together, in a new Pact or convention, all of the present free world parties to collective security pacts under Article 51, and any others which wish to join. It would:

(a) Set forth applicable international law as may be acceptable along the line of the United Nations Charter, but preferably going somewhat beyond this;

(b) Establish a consolidated scheme which, as between the parties would somewhat parallel the United Nations concept (Articles 43 and 45) of a collective security force and facilities, under the direction of a small council chosen to represent all the parties;

(c) Establish armaments control along the lines of our United Nations proposals, as far as applicable, and of the Brussels (WEU) Treaty;

(d) Establish procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes as between the members. These would supplement, and need not be in replacement of, arrangements already provided by OAS and NATO. These procedures should include use of the International Court of Justice.

7. It is obvious that such a program is far reaching and that many difficulties would be encountered. There would be the problem of the willingness of the present parties to mutual security arrangements to enter into a new arrangement. There would be the problem of relations with the United Nations. There would be the attitude of the Sino-Soviet bloc and of "neutrals". There would be the question of fitting some, at least, of United States military power into a tighter international framework. There would be domestic political considerations. There may be lacking the sense of danger and urgency which is usually required to accomplish major political goals, although the state of the United Nations disarmament talks makes apparent the need for a constructive alternative.

On the whole, we believe that the need is sufficiently evident, and the prestige of President Eisenhower a sufficient asset, to justify at least preliminary explorations of this project.

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Becker) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 3, 1957.

SUBJECT

Collective Security Project

The Problem

In your Draft #5, dated 8/29[*28*]/57, you have suggested that consideration should be given to an attempt to bring together in a new Pact or Convention all of the present free world parties to collective security pacts under Article 51, and any others which may wish to join. In that same paper you have indicated in general terms the types of provisions that should be included in such a Pact or Convention.

Recommendations

1. That the immediate objective be changed from a single free world collective security arrangement to three regional collective security organizations, namely: OAS, NATO (including WEU), the Organization of Pacific States, and the Organization of African and Middle Eastern States.
2. That provision be made in each of the Pacts governing these organizations, respectively, for consultation through the regional councils or equivalent organs, in contemplation of joint or collective action by the regional organizations.
3. That in all other respects, each of such Pacts be negotiated or amended to conform to the requirements outlined in your said memorandum.

Discussion

Forty-four free world nations are parties to collective security pacts supplementary to the Charter of the United Nations. These pacts include OAS, NATO, SEATO, WEU (Brussels), Baghdad, ANZUS, and four United States bilaterals (Japan, Republic of China, Philippines and Korea). The parties to these pacts constitute a majority of the members of the United Nations, who cannot fairly be said to be located in any single "region" unless all of the world outside the Sino-Soviet orbit be regarded as such a "region".

In Article 52, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, it is provided in pertinent part:

> "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies *for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of national peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, ...*"

It could well be argued that the setting up of an arrangement or agency for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security which has as participants a majority of the members of the United Nations, who, in turn, have territories located on every continent and bordering on every ocean, is not the creation of a regional organization within the meaning of Article 52, paragraph 1. Because of the express limitation on the activities of such regional organizations contained in Article 52, paragraph 1, a convincing argument could be made that an organization having a broader geographical function is impliedly prohibited by the United Nations Charter, since such an organization must of necessity be in the nature of a rival or rump United Nations. In my view, these objections are serious and an attempt to go forward with such a project despite them could be widely interpreted, even by nations friendly to us, as reflecting a United States determination that the United Nations should be replaced by a free world United Nations, leaving out the Soviet bloc nations and the so-called "neutrals."

There are, however, certain alternatives through which a substantial part, if not all, of the desired objectives could be accomplished without exposing us to such a charge. Perhaps the best of the regional collective security arrangements now in existence is the OAS. The Charter of the OAS contains provisions which closely approximate the requirements laid down in your draft #5, save for disarmament provisions and a collective security force in being. If the Brussels (WEU) pact be read with NATO, the European collective security arrangements, as they presently exist, could be said to include both disarmament and collective security force provisions. Nothing comparable is to be found in existing collective security pacts in the Middle East and in the Pacific area.

As a point of departure, I would suggest, first, an attempt to consolidate our collective security pacts with the free world nations in and about the Pacific area into a single treaty. As far as existing provisions are concerned, this could be done with a minimum of revisions because of the almost identical language used in most of these treaties. In view of the necessity of renegotiation, however, thought should be given to the question of whether it would be advisable to suggest a regional arrangement comparable to the Charter of the OAS. Whichever is determined upon, the new Pacific

Treaty would contain, in addition to provisions of the types suggested in your draft #5, a provision or provisions calling for the Council or other Organ established by the Treaty to maintain liaison and consultative relations with the corresponding Organs of the other regional collective security organizations, such as OAS and NATO (cf. Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which would have to be expanded and strengthened). These provisions could be drafted in such a manner as to indicate that one possible result of such consultation could be joint or mutual action by two or more of the regional organizations.

Such relationships would not appear to be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 52, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, since it is a legitimate function of a regional collective security organization to keep itself informed and, if necessary, to take action with respect to aggression or other activities in other regions which may by chain reaction affect regional peace or security.

Simultaneously, or immediately thereafter, steps could be initiated to amend the Charter of the OAS and the NATO Treaty, as required, to make their provisions conform in substance with the new Pacific States Collective Security Pact.

The last gap to be closed would be the Middle East and Africa. In that connection, the optimum objective would be to negotiate a collective security arrangement containing provisions comparable to those contained in the pacts covering the other regional arrangements, while, at the same time, negotiating a political settlement or modus vivendi between the Israelis and the Arabs.

[Attachment 3]

Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Legal Adviser (Becker)

Washington, October 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

Collective Security Project

I have read your memorandum of October 3, commenting on my memorandum of September 29,[3] on the above subject.

I suggest as a next step that you form a working group under your chairmanship to explore and develop the concepts put forward in the two memoranda. I would suggest that this working group be composed, in addition to yourself, of a representative from IO, S/P, EUR, FE, ARA and NEA.

---

[3] Presumably a reference to draft #5, dated August 28, Attachment 1 above.

This project should be treated as tentative and highly confidential.

John Foster Dulles[4]

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

96. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Legal Adviser (Becker)[1]

Washington, November 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

Collective Security Project

Your memorandum and that of the Secretary on this subject[2] seem to IO to raise three basic questions: 1) Does the answer to our present problems lie in the creation of additional machinery? 2) Are nations generally willing to make advance commitments with respect to the use of force outside areas of direct interest to themselves? 3) Is it possible to extend the OAS system to other, not comparable regions?

In addition, it is our understanding that a principal purpose of a new proposal in this general field would be the psychological benefits to be derived from the standpoint of U.S. leadership of the free world. Here, IO heartily concurs in your conclusion that any U.S. effort to establish a new collective security system embracing all of the free world but excluding the Communist bloc would almost certainly be interpreted as U.S. abandonment of the UN. Furthermore, any such pact would appear, if only by reason of the exclusion of the Communist countries from it, to be directed primarily toward the Communist threat. It might well therefore produce an adverse reaction on the grounds that it overemphasizes the military as against the political and economic approach to current problems and that it would tend to increase rather than decrease tension between the free world and the USSR.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Memoranda, General, 1957. Confidential. Drafted by Virginia Hartley.

[2] See Attachments 1 and 2, *supra*.

One of the principal considerations underlying the reduced enthusiasm for a UN Charter review conference is, in IO's opinion, the rather widely held view that the policies of member governments rather than UN mechanisms are responsible for the UN's shortcomings. An example frequently cited is the reluctance of countries to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and their reluctance to have recourse to the Court even where such recourse is clearly the appropriate means of peaceful settlement. Only this last year, you will recall, the British extended their reservations in accepting the Court's jurisdiction to include disputes "relating to any question which in the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom affects the national security of the United Kingdom or any of its dependent territories." While this situation is widely deplored in principle, it is not thought that the present international atmosphere is conducive to that change in the attitudes of governments that would be required to remedy it.

Similarily, all member states are committed under the Charter to settle their disputes by peaceful means and a wide variety of procedures is available to encourage and assist such settlement. Actual settlement, however, depends, as you know, on the parties' willingness to reach agreement on or to accept a recommended settlement. That member states would be willing now to go further and agree in advance to accept an undefined settlement seems improbable when viewed in the context of the dispute between Israel and the Arab states, for example, or between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Again, therefore, progress in peaceful settlement does not appear to depend on the creation of additional mechanisms but on the attitudes of governments.

While the Soviet veto in the SC has made it impossible for the UN to enforce decisions, it is questionable how far the UN should or could go, irrespective of the veto, in enforcing decisions under present world conditions. Collective military action going beyond the UNEF type operations does not appear practical. Such action to be effective would require the participation of one or more of the major powers. Inclusion of the USSR in such action would obviously not be to the free world interest under present circumstances. Action by the other major powers without the USSR would almost certainly bring the USSR into the situation and, where the colonial issue is involved, would be suspect in the area of the dispute.

Nor does the Soviet veto account for the very poor response of states to the request of the Collective Measures Committee that national contingents be earmarked for possible UN use. The replies of member states to this request made it clear that while they generally, though not without exception, approve the principle of collective security, they are unwilling to make any advance commitments that might involve them in hostilities of unpredictable origin, location, character, and scope.

Many states have been willing to make limited commitments with respect to collective action in areas where they see their own security to be directly at stake. They have, however, been unwilling to risk involvement in a great-power struggle in other areas, and there is, in this Bureau's opinion, no reason to believe that this reluctance would be any less under an Article 51 pact than under procedures and mechanisms provided in the Uniting for Peace resolution. In the absence of any general willingness to make firm commitments of a relatively substantial nature under such a pact, it is difficult to see where its advantage would lie over our present system of regional and bilateral security arrangements. A reaffirmation of principles would not be sufficient to permit the advance planning of the free world's defense. Moreover, since a free-world Article 51 pact would be regarded as directed against the Soviet bloc primarily, it would certainly not obtain the adherence of more countries than those encompassed in our present system of regional and bilateral security arrangements, and might well result in weakening these arrangements by causing present participants to withdraw when confronted by the need to extend their commitments.

The interlocking membership of our various regional and bilateral security arrangements and the availability of the UN appear to meet the need for consultative machinery and procedures between and among these arrangements so far as it can be met without extending, at least, by implication, the commitments of the participants. Efforts to coordinate more formally NATO with the Baghdad Pact and SEATO would be likely to intensify anti-colonialism and neutralism in the two latter areas. Moreover, any minimal advantages that might possibly be realized from greater coordination of our various regional and bilateral security arrangements would be offset, in IO's opinion, by the implications of such a development with respect to the US attitude toward the UN and with respect to East-West tensions.

It seems to IO unrealistic to anticipate the early development elsewhere of regional organizations comparable to the OAS, with the possible exception of the NATO area. The OAS is unique in that 1) it covers a well-defined area having certain generally recognized mutual interests, 2) it includes all states within this area, 3) it is of indigenous origins, 4) it is concerned as much, if not more, with developments within the region as with any external threats, and 5) its institutions are the result of an evolutionary process during which they have gained widespread acceptance.

On the other hand, NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO are concerned primarily with defense of their respective areas against Soviet aggression, overt or covert. None of them includes all the states in the areas concerned. The impetus behind the Baghdad Pact and SEATO comes in large measure from outside the area. It is difficult to conceive of their developing along the broader lines of the OAS within the foreseeable future. In these areas intra-regional antagonisms are sharp and neutralism widely prevalent. In the Middle East, solution of the Palestine problem, at least, appears a prerequisite to the establishment of any overall regional organization and in the Far East, solution of the Chinese representation question. In the absence of such solutions, there appears to be no possibility that states outside the present regional security pacts would be willing to join. Many of these states would therefore continue to regard the existing pacts as an indirect threat, thus precluding their serving any useful purpose with respect to intra-regional problems.

---

97. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, December 4, 1957—3 p.m.

1033. Following is translation text aide-mémoire handed me by Deputy Minister Zorin December 4:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has already several times drawn the attention of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow to the wholly inadmissible situation which has been created around the mission of the USSR to the UN in New York as a result of the hooligan-like actions with regard to the mission and its staff of elements hostile to the Soviet Union.

"In this connection the Ministry has pointed out that the failure of the American authorities to adopt effective measures to create normal conditions for the work of the mission can lead to undesirable consequences for the Embassy of the USA in so far as the publication in the Soviet press of reports about hostile actions in New York against the mission of the USSR to the UN, which has not happened up to this time, may cause the rightful indignation of the Soviet public and a corresponding attitude of the pubic of Moscow toward the Embassy of the United States.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–457. Official Use Only.

"Notwithstanding the assurances of the Embassy that the American authorities will adopt all necessary measures to prevent acts disturbing order (poryadka) and of lawlessness with regard to the Mission of the USSR at the UN, hostile demonstrations at the building of the mission are continuing.

"On October 23, the building of the Mission was twice subjected to picketing during which participants in the picketing committed hooligan-like pranks (vykhodki) in relation to the staff of the mission.

"On November 7 a noisy demonstration hostile toward the Soviet Union, lasting three hours, was again carried out at the building of the mission. The hooligans assembled at the building of the mission crudely insulted the guests who came to the reception at the mission and screamed obscene curses at them. The participants of the mob tried to beat up a member of the mission Barulin.[2] Stones, bottles with paint, and other objects were thrown at the windows and walls of the building of the mission.

"In drawing the attention of the Embassy to the inadmissibility of such a situation which is evidence of the clear violation of the diplomatic immunity of the Mission of the USSR in New York with the connivance (popustitelstvo) of the authorities of the USA, the Government of the USSR expects that the Government of the USA will adopt the necessary measures for not permitting hostile demonstrations in the future at the building of the Mission of the USSR to the UN so as to guarantee normal conditions for the work of the Soviet Mission and its staff."

Thompson

---

[2] Alexandr Barulin.

---

98. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, December 13, 1957—6 p.m.

3699. Anticipating early termination current session of UNGA[2] FonOff officials have begun summarizing its effect. On whole they feel relief and satisfaction concerning its outcome to date. They enumerate following major developments.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/12–1357. Repeated to USUN.

[2] The Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly concluded on December 14.

1. Disarmament debate ended with surprisingly large majority supporting Western position against Soviets.
2. Soviet effort to blow Syrian situation into anti-Western demonstration failed conspicuously with consequent damage to Soviet propaganda.
3. UNGA gave overwhelming backing to US-supported resolution on unification Korea, despite US challenge to Communist bloc regarding introduction new weapons North Korea in violation international agreement.
4. France luckily escaped damaging resolution on Algeria and Netherlands, similarly, avoided pressure from UNGA regarding New Guinea.
5. Although Cyprus debate not yet ended FonOff optimistic that most GA delegates want to give new Cyprus Governor Foot opportunity to examine situation on island before passing controversial resolution.
6. Kashmir debate although futile seems to have done little harm and outburst by Krishna Menon and his resultant unpopularity may produce sobering effect on him and Indian foreign policy.
7. Soviet refusal agree to increasing size of SC and other UN bodies makes USSR rather than West target for Asian resentment that new Asian (and African) countries insufficiently represented.

Embassy Comment: On whole FonOff considers 12th session UNGA to have been blissfully dull. FonOff strongly opposes continuing session after Christmas vacation.

Whitney

---

99. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President [1]

New York, December 19, 1957.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Twelfth General Assembly of the United Nations recently adjourned and I thought you might be interested in a list of its main accomplishments from a U.S. viewpoint, as follows:

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series. Confidential. On the margin of the source text, President Eisenhower wrote: "Thanks to him. A good letter! D."

—Stripping away the sham of the Soviet war-scare that the U.S. was masterminding a threat to the security of Syria. The communist resolution was not even brought to a vote—the first time in U.N. history such a thing had happened.

—Reduction in the share of the U.N. cost which the U.S. pays from 33⅓ per cent to 32½ and later to 30 per cent.

—Overwhelming endorsement of our disarmament program—to which I was glad to see you allude in Paris.[2]

—Approval of the new proposal by the U.S. for a $100,000,000 Special Projects fund for economic aid under U.N. auspices. This provides a way to strengthen underdeveloped countries against subversion from abroad whereby we get considerably more for our money than in the usual way. Already Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi has asked that this fund be used to create a central bank which (using Arab funds) could serve a proposed Arab economic union. Hammarskjold thinks this might lead to a radical change in the Arab approach to the Palestine question and to a true regional organization.

—Algeria and Cyprus dealt with to the satisfaction (confidentially expressed) of the parties.

All these things were done in the midst of the Sputnik Blitz. We (the U.S.) have never had a better year. Thank you for your leadership and support.[3]

With warm and respectful regard,

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

[2] Reference is to the statement by President Eisenhower at Paris, December 16; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 6, 1958, pp. 6–8.

[3] Lodge sent an identical letter to Dulles with the addition of the following two paragraphs:

"I have written the above to the President, thinking he (and you) might like a little good news.

"To you let me add that, in addition to Sputnik, Wadsworth was out at the start and Barco was sick in the middle. The fact that your guidance was, as usual, wise *and prompt* was a decisive and indispensable factor. You deserve a big share of credit for the success achieved." (Department of State, Central Files, 320/12–1957)

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, December 30, 1957—7:23 p.m.

700. Re: Embtel 1033.[2] The following Aide-Mémoire may, if Embassy perceives no objection, be delivered to appropriate official of Foreign Ministry:

Begin Text. The Embassy of the United States acknowledges receipt of the Aide-Mémoire of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated December 4, 1957 and takes this occasion to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR as follows:

The Government of the US is not aware of any actual interference suffered by the Mission of the USSR to the UN in New York either in carrying out official or social activities, nor of any violation of the immunity of the premises occupied by the Mission of the USSR to the UN at 680 Park Avenue, New York. Both US and appropriate local authorities in New York City, have at all times sought to insure that all possible steps are taken to prevent molestation of the personnel and premises of the Mission of the USSR to the UN in New York City. The Government of the US is confident that the police authorities of the City of New York will continue to observe this practice. If the efforts of the authorities have not entirely prevented annoyance, this is regretted. The Government of the US can reaffirm, however, that violation of laws protecting the mission from molestation will make the offenders subject to appropriate legal action.

The Government of the US deems it necessary to point out to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR that it will not and cannot curtail certain inalienable rights granted to all residents of the US, including freedom of speech and the right of peaceful assembly. *End Text.*

You may wish to use in any discussion of this matter following information from New York City Police on November 7 picketing:

During picketing demonstrators were not permitted to picket in front of building occupied by USSR Mission on side of the street on which building is located. New York City Police authorities assigned 95 policemen to area including 5 mounted patrolmen. When some of demonstrators became disorderly 5 persons were arrested and subsequently court convictions were obtained in all 5 cases. Moreover local authorities are prepared to take appropriate steps in every occasion when complaints are filed by an aggrieved party. On number occasions alleged Soviet victims have refused to file a complaint and as result, in absence of complaint, charges could not be brought.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.361/12–457. Official Use Only. Signed for the Acting Secretary by Jandrey.

[2] Document 97.

FYI only law governing picketing in Washington, D.C. concerns picketing of foreign embassies, legations, etc. There is no law prohibiting picketing of White House and picketing frequently occurs. A measure of control is exercised to make sure that pickets do not litter area with discarded leaflets and placards, and a permit is required if picketing group intends chant or sing.

New York Police have no record of any incident involving Soviet UN Delegation on October 23 although there was picketing.

There is no police record of attempted assault or incident involving Barulin on Nov. 7. Police officer in charge inquired at Soviet Delegation after Nov. 7 if there were any complaints or injuries. The officer was told there were none. Dept. contemplates no publicity unless Soviets release info. on matter.

Herter

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE ADMISSION OF QUALIFIED APPLICANTS TO UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP AND THE ISSUE OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION[1]

101. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the British Embassy (Salt) and the Special Assistant for United Nations Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs (Allen), Department of State, Washington, February 25, 1955[2]

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the UN

Miss Salt called on instructions to advise us of the response of the British Government to our inquiry of Dec. 22.[3] The UK intends to continue the moratorium arrangement[4] between our two governments in all UN and Specialized Agencies for the time being but is not prepared to commit itself for a definite period for the future, such as the full calendar year 1955. In the absence of major developments in the area, the government is not giving consideration to any early change in its policy. In bodies which both we and they have in the past considered to be incompetent to pass upon the issue, the UK will continue to adhere to the procedural device of lack of competence. In other bodies, they will work out with us the appropriate procedural device which will result in continuing to seat the Nationalists without a vote on the substance of the question. If required to explain their reasons they will follow the line followed by the UK delegation at the last UN General Assembly.

---

[1] For previous documentation on membership issues at the United Nations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. III, pp. 620 ff.

[2] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.393/2–2555. Confidential.

[3] Not further identified.

[4] Reference is to the agreement by the United Kingdom to support U.S. policy of not considering any proposals to exclude representatives of the Government of the Republic of China from the councils of the United Nations or to seat representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China in those councils.

102. Paper Prepared by Elizabeth Ann Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs[1]

Washington, March 8, 1955.

SURVEY OF MEMBERSHIP PROBLEM, 1955

1. The applications of 19 states remain pending before the United Nations. Fourteen of the 19 have been supported for admission by the United States and a majority of the United Nations members, but their applications have been blocked by the Soviet veto in the Security Council. These 14 states are Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Laos, Nepal, Portugal, Republic of Korea, and Viet-Nam. In addition, there are five Soviet sponsored candidates (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, "the Mongolian People's Republic", Rumania), none of whom have received the required majority in the Assembly or Security Council. Finally, the North Korean and Viet-Minh regimes submitted applications, which were never officially acknowledged by any Security Council action, but which are nevertheless sometimes listed by Secretariat and other sources as applicants for UN membership.

2. In the 9th Session of the General Assembly a resolution was adopted according to which all the pending applications were sent back to the Security Council "for further consideration and positive recommendations". The Security Council was also requested to consider the possibility of invoking the provisions of Article 28(2) of the Charter which provides for periodic meetings of the Council. Furthermore, the Good Offices Committee consisting of representatives of Egypt, the Netherlands, and Peru, which was established by the 8th session, was continued; and both this Committee and the Security Council were requested to report to the 10th Assembly. This means that at some time shortly, probably this summer, the Security Council will have to consider the membership question. Unless there has been some basic change in the position of the respective members, however, it may be that Council consideration can be limited to confirming the fact that positions have not changed, making it unnecessary to vote on the pending applications once again.

3. In initiating negotiations for a peace treaty with the USSR, Japan has indicated its intention to try to get from the USSR a commitment to support its admission into the United Nations as a

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership. Confidential. An addressee is not indicated on the source text which, however, contains the handwritten notation: "DHP—11:00 a.m. Mtg 3/9/55." David H. Popper was Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

part of the overall negotiations. So far the USSR has never included Japan in its "package". Last year Japanese sources were inclined to believe that Japan had no chance for admission unless a solution of the Chinese representation issue was reached simultaneously. In the current negotiations, however, there have been no indications whether Japan would seek an outright unqualified commitment from the USSR or would be willing to accept a "deal" of some sort that would tie Japan's admission to the admission of certain other outstanding candidates. It seems likely that Japan will insist upon an unqualified commitment, if it seriously desires admission into the United Nations. Whether the USSR would make such a commitment depends upon the importance it now attaches to regularizing its relations with Japan in the context of the present Far Eastern situation and on its position generally regarding membership. It is possible, however, that Japan might simply accept inclusion in the Soviet "package", if it can obtain other substantial concessions in return, in which case there would be increasing pressure upon the United States to relax its position on a "package" arrangement.

4. The issue of Chinese representation has an important bearing on the membership question. It is possible that the USSR will not modify its present position on membership until this issue has been resolved in some way. Furthermore, any relaxation of the present position of the United States with respect to the Soviet sponsored candidates could have undesirable repercussions so far as the Chinese representation question is concerned. Accordingly, it may be that this issue precludes any progress toward a solution of the membership impasse, with the possible exception of an agreement to admit several of the "non-committed" states, which in itself seems unlikely.

5. There are certain other prospects for action on membership:

(a) Last year the Secretary General suggested the possibility of reaching agreement on several states not clearly aligned with either East or West. Corridor rumors in New York mentioned such states as Austria, Finland, Libya, and Jordan in this connection. No actual proposals along this line were considered, however, apparently because informal soundings in the Soviet Delegation disclosed that the USSR would not go along on such a limited arrangement. It might nevertheless be worthwhile to try this tack again if we feel we could afford to add three or four such states at the expense of strong supporters of the West, who have equal if not better claims to prompt admission. If it were decided to proceed along these lines, the matter could be informally discussed with one or more members of the Good Offices Committee with a view to its developing some such recommendation.

(b) The possibility of an overall agreement to admit all outstanding candidates should be reviewed just prior to Security Council consideration of the membership question. It is assumed, however, that in the absence of a basic change in the current international situation it would not be possible to agree to admission of all nineteen candidates.

(c) The position which the United States takes on the membership question this year should be considered in relation to the proposals we may develop in connection with Charter review. If we intend to seek amendment of Article 4 of the Charter, it might be possible to move toward a settlement which would not take place until sometime in 1956 as a consequence of Charter review. At the least we could work toward a recommendation by the 10th Assembly that Members review their position on membership in light of the forthcoming Charter Review Conference.

(d) As suggested by the United States in 1954, arrangements could be devised for non-member participation in the General Assembly, pending the time that agreement can be reached on admission of qualified outstanding applicants. There is attached a separate paper on this subject,[2] suggesting its study during the current year by the Interim Committee.

---

[2] Not printed.

---

103. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State[1]

New York, March 31, 1955.

DEAR FOSTER: As time goes by, the one change in the Charter which seems to be commanding the greatest support is the one to eliminate the veto on the admission of new members.

But on this crucial change, there is the determined (although so far silent) opposition of the British. . . .

. . . .

Of course we have a deep conviction the other way and I think we should back up our conviction and make a two-fisted effort to get the Charter changed.

But in the light of the Secretary General's view that it might be desirable to postpone a Charter review conference, I thought you should have this British attitude in mind.

As it is, without a positive Charter review item, the next General Assembly looks pretty thin. I gather Harold Stassen will have nothing ready in time for the General Assembly to work on, although he may have material for a Presidential appearance at the U.N. at the end of the session.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.1/3–3155. Secret.

I wish we could get British acquiescence—however grudging—in making a strong effort on non-member participation. It would be good for the U.N., good for the U.S., not really bad for the U.K.—and it would make a *great hit* with the masses of Americans who feel kindly towards Ireland, Italy and Germany.

Whatever is done either on eliminating the veto on membership by a revision of the Charter or on pressing forward with our proposal for non-member participation, it is clear from past experience that we should begin now to press for acceptance by the British and others. We should not wait until late August, which is always too late on anything controversial. I feel that with more and earlier effort we have a good chance to make progress on both of these questions.

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

104. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

Washington, April 1, 1955.

DEAR CABOT: Thank you for the copy of your letter to the Secretary on the UN membership problem. [2]

I think that you may be interested in the enclosed preliminary draft of a memorandum on membership on which we have been working here for some time. It has not been shown to anyone outside our Bureau and of course has not been seen by the Secretary. Your comments would be very helpful to us. As you will see, we also are inclined to feel that we should follow up our non-member participation proposal.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth Ann Brown.

[2] *Supra.*

Sincerely yours,

David McK. Key[3]

[Enclosure]

Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs[4]

SUBJECT

Membership in the United Nations

Background

Under a resolution adopted by the last General Assembly, the Security Council and a Good Offices Committee (Egypt, Netherlands, Peru) will review the UN membership situation before the next Assembly meets. (Pending applications, the composition of the Soviet "package", applicants blocked by the Soviet veto, and other states eligible for membership but which have not applied are listed in Tab A.) The following possibilities arise as alternatives to the present deadlock:

1. A political "deal" to admit all the applicants.

Since 1946 we have opposed such a deal on the ground that the Soviet satellites do not meet the qualifications of Charter Article 4. However, the increasing difficulty of maintaining support for our position may make it desirable to review this situation. Until now one of the strongest arguments against the Soviet package has been Japan's omission. In the pending negotiations with the USSR Japan may obtain Soviet support for its admission, but if the USSR agrees only to add Japan to its package, our position will become more difficult since the package would then include all applicants except Cambodia, Laos, Viet-Nam and the ROK (against whose immediate admission some plausible arguments may be presented.) Moreover, the widely held view that the membership problem should be dealt with in Charter review, enables us to consider the matter in a new context.

Conceivably the US could publicly indicate willingness to see all the countries in the Soviet package except the "Mongolian People's

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[4] Drafted by Brown on April 1.

Republic" admitted (i.e., Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania), if Japan, the ROK, Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam were simultaneously admitted. Alternatively, we could indicate our readiness to accept, in addition to the above, Spain and Germany, even though they have not yet applied. In making any such proposals, it would be essential to make clear our continued opposition to the seating of Communist China in the UN. Even if, as is likely, the USSR opposes such proposals, we would then be in a stronger tactical position to urge alternative courses, such as non-member participation.

2. A limited agreement to admit several non-committed states (e.g., Austria, Libya, Jordan).

The Secretary General suggested this idea last fall but dropped it when it became clear the USSR was opposed. The fact that such a proposal omits states with equal if not better claims to prompt admission (e.g., Italy, Japan) and increases neutralist strength in the UN, makes it undesirable for us to take any such initiative, though it might be advisable to keep an open mind on the matter in order to be able to go along with an acceptable grouping, should one be suggested.

3. Further negotiations on non-member participation.

If we estimate that no progress on membership can now be made, our most fruitful course of action might be to reactivate study of non-member participation, recognizing at the outset that a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ with respect to the legality of the plan is probably all we can get through the Assembly at this stage. We could proceed through diplomatic channels and conceivably also use the Interim Committee, thus paving the way for the Tenth GA. On the other hand, in view of its current negotiations with the USSR, Japan, the most important applicant favorably inclined, may not maintain its support for this plan. Also to be considered is the implication that, by promoting non-member participation, we are relaxing our pressure for the admission of qualified states.

4. Focusing discussion on membership in the Tenth GA on Charter review prospects.

The objective would be an Assembly recommendation that Members review their position in light of the forthcoming Charter Review Conference. This approach would be interpreted as willingness to seek a membership settlement in the Charter review process and would be one means of countering pressures for an immediate package deal.

Recommendation

That, unless we can change our position on a package deal, you authorize the initiation of consultations in key capitals and in New York directed toward non-membership participation as described in paragraph 3. If the results of such consultations are negative, we could use the Charter review approach in the GA.

Tab A

1. *Pending Applications*

Albania
Austria
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Ceylon
Finland
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Republic of Korea
Laos
Libya
"Mongolian People's Republic"
Nepal
Portugal
Rumania
Viet-Nam

2. *Soviet Package*

Albania
Austria
Bulgaria
Ceylon
Finland
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Jordan
Libya
"Mongolian People's Republic"
Nepal
Portugal
Rumania

3. *Applicants Blocked by Soviet Veto*

Austria
Cambodia
Ceylon
Finland
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Republic of Korea
Laos
Libya
Nepal
Portugal
Viet-Nam

4. *Potential Applicants*

Federal Republic of Germany
Spain

105. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key)[1]

New York, April 11, 1955.

DEAR DAVID: I have read your memorandum concerning the Membership Problem,[2] and this morning talked with the Secretary on this subject. The Secretary agrees that we should make a renewed effort for non-member participation and that we should begin now to obtain support for the passage of a non-member participation resolution at the Tenth General Assembly.

As I indicated in my letter to the Secretary on March 31, 1955, I think that in addition to moving ahead on non-member participation, we should also begin now to obtain support for action in the Tenth General Assembly favoring charter revision to eliminate the veto as it applies to membership.

I think we can increase support for non-member participation by holding out to non-members the more far-reaching results of charter revision. Therefore, the two aspects of the problem should be considered simultaneously. But I do not think that action on charter revision should delay our getting to work on non-member participation.

Sincerely yours,

Cabot

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership. Secret.

[2] See the enclosure, *supra*.

106. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge), April 15, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Non-Member Participation Plan—Italy

Secretary Dulles telephoned this morning, April 15th, to caution me concerning the Non-Member Participation Plan as it affects Italy. He said he did not think the Italians would accept such a plan but would insist on full membership.

I said that it was not my intention to ask the Italians about the Non-Membership Plan, but to go ahead and push it at the General Assembly in the fall in the knowledge that the Japanese would accept it and that it would be available to all other nations to accept which wanted to.

I agreed with the Secretary that we should not assume that the Italians would accept it, but that it was certainly true that they could accept it without in any way prejudicing their chance for full membership.

He said it was important always to make that clear because the Italians felt that they had an understanding with the Russians under the terms of which they felt the Russians were obligated to support their membership.

I said I did not intend to mention this subject in my testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday, but that I did intend to go ahead with the Non-Membership Participation scheme in the fall, to which he agreed.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership. Secret. Drafted by Lodge.

107. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, May 10, 1955—7 p.m.

766. Re membership. Belaunde (Peru),[2] in his capacity as chairman of the Good Offices Committee on membership, called at his request this afternoon with his colleagues from Netherlands and Egypt. He pointed out that under the terms of the last GA resolution, the SÇ is seized with the question and that in his dual capacity as chairman of the GOC and representative of Peru in SC he feels he is required to raise the matter in the SC before the meeting of the 10th GA. He said he would do so in a friendly manner and in accordance with our views as to timing and method.

He suggests a procedure of taking up each nation in the chronological order in which it has applied for membership, which he considered "less artificial" than taking them up in alphabetical order. Should it appear probable a veto was forthcoming, the question of admission for that particular country could be dropped and the admission of the next country taken up. This would require a certain amount of negotiation prior to discussion on each country.

It seems to me that this whole question must be considered in the light of the admission of Austria, which is no. 8 on the chronological list. No. 7 is Italy and in this connection Belaunde feels it would be very difficult in present circumstances for the USSR to veto Italy. If they did, President of Italy would have good reason repudiate Communist support which helped elect him.

It may be possible to make an announcement at the San Francisco meetings[3] concerning a subsequent meeting of the SC on the membership question, which would give the San Francisco meetings a much-needed shot in the arm.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/5–1055. Confidential; Priority.

[2] Victor Belaúnde, Permanent Representative at the United Nations from Peru.

[3] Reference is to the San Francisco U.N. Commemorative Meetings, June 20–26; see Document 5.

Believe the above would be of interest to Secretary Dulles in the light of his activities in Vienna.[4]

Lodge

---

[4] Secretary Dulles traveled to Vienna to sign the Austrian State Treaty.

Telegram 800 from New York, May 19, reported that the Italian observer to the United Nations called on Lodge and stated the opinion that a very bad impression would be created in Italy if Austria were admitted to U.N. membership and Italy were not. Lodge added: "I feel that in any future action concerning Austrian membership, we should bear in mind its effect on others. There would be a setback to communism in Italy if the Soviets vetoed Italian admission after approving that of Austria. But it must not look as though things were 'rigged' to bring this about." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/5–1955)

---

108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)[1]

Washington, May 26, 1955.

SUBJECT

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

Discussion:

1. At a meeting in the Secretary's office April 28 he suggested that we should take advantage of the Bandung Conference statement calling for the admission to the UN of Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and a "unified Vietnam"[2] to make a move on the membership problem in the UN. As a "unified Vietnam" does not now exist, it would be excluded. It was agreed that Turkey, as the one SC member present at Bandung, might appropriately initiate SC action, at as early a date as possible, particularly in view of its relation to Japan's bargaining position in forthcoming negotiations with the USSR.

2. A draft telegram to USUN in New York to the above effect, prepared for the Secretary's consideration, reached him just before

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/5–2655. Confidential. Drafted by Brown. Cleared by EUR, NEA, FE, ARA, L, and C.

[2] Reference is to section F (1) of the Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference issued on April 24, 1955, entitled "Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation." The text of the entire communiqué is printed in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 429–436.

his departure for Europe. He decided then that the matter should be given further consideration.

3. EUR questions the desirability of proceeding now with the seven applicants in the Bandung statement. On the other hand FE and NEA continue to believe we should proceed on this basis as soon as possible.

4. In IO's view the timing of any move on membership is of importance for a number of reasons. To proceed only with the seven Asian-African applicants might prejudice broader negotiations, including the possibility of a "package deal" on membership in Great Power negotiations, particularly because any SC action on membership may lead to reconsideration of all pending applications. Also relevant are the facts that (a) all the pending applications (list attached as Tab A) are to be reviewed by the SC before the 10th GA; (b) in the event of a continued membership impasse we would presumably proceed, despite serious obstacles, with our non-member participation plan, on which negotiations ought to be initiated shortly; and (c) support is developing for a Charter amendment to eliminate the veto on membership, of which we may wish to take advantage, should it become clear no possibility exists for positive action on membership; this, however, is not a factor in 1955.

5. Ambassador Lodge has asked whether we would support Austria's admission now, without reference to the other qualified applicants. He has also suggested the possibility of proceeding on the basis of the Bandung statement. He reports that the UN Good Offices Committee on membership is discussing a possible "short package" (Austria, Finland, Italy, Libya).

Recommendation:

That you convene at as early a date as possible a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries from the four geographic areas, IO [&] L to discuss the UN membership problem in the light of the above, with a view to determining an appropriate course of action.

Tab A

Pending Applicants
(listed in order of application)

Albania
"Mongolian People's Republic"
Jordan
Portugal
Ireland
Hungary
Italy
Austria
Rumania
Bulgaria
Finland
Ceylon
Republic of Korea
Nepal
Vietnam
Libya
Cambodia
Japan
Laos

Applicants Supported by US

Jordan
Portugal
Ireland
Italy
Austria
Finland
Ceylon
Republic of Korea
Nepal
Vietnam
Libya
Cambodia
Japan
Laos

States that have not applied

Spain
Federal Republic of Germany
Switzerland[3]

---

[3] Presumably ineligible because of its status of permanent neutrality. [Footnote in the source text.]

109. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key)[1]

Washington, June 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

1. At the meeting which you recommended Mr. Murphy should convene on the above subject, widely differing views may be expected:

(a) FE and NEA desire to seek prompt SC action on Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya and Nepal on the basis of the Bandung declaration.

(b) EUR believes events have overtaken the utility of this approach, but there is some indication that it might favor for consideration in the prospective Four-Power negotiations a comprehensive settlement involving admission of all pending applicants (possibly excluding Outer Mongolia), and some provision for Spain. (EUR's opposition to action based on Bandung results from the view that it could prejudice the possibility of an overall settlement and from its judgment of the adverse effects on voting strength in colonial and East-West issues of the admission of these seven states.)

2. Other points that should be taken into consideration include:

(a) Ambassador Lodge and others have suggested the possibility of a new move on Austria alone in light of the conclusion of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

(b) The UN Good Offices Committee on membership is trying to peddle to the permanent SC members a "short package" (Austria, Finland, Italy, Libya, or only the first three) presumably selected because, except for Italy, they are not firmly committed either to East or West.

(c) Japan is now initiating negotiations with the USSR looking toward conclusion of a peace treaty and intends to seek Soviet support for its admission to the UN.

(d) All pending applications (list attached) are to be reviewed by the SC before the 10th GA.

(e) In the event of a continued impasse, we will presumably wish to proceed with our non-member participation plan, on which advance consultations will be necessary.

3. We believe that IO should take a position on the membership issue designed to bring the maximum number of states into the Organization. The Secretary has repeatedly made clear his own

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership. Confidential. Drafted by Brown. Attached to the source text is a list identical to Tab A, *supra*.

position that the success of the UN ultimately depends on the extent to which it becomes universal. On the basis of this criterion, the application of which must take due account of relevant political considerations, it is recommended that you take the following position at the meeting:

Preferred Position

(a) Since a virtual stalemate on the membership issue has existed in the UN for more than five years and because Members are so deeply and publicly committed to their present positions, there is little hope for real progress in the UN forum. One promising prospect for moving this issue off dead-center is its discussion in new forum which now exists in the prospective Four-Power negotiations.[2] However, unless we intend to make a comprehensive agreement taking account of all pending applicants and possibly providing for Spain, there is no particular advantage in raising the subject at all in these negotiations.

(b) If it is agreed that we should seek an overall settlement in Big Four discussions, our initial proposal should be either admission of all applicants except Outer Mongolia or, alternatively, all nineteen pending applicants. The decision on Outer Mongolia should be taken on the basis of our judgment whether its exclusion would constitute the sole obstacle to agreement on admission of all other applicants. If, as is likely, exploratory discussions disclose that the USSR will oppose admission of Viet-Nam and the Republic of Korea, we should not include Outer Mongolia. We could accept deferment of action on Viet-Nam and the ROK pending achievement of unification; and a similar arrangement for Germany might also be made. We should make clear that we are not prepared to discuss the question of Chinese representation. We should seek Soviet agreement on the admission of Spain, assuming it has been induced to apply for membership before the negotiations begin.

(c) It should eventually become apparent whether a comprehensive solution can be achieved in Big Four discussions. Failing progress, we should not initiate proposals for admission of fewer applicants but should consider on their merits any alternative proposals that the USSR may advance. It is assumed, however, that the USSR is unlikely to propose admission of any smaller group of applicants that does not include all the Soviet satellite candidates. We could not accept any such proposal, and in the event the situation develops in this way, the matter should be returned to UN channels for consideration.

---

[2] Reference is presumably to the Geneva Summit Conference, July 18–23, 1955.

Alternative Position (if agreement cannot be reached on proceeding in Big Four negotiations)

(a) A real effort should be made in the SC to follow up alternatives that might lead to admission of some qualified applicants. These would include support for a proposal (which could be initiated by Turkey as the only SC member present at Bandung) for admission of the seven Asian-African applicants; support for any satisfactory proposals which may be devised by the UN Good Offices Committee on membership for the admission of a limited number of states; and support for new moves, taking account of recent negotiations, to admit Japan and Austria. In all these cases, each applicant would be voted on separately. (Provided such proposals are not initiated by the US which could not discriminate among qualified applicants, we could support admission of any of the Asian-African candidates except Outer Mongolia and all other applicants except Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, to whose admission we should agree only as part of an overall settlement that completes action on all pending applicants and covers Spain.)

(b) If it becomes apparent that no sizable group of applicants is likely to be admitted, we should seek positive action on our nonmember participation plan.

(c) We should concur in the approach now under consideration by the Good Offices Committee whereby the Security Council would review all pending applications in the order of their submission and vote formally only on those on which advance consultation or discussion in the Council indicates agreement of the five permanent members.

110. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, June 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

Discussion:

USUN reports renewed discussion of the UN membership problem. We are being asked whether the pending Four Power conversations will affect our views on the UN membership deadlock, and we are likely to be further pressed on the point in private discussions at San Francisco or by the Russians in Four Power negotiations at some stage. (List of applicants attached. Tab A)

In the circumstances, we can:

a. stand on our present position that each candidate must be judged on its merits and only qualified (i.e., non-Communist) candidates admitted. Unless the Soviet position should spontaneously change on Austria, Japan, or other non-Communist applicants, this would mean all 19 candidates continue to be excluded.

b. be prepared to consider a suitable blanket arrangement. The optimum negotiable package would include all non-Communist applicants plus Spain, and all Communist applicants except Outer Mongolia. If necessary, we might defer action on the divided states (Korea and Vietnam, plus Germany if it applies). Any smaller package would risk offending friendly applicants who were excluded. Any effort to link the Chinese representation problem to the membership issue would have to be firmly resisted.

c. revive your idea of having Turkey propose in the Security Council the admission of the seven Asian states specifically endorsed by the Bandung Conference. This might possibly result in admitting seven non-Communist states; alternatively, it would produce an unpopular Soviet veto.

The second alternative has definite advantages. We will gain credit among the friendly applicants, as well as a majority of the General Assembly; increase the stature, effectiveness, and moral authority of the UN; and be in a position to use UN machinery more effectively in getting at the Soviet satellites. It would seem to be an appropriate subject for negotiation in any broad Four Power talks. If it arises there, action on the Bandung Conference candidates alone would clearly be inappropriate.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/6–755. Confidential. Drafted by Popper. Cleared by EUR, NEA, ARA, L, and USUN. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs wrote a dissenting memorandum that is printed *infra*.

FE opposes the second alternative and favors the third. FE believes a blanket deal means a surrender of principle by consenting to admission of unqualified (satellite) states, and fears a deal would increase pressure for seating the Chinese Communists. (Separate memorandum attached. Tab B)[2]

Recommendation:

That we prepare to consider the matter in the Four Power negotiations, and that consequently USUN be instructed not to take any action on membership for the time being.

[Attachment]

Applicants Supported by US

Jordan
Portugal
Ireland
Italy
Austria
Finland
Ceylon
Republic of Korea
Nepal
Viet Nam
Libya
Cambodia
Japan
Laos

Belaunde "Short Package" (based on Efforts UN COC on membership)

Austria
Finland
Italy
Libya

Bandung[3] Applicants

Cambodia
Ceylon
Japan
Jordan
Laos
Libya
Nepal

Soviet Candidates

Albania
Bulgaria
Hungary
"Mongolian People's Republic"
Rumania

---

[2] Printed as a separate document *infra*, with the stamped date June 9, 1955.

[3] A "unified Viet-Nam" was also included in the Bandung statement, but as it does not now exist, it would be excluded. [Footnote in the source text.]

111. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, June 9, 1955.

SUBJECT

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

I am unable to concur in Mr. Key's memorandum of June 7 which, as I understand it, recommends that we prepare to consider a blanket deal on United Nations membership in the Four-Power negotiations and that we take no initiative for the time being toward implementing the Bandung proposal on membership.

The question of blanket deal negotiations with the USSR on membership must be weighed in connection with the Chinese representation problem. The issues of United Nations membership and Chinese representation, while technically separable, are in fact closely related, as you pointed out in a press conference last year (July 8, 1954). Pressures to seat the Chinese Communists have been increasing, especially since the Bandung Conference. Our willingness to accept the Soviet satellites will afford a pretext for other United Nations members to change their positions on Chinese representation, with probable serious consequences for our position at the next General Assembly.

The close linkage which is known to exist in Communist minds between membership and Chinese representation is currently evidenced by the Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration of June 2.[2] This situation raises the question whether we can safely assume that we can resist "firmly" Soviet efforts to link these two issues and yet count upon obtaining a satisfactory membership arrangement with the USSR. Once, however, we have indicated a willingness to negotiate for a blanket deal, the present basis for our membership position will have been lost.

The issue thus becomes: Is the need for general flexibility so great and the chance of success in negotiations with the USSR on membership so encouraging as to be worth endangering our position on Chinese representation and forfeiting the moral and Charter basis of our membership position? In my view if we are to stand firm on the Chinese representation issue, we cannot afford the risks involved in the IO proposal.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/6–755. Confidential. Drafted by Bacon.

[2] For text, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1955, pp. 267–271.

I believe, however, that an initiative toward implementation of the Bandung suggestion would offer advantages with no apparent disadvantages. If, as anticipated, the USSR vetoes the proposal in the Security Council, the free world will have gained by showing an initiative in support of a Bandung suggestion and the USSR will have lost prestige. If unexpectedly the USSR approves the proposal, we shall have obtained the admission of seven states, none of which belongs to the Soviet bloc. Such an initiative might assist Japan in its current negotiations with the USSR, and would not prejudice any membership proposals which may later develop. Moreover, it would be desirable to have taken an initiative involving Japan in case the USSR, as a result of the current negotiations with Japan, undertakes to support or even propose Japanese membership.

---

112. Position Paper Prepared for the Geneva Summit Conference, July 18–23, 1955 [1]

Washington, July 1, 1955.

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Recommended US Talking Points

1. We support the admission of fourteen of the present applicants (Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal and Vietnam). Large majorities in the General Assembly and the Security Council have endorsed their qualifications, and only the Soviet veto has blocked their admission.

2. We continue to oppose the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Outer Mongolia because they have yet to show that they are qualified. None of them has ever been found qualified by a requisite majority in the Security Council or General Assembly.

3. We oppose the Soviet package proposal for the admission of the five Soviet-sponsored applicants along with nine others because it includes five applicants which we believe are not qualified, because it excludes five others which in our opinion are qualified (Japan, Republic of Korea, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), and be-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership. Confidential. Drafted by Brown.

cause the Charter, as interpreted by the International Court of Justice, requires separate consideration of each application on its own merits. For the same reasons and also because of the invidious distinctions it would involve among qualified applicants, any smaller package including both Soviet-sponsored and qualified applicants would likewise be unacceptable.

4. If the USSR wishes to make a genuine effort to alleviate international tension and to settle the membership question, it could cease to demand the admission of applicants which have never been found qualified as the price for the admission of those which have. It could permit admission on their own merits of the fourteen qualified applicants mentioned in 1 above.

5. If the USSR proposes the immediate, unconditional admission of Austria, we should agree, but, without conditioning the agreement in any way, we should also point out that we continue to favor the admission of Italy, Japan and all other qualified applicants and should challenge the USSR to refrain from vetoing them.

Anticipated Position of Other Governments

1. *France* and the *United Kingdom* are generally bearish on enlarging UN membership since it would increase the number of anti-colonial Members. They would probably agree to consider a membership deal as one item in a comprehensive agreement with the Russians involving a number of issues.

2. The *USSR* may propose (a) a membership deal involving some or all of the Communist and non-Communist applicants, or (b) unconditional, immediate admission of Austria, and possibly Japan.

Discussion

1. *Charter Provisions of Membership*

The qualifications for new members and the procedures for their admission are governed by Article 4 of the Charter.

> 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
> 2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The International Court of Justice has given two advisory opinions on Article 4. In the first, it said that a Member, while recognizing that a state fulfills the conditions of Article 4, cannot subject its favorable vote on the admission of that state to the additional condition that other states be admitted simultaneously. In the second, the Court advised that the General Assembly cannot admit a state in the absence of a favorable Security Council recommendation. It has been generally understood that a Security Council recommendation to admit a state is subject to the veto.

2. *Current Situation*

A. Only nine states have been admitted as new members since the founding of the Organization. These nine are: Afghanistan, Burma, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, and Yemen. Indonesia was the last member admitted—in 1950.

B. Nineteen other candidates have applied. The USSR has used its veto 28 times to block the admission of fourteen of these candidates (Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Vietnam), all of which the Assembly has determined to be qualified. The remaining five, which are Soviet-sponsored (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Outer Mongolia), have never received the seven votes required for a Security Council recommendation or been found qualified by the Assembly. Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany have not applied.

C. The Soviet Union has proposed the simultaneous admission of nine of the non-Soviet applicants (including Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal but not Cambodia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos and Vietnam) and of the five Soviet-sponsored candidates. The majority of Security Council members, including the United States, United Kingdom and France, have not accepted this package deal because it is contrary to the International Court's opinion that each applicant should be considered separately, and because it includes applicants not considered qualified while excluding certain qualified applicants. The membership question has therefore remained deadlocked, the Soviet Union vetoing the non-Soviet applicants and the majority rejecting the Soviet-sponsored candidates or a package deal.

D. The large majority of UN members have become increasingly concerned over this stalemate. The Eighth Session of the General Assembly unanimously decided to establish a Committee of Good Offices, composed of Egypt, Netherlands and Peru, to consult with members of the Security Council to explore the possibility of reaching an understanding which would facilitate the admission of new members in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter. This Good Offices Committee was continued by unanimous action of the Ninth Session. Currently it has been seeking through extensive consultations to develop proposals for admission of a limited number of applicants who might be acceptable to both the Soviets and ourselves by reason of the fact that they are not clearly committed either to the Soviet bloc or to the free world (e.g. Austria, Finland, Libya).

E. At San Francisco our delegation reported that the Chairman of the Good Offices Committee had received the impression from a conversation with Molotov that the USSR would be willing to add Laos and Cambodia to the old Soviet package of 14. There was also a report that Molotov suggested a package deal including Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Outer Mongolia and Rumania.

F. The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference called for the admission to the UN of Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and a "unified Vietnam." The Prime Minister of Ceylon has suggested to the Prime Minister of Indonesia[2] (in his capacity as Chairman of the Bandung Conference) that he get in touch with the heads of other states in the area which are UN members with a view to action in the UN to obtain the admission of all the above-listed states except a "unified Vietnam" which has still to come into existence. Copies of the Ceylonese Premier's letter went also to the other Bandung participants.

G. Pursuant to action at the Ninth Session of the UNGA the Security Council is expected to meet sometime before the 10th session of the Assembly to reconsider all pending applications. In order of application, these are Albania, "Mongolian People's Republic", Jordan, Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Vietnam, Libya, Cambodia, Japan and Laos.

---

[2] Sir John Lionel Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, and Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister of Indonesia; see *infra*.

---

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Ceylon to the Department of State[1]

Colombo, July 22, 1955—6 p.m.

27. Reference Embtels 419, June 15, 19, July 18 and Embassy despatch 665, June 16.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/7–2255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and New Delhi.

[2] Telegram 419 from Colombo, June 15, summarized the contents of a letter that Ceylonese Prime Minister Kotelawala sent on June 6 to Indonesian Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo calling for action to implement the resolution adopted at the Bandung

GOC Prime Minister has received letter from Nehru in response Kotelawala letter Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia dated June 6, copies of which sent other Bandung Conference heads of government re UN membership for countries enumerated Bandung resolution. Letter states verbatim: "The Soviet Government expressed their willingness to support the admission of all countries which are qualified for membership. When I asked them to name these countries they mentioned all the Bandung countries in addition to a number of others. Thus there was no opposition on their part to any country.

"Difficulties are likely to arise when a limited list of the countries is made and all the countries that are qualified are not put in the same list." PermSec Foreign Office who communicated Embassy foregoing stated last para was observation added by Nehru which Indian Prime Minister did not directly attribute Russians.

Indian High Commissioner informed me yesterday of despatch Nehru's letter to Kotelawala, but did not mention last para.

Local press has reported that Soviets would not oppose admission UN any of Bandung powers but noted this probably on condition USSR satellites also included.

Crowe

Conference on membership in the United Nations for the seven Afro-Asian countries. The letter stressed, in part, that (1) the seven countries were being kept out of the United Nations by the vagaries of the cold war and not because of any intrinsic lack of eligibility, (2) the June 2 Soviet-Yugoslav declaration inferred no further Soviet vetos of the admission of new Afro-Asian members, and (3) while other countries might also be qualified for U.N. membership the seven mentioned in the Bandung resolution should be considered first because of the merit of their case. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/6-1555) Despatch 665 from Colombo, June 16, transmitted the text of the above letter. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/6–1655) Telegram 19 from Colombo, July 18, noted the dispatch of a similar letter from Prime Minister Kotelawala to Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom. (*Ibid.*, 396.1 GE/7–1855)

114. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State[1]

New York, July 29, 1955.

DEAR FOSTER: There seems to be a good chance to get the British to agree to your great idea of non-member participation. If they do agree, it means that we will have the votes to put it across in the General Assembly this Fall. If we put it across, it will broaden and change the character of the United Nations in the way that you always advocated and the publicity and photographs coming out of the United Nations will reflect the presence of Japan, Italy, Germany, etc., even though they cannot vote. The fact that these countries, and others such as Ireland, will be present will be very helpful in the light of 1956.

My basis for thinking that the British may go along is due to their acute discomfort over our plans for Charter review. They really do not want this at all and Crosthwaite, the British Minister in New York, has suggested a resolution which puts off the holding of a review conference to which he invites our adherence. I told him that his resolution was a very milk and water affair and that Americans wanted to see some signs of development and growth in the United Nations.

1. I think that if you were to put it strongly to Macmillan, a deal might be made whereby the United States and the United Kingdom would agree to a resolution postponing a Charter review conference and another resolution putting into effect your scheme of non-member participation. The two would go together as a single package.

2. I recommend further that the State Department staff be instructed to get to work on the text of a resolution concerning non-member participation, the text of an explanatory statement, and the text of a position paper. Nothing has yet been done along this line.

I realize that you have other things to take up with the British which relate to the United Nations—in particular, the question of the successor to the Turkey seat in the Security Council, the perennial question of Chinese representation, and the Cyprus issue.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/7–2955. Confidential; Personal.

The non-member participation plan, however, is to me particularly interesting and constructive.[2]

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

[2] In a memorandum of August 3 to Barco, Armour wrote that in talking to several officials and in reading a memorandum of conversation in which Secretary Dulles took part, he gained the impression "that following the Four-Power Conference there appears to be hope on the part of some satellites of some advance toward a liberation of Soviet control. In view of this trend, I doubt that the Department will be anxious to agree to any package deal which involves the satellites presently not represented in the United Nations, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, as their presence there would tend to strengthen their present governments." Given these facts and the assurance that the Soviets would not accept any "package deal" on membership that did not include at least some of these countries, Armour suggested dropping the push for membership expansion in favor of proposals for some form of non-member participation in the United Nations. (USUN Files, IO, Membership)

---

115. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Phillips) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, August 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

Reply to Ambassador Lodge on Non-Member Participation

Discussion:

In his letter to you of July 29 (Tab B)[2] Ambassador Lodge suggests the possibility of getting British support for your proposal on non-member participation if we in return join the UK in a move to postpone a Charter review conference. He suggests that you seek Macmillan's agreement to this "deal".

We agree that it might at some stage be desirable to revive the non-member participation idea if this is the only alternative to a continuance of the present membership deadlock. If it is to be revived, however, we believe we must be able to demonstrate to the qualified applicants that there is in fact no serious prospect of a break in the membership deadlock, and that non-member participation represents, for the foreseeable future, the only feasible mechanism for their participation in the work of the UN. Having in mind their negative reaction to the non-member participation proposal when it was broached to them last year and the increased expectation of a break in the membership impasse aroused by the present atmosphere of relaxing tensions, this would appear to be difficult if not impossible to do until after we have once more tested Soviet intentions on the membership question. We do not believe that the attitude of the qualified applicants is apt to be substantially affected one way or another by the position of the UK on the non-member participation idea.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8–555. Confidential. Cleared by FE, ARA, and NEA.

[2] *Supra.*

A number of recent reports that the USSR may not use its veto on the admission of various states (e.g. Austria, the Bandung group) have contributed to optimistic speculation concerning the possibility of a solution to the membership question. Although our information does not conclusively substantiate these reports, it is reasonable to anticipate some new Soviet move on membership at this time. The Indian delegation has indicated that it may propose the admission of the Bandung group and that they believe the USSR will neither oppose this group nor add to it any unacceptable applicant. So long as there is a real possibility that the Soviet Union will agree to the admission of any of the qualified applicants, we would be playing into Soviet hands if in the meantime we should revive the non-member participation idea, which the USSR could claim was an attempt on our part to sidetrack a settlement of the membership question. Other governments too might conclude that we had ruled out any real solution to the membership problem.

To date the US has managed with increasing difficulty to keep the onus on the USSR for the impasse on membership. If the USSR now adopts a more flexible position, it will be even more difficult to combat the view that it is the US rather than the Soviet Union which is blocking a solution.

We believe, therefore, that action on the non-member participation idea should be deferred at least until the membership question has been reviewed by the Security Council and there has been an opportunity to assess the situation in the General Assembly. In any event, we question the advisability of linking non-member participation with Charter review as Ambassador Lodge suggests. We see no bargaining advantage in this combination.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached draft reply to Ambassador Lodge (Tab A) informing him that, for the above reasons, you wish to defer consultations on non-member participation.[3]

---

[3] Tab A, not found with source text, was a draft letter of August 4, prepared by Bond and De Palma, along the lines of this memorandum. (Department of State, IO-UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Membership) For Dulles' reply, see *infra*.

---

116. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, August 9, 1955.

DEAR CABOT: I have your note of July 29 with reference to non-member participation. I spent considerable time today discussing the problem of membership and the related problem of Charter review with our people here, including Francis Wilcox.

My feeling is this:

The acceptability by non-members of non-member participation seems at the moment to be at a low ebb because of greater hopes for full membership. These hopes were aroused by the Bandung communiqué which proposed seven members, including Japan. There seems a fair prospect that the Soviet Union may take these up. The hopes of Italy and Austria have recently been increased by various Soviet hints. It could be that something might be worked out on membership at the Security Council meeting which will precede the General Assembly. I doubt that the non-member participation business will get very far until at least that has been tried and either succeeded or failed. If it succeeds, then the non-member participation idea is unnecessary and there is less urgency about a Charter Review Conference. If the present prospects of new members should fail, then I think the non-member participation idea could be revived as an alternative to an early Charter Review Conference.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Confidential.

We shall try to push our thinking along these lines so as to put you rapidly in a position to talk with others. At the moment, however, I think it is better for the Mission to avoid negotiations.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

---

117. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, August 9, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the UN

Ambassador Koo said that his Government was concerned about its position in the United Nations. It was thought that in response to the new Communist peace propaganda campaign, a group of nations might try to force the admission of Communist China to the UN. He said that his Government was trying in every way possible to bolster its position at the coming General Assembly session. Work was being done in New York and elsewhere. But the Chinese Government needed and would like to ask the help of the United States Government, which had more influence.

Mr. Robertson assured the Ambassador that the American Government would assist in every way possible in maintaining the UN position of the Chinese Government.[2]

Ambassador Koo said his Government would be very grateful.

Mr. Robertson said undoubtedly an effort would be made in the UN to unseat the GRC and replace it with the Chinese Communist regime. For example, the Ceylonese Ambassador to the US had just made a speech urging the UN admission of Communist China at the Forum being held by the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8–955. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy. A notation on the source text indicates that Chinese representation was one of a number of topics discussed at this meeting and that separate memoranda of conversation were prepared on each subject discussed.

[2] During a conversation on a number of subjects held at San Francisco, June 24, during the Commemorative Meetings of the United Nations, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson had spoken of "Communist China in a way which implied that" the United States "should begin to think about recognition and admission to the United Nations." Secretary of State Dulles "recalled that we had not recognized the Soviet Union for sixteen years, and had gotten along very well all during that period, better than afterward. Mr. Pearson said that the conditions about China were different." The talk then turned to other matters. (Memorandum of conversation; USUN Files, IO, Dels, China)

Ambassador Koo said he felt that Great Britain would hold the key to the resolution of this issue.

Mr. Robertson agreed that this might be the case. He remarked that the British are quite upset over the bombing of British vessels in South China ports by Chinese Nationalist planes. They have just made a strong statement to us following the bombing of the *Inchwell* in Foochow harbor on August 3. The British disposition to go along with the "moratorium" arrangement in the UN might be adversely affected by their anger over the Chinese attacks on British shipping. Mr. Robertson thought that a concerted effort would be required to maintain the GRC position in the UN.

Ambassador Koo said his Government was doing everything it could, but its influence was limited.

Mr. Robertson assured the Ambassador that the matter would receive our earnest attention.

---

118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, August 24, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position on Admission of New Members to UN

At a meeting in your office on August 9, 1955 representatives of this Bureau (including Dr. Wilcox) and of certain other interested areas of the Department discussed with you the possibility of resolving the current membership deadlock, having in mind the anticipated early review of outstanding applications by the Security Council and the scheduled discussion of that subject at the Tenth General Assembly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8–2455. Secret. Drafted by Bond. Initialed by Wainhouse. Cleared by EUR, NEA, and L. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs wrote a dissenting memorandum; see *infra.*

It was pointed out at that meeting, as well as in IO's memorandum of August 5, 1955 (Tab A),[2] that there had been certain indications of a prospective relaxation of the Soviet position on membership, with particular reference to the Bandung group and possibly Austria (which the Soviets appear to want to link with the other "peace treaty" states). It was mentioned also that such a change in the Soviet attitude, should it in fact materialize, would be likely to give new impetus to a tendency which was already discernible to shift the onus for the membership deadlock from the USSR to the U.S.

In the present climate of relaxing tensions there can be little doubt that expectations of a break in this deadlock are high, and that any Member which allows itself to be placed in the position of appearing to block an overall solution will incur the ill will of a large majority of the other member nations, as well as of any qualified applicants which may continue to be excluded. We have particularly in mind the situation which would arise should the USSR press for the admission of .ll outstanding applicants with the exception of the divided states of Korea and Viet-Nam. Under our present position, we would have to oppose the admission of the satellites, thus blocking a comprehensive package deal. We would then have to be prepared to deal with Soviet acquiescence in the admission of at least the Bandung group, and possibly also Austria. Since presumably we could not oppose any of these, their admission would be assured. The reaction of the remaining qualified applicants, and particularly of Italy, would certainly be strong and vociferous. The onus for Italy's failure to gain admission would in the present atmosphere attach not to the USSR, but to the U.S., a circumstance which would tend to encourage a resurgence of Italian neutralist sentiment. Moreover, the admission of the Bandung group alone would strengthen the anti-colonial and neutralist forces in the UN and probably impel the UK, France, and other European UN Members to press for the admission of Italy and Portugal even at the cost of admitting the European satellites.

As indicative of the current thinking of other member nations on this question, Canada, supported by Australia, has already expressed interest in a package arrangement which would admit all of the outstanding applicants (including the Mongolian Peoples Republic and the European satellites) with the exception of Korea and Viet-Nam.

In considering the feasibility of our supporting a package arrangement on membership, and in particular of our agreeing to the admission of some or all of the European satellites, you raised the question of possible adverse effects on anti-Communist elements within the satellites, and requested that inquiries on this subject be made of our diplomatic representatives (in the cases of Hungary and Rumania) and through other channels (in the cases of Albania and Bulgaria). Replies received from our Legations in Budapest and Bucharest are attached (Tab B).[3] While the results of other agency inquiries concerning Albania and Bulgaria have not yet been received, the principal points made by our two Legations are the following:

---

[2] Printed as Document 115.

1. The failure of the U.S. to block the admission of the satellite applicants would, at least temporarily, have a negative and demoralizing effect on the anti-Communist populations of those countries.
2. This effect might be at least partly mitigated if the U.S. were to accompany its renunciation of the use of the veto on satellite admissions by a statement making clear our continued strong disapproval of the satellite regimes and our serious reservations as to their qualifications for UN membership; this would be particularly true if the admission of the satellite applicants were to be offset by the admission of a substantially greater number of non-Communist applicants.
3. Should the U.S. decide on a course of action which would lead to the admission of the European satellites, the fullest possible advantage should be taken of the bargaining value of that decision in seeking concessions from the satellite regimes concerned.

Pursuant to your desire to include Spain in any membership arrangement to which we might agree, a telegram was despatched to Embassy Madrid on August 20 (Tab C)[4] designed to stimulate an early application by Spain.

Recommendations

It is recommended that you approve a course of action by this Government along the following lines:

1. As a first step the U.S. should discuss with the UK, and subsequently with the French, Canadians, and possibly certain of the other Commonwealth countries, the feasibility of reaching general agreement on an understanding to admit (a) all of the qualified applicants with the possible exception of the divided states of Korea and Viet-Nam (i.e., Austria, Italy, Finland, Portugal, Ireland, Japan, Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Jordan and Libya), (b) Spain (provided it submits its application in time), and (c) the four European

---

[3] Not found with the source text, but presumably reference is to telegrams 73 from Budapest, August 17, and 37 from Bucharest, August 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8–1755 and /8–1555)

[4] Not found with the source text, but presumably a reference to telegram 163 of August 20, that stated the United States anticipated detailed and serious consideration of the entire membership question by both the Security Council and General Assembly in coming months. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/8–2055)

satellite applicants (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania). Such consultations might logically be followed at a later date by discussion with Chairman Belaunde (Peru) of the Committee of Good Offices with a view to enlisting his support on behalf of such an arrangement.

2. The U.S. should seek an agreement to postpone Security Council review of pending membership applications until after the convening of the General Assembly. The U.S. position on membership might then be set forth in your general debate speech (see suggested text attached as Tab D)[5] in which the following points would be emphasized:

> (a) The continued exclusion of a significant number of qualified nations confronts the UN with an intolerable situation which, if allowed to persist, can result only in a progressive deterioration in the prestige and effectiveness of the organization.
>
> (b) The fourteen nations already found by a majority of the Security Council and the General Assembly to be qualified for membership have been prevented from gaining admission solely by the Soviet abuse of the veto.
>
> (c) (If Spain has applied) It is the view of the U.S. that Spain, a new applicant, is also fully qualified for membership and we shall strongly support its admission.
>
> (d) It is the hope of the U.S. that the USSR, as its contribution toward a solution to this urgent and compelling problem, will forego further use of the veto to block the admission of these qualified applicants.
>
> (e) For its part the U.S., consistent with its view that the veto should not be used to block the will of the majority on the issue of membership, will not use its vote to prevent the admission of any state which receives seven or more votes in the Security Council. Specifically, the U.S., while still of the opinion that the regimes presently in control of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania have by their own conduct cast the gravest doubt on their readiness to abide by the principles of the Charter and their willingness to undertake the obligations of membership, will no longer oppose the admission of those four states if it is the will of the majority that they should be admitted to membership, although we shall continue to hold them accountable for past agreements.
>
> (f) The U.S. will continue to oppose the admission of the so-called Mongolian Peoples Republic, which in our opinion cannot present a valid claim for membership since it does not possess the commonly recognized attributes of statehood.

3. The U.S. should then request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of membership; at that meeting it should state its position along the same lines as the foregoing.

4. Rather than seeking a prior agreement with the USSR, which would be regarded as acceptance of a "package deal", we should see

---

[5] Not found.

to it that the USSR Delegation is apprised of our intentions just prior to your speech, and undertake any necessary consultations with that Delegation as soon as possible thereafter.

5. In the meantime the Department should explore ways and means of taking advantage of a decision on our part not to block the admission of the Soviet satellites as a bargaining weapon in obtaining desired concessions from those regimes, pursuant to recommendations set forth in the two telegrams attached as Tab B.

---

119. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 29, 1955.

SUBJECT

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

I am unable to concur in the policy proposed in IO's memorandum of August 24.

1. It will create confusion concerning the actual basis and strength of US opposition to international Communism and its practices.

2. It will undermine our position on Chinese representation in the UN. Our willingness to overlook moral and Charter qualifications for the satellites will set a precedent for others to apply to Chinese representation issues. The proposed explanatory statement contributes to, rather than obviates, this danger. If we are to hold the line, we cannot afford the risks of the IO proposal.

3. It leaves the USSR free to veto any candidate which does not come to terms with the Communists. It thus calls for a sacrifice of the US moral and Charter position and bargaining power for an unknown return. It may also increase pressures on candidates (e.g., Japan) to come to terms with the USSR.

4. It apparently involves abandonment of Korea and Viet-Nam to indefinite exclusion from the UN.

5. It involves nearly doubling the Soviet bloc (from 5 to 9)—to which will be added the votes of some of the proposed "neutral" candidates in all probability, on some crucial issues.

6. The argument based on the "under-representation" of Europe overlooks the "under-representation" of other areas, which is of similar and even larger proportions.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/8–2955. Secret. Drafted by Bacon.

If the proposal were to be made subject to the acceptance of similar conditions by the USSR objection 3 above would be met, but the other objections based on principle and on Chinese representation would remain.

As an alternative I suggest that in your address you announce support for the Bandung recommendation on membership and express the hope and confidence that in the prevailing atmosphere it will be possible to admit not only these states but also certain other states, notably in Europe. It may develop that states such as Italy and Austria will prove acceptable to both sides in the new circumstances. If the USSR insists upon all or nothing, the responsibility for the impasse will rest there. A piecemeal approach of this sort offers a reasonable effort toward breaking the deadlock without the risks and sacrifices involved in the IO proposal.

Additional comments are attached.

Additional Comments on IO's Memorandum of August 24 on UN Membership

1. The proposal involves our acquiescing in the admission of the European satellites. Three of the four satellites stand condemned by the General Assembly for "wilful refusal" to fulfill a Peace Treaty obligation and all four have been condemned year by year by the US and other delegations for violating human rights and accepted codes of conduct. The President has just felt it necessary to emphasize that relaxation of tensions does not involve relaxation of principles on our part.

2. The proposal involves an undertaking that the US "will not use its vote" to prevent or "will no longer oppose" the admission of any state which receives seven or more votes in the Security Council. The implications for the Chinese representation issue of the announcement of this change in US policy toward the satellites will be immediately evident to UN members. At your press conference on July 8 last year you said that " . . . [2] if you look at the substance of the matter rather than the form, the question of the eligibility of a new government should be subject to the same voting tests as the admission of a new state." IO proposes that you explain that our willingness to acquiesce in the seating of the satellites despite our views as to their eligibility does not mean that we are prepared to consider the seating of "any regime which has been convicted of aggression by the United Nations and which has yet to purge itself of that aggression", and specifically that we continue to oppose any change in Chinese representation. This explanation serves to make clear to all that we realize the dilemma which our

---

[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

change in policy creates with respect to Chinese representation. It also strips our opposition to the Chinese Communists of all objections except the sole issue of aggression. Objections based on violations of human rights and treaty obligations, mistreatment of American and other foreign nationals, etc. are discarded. It carries the unmistakable suggestion that once the finding of aggression is lifted we can be expected to acquiesce in their seating. This statement would be made at the very time when we shall need all possible strength to maintain our position in favor of the seating of the Chinese Nationalists and against the seating of the Chinese Communists.

3. The recommendations on Korea and Viet-Nam are not entirely clear. Under recommendation 1, we would apparently be willing to drop both if the Commonwealth and France objected to their inclusion, while recommendation 2b apparently contemplates our including both in our proposal. Both would in any case be subject to a Soviet veto, for our self-denying policy would not be contingent on the acceptance of a similar policy by the USSR.

---

120. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, September 2, 1955.

In a telephone conversation with Cabot Lodge at his home in Beverly, Massachusetts, this morning, I outlined to him your decision not to accept the "package deal" for admitting certain members to the UN. Ambassador Lodge told me that he was very much in favor of your decision and believed that it was the only course which we could properly follow and remain consistent with our past policies.

Ambassador Lodge said that he believed we should consider the membership for the UN of any particular country entirely on its own merits—we should be *for* those countries we thought were suitable for membership, and *against* those we did not believe measured up to the requirements.

We discussed the possibility of his making a visit to see you at Duck Island in the event that positive action would be necessary in order to head off some of the activities of delegations who were lobbying for a package deal.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–255. Secret.

H

---

121. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 7, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the UN

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Robertson, FE
Mr. Wilcox, IO
Mr. Elbrick, EUR

The Acting Secretary said that he had invited Sir Robert to call this afternoon in order to discuss with him a very important question, namely, that of Chinese representation in the United Nations. After reciting briefly the history of the U.S.-U.K. moratorium arrangement on Chinese representation, Mr. Hoover said that we had been concerned at the recent suggestion of the British Government that a change be made in the procedural formula used heretofore in avoiding consideration of the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the General Assembly. He said that any change in the formula, such as that suggested by the British Government, which could be interpreted as a weakening of this Government's position with regard to Chinese representation could have very serious repercussions in the United States which could involve our relations with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth nations as well as our participation in the United Nations. He pointed out that the Congress and the public in this country are unanimously opposed to the seating of the Chinese Communists and the reaction on the part of the public here to any apparent change in our attitude would be pronounced and immediate. There had been exchanges between the U.S. and U.K. Delegations in New York on this subject but some time had now elapsed since this Government's views had been called to the attention of the United Kingdom Delegation and we had not yet received any definitive reply from the British Government. We were bringing this matter up again through our Embassy in London and hoped that Sir Robert would also report our views to his Government with a view to obtaining an early favorable decision.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Elbrick. Hoover was presumably Acting Secretary.

Sir Robert said that it was his understanding that the British Government's attitude toward the moratorium had not changed basically but that a slight alteration of the formula had been suggested to prevent the loss of any votes when this matter came to be acted upon by the General Assembly. He referred particularly to developments arising from the Bandung Conference in this connection. He would, of course, report our views to his Government. Meanwhile, he wished to assure us that the United Kingdom Government desires a harmonious relationship with the United States in the UN. He realized that we felt very strongly on this subject of Chinese representation but he wished to point out that the British Government feels just as strongly on the subject of any discussion of the Cyprus question by the UN, and he reminded the Acting Secretary that the British Government has appealed in the strongest terms for American support in avoiding such discussion. He made it very apparent that he considered that the United States should cooperate with the United Kingdom on this matter if we expected the latter to accede to our suggestion regarding Chinese representation. In any event, he said, this question of Chinese representation will soon come to a head and he doubted that it could be avoided after this year.

Sir Robert was told that we were awaiting the outcome of the British-Turk-Greek talks in London on the Cyprus question before determining our final position for the forthcoming General Assembly session. Sir Robert said there seemed little reason to suppose that the Greeks would not proceed with their plan to introduce the resolution on the subject, though he admitted that there was a chance that the London talks might have the happy result of inducing the Greeks to refrain from such action.

Mr. Robertson raised the question of the UN censure resolution against Communist China which named it as an aggressor and said that he assumed that action would have to be taken to rescind this resolution before consideration could be given to Chinese Communist representation. Sir Robert said that he had not considered this angle but had assumed that a vote to seat the Chinese Communists as the representatives of China would suffice.

Sir Robert said that he would report this conversation immediately to his Foreign Office.

122. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, September 10, 1955—11 a.m.

260. Re Chinese Representation. Dixon paid an official call to tell me that Her Majesty's Govt, only "after considerable hesitation and reluctance" had agreed to the moratorium on Chinese representation. He said that this "had been a hard decision" and that he had been instructed to emphasize to me that there was "strong political feeling in both parties that the time has come to admit the Chinese Communists, and that this indefinite postponement was more and more embarrassing to HMG and increasingly more and more difficult to defend".

He said that the British Government felt that the formula of using the words "not yet" should have been accepted by the US.

He wished to stress that the British Government had agreed to the moratorium only in a "spirit of comradeship" but that they do disagree and that the sense of comradeship does not mean agreement. He wished to make it clear that it was "highly doubtful that the British Government could maintain this line much longer".

I made it clear that there was a definite relationship between the American attitude and the behavior of the Chinese Communists but also made it clear that it was quite out of the question to expect any change of the American attitude in 1956.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–1055. Confidential; Priority.

---

123. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, September 14, 1955—1 p.m.

284. For the Acting Secretary. Suggest urgent message be sent to all our Embassies in Latin America urging our Ambassador to call on the Foreign Office to request the support of govt for our position on the Chinese representation question. So far we are unable to get

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–1455. Confidential; Niact.

satisfactory assurances of support from members of this group. I am meeting with them all personally Monday afternoon, but if the vote takes place Tuesday afternoon there will not be time to communicate with Latin America between Monday afternoon and Tuesday afternoon. Hope, therefore, that these approaches to the Latin American govts can be carried out immediately.

Believe there is a possibility of changed attitude on this question on the part of Asian-African nations and request that similar efforts be made in their capitals too.

In all cases the following arguments could be made at the discussion with the Ambassador:

1. The release of the prisoners was not in any way linked to the question of admission to the UN.
2. When someone stops committing an outrageous act which he never should have committed in the first place, there is no occasion for gratitude or a reward. In fact, some appreciation is due to nation which has always behaved itself.
3. The ChiComs have seven hundred thousand troops in flagrant aggression in North Korea, which is the subject of an official denunciation by the UN.
4. A salient element of US policy in the Far East is the recently concluded treaty whereby we restrained Chiang Kai-shek from any actions on the mainland.

This is sign of our moderation which is entitled to recognition and support.[2]

Lodge

---

[2] On September 15, the Department instructed eight Latin American posts, and Monrovia, Addis Ababa, and Tel Aviv to request their host governments' support on Chinese representation in the United Nations. (Circular telegram 171; *ibid.*, 320/9-1555)

---

124. Editorial Note

On September 22, Secretary Dulles addressed the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly at New York. The speech, entitled "Entering The Second Decade," is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1955, pages 523–529.

On September 19, Dulles sent a draft of this speech to President Eisenhower and in a covering memorandum, the Secretary wrote:

"I enclose a draft of a speech which I propose to make at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly on Thursday morning. I worked on this Saturday and Sunday and it is still subject to some checking and revision.

"I do not think that this requires your attention because it does not attempt to set out any new policies, but merely recapitulates the existing policies. Nevertheless, if you do have a chance to glance at it before I make it and have any thoughts you may wish to give me, I would be very happy to receive them.

"I repeat, however, that this need not be considered as a task interfering with what I hope will be days of real privacy and freedom from official cares."

Attached to Secretary Dulles' memorandum was the note: "Mr. President: No action necessary. a." The signature was presumably that of the President's personal secretary Ann Whitman. A copy of Secretary Dulles' memorandum without the draft speech attached is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.

---

125. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, September 27, 1955—11 a.m.

Secto 4. In conversation with Secretary last evening Macmillan raised question of new membership in UN. He said to him there appeared two possibilities: one, to accept the principle of universality which would mean including Albania, Outer Mongolia, etc., the other, to postpone whole question another year. He asked Secretary's views.

Secretary said US could not agree vote for package deal including such members as Hungary, Albania, Outer Mongolia, etc. He said even if Security Council waived right make recommendations regarding new membership, US was not prepared in any ad seriatum vote on new members in General Assembly to agree in advance to vote for all members in what would in effect be a package deal. Secretary said we are prepared to vote in General Assembly for countries on basis of merits of their application and in particular to vote for the seven countries proposed by Bandung Conference, plus Japan and friendly Western European applications. Secretary added we had given serious consideration to voting for Albania if Soviets agreed to entry of Austria, Italy and Bandung countries plus Japan. Reason for this is Albania does not have outstanding against it any UN or other charge of violating human rights, etc. In other words, it would be easier for us agree to Albania's inclusion in return for inclusion friendly countries than it would be agree to inclusion of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria which have violated fundamental human rights, and with which US in particular has serious grievances because of actions these governments.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–2755. Secret; Priority.

. . . .

Macmillan then suggested one possible means of handling question was for US, UK and other like-minded countries take position they did not approve veto of new members by Security Council and that therefore they might say that membership question should be referred to General Assembly on basis that each country was to be considered on an individual basis and not on basis of any package or block deal. Macmillan said that in view of lateness of hour, he would not pursue this discussion further but felt problem of new membership was something which we should all be thinking about and be in touch with during coming days of present General Assembly meeting.

---

126. Editorial Note

Between September 27 and October 1, members of the United States and Soviet Delegations at the United Nations held a number of conversations on the issue of membership. The first of these took place following a discussion of other matters when the Vice Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, Vasili Kuznetsov, suddenly remarked to Lodge that Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had made a proposal on membership and that the Soviets wished to talk to the United States about it. Lodge replied that he understood that Molotov had proposed admitting 16 new members but had not said which ones and, in view of the fact there were 22 prospective candidates for membership, asked Kuznetsov which 6 the Soviet proposal did not include. Kuznetsov replied that the 6 were Japan, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, and Spain.

Lodge reported this conversation in Delga 21, September 27, requested instructions, and suggested that the Department's first consideration should be whether the list should be appraised in alphabetical order or chronologically, that a rule then be adopted by the Security Council "stipulating the applicants be called in the order we have selected, that there be no debate, that the five permanent members agree not to use the veto and that the issue be settled by a majority vote." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–2755)

Lodge reported on September 29 in Delga 30, that pursuant to authorization by the Secretary he had spoken to Kuznetsov, telling him that the United States favored referring the Molotov proposal to the First Committee. Lodge then asked Kuznetsov if the Soviet Union would agree not to use the veto in the Security Council and when Kuznetsov asked in return if this meant the United States was ready to vote for the Soviet list, Lodge replied that he wished to get the veto issue out of the way first. Lodge gave the same response when Kuznetsov asked if the United States was planning to suggest admission of more than 16 countries. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/9–2955)

In Delga 35, September 29, Lodge reported a subsequent conversation with Kuznetsov who had "asked to speak to me alone." Kuznetsov wished to know if all five permanent members would agree not to use the veto in the Security Council against any proposed member. (*Ibid.*) Lodge promised to explore the issue with other concerned delegations and in Delga 41, October 1, reported that Anthony Nutting, Chairman of the British Delegation had given "categorical" assurance that "it was UK established policy not to use veto on new members and that I was authorized to inform Kuznetsov." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10–155)

127. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 30, 1955.

SUBJECT

Extreme Italian concern over UN membership question

Discussion

During the past month the Italian Ambassador and Minister have stated and restated with increasing emphasis that should any other country be admitted to the UN without the simultaneous admission of Italy, the domestic effects in Italy would be disastrous for the Italian Government. [2] The admission of Austria by itself or with the Bandung powers seems to be the greatest specific fear of the Italians. On the other hand, Italian representatives have taken pains to say that no serious effects would be likely to occur if Italy remained out of the UN along with *all* the other applicants.

You may recall that the same clause regarding UN membership that appears in the preamble to the Austrian State Treaty also appears in the preamble of the three satellite and Italian peace treaties signed in 1947. The Italians, therefore, consider that among the Western nations Italy has priority on the basis both of the peace treaty and date of application for membership.

The latest development was in Foreign Minister Martino's general foreign policy speech before the Italian Parliament on September 27, when according to our Embassy's report, he "stressed that Italy would consider unfriendly any action to elect other countries without Italy". Such strong language applied to friendly and unfriendly governments alike is probably intended to impress upon us the seriousness with which the Italian Government regards this question. Should Martino's assessment of Italian public opinion have been exaggerated (which we are not really in position to charge), such a statement would tend to produce the opinion he believes already exists.

That the Soviet Union is and has been responsible for the situation in which Italy finds itself is true. Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets are now willing to accept a large or small package, either including Italy, would, I believe, result in the United States being held responsible by the Italian Government and public should some other state or states obtain admission without Italy. Such a potentiality in an allied country where the "Geneva spirit" constitutes an exceedingly serious problem for the government and where the electorate is already 35% social-communist warrants the most serious consideration in connection with United States decisions and actions regarding UN membership.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–3055. Secret. Drafted by Freund and cleared by Wilcox. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to Lodge.

[2] See the memoranda of conversation with Ambassador Brosio of September 9 and 28, and with Minister Ortona of September 20, *ibid.*, 310.2/9–955, /9–2055, and /9–2855, respectively.

Recommendation

That this problem be kept in mind.

---

128. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 3, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

UN Membership

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
M. Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador
M. Charles Lucet, Minister-Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Asst. Secretary for International Organization Aff.
Mr. John Wesley Jones, WE

When the French Ambassador called on the Secretary yesterday to explain French withdrawal from the General Assembly, the conversation turned to the future composition of the United Nations should a formula be found for the admission of new members. The Secretary speculated on the feasibility of a formula whereby neither the Soviets nor the other four permanent members of the Security Council would use the veto. Mr. Wilcox suggested that in such an event an abstention rather than a negative vote would better meet the legal requirements. The Soviet satellites were discussed as examples and the French Ambassador expressed the view that even though the U.S., U.K., France and China should abstain the Soviets and the other six Security Council members voting affirmatively would give the required seven votes for membership. He added, however, that it would be difficult for countries like New Zealand

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–455. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on October 4.

and Belgium to vote with the U.S.S.R. and not follow the example of their Allies in the case of the satellites. The Secretary agreed that it was likely that the Soviet delegation would insist on some prearranged understanding to assure that their protégés would not be excluded under the formula by either the Council or the Assembly.[2]

At the end of his call the Ambassador asked the Secretary about the plans of the Disarmament Subcommittee. The latter replied that the Canadian objection to the early recess of the Subcommittee had been overcome and there now seemed to be no obstacle to its adjournment some time next week.

---

[2] Secretary Dulles was asked about the United Nations membership question at his press conference on October 4 and replied, in part, as follows: "I think that our position on all United Nations memberships is substantially the same as it has been in the past. We have never believed that the Security Council should operate as an agency for the vetoing of members. . . . We believe that candidates should be considered on their merits; they should not be arbitrarily vetoed in the Security Council. . . . There are some nations which, it seems to me, have made clear that they are not either peace-loving, or able or willing to carry out their obligations under the charter, and we doubt that they should be allowed to come into the United Nations in violation of the charter, or merely in order to get other eligible nations in." For a complete text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1955, pp. 604–608.

---

129. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, October 4, 1955—10 a.m.

Delga 51. For Wilcox. Re: Membership. Dixon (UK) at his initiative called yesterday to discuss number of questions including membership. I reviewed for Dixon previous conversations with Kuznetsov and Nutting (Delgas 30, 35 and 41[2]) and added that Tsiang (China) that afternoon told me if there was general agreement among the big powers not to use veto, he would also agree.

Dixon stressed importance determining before-hand "what is it with respect to new members we want to have happen?" I indicated first step was to get agreement among big powers on non-use veto, and added I felt Russians should tell us what they want to have happen on membership question, and then we can give consideration next step.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–455. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

[2] See Document 126.

Dixon of view that no progress can be made on membership problem without French, and we must therefore await return Alphand in order raise with him French position regarding non-use of veto. I assured Dixon that after I had had opportunity talk to French about forbearance use of veto we could consult with UK again on what we might next say to Soviets.

Dixon asked what we might tell others who raise questions regarding membership. I suggested we could inform them we are trying to get agreement among big powers not to use veto on membership problem.

Lodge

---

130. Memorandum From Joseph J. Sisco of the International Organization Affairs Staff of the Mission at the United Nations to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

New York, October 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

Membership

Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Morton to Mr. Wilcox which deals with the Congressional reaction on the membership problem. You will note in particular the last paragraph, which indicates the desirability of informing certain Members of Congress at an appropriate time in the event progress is made on the membership question.

Recommended Action:

None at this time. Should developments warrant, you will wish to consider at a later date an appropriate way to inform Congressional members. [2]

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Limited Official Use.

[2] A handwritten notation on the source text in Lodge's hand reads: "file carefully."

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Morton) to the Secretary of State

Washington, September 30, 1955.

SUBJECT

Congressional Reaction to UN Membership Package Deal

There will be a strong adverse Congressional reaction if we permit the entry of satellite nations to the UN. However, this will be offset if the package should include Spain, Ireland, and Italy. The opposition would primarily spring from members with large Catholic constituencies but the inclusion of the three European nations mentioned, especially Spain, should more than compensate.[3]

In any package we would attempt to get enough new votes on our side to more than offset the four Russian votes—Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. The inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Portugal would have general Congressional approval. Japan would be received with less enthusiasm, but the total reaction would be favorable. There would be little enthusiasm for Nepal and the Jewish elements would oppose Jordan. There would be little reaction one way or the other to Libya, Ceylon, Laos and Cambodia.

If security considerations permit, our position on the membership problem should be given in advance to Rayburn, McCormack, Richards, Martin, Halleck, Chiperfield, Vorys, and Senators Johnson, George, Knowland and Wiley.

---

[3] The words "should more than compensate" are underlined on the source text. A memorandum of transmittal to Wadsworth, October 10, from Cook indicates, inter alia, that the underlining was done by Lodge.

131. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 12, 1955—6 p.m.

Delga 83. Re Membership. In accordance with Gadel no. 33, October 10,[2] we raised with French representatives de Guiringaud and Ordonneau this a.m. question of five permanent members agreeing forego veto on new members. We reported that we had broached question with other permanent members and that the UK had stated it was their policy not to use veto, that China had indicated that they would go along with the other four, and that USSR had wished to know others' views before replying.

Ordonneau said that he believed in present circumstances French reaction would be negative, and both he and de Guiringaud felt that in any case an immediate French reply was doubtful.

Crosthwaite, who was present, expressed UK Delegation's great interest in having French Government's reaction. De Guiringaud and Ordonneau agreed raise question with FonOff.

Crosthwaite, while making clear UK position on not using veto was well known, expressed UK Delegation's interest in knowing what next steps would be if all members agreed on veto. He said UK had not as yet agreed "to forego the use of mass abstentions."

Ordonneau felt that Soviets would not be satisfied with leaving issue to be decided by uninfluenced majority and anticipated Soviets would ask the other permanent members to obtain votes for their candidates.

We indicated that by asking permanent members forego veto, we were in a position to drop question at any point, and that we were not now prepared anticipate further developments.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–1255. Confidential.

[2] Gadel 33 summarized Dulles' October 3 conversation with French Ambassador Couve de Murville (see Document 128), noted from Delga 51 (Document 129) that affirmative reactions on the veto issue had come from the United Kingdom and Chinese Delegations, and suggested that the U.S. Delegation discuss the matter with the French, indicating interest in an early reply and inviting French opinion whether the matter ought also to be raised in Washington and/or Paris. The telegram closed with the admonition that until great-power agreement on the veto question had been secured, discussion of the matter should not be encouraged. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–1055)

132. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, October 15, 1955—3 p.m.

Delga 103. For the Secretary, Wilcox and Merchant. Re membership. In the course of a call on me today (at his request) Kuznetsov (USSR) who was accompanied by Malik, raised the question of the admission of new members. He referred to an inconclusive conversation between Molotov and the other three Foreign Ministers at which the subject of Japan and Spain was only briefly mentioned.

I informed him of the reactions of the British and Chinese to the proposition of abstention from use of the veto, and also said that while we had approached the French we had not yet received response.

He said he was raising this question only to obtain "sign posts" to guide their further thinking on the question and said that he is without a governmental position.

I said, speaking personally and unofficially, that if the Soviets were to propose admission of all applicants including Spain and Japan, but excluding the divided countries of Vietnam and Korea and Outer Mongolia, it would seem to me a truly interesting proposition. Malik expressed mock surprise at the exclusion of Outer Mongolia. Kuznetsov and Malik then mentioned rather in passing the difficulty they might face regarding Japan, arising from the fact that they are still in a state of war with that country, and said that some way would have to be found to get around that. Regarding Spain, while denying technical knowledge in the matter, they averted [*advertised*] that the 1946 resolution[2] would make Spanish membership impossible. I suggested that the 1950 resolution[3] had taken care of this question. We agreed that there might be a difference of opinion as to the legal aspects.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–1555. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

[2] For documentation on the 1946 resolution proposed by the United States and adopted by the Security Council on procedures to be adopted by the Security Council in connection with applications for membership, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 375–388.

[3] Reference is presumably to the General Assembly resolution adopted on December 5, 1950, submitted by Brazil, Canada, the Philippines, Sweden, and Syria requesting the Security Council to keep all pending applications under consideration as per prior resolutions of the General Assembly adopted at its Fourth Session. Information on this resolution is in *United States Participation in the United Nations; Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950*, Department of State Publication 4178 (Washington, July 1951), pp. 117–118.

The conversation was on both sides informal but the general impression was one of considerable flexibility on their part.

Lodge

---

133. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 24, 1955—7 p.m.

Delga 149. Paris for Secretary. [2] Re: UN membership. I met with Ordonneau (France) and Nutting (UK) at latter's request to discuss membership.

Nutting opened meeting by saying that when Macmillan was here he had discussed UN membership with number of delegations and had been button-holed by number of others. Macmillan had found considerable pressure from observers, from non-member countries, and would-be promoters of solution of membership problem, Nutting said. He referred to rising tide at that time in favor solution, a tide which since then "has not ebbed and in fact continues to rise in part due to fact Soviets have been fishing around and dropping hints" of their willingness to support a group of 18, including Japan and possibly Spain. Nutting informed us that Foreign Office is convinced we cannot stand in way of rising tide and UK is therefore now prepared to support a proposal, if made, along the lines of Canadian proposal. Nutting described this as a behind-the-scenes prior agreement between West and Soviet Union to "promote, support or acquiesce in admission of membership of group of 18". (This would include Japan, Spain and Outer Mongolia, and exclude divided states.) UK wants to inform Canadians of this position . . . . Nutting suggested a four-power get-together here, including Canadians, after US has communicated its views to UK. I informed Nutting I would communicate his government's views to Department.

Ordonneau, while speaking personally and without instructions, understood French view to be that they would not renounce veto, since it was only reason for staying in SC. However, this was not to say, added Ordonneau, that France would actually use veto on question of admission of new members. He further expressed personal view that Paris would not welcome prospect of "more additions to zoo". Ordonneau also indicated his personal view that France might adopt principle of abstention with few limited exceptions such as Italy, which France would wish to support.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–2455. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris.

[2] Dulles was en route to the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference of October 27–November 16.

Nutting agreed that in light of fact French have no instructions, a four-power meeting here may be premature. Nevertheless, Nutting is anxious to tell Canadians confidentially of UK position . . . .

In brief discussion procedure which could be used in Security Council, Nutting said it would be necessary to work out a plan in order to insure that applicants would receive required seven votes. There was also some discussion regarding fact that certain members would not wish to vote affirmatively on certain satellite states. In this connection, Nutting said . . . . Crosthwaite (UK) recalled that in conversation with Macmillan here in New York Secretary appeared to put . . . category.

Nutting said Macmillan might have a word on membership problem with the Secretary this week.

. . . .

Wadsworth

---

134. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, October 26, 1955—7 p.m.

Delga 160. Verbatim text. Re membership. MacKay (Canada)[2] handed attached draft resolution on membership to Wadsworth this a.m. He said that Canadian cabinet was giving approval to Pearson to take initiative on something along these lines:

Begin verbatim text.

"The GA

Having noted the growing general sentiment in favour of the universality of the UN, membership in which is subject only to the provisions of the Charter,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–2655. Secret; Priority.

[2] R.A. MacKay, Deputy Canadian Representative to the United Nations.

Having considered the report (A/2973) of the Comite of Good Offices established by the GA Res 718 (VIII) of 23 Oct 1953,

Taking into account the statements made by the permanent members of the SC in the present session on the question of new members,

Believing that a broader representation in the membership of the UN will enable the organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation,

1. Expresses appreciation of the work and efforts of the Comite of Good Offices;

2. Requests the SC to consider, in the light of the general opinion in favour of universality and of the improved international atmosphere, the pending applications of the following states which so far have not gained admission to the UN:

(List group of 18, including Spain)

3. Requests further that the SC make its report on these applications to the GA during the present session."

Lodge

---

135. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 26, 1955—7 p.m.

Delga 161. For Hoover and Wilcox. Please transmit to Dulles from Lodge. Subject: Membership. If it appears to you that we are losing popularity with Italy and other nations over the membership question and that blame is being put on US for inaction, I suggest the following:

That I be authorized to let it be understood that the US would certainly be interested in an arrangement whereby all applicants except the two Koreas, the two Vietnams, and Outer Mongolia are elected to membership.

We have Morton's estimate that unfavorable reaction in Congress to the admission of satellites would be more than counterbalanced by admission of such nations as Ireland, Italy and Spain. From the standpoint of protecting US interests here the situation would not be any more difficult than it is now. In fact, it might be slightly easier.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–2655. Secret; Niact. Subsequently repeated to Dulles at Geneva.

The Canadians are circulating a so-called secret draft resolution, presumably to friendly delegations, whereby the GA would endorse admission of the "group of 18, including Spain". This would include Outer Mongolia. We are advised that the Canadian resolution has the approval of the Canadian cabinet.

The situation is developing rather quickly. My motive is more to prevent damage to the US than to solve the membership question.

Lodge

---

136. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 3, 1955—3 p.m.

Secto 148. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. After my visits to Rome and Madrid [2] am deeply impressed by passionate desire of these countries to get into UN. I was surprised to find feeling in Spain seems fully as strong as in Italy. Spanish say they filed application at our suggestion and would never have done so had it not been taken for granted this meant we would get them in. To have applied and be rebuffed would be galling to Spanish pride and intolerable.

I recalled Franco's urging to keep resistance movement hopefully active and said satellite admission would tend to damage will to resist. Reply was presence in UN of such vigorous anti-Communist

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–355. Secret. Repeated to USUN.

[2] Secretary Dulles' memorandum of conversation with Franco at Madrid, November 1, is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memorandum of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, USDel/MC/22. Dulles elaborated on this conversation in Dulte 39 from Geneva, November 2, eyes only for Hoover and Robertson. The telegram reads: "In my conversation with Franco where he urged admission to UN and I objected to certain satellites he said in effect UN could have been a non-Communist organization but that a number of Communist states were already in and that a few more did not make any difference and once it was apparent Chiang Kai-shek could not recapture the mainland it would be necessary to admit Communist China. I was greatly struck by this observation coming from head of most anti-Communist state (hope this will not make Robertson's ulcers worse.)." Acting Secretary of State Hoover replied in Tedul 48 as follows: "Robertson advises he thinks he is about to have a severe relapse." (Both *ibid.*, Central Files, 310.2/11–255)

Christian countries as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland would more than offset damage having satellites in. In any event they would be regarded as merely one more of several available Moscow mouthpieces and do no real harm.

After much pondering and in light of Tosec 43,[3] I have come conclusion our relations with Spain, Italy and other countries would be so badly hurt by not making real effort to get them in that this damage could not be compensated for by using veto to keep European satellites out.

Two questions present themselves: (1) is it possible handle matters so we would abstain in SC and still vote against satellites GA, although we would not in GA campaign against satellites; (2) if in GA we had to abstain on satellites to get our friends in, we would as a minimum have to express our views re non-representative character of satellite governments and recall President Eisenhower's statements at Geneva and Philadelphia[4] as to US policy toward satellites.

Obviously ideal result would be in effect to carry out Vandenberg resolution whereby all permanent members of SC would avoid veto on membership and be free to vote as they like in GA. I had initially understood this was objective of conversation initiated between Lodge and Soviet delegates. However, I now have impression Soviets may interpret agreement to abstain in SC as also implying abstention in GA.

Would appreciate your views so I can discuss matter with Macmillan and Pinay.

---

[3] Printed as Delga 161, *supra*.

[4] Presumably a reference to Eisenhower's July 18 statement at the opening of the Geneva Conference and his August 24 address at the annual convention of the American Bar Association, held in Philadelphia. For texts see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 707–712 and 802–809, respectively.

137. Memorandum From the Senior Political Adviser to the Mission at the United Nations (McSweeney) to Joseph J. Sisco of the International Organization Affairs Staff of the Mission at the United Nations [1]

New York, November 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

Membership: Soviet Union

Zamyatin (USSR) [2] approached me with an inquiry regarding the membership problem. He first inquired as to the meaning of the Canadian draft resolution and did a little shadow-boxing on the method of treatment of the resolution in the Ad Hoc Committee. He professed to understand that the consensus in the UN was that it should be taken up early next week in the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was pretty clear that he really was under instructions to find out what was the present status of our inquiries of the other permanent members as the result of Ambassador Lodge's conversation with Kuznetsov. I spent most of my words endeavoring not to give any answers but still to retain our initiative and interest in the matter.

After a certain amount of chit-chat he agreed, as one might expect a Soviet to do, that the first positive step in solution of the membership question must be private but firm understanding amongst the permanent members of the Security Council. He also agreed that discussion of membership in the Ad Hoc Committee, presumably to be followed by recommendation to the Security Council on the membership applications of a certain group of countries, could hardly be helpful and might well be harmful since the necessity of speaking in public would be likely to give rise to reiteration of old positions and hinder the possibility of progress in private conversations.

In the conversation he first started speaking of the 18 countries mentioned by Canada but later, and quite purposefully I am sure, referred to 16 and, a couple of times, 17 applicants.

He indicated considerable interest in the question of whether the Soviets now should rely on negotiations in New York to proceed in this matter or to take the question up at Geneva.

If he is representative of the Soviet viewpoint, the Soviets would hope that there would be some indication of progress in the private negotiations and if this were the case would prefer to defer any Ad Hoc Committee action. He, as always, was insistent on the necessity of some sort of solid assurance to the Soviets regarding the admission of their candidates. He suggested that it would be necessary to have some sort of informal meeting of the Security Council members prior to the formal session which would take membership action.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Confidential.

[2] Leonid M. Zamyatin, First Secretary of Embassy.

I think that if we are really interested in the solution of the membership matter on terms acceptable to us we should be able to give the Soviets some sort of an answer in the very near future as to the prospects. They would, I think, be prepared to go along with us to defer Ad Hoc consideration if we were able to convince them that we are in fact moving forward, however slowly.

If we are not able to have some such conversation with them, I would expect they will assume that our previous conversations have been insincere and that they will proceed to use the membership question for the utmost propaganda effect.

---

138. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 3, 1955—midnight.

Delga 213. Re: membership. In a conversation with Urrutia (Colombia) he agreed with Belaunde (Peru) and me that with addition of 17 new members in UN it would be easier for us to prevent a two-thirds vote against us on issues in which we have an interest.

Belaunde then said he planned to bring up membership item in ad hoc committee this Friday, and after I said this would be too soon, he said then perhaps he would bring it up following Friday. After further discussion he then agreed that he would not bring up this matter of membership in ad hoc before consulting with us.

. . . .

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–355. Confidential.

139. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 4, 1955—1 p.m.

Delga 217. Department for Hoover and Wilcox. After considerable thought I have concluded that I should be authorized to make the following statement to the press:

"Thirteen deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the United Nations because of Soviet Russia's abuse of the veto power in the Security Council.

This list includes such important nations as Italy, Japan and Spain.

It includes such small, but old and civilized, nations of the Western world as Austria, Finland, Eire, and Portugal—nations whose sons have also contributed to much of our own national culture.

It includes in the Near East and Far East: Cambodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Laos, Libya and Nepal. All of these nations have emerged into sovereignty since the Charter was written and have made distinctive contributions to the free world. Many of the Asian nations, in particular, were specifically endorsed for membership by the Bandung Conference of last spring—a list which the United States had endorsed.

In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on September 22nd, Secretary of State Dulles pointed out 'that our organization's power derives largely from moral judgments formed here' and that, therefore, it is essential 'that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of UN charter'.

He went on to point out that 'about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here and many of them meet the membership tests of our charter. They are peace-loving and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the Charter's obligations. Their governments would reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is a grave wrong, not only to them, but it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members. I hope that during this tenth session action will be taken by the Security Council and by this Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–455. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Geneva for Dulles.

United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind'.

It is reported that the Soviet Union will withhold its veto and that these free nations can become members of the United Nations if the free world is willing not to block the admission of governments behind the so-called 'iron curtain'—governments which are not equals among equals as are the large and small nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow. We refer to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

We will not disguise our feeling that to see such governments enter the United Nations is not pleasant for anyone who takes seriously the words of the Charter.

On the other hand, there is an overriding argument which, after mature consideration, seems to us to outweigh this drawback. This is that the admission of these 13 free nations greatly outweighs the admission of the 4—because the 13 nations would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the United Nations. In fact, if these 13 whom we support were all admitted, the balance in the General Assembly with a total membership of 77 would be even more heavily weighted in favor of the free world than it is now with 60.

There is also reason to hope that membership in the UN will to some extent bring the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania closer to freedom.

We must speak too with warm and friendly feeling of the Republic of Korea and of the Republic of South Vietnam whose allies and supporters we are but who, because their territory is divided, cannot reasonably hope for admission in the present state of the world.

For all these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the thirteen and to raise no objection to the four mentioned above."

For your information, the arguments for this course, in addition to those which are contained in the statement itself, are as follows:

1. The situation is developing here in such a way that we will be confronted with a proposal of this sort in any event and will have to accede to it or incur considerable unpopularity throughout the world.

2. In the past week there have been clear indications from Italy and Ceylon that we were being blamed for the failure of these nations to be admitted. Yesterday the Japanese observer said in front of a large group of people that "the United States holds the key". The Spanish observer is spreading reports that the Latin Americans will gladly vote for a satellite if Spain is admitted—which I believe to be completely true.

3. If we do not do this, we run the risk of getting into a position where we might be compelled to vote for the admission of

certain Arab-Asian countries with the USSR excluding our Western European friends. The admission of anti-colonial countries at this stage of the development of the United Nations without the admission of our friends from Europe could be very harmful indeed.

4. I have cleared the above statement with Tom Stephens,[2] who thinks it is all right if we organize statements of approval from Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Scandinavian representatives to be printed in the next day's newspapers.

5. I have also cleared it with Congressman Hays, Congressman Merrow, and Senator Pastore of the US delegation, who all approve.

6. If we decide to make this statement, I would notify all the representatives of the thirteen countries in advance that I was going to make it.

7. This will put us in a more favorable position with respect to support of the moratorium arrangement on Chinese representation, and would make it easier for us to prevent a two-thirds vote on anything.

8. A prompt announcement along this line makes it easier to keep out Outer Mongolia because it puts the initiative on those who sponsor Outer Mongolia to bring her into the picture.

The statement I propose, because of the influence of the United States, would set the stage and it would be up to others to modify our presentation instead of our being in the position of dragging our feet and then making a last-minute attack on Outer Mongolia.

Believe I should decide timing in consultation with Washington and in light events here, but urgently request authorization as soon as possible.

Department should make arrangements for statements of approval from Irish and Portuguese Ambassadors.

Lodge

---

[2] Presumably Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to President Eisenhower.

---

140. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 4, 1955—10 p.m.

Delga 221. Department eyes only for Hoover and Wilcox. Re membership. I believe the views I have arrived at re membership as contained mytel 12 to Geneva repeated Dept Delga 217 (which crossed your Secto 148[2]) parallel your own. If you agree with statement I propose making, the answer to your two questions is that we should abstain both in SC and GA on satellites. I agree with you, moreover, that as a minimum we would have to express our views re non-representative character of satellite governments and recall President Eisenhower's statements as you suggested. My proposed statement re satellites was intended accomplish this result and could be expanded.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–455. Secret; Niact. Sent to Vienna eyes only for Secretary as telegram 1 and repeated to the Department.

In this connection, yesterday Kuznetsov raised with me membership problem and said it was not simply a matter of how people voted in SC, but also a question of how they voted in GA. I said that I viewed this as "an entire operation" and that it should all be worked out on paper in advance to avoid misunderstanding. I went on to say to Kuznetsov that we should be straightforward in dealing with this matter and not attempt any sharp practices such as calling the list of applicants in chronological or alphabetical order, etc., and thereby not reaching certain controversial countries. Kuznetsov agreed.

I feel that if we were to abstain in SC and vote against satellites in GA, our position would be more difficult for American public to understand than if we abstained throughout. We would, in fact, be saying in one forum that we were in effect willing to allow the satellites in and in the other forum by voting against them give the contrary impression. This would weaken our position with others in GA, would confuse our friends, and would not mollify those who are adamant on the satellite question. All of this is quite apart from fact that, as indicated above, Soviets are not likely to approve any arrangement that is not "entire operation".

The Soviets have over the years been the object of much adverse criticism because of their abuse of the veto on the membership question. But world opinion seems to have moved on from there; it recognizes Soviet intransigence as an unpalatable fact—but a fact nevertheless, and will censure us and hold us responsible if new members do not get in.

I hope you will agree with me that timing of my proposed statement is important and that while you will of course wish to discuss matter with Macmillan and Pinay, I feel we should not delay unduly taking step I propose. UK FonOff has already, without awaiting our views, announced its support for Canadian proposal which includes Outer Mongolia. For this reason alone I feel our statement should be made promptly. At present I favor a US resolution thereafter which does not include Outer Mongolia, which would take precedence over other resolutions, and would thus require the supporters of Outer Mongolia to make an affirmative effort. I also favor proceeding first in SC.

---

[2] Document 136.

Lodge

---

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria[1]

Washington, November 5, 1955—1:32 p.m.

1434. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. Regarding UN membership situation and your wire to me (Secto 148, November 3), together with Lodge's proposals (Delgas 217, 211 [*221*], November 4[2]):

(1) I am asking views of Nixon on certain public policy phases. Humphrey and Brownell are out of town over the weekend.

(2) I am again reviewing overall departmental position. This is not an easy task in view of many dedicated individuals, intense viewpoints involved, and the past history of the project.

(3) I have discussed Lodge's proposed program with him by telephone and he advises that if it is adopted timing can be deferred without prejudice until November 15, obviating necessity for decision until latter part of next week.

(4) I asked Gray[3] in confidence if he believed there were any legitimate Defense interests to consider. He promised to make personal evaluation and report to you in Geneva this weekend.

I will wire you result of (1) and (2) above by time your return to Geneva.

I suggest that I should discuss the subject with the President on Wednesday and obtain his views, if you have not already done so.

After preparing above I have just received your Secto 177[4] outlining message to Macmillan, for delivery in London. I had not realized proposal for package deal had progressed as far as indicated therein and that a commitment had in effect already been made.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–355. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hoover. Repeated to Geneva.

[2] Document 139 and *supra.*

[3] Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1955–1957.

[4] Printed as telegram 125, *infra.*

Hoover

---

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Geneva, November 5, 1955—1 p.m.

125. For Ambassador from Secretary. Following personal message to be delivered urgently to Macmillan:

"Dear Harold:

As you know I am disposed favorably to consider package membership arrangement in UN. I do not see however how we can bring ourselves to swallow Outer Mongolia and from our talks on the general subject I have understood you shared this view. It seems we would be on firm ground in opposing its admission particularly in light of its exclusion from the list of applicants approved by the Bandung Conference. Word reaches me from New York that the Canadians have specifically included Outer Mongolia in their draft resolution and that your Delegation is freely indicating to other Delegations their support for the Canadian resolution as it stands including Outer Mongolia. If your views on the matter are as I understand them to be I wonder if you might make them clear to the Canadians as well as to your UN delegation. Sincerely, Foster"[2]

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN and the Department as Secto 177, which is the source text. Subsequently repeated to the Denver White House in Toden 13, November 5, from Hoover to Adams. In this telegram Hoover also indicated that he had notified Adams of the contents of this message by phone.

[2] On November 8, the Secretary of the U.K. Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meetings transmitted a memorandum to the U.S. Delegation enclosing a reply to Dulles' letter. Macmillan wrote that he would discuss the membership matter with Dulles on November 10 and "have asked our people to go slow on the Outer Mongols. I am also telling the Canadians." He continued "It is perhaps, worth remembering that the Communist Chinese cannot look with much pleasure on the independence of Outer Mongolia. It is their Ireland and they would like it in the Chinese Commonwealth." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–855)

143. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Washington, November 5, 1955—9:17 p.m.

Tedul 58. Eyes only Secretary (upon return to Geneva). Prior to receiving your message to Macmillan (Secto 177 [2]) and before I realized that a commitment on UN membership had already been reached, I mentioned to Adams over the telephone in Denver that if you concurred I might ask President's opinion on situation during my visit Wednesday.

Adams apparently raised the subject with the President later in the afternoon on his own initiative, and has sent me following transcript of the President's comments: [3]

"Governor Adams brought to the President's attention the package deal now being discussed before the UN as to the addition of thirteen new members on the side of the Free World, including Italy and Japan, Spain and Portugal; and on the side of the Soviet, four nations—Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and Hungary.

"The President said: 'I can't personally see any great defeat for us here. These countries are small nations. We would be getting in Italy and Japan. The countries of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Albania will of course always vote with the Russians, and we might find one or two of the others voting against us. But look at the size of the population of Japan and Italy—look at the representation we would have coming in. We are anxious to build up the morale and the moral consciousness of both Japan and Italy. I think on balance I would favor it.

"'This does not mean I remember my detailed conversation with Foster on this subject, and this does not mean that if Foster saw something particularly vulnerable about the idea, I would not go along with him—but unless he sees something which I do not, I am in favor.'"

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-555. Secret. Drafted by Hoover.

[2] Printed as telegram 125, *supra*.

[3] Transmitted to the Department in Dento 4, November 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-555)

144. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 5, 1955—10 p.m.

Secto 188. Department for Hoover and Wilcox. The following is revision of text contained in Usun 12[2] to Geneva Secretary from Lodge. Revised text has not been seen by Secretary before he left for Vienna and Brioni, but we believe it reflects his views expressed to us orally this morning.

The text as revised is not to be made public until Secretary receives answers to questions he posed in Secto 148 of November 3, and has had time to consider said answers and comment on them.

"1. In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on September 22nd, Secretary of State Dulles pointed out 'that our organization's power derives largely from moral judgments formed here' and that, therefore, it is essential 'that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of UN Charter'.

2. He went on to point out that 'about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here and many of them meet the membership tests of our charter. They are peace-loving and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the Charter's obligations. Their govts would reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is a grave wrong, not only to them, but it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members. I hope that during this Tenth Session action will be taken by the Security Council and by the General Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind'.

3. Twelve of the thirteen deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the United Nations because of Soviet Russia's abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. The Security Council has not as yet acted on the application of Spain.

4. In the European area, the list includes Italy, Austria, Finland, Eire, and Portugal.

5. In the Near and Far East, it includes Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordon, Laos, Libya, and Nepal. These were specifically endorsed for membership at the Bandung Conference of last spring.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to USUN for Lodge.

[2] Printed as Delga 217, Document 139.

6. It is reported that the Soviet Union will withhold its veto and that these free nations can become members of the United Nations if the free world is willing not to block the admission of govts behind the so-called 'iron curtain'—govts which are not equals among equals as are the nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow. We refer to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

7. To see such govts enter the United Nations is not to approve their systems of govt nor condone the violations of human rights which the govts of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania have persistently engaged in.

8. On the other hand, there is an overriding argument which, after mature consideration, seems to us to outweigh this drawback. This is that the admission of these 13 free nations greatly outweighs the admission of the 4—because the 13 nations would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the United Nations.

9. There is also reason to hope that membership in the UN will to some extent bring the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania closer to freedom.

10. For these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the thirteen and to abstain on the four mentioned above."

You will observe particularly that we have omitted any reference to divided countries because of the difficulties of treating with Federal Republic of Germany which while it has not yet applied for membership, is nevertheless a divided state.

---

145. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 6, 1955.

DEAR HERB: I have carefully reviewed the messages you sent me yesterday with regard to the "Package" plan for the admission of new UN members. I addressed myself particularly to the consequences of admitting the four European Soviet satellites, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, and to the Outer Mongolia question.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–655. Secret.

Before he left Foster spoke to me about the satellite admission problem. I told him that I thought the effect, at least initially, would be unfavorable as regards the efforts we are making to build up morale and maintain the hope of eventual liberation in these countries. I added that I did not think this effect would be disastrous over the long run and that I realized that on the political side the State Department had to weigh the great advantages to be derived from bringing in a substantial group of Western oriented states against the disadvantages of taking in the satellites.

On further consideration I see no reason to change that position.

If it is decided to proceed, I think it would be possible to strengthen the portion of Cabot Lodge's proposed statement which deals with the satellites, and I have submitted in the enclosure a suggested rephrasing. You may find parts of it too stiff, but I felt we should put in all our thoughts and leave it to you and Cabot to apply the scissors.

Furthermore, I feel that it is most important that both VOA and Radio Free Europe be given a brief time to prepare for this announcement, naturally on a highly confidential basis, so that they can immediately explain in vigorous terms the reasons for our action along the lines of the attached memorandum.

. . . .

I am getting together some material on Outer Mongolia in case you need more ammunition on this particular subject.[2]

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

[Enclosure]

Suggested changes in Ambassador Lodge's draft statement for the Press—Delga 217, November 4, 1 PM—beginning with third full paragraph page 2, through end of statement.

It is reported that the Soviet Union will withhold its veto and that these free nations can become members of the United Nations, if the free world is willing not to block the admission of the [regimes][3] of four countries from behind the Iron Curtain—Albania,

---

[2] A handwritten note on the source text reads: "P.S. I understand there is a . . . cable on this subject—but I have not had a chance to study it. AWD"

[3] The word "governments" was in brackets and the word "regimes" handwritten in above.

Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

The peoples of these countries, as distinct from the regimes presently imposed upon them, have proud national heritages. Their history is full of examples of courageous devotion to the cause of national freedom and independence. We have not forgotten that about a century ago the Hungarian patriot, Kossuth, came to this free country to gain our support for his brave struggle to free his native land.

Citizens of these countries have also in the past made great contributions in nearly every field of human endeavor. If represented by governments of their own choosing, they would have much to offer the UN. Then they would be in a position to send as delegates to this organization those who could speak for their real aspirations and defend their true national interests. Under these conditions we could all welcome their election to membership.

But the governments of those four countries, as they are constituted today, are neither representative of the majority will of their peoples nor free in their relation with other states to advance their own national interests and objectives. Those governments were initially imposed by naked military force, and it is force not free consent that keeps them in power—force exercised by concentration camps, secret police and foreign troops. In international affairs, these governments are not free agents but are completely under the control of the Soviet Union, whose foreign policy and economic needs determine their every decision.

For these reasons, the United States has never been in favor of the admission of these four regimes.[4] It has seemed to us, however, that the addition to UN membership of 13 free nations with all the understanding and support they can give to the cause of the free world more than outweighs the disadvantages of permitting the four satellites to join.

In no sense does the abstention of the U.S. on the issue of satellite membership indicate that we accept as permanent the present situation in these four countries in Eastern Europe. As President Eisenhower stated at the Geneva Conference in July: "On a broader plane, there is the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and of restoring sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been deprived of them. The American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements."

---

[4] The phrase "governments, and we propose to abstain on the vote if their names are presented." was deleted from the text and the word "regimes" added by hand.

Again, as President Eisenhower stated in August when speaking in Philadelphia before the American Bar Association: "The domination of captive countries cannot longer be justified by any claim that this is needed for purposes of security. . . . [5] Very probably the reason for these and other violations of the rights of men and of nations is a compound of suspicions and fear. That explains. It cannot excuse. In justice to others and to ourselves we can never accept these wrongs as a part of the peace that we desire and we seek. . . ."

The satellite regimes of Poland and Czechoslovakia have long enjoyed UN membership. Unfortunately this fact has neither helped them to win popular support at home nor to advance their interests abroad. The convinced Communists who will largely make up the UN delegations of these four new members will obtain only the ritualistic satisfaction of having followed Kremlin instructions on how to vote and what to say. But there may be some members of these delegations who will learn much in the UN and whose contacts here may widen the possibilities for freedom of their people.

The determined opposition of the majority of the people of these countries to Communist rule and Soviet economic exploitation will eventually win them freedom and the strength of this opposition at home and in exile will not be affected by this temporary representation in the UN through alien regimes.

Meanwhile, it is not too much to urge that as part performance of the obligations which the satellite governments will undertake as UN members, they will do away with iron curtains and other barriers to normal decent relations with other nations.

For all these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the thirteen and to refrain from voting against the four mentioned above.

Our warm and friendly feelings for the Republic of Korea and the Republic of South Vietnam whose allies and supporters we are, is well known. Because their territory is unfortunately divided, they are not now being presented for membership.

---

[5] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

146. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 7, 1955—noon.

Dulte 50. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Your Tedul 58.[2] In light thereof doubt whether there is need for elaboration my views as President and I seem to be seeing alike on this situation. While I realize there are disadvantages in letting any of satellites in I think these disadvantages can be reasonably minimized and that balance will be in our favor. I believe we cannot without very great loss indeed be the nation which adheres to an interpretation of Article 4 which would result in excluding of seven countries recommended by Bandung Conference, including Japan, and which would in such predominantly Christian Catholic countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Austria shift to US, rightly or wrongly, the responsibility for their exclusion. This could have very serious consequences particularly in Italy. Also the consequences upon our Latin American relations would I suspect be considerable.

It is to be recalled that our peace treaties with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in effect commit us to UN membership. In connection with above the position of France in Security Council has not been clarified. They may be reluctant to waive veto to permit universality which they believe would further increase anti-colonial element. However, I believe France will not stand alone against the clear will of the great majority including UK.

I have now seen Secto 188[3] which generally has my approval subject to any comments Dept or Lodge may have to make.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–755. Confidential; Priority.
[2] Document 143.
[3] Document 144.

147. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings, at Geneva[1]

New York, November 7, 1955—midnight.

13. Eyes only Secretary from Lodge. Re membership.

1. I believe that I can stall off the membership question for a little while because of the fact that neither the French nor the Russians have replied to my inquiry as to abstaining from the use of the veto in the Security Council on the membership question. But this device cannot be used indefinitely.

2. There is also a considerable amount of preparatory work that has to be done in the time elapsing after you have made your decision and before I make a public statement. I refer to organizing, supporting and following statements by the Italians, Irish and Portuguese and statements by various American politicians. I have in mind Nixon and Joe Martin.[2]

3. Wilcox is talking to Hickenlooper[3] and I believe that it is greatly preferable for you to communicate with Knowland[4] yourself. If not possible, Hoover or I can do it. All this will take time.

4. I have talked with two men in the Middle West who were extremely active and helpful in the Eisenhower campaign in '52. One is Charles S. Reed of Omaha, who was the first Eisenhower delegate in Nebraska. His reaction was that a few hardheads wouldn't like it "but that it would help us a lot around election time." This is significant coming from Omaha. The other man, whom I am sure you know, is Barak Mattingly of St Louis who is one of the very shrewdest operators. He thinks the minus aspects of it are insignificant and that it will be very well received indeed and do us a lot of good in his area.

5. It is important that this be done in such a way that we not look as though we were being dragged in by the heels, as a result of pressure from others, and that is where the time element comes in. On general principles, I always prefer a Monday morning release date. If you were to ok a release or Monday, November 14, we could

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department eyes only Hoover and Phillips as Delga 230, which is the source text.

[2] Representative Joe Martin (R-Mass.), Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1953; thereafter Minority Leader.

[3] Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

[4] Senator William F. Knowland (R-Calif.), member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

start to organize the follow-up from the proper foreign and domestic quarters now.

Lodge

---

148. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings, at Geneva [1]

New York, November 7, 1955—8 p.m.

14. Geneva for Secretary. Verbatim text. Following is my revision of text contained in Geneva 33 (Secto 188 to Dept [2]) on which I would appreciate your comments soonest:

"1. In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on September 22nd, Secretary of State Dulles pointed out 'that our organization's power derives largely from moral judgments formed here' and that, therefore, it is essential 'that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter'.

2. He said further that 'about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here and many of them meet the membership tests of our Charter. They are peace-loving and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the Charter's obligations. Their governments would reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is a grave wrong, not only [to] them, but it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members. I hope that during this Tenth Session action will be taken by the Security Council and by the General Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the UN would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind.'

3. Twelve of the thirteen deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the UN because of Soviet Russia's abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. The Security Council has not as yet acted on the application of Spain.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–755. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department for Hoover and Phillips as Delga 233, which is the source text.

[2] Document 144.

4. In the European area, the list of applicants includes Italy, Austria, Finland, Eire, Portugal, and Spain.

5. In the Near and Far East, it includes Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal. These were specifically endorsed for membership by the Bandung Conference of last spring.

6. It is reported that the Soviet Union will withhold its veto and that these free nations can become members of the UN if the free world is willing not to block the admission of governments behind the so-called 'iron curtain'—governments which are not equals among equals as are the nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow. This means Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

7. Not to prevent the entrance of such governments into the UN does not mean approval of their systems of government nor a condoning of the violations of human rights in which these governments have persistently engaged.

8. But there is an overriding reason which, after mature consideration, seems to us to outweigh this drawback. It is that the admission of these 13 free nations would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the UN as overwhelmingly to outweigh the admission of the 4.

9. There is also reason to hope that membership in the UN will to some extent bring the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania closer to freedom.

10. For these reasons, the US intends to vote for the admission of the 13 and to abstain on the 4 mentioned above."

I will undoubtedly get a question at the press conference, after having released my statement, regarding Chinese representation. While not including reference to this question in my prepared statement above, I propose to answer such query along following lines:

"11. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I point out that the question of new members is totally distinct from the demand of the Chinese Communists to represent China, which is already a member.

In American political language, the matter raised by the Chinese Communists is a credentials question and not a membership question. The only connection would be that the added moral weight which these 13 would bring would mean more support for the United States on many issues, including the type of motion we have made in the past in the United Nations against the seating of the Chinese Communists."

I have noted your suggestion that reference to divided countries be omitted from my prepared statement because of difficulties of treating with Federal Republic of Germany. As you are aware, North and South Vietnam and North and South Korea have applied for membership, whereas Federal Republic of Germany has not. I am not aware of any intention on its part to make application until it is unified. Even if there is no reference to divided states in my prepared statement, I will surely be asked at press conference what US attitude is regarding applications of divided countries. Would appreciate your suggestions as to what I might say in response such press query.

Lodge

---

149. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Geneva, November 8, 1955—4 p.m.

37. Eyes only Lodge. Your Geneva 13.[2] As you know, I have reached in my own mind favorable decision toward package deal excluding Outer Mongolia and I understand President concurs. If so, question of date is tactical matter which I leave for decision between you and Hoover. So far as I am concerned release for November 14 is OK.

However, I assume you will not want to go ahead until you have had an answer from French and Russians on the veto matter and it is thought here French will not want to come up with answer until after Algerian item has been disposed of. These are all tactical considerations which I would prefer should be handled between you and Department and our normal diplomatic channels. I do not want to get involved in this matter here with Pinay where both he and I are inadequately staffed to deal with it.

Assume you have seen my 33[3] to you which reflects my views as to nature of statement.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-855. Secret. Repeated to the Department eyes only Acting Secretary as Dulte 57, which is the source text.

[2] Document 147.

[3] Printed as Secto 188, Document 144.

So far as Knowland is concerned, this should be handled by Hoover.[4]

Dulles

---

[4] Delga 237 from USUN, November 8, reported that Lodge spoke with Herve Alphand, who "says he has no instructions on membership and does not expect to receive any of a general nature." Lodge added that "this afternoon Tsiang (China) came in and said that while his government could swallow the four European satellites, his instructions are to veto Outer Mongolia." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–855)

---

150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva[1]

Washington, November 8, 1955—7:44 p.m.

Tedul 68. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. Re your Dulte 57.[2] I have discussed with Cabot the tactical question of an approach to the French and the Russians on the veto matter, outlining our preoccupation that without assurance on the veto matter we might be placed in a most awkward position if the public statement is made. The result could conceivably be that in the end we would fail in our objective to obtain the admission of the 13 friendly countries, having, however, publicly surrendered the principle on which we have stood heretofore. It was assumed by Dept that Soviet assurance on the veto was a condition precedent to application of the present membership plan. Cabot seems to believe that an approach to the Russians now on the veto matter would not be fruitful and is inclined to proceed with the public statement in the absence of a Russian assurance. He states the opinion that we could win out in the GA on the issue and obtain an important propaganda effect. We have agreed to defer a decision pending further examination of the problem.[3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–855. Top Secret. Drafted by Murphy. Repeated to USUN.

[2] Printed as telegram 37, *supra*.

Hoover

---

[3] Delga 242 from USUN, November 9, contained a suggested revision of Lodge's proposed statement "which is designed to eliminate necessity of advance consultations with Soviets and at same time improve our negotiating position generally." The revision reads as follows: "It has been reported that the Soviet Union would be willing to withhold its veto and accept these free nations as members of the UN if the free world is willing to accept the admission of nations behind the so-called iron curtain—nations whose governments are not equals among equals as are nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow. Since Outer Mongolia would obviously be generally unacceptable, this would mean Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-955)

---

151. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 9, 1955—11 a.m.

Delga 243. For Hoover and Phillips (IO) from Lodge. Re: Membership.

1. The fundamental tactical fact concerning our relationship to the Soviet Union on the membership question is this: the only way we can get an answer from the Soviet Union is to tell them what we are willing to do. Therefore the question is: When does the news of our position come out?

2. If it comes out as the result of a Soviet leak, following a supposedly private talk between me and Kuznetsov, our position will not be properly presented to the world, which includes the American public.

3. If, on the other hand, we release our statement first and talk to the Russians thereafter, we will:

a. Be in a much stronger position to deal with Outer Mongolia because we will have begun to mobilize sentiment against her;

b. We will have brought our advocacy of Japan and Spain into the open, thereby increasing the difficulty from the Soviet viewpoint of blocking Japan and Spain;

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-955. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Subsequently repeated to Geneva for Secretary Dulles as Tosec 233.

c. We will have gone far to meet the Canadian res, which, with UK support, is in the open now and which we must at some time meet in the open;

d. We will look the least like making a deal with the Soviets.

4. I have talked three times with Kuznetsov on membership and it is simply inconceivable to me that I could get any further information out of him unless I tell him precisely what we are willing to do. Frankly, I would rather tell the world before I tell him.

5. I am quite sure it has not been Dept policy at any time that I should tell the Soviets what we propose to do. Has this policy changed?

6. Regarding your Tedul 68:[2]

a. Your phrase "without assurance on the veto matter" is different from what Dulles said in his number 37.[3] He uses the language "until you have had an answer", and does not speak of an assurance. Frankly, I think an advance assurance before they know our position is inconceivable.

b. I do not think we would be "placed in a most awkward position if the public statement is made". The fact that we are willing not to block the admission of 4 satellites if we obtain the admission of 13 friendly countries will become public eventually. It is merely a question of whether it becomes public as a result of a leak from the Soviet Union or whether it becomes public as a result of our own initiative and our own timing.

c. Our ultimate assurance against being put in an awkward position is in proceeding in the SC after our public statement and after a discussion with the Soviets, in such a way that we will not vote on the satellites unless the Soviets already or simultaneously have voted for the 13. This is a question of procedural tactics which I feel we can work out. In the GA the Latin Americans, for example, would not support satellites unless Soviets have permitted Spain to be OK'd by the SC. In fact US can easily block a two-thirds vote in GA if there is any double cross by the Soviets in SC of any kind.

d. Your assumption that "Soviet assurance on the veto is a condition precedent to application of the present membership plan" is quite correct. But publicity is not the same thing as application. Release of the statement is one phase in getting to a point where the present membership plan can be applied. This is a very different matter.

7. I will do nothing without further word from you as we agreed in our telecon last night.

Lodge

---

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 149.

152. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 9, 1955—9 p.m.

Delga 251. For Hoover and Wilcox. Membership. Belaunde (Peru) came in to see Lodge and asked him to forward a letter from him to Secretary Dulles re membership. (Copies pouched to Hoover and Wilcox.)[2] Briefly letter makes following points:

1. There is a strong pressure for solution of membership problem.
2. Failure to solve membership problem at this session would produce profound crisis because attempts of Good Offices Committee would be at an end and each country would return to its own juridical position regarding admission new members. There is growing conviction that General Assembly should take matter in its own hands, like uniting for peace resolution, and should admit those applicants which receive required majority.
3. Canadian proposal sums up state of general opinion on membership question. It is not a package deal because it takes in all applicants except the divided states. Canadian proposal will be approved by great majority.
4. Security Council would meet under moral weight of assembly action to admit new members. SC could make positive recommendation on new members either with affirmative votes of big powers or abstention of certain big powers on those candidates they could not approve.
5. Veto in SC by a permanent member would go against crystallized opinion in and outside GA and blame would be placed on permanent member who applied veto.
6. While Soviets would be getting in their 5 candidates, we have to take into account that 13 countries being admitted are linked closely with the West.
7. Integration of UN on more universal basis will have enormous moral implications. West would have greater majority both quantitatively and qualitatively.
8. It would take 57 votes to get a two-thirds majority. The quantitative and qualitative improvement in the membership would make it more difficult for ill-conceived resolutions to get adopted.

Belaunde said membership question ought to go first to ad hoc committee. He thought all that was needed was a speech by him and Martin (Canada) and that no debate would be necessary in the GA. There would result, in his view, an overwhelming vote of the GA which he felt would place great moral pressure on the SC.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

[2] Not found.

After telling Belaunde his letter would be forwarded, Lodge said we were opposed to Outer Mongolia. Lodge added his personal view that we should go to the SC first. Lodge added that going to GA first would cause us great difficulties.[3]

Lodge

---

[3] In Delga 256 from USUN, November 10, for Hoover, Lodge recommended "that I be authorized to tell Belaunde now that there will be an American membership proposal and that we therefore request him not to go ahead with his own plan. In addition, I think we should give Belaunde an advance copy of our statement. We should also ask him to proceed in the SC in cooperation with us. Because of his previous role as chairman of the Good Offices Committee, he can help us and is entitled to participate in the SC discussion in this way. If we do not do this we risk serious embarrassment." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1055)

---

153. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

Taipei, November 10, 1955—noon.

428. Foreign Office view of package proposal for new membership in UN is that it is fundamentally same as Russian proposal in ninth GA which was rejected. Because of increase number of non-communist applicants in the new proposal, it looks more favorable, but attitude of Chinese Government still is that acceptance of package deal is (1) contrary to the UN previous stand, and (2) violation of the charter to accept new members except on merit. Foreign Office stated GRC delegation would oppose package deal and expressed hope US Government would do likewise. Requested to be informed American view on this issue. Please supply Embassy any information this subject appropriate for transmission Foreign Office.

Rankin

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1055. Confidential.

154. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 10, 1955—10 p.m.

Delga 266. For Hoover and Wilcox. Reference: Membership.

1. Following is revised text Canadian draft GA resolution. Martin informed us late this afternoon that copies have been given to Netherlands, Norway, Brazil, Australia, Peru, New Zealand and Iraq and that all of these delegations have been asked to co-sponsor.

Verbatim text.

"The General Assembly,

Having noted the general sentiment which has been expressed on numerous occasions in favour of universality in the membership of the United Nations,

Having received the preliminary report (A/2973) of the Committee of Good Offices established by the General Assembly resolution 718(VIII) of 23 October 1953,

Taking into account the statements about the admission of new members made by permanent members of the Security Council in the general debate of the present session of the General Assembly,

Believing that a broader representation in the membership of the United Nations will enable the organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation,

1. Expresses appreciation of the work and efforts of the Committee of Good Offices;
2. Requests the Security Council to consider in the light of the general opinion in favour of the universality of the United Nations, the pending applications for membership of all those countries about which no problem of unification arises.
3. Requests further that the Security Council make its report on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session."

End verbatim text.

2. Dixon opened by saying to Martin that he had called meeting since he gathered Martin was moving ahead. Martin then explained his draft resolution, saying that it was an improved draft based on universality.

3. Dixon explained UK's hand forced on membership question by Ceylonese and he cited hostile press in Ceylon accusing UK paying only lip service to membership question. Dixon recalled Foreign Office statement in favor of 18. He also referred to "Macmillan–Dulles agreement we should get Soviets agree to 17."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1055. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

4. Discussion then focused on procedures. Dixon said he preferred going to Security Council first. He conceived of "theater diplomacy" in GA whereas hard bargaining of deal involved Security Council, and we should do this first. Also he envisaged some agreement on procedure, pointing out that if candidates taken up alphabetically in SC, ...

5. Martin disagreed and said we should go to GA first. He stressed four or five times view that GA would be helpful in mobilizing opinion. He said that it was this mobilization of opinion, since Canadians have undertaken their steps on membership, that has had a persuasive effect upon some governments, including UK.

6. Lodge said his personal view is that of Dixon's—that we should go to Security Council first. It would give us greater protection and Security Council would be more manageable. Barco added he assumed we all wanted solution and question was how best to achieve it. He said it would be more difficult for us if we proceed in GA initially and cited in particular question of Outer Mongolia. Dixon picked this up and said Indians would undoubtedly press for Outer Mongolia and Soviets would have to give support for such a move. This could upset any agreement which might be arrived at on Security Council action regarding 17.

7. We had distinct impression that position taken by Martin in favor moving in GA first largely motivated by desire insure Canada will get credit for breaking impasse on membership problem. Since Canada not member of SC it could not expect play same role there as it would in GA. When Martin was pressed on difficulties which would arise with respect to Outer Mongolia if we go to GA first, Martin admitted this was weakest link in his argument.

8. There was also brief discussion with respect to position of France. Dixon pointed out that there were two things being whispered in corridors: first, that nothing would move the French until Algerian question was settled, which in turn would pave the way to a more moderate French attitude on membership question; secondly, it was also being whispered if French would give undertaking on new members this would lead Arabs to be helpful on Algerian matter. Martin said that while French have not concurred, they have not said no. He expressed view that France would not stand against US and UK position in SC, and he added it is a chance we have to take. Martin also expressed his belief that the Russians are prepared "to go a long way," and he added that he did not believe that there was need for assurance from the Russians before putting in his resolution in GA.

9. Lodge expressed hope that there will be more opportunity to consult with Martin before he moves ahead. Martin responded that there would be such opportunity for future consultations.

Lodge

---

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva[1]

Washington, November 11, 1955—midnight.

Tedul 81. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. I have been attempting to work out procedure on UN membership within the Department and USUN, and I am also mindful of your Dulte 57 of November 8[2] in which you said in paragraph 2: "I assume you will not want to go ahead until you have had an answer from French and Russians on the veto matter."

While the problem is primarily one of tactics it also involves substantive questions. The facts are briefly as follows:

1. The Russians and the French apparently will not give any answer regarding use of the veto.

2. It appears probable that Outer Mongolia will be presented to the SC in addition to the four other satellites. Assuming that the ChiNats veto Outer Mongolia, which they have stated they will do, it is possible that the Russians will veto one or more of the Western candidates such as Spain or Japan.

3. In the event that Russia vetoed one or more Western countries, either (a) out of general cussedness, or (b) because of ChiNat veto of Outer Mongolia, we must be certain of receiving sufficient support in the GA to block admission of the four satellites.

4. It was proposed to issue the statement without further consultation with other delegations, in view of the Russian refusal to answer.

5. It seems to me that this procedure involves unnecessary risk. The fact is that at present we do not have a package deal at all, and the final outcome of the exercise is still in doubt. If we proceed with

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.393/11–1155. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hoover and Macomber.

[2] Printed as telegram 37, Document 149.

the proposed statement in the absence of an agreement we would have committed ourselves publicly to a policy of universality and undertaken a major shift in policy without first being assured of success in our primary objective. At the same time our negotiating position would be limited, as the proposed statement represents only the minimum terms which we could accept.

6. I have therefore suggested to Lodge and he agrees, subject to your concurrence, that we not attempt to get an answer from the Russians or the French, but that instead we should obtain advance agreement to a package deal from a sufficient number of friendly countries so that our position, especially in the GA will be protected.

7. To this end, Belaunde (Peru), chairman of the ad hoc committee, would be approached to the effect that we are disposed to make a package deal under certain conditions, and show him a draft of our statement as an indication of what we have in mind. The conditions would be along the following lines:

(a) That every effort would be made to keep Outer Mongolia from being considered in the SC.

(b) That in the unlikely event that Outer Mongolia was passed by the SC, a sufficient number of friendly countries would be committed in advance to assure blocking in the GA.

(c) That in the event that Russia vetos one or more of the western nations in the SC, a sufficient number of friendly countries are committed in advance to block the admission of any of the four satellites.

8. There is much feeling that, notwithstanding good reasons advanced to the contrary, the adoption by the US of the policy of universality will open the way for the eventual membership of Communist China. While it is doubtful if we should attempt to line up support now for opposition in future years, I strongly recommend that we include a strong statement regarding Communist China at the time our proposal is made public.

9. At your press conference on July 8, 1954 you said:

> "I recall from the days at San Francisco in 1945, when the Charter was drawn, that there was at that time a very considerable argument on whether the United Nations should be a universal body which would represent all the governments of the world, good, bad, or indifferent, or whether membership should be on a selective basis. That was strongly argued at San Francisco and the proponents of selectivity won. That is reflected by the provision in the Charter that members should be peace-loving and able and willing to discharge their obligations under the Charter. That is strengthened furthermore by the provision that any nation against which enforcement action was taken should be liable to suspension from membership in the United Nations. In other words, the United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good."

There may be some difficulty in reconciling the present proposal with the earlier statement of July 8th unless we say frankly that there has been a basic shift in policy.

10. If Lodge is to maintain the initiative in New York he wishes to begin lining up the support outlined in paragraph 4 over this weekend. I would therefore appreciate your guidance by tomorrow if possible.

Hoover

---

156. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary's Office, Hotel du Rhone, Geneva, November 12, 1955, 3:30 p.m.[1]

USDel/MC/36

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Gray
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Merchant
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Russell
Mr. Tyler

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Macmillan
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Sir George Young
Patrick Hancock

France

M. de Margerie (in place of Pinay)
Henri Roux
Jacques Roux
Mr. Baraduc

SUBJECT

UN Membership

Mr. Macmillan raised the question of the UN membership. He said the Canadians wanted to table their proposals. He said that the Russians were backing Outer Mongolia and he thought that they might try to bargain for its admission against some other nation.

The Secretary said he was strongly against the admission of Outer Mongolia. Mr. Molotov was coming to see him Sunday morning at 10 o'clock and, from something Gromyko had said to him, he thought that his call might have something to do with the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, November 1955. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.

UN membership question. The Secretary then asked Mr. de Margerie what the French position was with regard to the Canadian proposal for the admission of eighteen countries.

Mr. de Margerie said that at present the French Government does not feel that it can be a party to the discussions on this subject. If the Latin American motion were voted by the General Assembly, whereby the Algerian item would be removed from the agenda, the French Government would return to the General Assembly. Otherwise, it would not be part of it. He said that the French were somewhat unhappy at the prospect of the admission to the UN of several countries of the Bandung Conference.

The Secretary observed that the question of UN membership was principally a matter which concerned the Security Council and not the Assembly.

Mr. de Margerie said that at present there was no official French position on the membership question, and that Mr. Pinay had instructed Mr. Alphand to keep hands off.

There followed a discussion of the procedures under the Charter of the United Nations for admission of new members, and the Secretary observed that the Security Council has to recommend the States involved to the General Assembly.

The Secretary said that Outer Mongolia was not a genuine state. Admission of Outer Mongolia would give the Soviet Union four votes instead of the three it now has. It would be more appropriate, he said, to trade off Outer Mongolia against the Ukraine or Byelo-Russia. Mr. Macmillan observed that the Russians might be tempted to veto Spain if we don't admit Outer Mongolia.

In answer to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Macmillan said that the UK Government is known to be a supporter of the Canadian proposal, and if the Canadians table it, the UK will have to vote in favor of it because of the candidacy of their staunch and faithful Commonwealth ally, Ceylon.

The Secretary wondered how the Canadians had reached the number of eighteen and Mr. Macmillan said that they had simply taken a list of all the candidates. The Secretary said that Puerto Rico would be as good a candidate as Outer Mongolia; in fact, why should he not propose Duck Island?

The Secretary observed that the Canadian proposal meant a kind of de facto amendment of the Charter with regard to its provision for conditions of membership. He said that it had been regrettable that the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia had been allowed to slip in at the beginning.

Mr. de Margerie said that he could speak for Mr. Pinay to the effect that if the Algerian question were settled before the Canadian proposal came up for a vote, he thought that France would go along with it.

Mr. Macmillan said that if it were a question of nothing at all or admitting the eighteen countries, the Government of the United Kingdom would take the whole lot, including Outer Mongolia, though it, did not like it. He observed further that the admission of all these countries would mean that a whole lot of new issues would be introduced for debate, especially with the presence of Ireland in the UN. The Secretary observed that no doubt the question of the partition of Ireland would come up and Mr. Macmillan ruefully agreed.

No more subjects were proposed for discussion at this meeting and it was agreed that the press would be told that the three Ministers had met in order to have an exchange of views on matters outside the scope of the Conference of Foreign Ministers. It was subsequently discovered that Sir George Young[2] had already told the press this and had informed them that among the matters to be discussed there would be:

(1) The Near East Crisis.
(2) Vietnam.
(3) UN Membership.

---

[2] Minister, British Foreign Office, and Head of the News Department.

---

157. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings, at Geneva[1]

New York, November 12, 1955—1 p.m.

15. Eyes only for Secretary, from Lodge. Following is sent in view of your meeting with Molotov tomorrow[2] so as to give you picture of existing situation at UN concerning membership.

1. It has been clear to me since November 4 (Geneva 12[3]) that US should take initiative so far as publicity is concerned.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1255. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department eyes only for Hoover and Wilcox as Delga 275, which is the source text.

[2] Dulles reported in Secto 259 from Geneva, November 12, that "Molotov on his initiative will come to see me Sunday morning [November 13,] ten o'clock on membership in UN. Please hold everything until result known". (*Ibid.*)

[3] Printed as Delga 217, Document 139.

2. I had hoped that statement which you approved (Secto 230 November 10[4]) could be issued promptly.

3. When this was impossible, I hoped for release for this a.m. Saturday papers because of signs that Canadians and Indians were getting restless and would table 18 rather than 17-nation proposal and would start proceedings in ad hoc committee rather than in Security Council, both of which concepts are unsatisfactory to the US.

4. I still hope to be able to release statement early next week.

5. We have, of course, talked with both French and Soviets. We cannot get assurances from Soviets not to use veto without getting into negotiating position with them which inevitably would require assurances from US on actual operation of entire plan. I believe we would be in much stronger position vis-à-vis Soviets in subsequent and necessary negotiations regarding the operation of plan after I have issued press statement. If Soviets in subsequent negotiations regarding procedures to be used in Security Council to implement our proposal insist upon Outer Mongolia, they would be held responsible for preventing admission of new members.

6. Issuance of press release is distinct from having a commitment from the Soviets before beginning actual operation of the plan itself in the Security Council. Such commitment is necessary, although we would, of course, always be in a position to protect ourselves in case of a Russian breach of faith.

7. French advance agreement not necessary even for start of operations. Believe they are now trying to use membership issue to trade with Arabs on Algerian question and could not risk disapproval of world opinion by being sole permanent member to block the deal. But this French angle is a matter for later determination and should not stand in the way of our press release.

8. Suspect Molotov may realize situation here and may be trying to steal the play and get the credit, leaving us in the unenviable position of tagging along, picking up the pieces, fighting a rearguard type of action against Outer Mongolia and defensively against going into ad hoc committee first.

9. It is good that he is going to see you rather than me going to see Kuznetsov because you can listen to him and, if his proposal is not satisfactory, you need not show your own hand.

Lodge

---

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1 GE/11–1055)

158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary's Suite, Geneva, November 13, 1955, 10 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/38

SUBJECT

UN Membership

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*USSR*
The Secretary	Mr. Molotov
Amb. Bohlen	Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Troyanovsky
Mr. Wainhouse	

Mr. Molotov, at his request, came to see the Secretary this morning to discuss, inter alia, the problem of membership in the United Nations.

Mr. Molotov started the conversation saying that it would be useful to exchange views on the membership question. The Secretary also thought it would be useful to exchange views. Mr. Molotov asked whether there was hope of settling the matter in the General Assembly. The Secretary replied that that depends on what we and other concerned countries agree on and asked whether Mr. Molotov thought it could be settled.

The Secretary added that the United States would forego the veto in the Security Council and had gathered that that might be satisfactory to Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov thought that the matter was on a different plane and stated that we ought to see what can be done concretely. He referred to a conversation he had with the Ambassador of Ceylon. He said that as far as the Canadian proposal is concerned, there is a majority in the United Nations in favor of it and explained what that majority consists of—the Latin Americans, the countries of Asia and Africa as well as the majority of Europeans. Mr. Molotov was certain that the United States was aware of the positions of these countries. He went on to say that the USSR has certain reservations regarding Japan and that the United States was aware of the USSR attitude toward Spain, but he felt, nevertheless, that it was possible to find a solution on this between the United States and the USSR. The Secretary stated that the United States also has reservations about certain countries and asked whether Outer Mongolia is on the Canadian list. Mr. Molotov said that it is and the Secretary said that he did not consider Outer Mongolia an independent state and had great reservations regarding Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The Secretary suggested that if Mr. Molotov would drop his two reservations, we might find a way to drop ours regarding the satellites. He was not prepared, however, to accept Outer Mongolia. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought we should find a common decision which would be acceptable to the United Nations as a whole, and that we should recognize that the Canadian proposal is acceptable as it stands. He appreciated that there would be absentions on the part of certain countries.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 584. Drafted by Wainhouse on November 14. In a covering memorandum to O'Connor, November 13, Wainhouse indicated that the memorandum of conversation was sent to Dulles for "review and approval". A handwritten notation by O'Connor reads: "Sec cleared summary cable and Merchant read this memo—so I am o.k.ing it for distribution." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 310.2/11–1355) A summary of this conversation was transmitted to the Department in Secto 280 from Geneva, November 13, and also sent to USUN eyes only for Lodge. (*Ibid.*)

The Secretary stated that there are other countries besides the United States and the USSR, which have the veto in the Security Council. The Secretary then went on to say that a general agreement could presumably be found on certain European countries: Italy, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, and Finland. This sets aside Spain because of the USSR objection. We could also accept the Bandung seven states which did not recommend Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Molotov restated his position on Spain and Japan and contended that he would not differentiate between the treaty countries. For that reason, he felt, it would be more advisable to seek agreement on the Canadian proposal of 18 or the earlier Canadian proposal of 17 which was minus Spain. He said he was prepared to come to an agreement on either of these two Canadian proposals.

The Secretary said that he would be prepared to make some concession to reflect the Soviet objections to Spain and Japan, but we could not agree to accept Outer Mongolia and Albania. Mr. Molotov replied that it is difficult not to recognize Albania as a state since it has existed for a long time and is referred to in the Italian peace treaty. It would also be difficult to deny the existence of Outer Mongolia which has diplomatic relations with a number of countries and which has recently established relations with India. In making concessions on Spain and Japan, the Soviet Union feels that the matter should be settled simultaneously. This view, he stated, is shared by the overwhelming majority in the United Nations. The Secretary commented that he didn't feel that there is an overwhelming desire in the United Nations for Albania, Outer Mongolia, etc., and if the matter were put to a vote those applicants would be defeated, whereas if all the other applicants were put to a vote they would not be. If there is any doubt on this, the Secretary said, we could put them up one by one, to see what the outcome would be.

Mr. Molotov said that in the peace treaties we undertook to support these states for United Nations membership and he felt that the signatures to those treaties were worth something. The sentiment in New York, as he understood it, is quite definitely that a majority of the United Nations members is in favor of simultaneous admission. The Secretary again pointed out that the Soviet Union knows the United States views on the satellite nations. The views of the United States were expressed by the President here in Geneva at the Summit Conference and in his speech of August 25. In view of our well-known position regarding the satellites it is difficult for the United States to accept these nations into the United Nations. The Secretary went on to say that no one will want to raise any objections to the Bandung states. In view of the general approval by the Bandung Conference of these seven, we, of course, would not want to disapprove. However, the Bandung Conference left out Outer Mongolia and if the African-Asian states did not consider Outer Mongolia deserving of membership it is hardly expected that we should. In Europe, there are five to whom we cannot find any objection—Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, and Finland. Finland is friendly and close to the Soviet Union; Ireland is strongly anti-UK; Austria is neutral. That leaves for discussion Spain, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria. The Secretary expressed a willingness to discuss this group in the hope of reaching some agreement.

Mr. Molotov responded by saying that it is true that Outer Mongolia was not mentioned in the Bandung list. The reason is it was not represented there. We cannot, he said, accept the accusations levelled against the other four in Europe. The peace treaties were concluded with them and signed by the United States. In the treaty with Italy special mention is made of the rights of Albania. We, he said, attach importance to these treaties, and we cannot differentiate these treaties from those with Italy and Austria.

The Secretary said that the United States could not accept Outer Mongolia, and as far as Europe is concerned, we cannot disagree concerning the five he first mentioned. He is prepared to negotiate on Spain and the four satellites. It is against our principles, he said, to admit the four satellites to the United Nations. He was prepared to take two satellites, any of Mr. Molotov's choosing, if Mr. Molotov would take Spain. One, he said, should be sufficient in Mr. Molotov's eyes to match Spain, but he was prepared to take two. Mr. Molotov said the best way to settle this matter simply and clearly, bearing in mind the overwhelming sentiment in the United Nations for the Canadian proposal of 18, is to agree on that proposal. He felt that we could find a way to overcome these difficulties in order to meet the desire of the United Nations members. Otherwise, he was afraid that we are not placing ourselves in a good position before world public opinion in holding up agreement on a situation which is ripe for settlement. It would hardly be understandable to raise objections to some special countries if public opinion would not understand it. This is true with respect to Outer Mongolia and Spain. He thought that there was a good basis for settlement on the Canadian proposal.

The Secretary said that if Mr. Molotov wants Outer Mongolia, he doubted we could reach an agreement. He was willing to take the Bandung seven and negotiate on the European countries but he repeated that there could not be a package settlement with Outer Mongolia in it. Mr. Molotov said it is impossible for the Soviet Union to segregate the 18 into acceptable and non-acceptable countries. We regard the list, he said, as an acceptable basis for agreement. Outer Mongolia was not on the Bandung list because it was not at that conference. Israel however was not represented there either.

The Secretary responded that Israel's absence from Bandung is quite different. It is not recognized by any Arab country just as Outer Mongolia is not generally recognized.

Mr. Molotov restated the USSR view is to accept the suggestion of an American neighbor, Canada. He didn't think Canada had wanted to harm the United States.

The Secretary said that Canada is a good neighbor but the United States does not always agree with Canada. In this case, said Molotov, we could achieve good results on the basis of your good friend and neighbor. The Secretary said we have already considered this and strongly urged Molotov that Outer Mongolia be excluded from the list. Mr. Molotov replied it would be difficult and impossible to divide the list and discriminate on Outer Mongolia. That in turn would raise the question of Spain and would hold up the settlement. The Secretary recognized that an agreement would be difficult for the USSR but it would be just as difficult for us. There is a difference between difficulty and impossibility. If one uses the word impossible, then there is little room for negotiation. Mr. Molotov replied that difficulties and impossibilities regarding Outer Mongolia are the same as those regarding Spain. The Secretary replied that we have the same problem with the four satellites. Mr. Molotov said that this was the reason he was suggesting that there not be a one-sided approach and that we take the Canadian proposal in toto—one supported by an overwhelming number in the United Nations.

The Secretary said that the United States was anxious to try to settle this question in considerable part at least at this time. We were willing to make sacrifices and if the Canadian proposal is the only basis then he thought there was not much to discuss here.

Mr. Molotov said, there are in fact two Canadian proposals: one dealing with 17 applicants and one dealing with 18. The USSR is prepared to support either of these.

The Secretary responded that the United States was not prepared to take either of the Canadian proposals. He said that there is a large area of agreement and that it would be generally helpful in relaxing of tensions to solve the membership problem. He stated that we were not consulted on the Canadian proposals and the issue is on what applicants we can have an agreement.

Mr. Molotov said that the USSR also views the matter from the standpoint of relaxation of tension and believes that the Canadian package proposal is directed toward that end. The USSR, he concluded, attaches great importance to an agreement being reached with the United States on the membership problem.

---

159. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, November 13, 1955—noon.

Dulte 74. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Lodge from Secretary. Reference Usun 15 to Geneva repeated Department Delga 275. After conclusion long talk with Molotov he is adamant on Canadian 18-state admission program and said it would be "impossible" for Soviet Union to consider any program which did not include Outer Mongolia. I indicated acceptability of Bandung group and negotiability of Soviet Union European satellites but he did not respond.

Under circumstances believe that unless we are prepared to accept onus of rejecting any package proposal we should quickly get out our own 17-power proposal and try to rally enough support for it to nullify Canadian proposal.

I believe cost of opposing any package proposal would be prohibitive in terms of sentiment in such countries as Italy, Spain, Ceylon, Austria and indeed most of our friends. I must confess I also wonder whether we can in end exclude Outer Mongolia but perhaps if we move rapidly and can get Latinos behind our proposal rather than Canadian, Soviet Union might in end give in although Molotov showed extraordinary stubbornness on Outer Mongolia today.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1355. Top Secret; Niact. A typed notation at the bottom of the source text reads: "Passed USUN 11/13/55. JRL."

Dulles

---

160. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 13, 1955—7 p.m.

Delga 279. Re: Membership. I made following statement at press conference held Sunday, 4:30 p.m. at US Mission:

"In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on September 22nd, Secretary of State Dulles pointed out 'that our organization's power derives largely from moral judgments formed here' and that, therefore, it is essential 'that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter'. He pointed out that 'about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here and many of them meet the membership tests of our Charter. They are peace-loving and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the Charter's obligations. Their governments would reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is a grave wrong, not only to them, but it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members. I hope that during this Tenth Session action will be taken by the Security Council and by the General Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind'.

A large number of deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the United Nations because of the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. Among these nations, in the European area, are Italy, Austria, Finland, Eire, and Portugal. The Security Council has not as yet taken up the application of Spain, which is also a deserving and qualified nation.

In the Near and Far East, the number of deserving and qualified nations includes seven countries specifically endorsed for immediate

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1355. Limited Official Use.

United Nations membership by the Bandung Conference of last spring: Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal.

It has been reported that the Soviet Union would be willing to withhold its veto and accept these free nations as members of the United Nations if the free world is willing to accept the admission of nations behind the so-called Iron Curtain nations whose governments are not equals among equals as are nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow.

To refrain from preventing the entrance of satellites into the United Nations does not mean approval of their present systems of government nor does it condone the violations of human rights in which these governments have persistently engaged.

Indeed, there is reason to hope that membership in the United Nations will to some extent bring the peoples of these countries closer to independence.

The over-riding fact is that the admission of 13 free nations greatly outweighs whatever drawbacks there may be in the admission of the others because the 13 nations would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the United Nations.

For these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the 13 and to abstain on the others. Our abstention in the Security Council on the applications of satellites is consistent with our national policy, as expressed in the Vandenberg resolution of 1948 (80th Congress), which called for voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to remove the veto from the admission of new members. This proposal covers 17 new members, 13 of whom we favor. The satellites would include Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, since it is obvious that Outer Mongolia can not make the grade."

In response to planned inquiry, I made following statement concerning question of Chinese representation:

"To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I pointed out that the question of new members is totally distinct from the demand of the Chinese Communists to represent China, which is already a member. In American political language, the matter raised by the Chinese communists is not a question of membership, but a question of what delegates from what governments are entitled to represent a country which, from the beginning of the United Nations, has been an acknowledged member. The only connection between the proposed new members and representation of China by the Communists would be that the added moral weight of the new members would mean more support for the United States on many issues (even after deducting the votes of the satellites), including our opposition to seating the Chinese Communists."

In addition, in order to help prepare groundwork for important role we expect Belaunde (Peru) to play on this question, I paid tribute to his efforts as Good Offices Committee chairman.

I also praised Canadian government for efforts made up to this point in keeping membership question alive. I also took opportunity to make reference to Kossuth, reference to which was included in additional material Dept sent on Eastern European satellites. With respect to divided countries, I made statement along lines suggested by Secretary in Secto 230.[2]

Verbatim text of entire press conference will be sent by wire also.[3]

Lodge

---

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/11–1055)

[3] Transmitted in circular telegram 322, November 13. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–1355)

---

161. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 14, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 287. For Wilcox. Re membership. Unless instructed to the contrary, I propose we proceed in accordance with following plan.

1. Timing of SC meeting—request that SC meeting be called as soon as possible by President. (In discussion with Belaunde (Peru) today, he preferred not take initiative in SC in view his support for Canadian proposal.) Assuming arrangements and consultations can be completed, I am thinking in terms of Friday afternoon, November 18 or Monday afternoon, November 21. Canada and India served notice in ad hoc committee today that they intend press for consideration membership as soon as Palestine refugee item completed. (We estimate about middle next week.)

2. Wording of agenda item—suggest to President that item on provisional agenda read as follows: "Admission of new members to the United Nations." (There would be no reference to GA resolution of last year.)

3. Procedure in the council.

A. Adoption of agenda.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1455. Confidential.

B. Suggest that President of Council state that as result informal discussions consensus is that members wish vote on following 17 applicants (18 if USSR insists upon vote on Outer Mongolia) in alphabetical order or alternatively chronological order. No resolution would be presented.

C. Suggest that President then state that he understood the consensus was that the Council should proceed to vote and that following completion of voting members could make explanations of vote.

D. Council would then proceed to vote on first application, i.e. Albania, etc.

E. Following voting and explanations of votes by members, President would state that he would prepare a report to GA after consultation with members of Council, forward to SYG for circulation. (This report could merely record Council action on the applications; it could also attach a verbatim transcript of Council proceedings.)

F. A plenary meeting of GA would be convened as soon as possible after Council meeting. (Our attitude regarding timing of GA meeting would have to depend on whether Council had taken action favorable to US, i.e., the list of 17. If USSR has double crossed us we would want sufficient time after SC meeting to mobilize support in GA to prevent satellites from getting two-thirds vote.)

4. In order to make gesture in recognition Canadian initiative and obtain his cooperation, I plan suggest to Martin that he appear in Council at beginning of proceedings, make a speech, and lay his resolution before Council for its information. It would be understood Council would not take up Canadian resolution.

5. We are also giving consideration to whether it would be desirable to make Security Council meeting private in order facilitate agreement on above procedures.

Lodge

---

162. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 15, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 293. Re membership.

1. As result of meeting with Dixon this morning, I submitted, after obtaining Department's concurrence, letter to SC president

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1555. Confidential; Priority.

Entezam (Iran) asking for early SC meeting on membership question. Request based on great interest shown in GA on this subject and on request for SC report made by GA last year in para 5 of Res 817 (IX). Dixon did not feel he could join in request because of Canadian involvement in matter.

This action is designed (a) to smoke out Soviet position; (b) to head off introduction by Martin (Canada) of his res in favor "universality" and 18; and (c) to assist in defeat possible Canadian-Indian motion in ad hoc committee to take up membership item immediately.

Dixon reported earlier that Martin had informed him this morning that he intended submit his res late this afternoon. Dixon said he had argued strongly against this but Martin was determined to go ahead. Dixon noted that negotiations on Palestine refugee resolution had not been completed and that debate on this item likely be bogged down. He feared if this happened there was strong probability that Martin and Menon would move that membership item be taken up immediately. . . .

2. Dixon said he had agreed discuss membership question with Soviets this afternoon. He said he intended tell Soviets that Outer Mongolia was impossible for US and that Soviets would take on heavy responsibility if they wrecked chances of getting new members in by insistence on Outer Mongolia. He also said he would tell Malik that US was not only one against Outer Mongolia. Others were opposed not only to Outer Mongolia, but also to the four Eastern European satellites. He would say to Soviets that if they drop their insistence on Outer Mongolia, he, and perhaps US, might be in position to help with getting four EE's elected. Unless this were done, the four might well not get in. Re Outer Mongolia, Dixon explained he was somewhat handicapped in talking with Soviets by fact UK was already publicly committed to support 18 as result unauthorized publication . . . of Eden's letter to Sir John Kotelawala.

Dixon and I agreed to meet following my conversation with Soviets tomorrow noon to consider when SC meeting should be held. I said we could obviously not wait until the five signed on the dotted line because I did not think the USSR, France or China would really tip their hand prior to the Council meeting and Dixon agreed with this estimate. I also said I felt on other hand that meeting should not be scheduled until Dixon and I are reasonably sure that there is fair prospect of agreement since it would not be in our interest permit Western candidates to become political footballs. Dixon agreed.

3. . . .

. . . .

Belaunde said that in Good Offices Committee meeting today, on motion of Egypt, this three-man group decided offer its good offices to SC.

. . . .

Lodge

---

163. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs (Kirlin) [1]

Washington, November 16, 1955.

SUBJECT

Congressional reaction to UN membership proposal

Late Sunday morning the Secretary cabled that we should proceed to release quickly our position on the question of admitting new members to the United Nations. As a result of this wire, Ambassador Lodge announced that he would hold a press conference at 4:30 pm. In the circumstances we felt it necessary to call Congressional leaders in order to let them know what our plans were and to give them background information on the problem.

As a result of my conversations with eleven members of the Congress, it appears that ten were in favor of our proposal and that only one, Congressman Vorys of Ohio, [2] had strong reservations. Most of them opposed the admission of Outer Mongolia (if that could be done without destroying the package deal) and nearly all of them expressed the hope that the admission of new members would not jeopardize our policy with respect to the seating of Communist China.

In brief, the reaction of the members contacted was as follows:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Congressional Letters, 1955.

[2] John M. Vorys, Republican.

Speaker Rayburn [3]

Mr. Rayburn said that if the Secretary thinks it is necessary to take this step, then he would go along with it.

Mr. Martin—(Massachusetts)

Ambassador Lodge agreed to call Mr. Martin after his press conference on Sunday. I do not have the results of that conversation.

Mr. Richards—(South Carolina) [4]

Mr. Richards stated that while he did not like the satellites he would go along with the idea on the ground that it would help us more than it would hurt us; that it would in general improve the UN. He recalled the pressure that existed in New York when he was on the delegation and said he thought we would probably have to do something like this.

Mr. Vorys—(Ohio)

Mr. Vorys commented that he had been willing for some time to accept the principle of universality in the UN. On the other hand he did not like Outer Mongolia and he was not sure that this was a good bargain from our point of view. He said that on further reflection he might reconsider but his attitude was somewhat unfavorable.

Mr. Chiperfield—(Illinois) [5]

I tried to reach him at his home in Canton but he was not available.

Senator Knowland—(California)

Mr. Hoover called Senator Knowland [6] and reported to me that the Senator would go along with the idea but that he raised two questions. He asked whether we would abstain in principle in the Security Council or whether our abstention would be just for this particular package deal. In other words, he did not wish to give away our veto in the future when we might want to keep out certain undesirable states. He also raised the question of South Korea and said that he hoped some statement would be made about our concern over that divided country.

---

[3] Sam Rayburn (D-Texas).

[4] James P. Richards, Democrat.

[5] Robert B. Chiperfield, Republican.

[6] A copy of the memorandum of this telephone conversation is in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Congressional Letters, 1955.

Senator George—(Georgia)[7]

Senator George believed that on balance it was a wise thing to do. He underlined the fact that we should not leave the impression that this would pave the way for the seating of Communist China and he pointed out that he did not like Outer Mongolia, but he realized that the pressure of public opinion was such that our change in policy seemed justifiable.

Senator Wiley—(Wisconsin)[8]

Senator Wiley understood the problem quite well since he had handled the membership problem when he attended the General Assembly three years ago. He has not been in favor of admitting the satellite states but supposed that the situation had developed to the point where it might now be the least objectionable of the two courses open to us. He indicated that he would go along with the idea if the Secretary felt it desirable.

Senator Hickenlooper—(Iowa)

Senator Hickenlooper said that he would be greatly swayed by the Secretary's judgment in this matter. He thought on balance that we would get more out of it than we would lose although he hated to see the satellite states come into the UN. He expressed some concern over the German situation although he realized that a divided country constituted a separate problem. He said that he would be glad to go along with the idea which he characterized as "on the plus rather than the minus side".

Senator Green—(Rhode Island)[9]

I called Senator Green and left a message for him but he was not available.

Senator Smith—(New Jersey)[10]

Senator Smith stated that he had wondered for some time whether our policy with respect to UN membership was sound and he believed that on the whole our change was the proper thing to do. As in the case of most members, he wanted to make clear his opposition to the seating of Communist China. He also recalled his experience at the General Assembly last year and recognized the fact that it would not be possible for us to withstand the pressure of public opinion in this regard much longer.

---

[7] Walter George, Democrat.

[8] Alexander Wiley, Republican.

[9] Theodore Francis Green, Democrat.

[10] H. Alexander Smith, Republican.

Senator Humphrey—(Minnesota)

Senator Humphrey stated that on balance the proposal seemed to be a reasonable one. He believed that the U.S. is on the spot for keeping out the countries that now seek admission and that the U.S. should not be a road-block in this respect. He pointed out that basically he favored the idea of universality and that this would be a step in that direction.

Senator Mansfield—(Montana)

Senator Mansfield generally favored the idea and said that he would be glad to comment favorably on it to the press if that would be helpful. He thought it would increase the voting strength on our side in the General Assembly and that the admission of these states would be something of a counterpoise to the Afro-Asian bloc.

Senator Aiken—(Vermont) [11]

Senator Aiken believed it was a desirable step for us to take because of all of the nations which have desired admission. He felt it would be unwise for us to continue to prevent their admission even though that would result in letting in some undesirables.

Senators Sparkman and Fulbright [12] were not available.

I also spoke with Boyd Crawford [13] about this matter and he remarked that it made a lot of sense to him. I also know that Carl Marcy [14] is generally in favor of some development of this kind.

A number of the Senators expressed appreciation to me for calling them about the matter. In the circumstances it was probably worth the time and effort.

---

[11] George D. Aiken, Republican.

[12] John Sparkman (D-Alabama) was a Vice Presidential candidate in 1952. J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas).

[13] Staff administrator and committee clerk of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

[14] Consultant to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

164. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 16, 1955—1 p.m.

Delga 298. Re membership. Last night, Tuesday,[2] after the meeting of the 22 countries who are interested in membership, Martin of Canada called me but we did not connect. When I returned his call this morning he made roughly the following declaration:

. . . .

I said that I would talk to him after meeting with the Russians and that I thought the realism of the situation was that for reasons with which he, Martin, was perfectly familiar, Outer Mongolia could not get through the SC. It would not be because of any action of the US either. Therefore, I was going to try to persuade the Russians that if they would drop Outer Mongolia, the US would help get the 17 package deal across, and without voting for the satellites ourselves, would actively try to get the votes for them in the SC and would stand by a package SC report in the GA. I said that one of the reasons we did not like his plan to take this up in the ad hoc committee was that we were afraid it would generate more pressure for Outer Mongolia, which was like beating your head against a stone wall in view of the reality of the situation, and that instead of trying to whip up sentiment for Outer Mongolia his effort should be directed towards trying to persuade the Russians not to be arbitrary about it.

. . . .

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1655. Confidential; Priority.

[2] November 15.

165. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 16, 1955—9 p.m.

Delga 301. Re membership. I informed Kuznetsov today at lunch the substance of our position. I said US would not use veto on new members; we would vote for the thirteen and abstain on their five. I stressed that there is real doubt that the satellites would be able to get seven votes in Security Council, and that the doubt was much greater concerning Outer Mongolia. I said that if they would drop Outer Mongolia, the US would help in two ways: 1) to help get votes for the four European satellites; and 2) vote affirmatively on a Security Council report to GA which would contain SC recommendation for admission of the group of seventeen. I pointed out that we had reached the phase where action was necessary, that there should be an early meeting of SC, and that we were willing to make such a meeting private.

Kuznetsov, after emphasizing the tremendous interest among members in finding a solution to the membership problem, agreed that it was necessary for us to come to an agreement. He emphasized their difficulties on Spain. He said the USSR cannot consider anything but an agreement on the eighteen and asked why, if the US is willing to assist with respect to their four, we could not do the same for Outer Mongolia. He asked US assistance in getting the eighteen in, citing the fact that they had made a count with respect to Outer Mongolia and found forty-three in favor.

I said they overestimated what we can do; that we may be able to help out by finding seven affirmative votes on the four but that Outer Mongolia just did not have support.

Kuznetsov seemed attracted to the idea of merely taking one vote on a SC report to GA when we pointed out that this was a protection for him in the GA. At same time he suggested that another way in which it might be done would be to convene the SC and GA simultaneously taking the applications one by one on a chronological basis. The SC would convene, acting first upon Albania, whose application would then move to GA, and GA would act upon it before SC proceeded to next application. Kuznetsov, however, indicating there might be advantages in a single report requiring one vote only, stopped Malik from pressing this procedure, saying that if we can find agreement, he was sure that we could arrive at a satisfactory procedure to implement it.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1655. Secret; Priority.

I pointed out that it was not at all clear as to what the permanent members would do and that if Kuznetsov did not believe this, he should seek to find out for himself. I expressed my feeling that we are not going to get final position from all the members until we have a SC meeting, preferably a private one.

Kuznetsov suggested a meeting of US, France and UK with a view to ascertaining where the four stand on this matter. I agreed that we could attend such a meeting, but that if such a meeting was called on our initiative I would have to insist on inclusion of the Republic of China. Kuznetsov said he understood, and that there was every intention on their part to speak with China, but he preferred to have a meeting of the four in the first instance and would issue the invitations. This meeting is tentatively scheduled for Saturday at Soviet residence.

In light of expected meeting on Saturday, we asked whether Kuznetsov agreed that we should not press ahead with the membership item in ad hoc committee. We pointed out that there is a move to bring up this item as quickly as possible in committee. Kuznetsov agreed and said that he would speak to Martin along these lines.

I reported to Martin (Canada) about my conversation with the Soviets. I said that my impression is that a Soviet decision not to stick till the bitter end for Outer Mongolia was by no means out of the question. Concerning a discussion of membership in ad hoc committee, Martin said: "I can't see it being discussed even next week." I said it was important to keep this whole thing fluid and that there shouldn't be a commitment of any kind—whether on eighteen or on seventeen. Martin agreed that it is advisable to "keep the matter open" and said "if the end result was seventeen we would be happy". I also reported to Tsiang and Entezam, President of Council, who agreed to do nothing about a meeting until hearing from me further. I also reported efforts we were making to Erice (Spanish observer).

At subsequent meeting with Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) I gave them my impression that Soviets will not stick on Outer Mongolia if we continue to take line with Soviets that there is real doubt as to seven votes for their four, that Outer Mongolia just does not have the support, and that we would be willing to help get seven votes on the four satellites if the Soviets are willing to set aside Outer Mongolia. Dixon said his impression is that the Soviets are making a play on Outer Mongolia as a test of strength. Moreover his impression is also that they are frightened about being tricked on this matter. Dixon said that a meeting of the four is desirable in that it would help to reassure the Soviets.

Alphand said that in conversation with Dulles and Macmillan, Pinay had made it clear that France thought a package deal was bad.

The addition of seven, eight, or eleven votes upsets the General Assembly balance, Alphand said. He is not at all sure he will be permitted to meet with the Soviets on Saturday since he has no instructions. His Foreign Minister has said that France will not consider membership question before it is back in GA, and Alphand does not know whether France will be able to accept any group of applicants.

Dixon said that they would like to see admission of seventeen, but if that was not possible, UK would be obliged to favor eighteen. Dixon then went on to express grave concern that we may be confronted eventually with a situation whereby Tsiang would veto Outer Mongolia and the entire membership question would fail. A veto by Tsiang would be catastrophic according to Dixon. There would be a violent reaction against the Chinese for frustrating the general desire on membership and this would likely be used to reopen the Chinese representation issue at this session. . . .

Dixon interrupted our meeting to see Martin (Canada) to ask him to make two changes in the resolution on the understanding, of course, that there would be no implication that the UK was supporting Martin's initiative. He has suggested the substitution of the phrase "widest possible membership" in the preamble for the word "universality" and the phrase "expanding the membership" for the word "universality" in operative paragraph two.

. . . .

Following is my evaluation of situation:

1. Worst possibility is that the membership deal will get to a point where it is finally wrecked by the veto of Tsiang on Outer Mongolia. Even allowing for some exaggeration by Dixon, this would have a violent effect here with a strong possibility of raising Chinese representation question this session or at least making our position on this question more difficult at subsequent sessions. It therefore should be avoided even if we have to pay the price of not having any membership deal at this session.

2. It may be possible to knock off Outer Mongolia in the SC without China using the veto, by arranging for five abstentions. This would however, put us in opposition to UK as they would feel obliged to vote for Outer Mongolia . . . .

3. Obviously the best solution is to try to talk the Soviets out of Outer Mongolia, using inducements I expressed to them today. Dixon assures me he will cooperate fully to accomplish this.

4. If we do make the necessary impression on Saturday, I believe we will not know until we have our first meeting of SC when everyone will have to show his hand when the voting begins.

5. . . .

Lodge

---

166. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 16, 1955—10 p.m.

Delga 302. Re membership. Crowe (Canada)[2] informed GADel officer that Canadian resolution (Delga 266[3]) was tabled this evening with 25 co-sponsors. Resolution has been revised to substitute phrase "widest possible membership" for word "universality" in preambular para one and operative para two. List of co-sponsors are:

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Crowe said that timing of consideration of the membership item in ad hoc comite is still flexible, and it is not their intention to press it at the moment.

Martin called Lodge to inform him of changes in resolution and fact that resolution was tabled. Martin informed Lodge that he told press he was satisfied, after talking with a number of delegations, that situation on membership had clarified. We are not all agreed, Martin said, but our objective is the same. There is no competitive arrangement and everyone is cognizant of responsibility of great powers.

Kuznetsov phoned Martin that he wanted to see him tonight, but Martin said he couldn't make it.

Lodge made emphatic statement to Martin on catastrophic results if membership solution collapsed as result of Chinese veto, (see mytel Delga 301[4]). He stressed how terrible it would be to have

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1655. Confidential.

[2] M.A. Crowe, member of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations and Alternate Canadian Representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

[3] Document 154.

[4] *Supra.*

Anglo-American breach resulting from fact that Chinese representation issue might be reopened this session if China vetoed Outer Mongolia, and that Canadians could not ignore this. Martin said they had carefully considered that aspect and had told Chinese they will have to bear consequences. Lodge emphasized that Chinese would not have to bear consequences, but it would be the US and Canadians ought to help US. Martin however, merely said he would think about it.

Lodge

---

167. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs (Meeker) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

Washington, November 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

Admission of New Members

Problems

In pursuing the admission of 17 rather than 18 new members, the US is confronted by the following problems among others:

(1) Soviet fear that somehow there will be insufficient votes, particularly in the Security Council, to elect Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania;

(2) the reported French position to veto all applicants except Italy, unless the Assembly rules are amended to require a two-thirds' vote for inscription of items;

(3) the inclination of many UN members to vote for 18 new members for fear that omitting Outer Mongolia will result in no deal; and

(4) the Chinese threat to veto Outer Mongolia, which if carried out, and if it were the last obstacle to Outer Mongolia's admission, could result in collapse of the effort to admit new members—with serious repercussions on the issue of Chinese representation, particularly for the US.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Secret.

A possible tactic

The dangers inherent in these problems might be minimized and even averted by the following course of action, assuming continued lack of agreement with the USSR that Outer Mongolia may be dropped from the package: one or more members of the Security Council (perhaps preferably seven members, including the US) would introduce a proposal to recommend the 17 for admission. This would be done early enough to give the proposal priority over any others. The US would stand back of this proposal, and make it clear that we proposed to have Outer Mongolia considered separately—on its own, with the US abstaining and not vetoing, and with the US and USSR competing in the open market for votes on Outer Mongolia.

Probable consequences of this tactic

Disadvantages. For the US to follow this course would involve us in active support of four satellites (rather than abstention and benign neutrality); however, this distinction would probably not be important to the American public or opinion elsewhere. This course would emphasize the *package* character of the whole membership arrangement (in contradistinction to the point we have made that each applicant must be considered on its individual merits; but, here again, the realities are too well known to make a purist position really important for the United States.

Advantages. The tactics described above would abolish any Soviet fear that the four European satellites would get lost in the shuffle. It would maximize whatever difficulties stand in the way of a French veto; France would be having to veto all 17, including Italy. Admittedly, the tactic would facilitate a Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia by separating out this one applicant. However, the reasonableness and appeal of the US proposal might be sufficient to induce enough abstentions on Outer Mongolia in the Security Council to make a Chinese veto academic and even unnecessary.

Procedure in the Council

If a resolution to recommend 17 applicants were introduced in the Security Council, the USSR might counter by (a) an amendment to add Outer Mongolia to the package, or (b) a resolution to recommend 18.

(a) Theoretically, an amendment could be shelved by a decision to postpone consideration under paragraph 30 of Rule 60 in the Security Council Rules. But such a decision would require seven affirmative votes (and not merely five abstentions). Also, a move of this kind could evoke an unfavorable reaction by letting it appear that the US would not allow the USSR its day in court on Outer Mongolia. However, the possibility should be kept in reserve, if postponement appeared more practically possible, vote-wise, than defeating the amendment through abstentions.

Five abstentions would defeat an amendment to add Outer Mongolia, if the amendment were directly voted on.

(b) If the Soviets introduced a resolution to recommend 18 applicants, we should meet this by having our proposal voted on first. If it carried, the Soviet proposal could be allowed to fail through abstentions, as its only substantive effect would be to add Outer Mongolia.

Conclusion

An affirmative resolution to recommend 17, backed and even sponsored by the US, would have the fundamental advantage of requiring the Soviets to veto the whole list if they insist on Outer Mongolia and cannot get enough votes in the open market. The onus would then be put, dramatically, where it would belong.

[Attachment]

Portugal
Ireland
Jordan
Ceylon
Albania
Italy
Austria
Nepal
U.K. of Libya

Hungary
Finland
Cambodia
Rumania
Spain
Japan
Laos
Bulgaria

168. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, November 17, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Chinese Position on Outer Mongolia's Candidacy for Admission to the United Nations

The Chinese Ambassador, during a call at his request, stated under instruction his Government's position on Outer Mongolia's candidacy for the United Nations.[2] He said that Outer Mongolia's independence was a consequence of the Yalta Agreement and of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, with respect to both of which the US had a measure of responsibility. His Government was opposed to the admission of any of the satellites. China would, however, abstain on the four Eastern European satellites if Outer Mongolia were not included in the deal. If, however, Outer Mongolia came up for a vote in the Security Council, China would use its veto if necessary to prevent Outer Mongolia's admission. In that case, China would also vote against the admission of the four European satellites but would ask that its negative votes not be considered as vetoes. His Government strongly hoped that it could count upon the publicly expressed support of the US Government in this position with respect to Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Robertson, after stating that the US shared China's views with respect to the satellites, explained the reasons underlying our position on membership along the lines of Ambassador Lodge's press statement of November 13. He commented that if the four European satellites obtained seven affirmative votes, China's negative vote would constitute a veto and that in these circumstances China would have to abstain if it were to avoid vetoing the satellites.

The Ambassador asked whether the US would be prepared to support China in vetoing Outer Mongolia. Mr. Robertson replied that we were opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia; that we were now doing all that we could in New York to ensure that Outer Mongolia would not be included; and that we found it difficult to believe that Outer Mongolia would have sufficient support to make the use of the veto a practical question. If Outer Mongolia did not receive the necessary support, we also hesitated to believe that the USSR would stand in the way of the admission of the other applicants but so far the USSR was insistent. The whole membership question was at present under active discussion in New York. Mr. Robertson continued that he was inclined to believe that the spirit of the Vandenberg Resolution would preclude our using the veto on membership. He realized, however, that the question was whether, the Chinese Government having decided to use its veto if necessary to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia, the US would let China bear the full brunt of world opinion alone. This situation presented serious problems both for China and the US and the matter should be placed before the Secretary after his return. Mr. Robertson emphasized that we continued to hope that the use of the veto on Outer Mongolia would not be a practical problem but the possibility could not be entirely ruled out that in certain circumstances we might have to ask the Chinese Government to consider whether it might not abstain rather than veto Outer Mongolia's application. He added that he hoped that we would not have to make any such request of the Chinese Government.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/11–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Bacon.

[2] A paraphrase of the instructions sent Ambassador Koo by the Government of the Republic of China was transmitted to the Department in telegram 462 from Taipei, November 17. This telegram reported that a copy of the instructions to Koo were "supplied to Embassy this morning" by the Republic of China. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–1755)

Ambassador Koo urged strongly his Government's hope that whatever course we took we would make clear publicly our opposition to Outer Mongolia and our sympathetic support of the Chinese Government's position.

He then turned to another topic which is reported separately.

---

169. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 18, 1955—3 p.m.

Delga 309. Eyes only for the Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Subject: Membership, re Dulte 74. [2] Before a formal meeting of the Security Council on admission of new members is held (which must be next week), we should have explored and be fully prepared for possible procedures in the Council so as to protect our basic objectives regarding membership. I understand these to be:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1855. Secret; Niact.

[2] Document 159.

(1) The admission of 13 countries (under the conditions the Secretary has already prescribed) which we consider qualified and which include Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Japan;

(2) The exertion of all feasible efforts to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia;

(3) To secure recognition and credit for the United States in bringing an end to the UN membership deadlock;

(4) To prevent the US being blamed for a failure;

(5) To avoid repercussions from the membership question which would adversely affect our efforts to ensure the continued seating of the Chinese Nationalists; for example, to prevent a situation arising in which Chinese Nationalists veto torpedos the membership deal, thus creating a demand to seat the Chinese Communists with consequent disruptive effects on Anglo-American relations and US opinion.

Certain immediate problems in the membership situation which have tactical consequences for US are: (a) the reported French intention to veto all applicants except Italy, unless the Assembly rules are amended to require a two-thirds vote for inscription of items; (b) the Chinese threat to veto Outer Mongolia, which if carried out, and if it were the last obstacle to Outer Mongolia's admission, could result in collapse of the whole effort to admit new members—with serious repercussions on the issue of Chinese representation, particularly for the United States; (c) Soviet unwillingness to agree to the dropping of Outer Mongolia, except possibly in return for the rejection of Spain, coupled with the Soviet fear that somehow there will be insufficient votes (particularly in the Security Council) to elect Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania; and (d) the inclination of many UN members to vote for 18 applicants, out of fear that rejecting Outer Mongolia will result in no admission at all, or in the exclusion of Spain.

The course of action outlined below can minimize and perhaps even avert the worst dangers inherent in these problems. It aims to save the United States from the charge and onus of preventing a solution of the membership problem and at the same time is an effort to give effect to the position announced in my statement of last Sunday. It would also make clear to the world the arbitrariness and intransigence of Soviet policy in contrast to the reasonableness of our own, and would bring us credit for making possible the entry into the UN of a number of valuable new members, with some of whom we have very close ties and who as you have said would hold the US accountable if they are not admitted.

Subject to prior consultation with France and other SC members and a firm agreement with Chinese Nationalists not to veto stage 5, I propose following procedure:

(1) That the United States introduce in the Security Council (early enough to gain priority in voting) a resolution recommending the admission of 17 countries;

(2) If the Soviets propose an amendment to add Outer Mongolia to the list, that we move for a Council decision that the vote on the amendment shall not be taken until after the rest of the list has been voted upon;

(3) If the French or Belgians move to divide, we resist;

(4) That we seek the adoption by the Council of the resolution recommending 17 countries, and that the amendment on Outer Mongolia be defeated by arranging for at least 5 abstentions;

(5) If, as we must probably anticipate, the resolution on the 17 fails because of the Soviet veto, that a member of the Council introduce a proposal to recommend 18 countries, including Outer Mongolia; the United States would make a statement and vote for this proposal.

The course outlined above obviously entails certain disadvantages. For one thing, in presenting a proposal to admit 17 countries, we would be appearing actively to support 4 satellites, rather than abstaining and remaining benignly neutral. Such a distinction, however, seems not to be real with public opinion. For the United States to introduce a resolution recommending the admission of 17 countries together would emphasize the "package" character of our approach (as against the point we have made since 1946 that each applicant must be considered on its individual merits). But, here again the realities of the situation are pretty well known.

Other disadvantages are: difficulties with France and charge that in view of known Soviet attitude on Outer Mongolia we were using membership question as political football in cold war.

These drawbacks seem to be outweighed by other considerations. Introduction by the US of a resolution to recommend 17 applicants would abolish any Soviet fear that the 4 European satellites would get lost in the shuffle. It would also maximize whatever difficulties stand in the way of a French veto, since France would be having to veto all 17 countries covered by the resolution, including Italy, although she could move to divide. It protects Spain and Japan by preventing these countries from being eliminated in a series of individual votes.

By having a vote taken first on the 17, we would compel the Soviet Union to veto them (if the USSR goes through with its threat of a veto) before the fate of Outer Mongolia's application had been decided. Of course, it might have proven necessary to move and decide that the Council should pronounce itself on Outer Mongolia's application after the 17 and not before. I am hopeful that 7 votes could be obtained in the Council for reaching a procedural decision that a Soviet amendment on Outer Mongolia should be voted on after the Council's vote on a resolution recommending 17 countries.

If, as we must probably expect, the USSR would veto the 17, there would be no problem in defeating Outer Mongolia on a subsequent vote. The question of a Chinese veto here would be academic.

As to the last stage in the course of action outlined above, there might be no occasion for a Council member at that time to introduce a resolution recommending 18 countries including Outer Mongolia; the USSR might already have introduced such a resolution, which under the rules would be voted on after the US resolution to recommend 17. Regardless of the manner in which such a proposal came before the Council, the United States would make a statement attacking the Soviet position, emphasizing the reasonableness of the United States attitude, and pointing to the desirability of admitting to membership in the UN a large number of qualified countries whose entry should no longer be delayed.

In the vote on the resolution proposing admission of 18, we would, of course, be faced with the problem of a Chinese veto. However, the Chinese attitude might be a little different on a resolution covering 18 countries than on a vote concerned with Outer Mongolia alone, where China has said it will veto (Taipei's 462[3]), although she too can move to divide. It would also by that time have been demonstrated to China that we had gone as far as we dared in jeopardizing a solution of the membership problem in trying to prevent Outer Mongolia's admission. It would be of the greatest importance—and to safeguard the Republic of China's continued existence—that the contemplated procedure be taken up in advance with the Republic of China urgently on the highest level, with a view to securing Chinese abstention on a resolution covering 18 countries, which would be the very last resort in efforts to break the membership deadlock.

If the Soviets introduced a resolution for 18 before we introduced a resolution for 17, we could try to gain the same effects as those described above through the following procedure:

(1) A move to have Outer Mongolia considered by the Security Council after the rest of the list; in effect a motion to divide;

(2) A vote on the 17, which we must assume the USSR would veto;

(3) Rejection of the Outer Mongolian application; and

(4) A vote on a new resolution covering 18 countries.

The Soviets, particularly for Latin American consumption, have indicated that Spain could not be admitted if Outer Mongolia were not admitted. This may be essentially a device to stimulate Latin votes for Outer Mongolia. It may not represent a serious Soviet proposition to delete Spain in return for the deletion of Outer

---

[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

Mongolia, as the Russians are doubtless aware of the Latin threat to wreck any membership arrangement if Spain is not included.

Would like your views just as soon as possible on the above strategy and tactics. In light of Kuznetsov press conference yesterday doubt that it is possible to reach agreement with Soviets on package of 17 even with US introducing and supporting proposal of this sort. For this reason, and because approach to Soviets along this line might only serve to indicate to them that US is over-anxious, I would prefer to move quickly in SC without letting Soviets know what we plan to do. Some confusion for Soviets may result, in which their blackmail, if they stick to it would appear in worst light because they would be vetoing the 17 at a stage when the fate of Outer Mongolia was not certain; US might emerge in not too bad a light. We should not show our hand on last stage of proposal until this was reached in SC; to do otherwise would obviously undermine earlier phase of operation directed against Outer Mongolia.

To sum up: I believe that plan described above is the most auspicious way for extricating ourselves from a very prickly situation. For a Chinese veto to be generally regarded as being the cause of failure to solve the membership deadlock could raise the issue of Chinese representation in a more acute and difficult form than we have ever known. Apart from the very serious impact of such a development on the United States, we must not be held responsible for the failure of a number of free world countries to secure entry to the UN. There are indications that China is fully aware of the dangers in this situation, and that the Chinese may therefore not wish to carry to its extreme the threatened veto of Outer Mongolia which would jeopardize Republic of China's whole future status in the UN. Particularly if the ultimate vote is a single vote on a list of 18, China might be willing to refrain from a veto. I believe it of great importance that our plan for handling the membership situation should be urgently taken up with President Chiang Kai-shek, to persuade him the common interest of our two countries requires us to follow this course.

Request authority to introduce 17-nation motion now, so that it will have priority of voting in SC. I can later withdraw motion if after further study you deemed it undesirable. I propose public statement somewhat as follows:

> "The United States is proposing a motion covering 17 nations because we believe, after careful study, that this is the most effective way to be sure that none of the free nations in whom we are interested is left behind, and because it prevents any question of bad faith in carrying out the membership plan."

Press officer can background the newspaper men to the effect that we are thinking of Italy, and Spain and Japan and so on.

Lodge

---

170. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 19, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 314. Eyes only—for the Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re membership. Following is my latest evaluation of the membership situation:

It has become clear that the Chinese Nationalists will definitely veto Outer Mongolia unless we prevent it. T.F. Tsiang made an appointment and called on me yesterday to tell me of this (Delga 311 [2]). This morning he telephoned me and after I had explained to him at some length that a veto by them would gravely endanger their whole position here and would make it altogether probable that they would no longer be here next year, he simply said: "That can't be helped".

1. For this reason I suggest an Eisenhower approach to Chiang Kai-shek to prevent a Chinese Nationalist veto on Outer Mongolia, whether by itself or as part of a package.

2. If in spite of all our efforts Nationalist China is determined definitely to veto Outer Mongolia, then it seems that we should not have a meeting of the Security Council and should simply try to stall the whole thing along and let it evaporate if possible, difficult though this will be. I was encouraged today at the Soviet lunch to find in response to a question of mine that Kuznetsov and the Russians appeared to agree that unless there was advance agreement among the five permanent members a meeting of the Security Council should not be held. Evidently the Soviets have not yet realized the potential embarrassment of our position.

3. If on the other hand we can be assured that the Chinese Nationalists will not use the veto, I think we have a good chance of getting away with the 17 nation deal and in that case we should re-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1955. Secret; Priority.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.5/11–1855)

examine my proposal of yesterday (Delga 309 [3]) with its tactic of the United States putting in a 17 nation proposal so as to get it first on the agenda and put the Soviets on the defensive.

Lodge

---

[3] *Supra.*

---

171. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 19, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 315. For Secretary and Wainhouse. I met with Dixon and Alphand at latter's residence before our lunch with Soviets to work out line we would take at luncheon meeting with Soviets.

Dixon mentioned conversation which Eden and Macmillan had with Spaak regarding the difficulty that both UK and Belgium have with package idea in general. Moreover, Dixon underscored once again the UK difficulty with Albania and that using this as point of departure he could then emphasize with Soviets that there was real doubt that there would be seven votes for certain of the satellites.

Alphand said he would merely state that he had no instructions. . . .

It was agreed that we would state our position, listen to what the Soviets had to say, and if any proposal was made by them that we would merely state that we would consider it rather than agree to it at the luncheon itself. It was also agreed to reconvene at the French residence after the meeting.

At lunch Kuznetsov opened the discussion by emphasizing, as he had at our lunch last Wednesday, the difficulties the USSR has on the admission of certain states, particularly Spain and Japan. He said he made his position clear at last Thursday's press conference and that it was 18 or nothing. He stressed that their soundings indicate great pressure for the 18.

The line taken by Dixon was helpful to us. He said UK could "acquiesce" in the 18, but like all of us they too have difficulties with certain governments. He said UK had great difficulty with the package idea as a whole, particularly in light of the ICJ decision that each applicant should be considered on its merits. Not only was there doubt concerning Outer Mongolia but Albania presented a particular problem for them since it had not abided by the ICJ decision. UK has serious doubts regarding Albania's application and is not at all certain there would be sufficient votes to admit it. The realistic fact is, Dixon said, there just are not seven votes for some satellites.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1955. Secret; Limited Distribution.

In a very brief statement Alphand said that he had no instructions. He added, however, that he shared Dixon's views regarding the difficulty of any package deal.

I noted that Kuznetsov had said that it was not easy for the Soviets to agree to the admission of Spain and Japan. I pointed out our difficulties with regard to the four Eastern European satellites, but despite this we were willing to help find the votes for the four if the Soviets were willing to drop Outer Mongolia. I said the UK and USSR were apparently agreed on the Bandung Powers less Japan and the West European group less Spain and that for them to let in two nations they didn't like in exchange for four nations we didn't like was not a bad deal. Once again I said we would be willing to help them get the votes for the four satellites if they would agree to postpone or set aside Outer Mongolia until some future date.

Conversation then focused on Outer Mongolia, with Kuznetsov having difficulty making a case for the independent status of Outer Mongolia. When Kuznetsov argued that the people of Eastern European origin in this country would welcome the entrance of the satellites to the UN, I disagreed strongly and indicated that the people of Eastern European origin in the U.S. disliked the Communist governments imposed and maintained on these people by force.

Kuznetsov replied that there are positive and negative factors in a deal for each of us and there was a question of balancing one against the other. He then went on to say that the USSR would not "consider" anything other than the 18. He said: "This is strong, definite, and firm".

I said if the Soviet attitude was that they would not even "consider" then we might just as well conclude that we had a pleasant lunch and that there was nothing more to talk about. Kuznetsov backed down immediately.

Dixon said it would be nice if 18 could get in, but if the USSR attitude was 18 or nothing then there was no basis for discussion. The fact of the matter was that there was real doubt as to the votes on some of the satellites. He said the Soviets were working on a false assumption that votes would be forthcoming.

Kuznetsov was asked by me how he proposed to get the seven votes for the satellites. Only answer he could give was that we must help him get the seven votes. I pointed out to Kuznetsov that he cannot trade what he does not have. He does not have the seven votes, and we would be willing to help him get the seven votes on the four Eastern European countries if he is willing to drop Outer Mongolia. Kuznetsov said if we can agree to help on the 17, why shouldn't we be able to agree to help on the 18.

The conversation then turned to the Canadian proposal with both Dixon and me pointing out that it was ambiguous on whether it meant 17 or 18. Both Kuznetsov and Malik said it meant 18. I pointed out that the Soviets must have shared our view that it was ambiguous otherwise they would not have submitted an amendment yesterday listing 18. Kuznetsov replied to this by saying it was submitted merely to emphasize the sentiment for the 18 and that there was no ambiguity regarding the Canadian proposal.

Kuznetsov suggested it might be desirable to have a non-official Security Council meeting where we would try to find out how the others would vote. He called this a practical approach and suggested that through this process we might ascertain just where we all stand. We said that we would think about this. Kuznetsov and Sobolev agreed, however, that there should be no Security Council meeting without prior Big Power agreement, saying that if there was no agreement between us then such an exercise would be wasted effort. (They would certainly have pressed for an official SC meeting if they realized that they could put us in an embarrassing position as a result of Chinese intention to veto Outer Mongolia.)

At the end of the luncheon Kuznetsov suggested that we should continue our consultations on this matter in order to try to arrive at a solution.

We reconvened at the French residence after the luncheon and it was agreed that we would tell the press that no agreement was reached but that consultations are continuing. I shall let them take the initiative.

I informed Tsiang, Belaunde, Trujillo and Martin of the general lines which our discussion took with the Soviets. When I called Trujillo it was arranged that I attend an early Latin American caucus to answer questions on the matter.

Lodge

172. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 19, 1955—8 p.m.

Delga 316. Re membership.

1. Belaunde (Peru) expressed view U.S. should accept eighteen nation proposal, although he said he recognized there might be considerable public reaction against this in U.S. He thought, however, we could very well explain such an action on ground that a great majority of Latin American nations had already expressed themselves in favor of eighteen nation proposal and there was little left for U.S. to do but go along. In other words, Belaunde said, "Let the Latin American nations take the rap". View similar to that stated by Belaunde was also expressed to USGADel by chief delegates Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador.

2. Malik (USSR) yesterday told Trujillo (Chairman LA caucus) that USSR insisted on eighteen nation proposal; that unless Outer Mongolia is admitted USSR will veto Spain; and asked for LA decision on 18 nation proposal by end afternoon. Trujillo thereupon immediately began canvass LA delegations apparently pleading for affirmative response on ground Spain's fate was at stake. All but four countries (Dominican Republic, Cuba, Honduras and Paraguay) apparently indicated their willingness support 18 nation package. We understand from Honduran and Paraguayan [delegations] that Trujillo thereupon prepared press statement (apparently to effect that LAs favored package of 18) which he would have released, without further consultation, had not Honduran, Paraguayan and 1 other Latin delegation learned of his plan and vigorously objected on ground Trujillo was not authorized issue any statement on behalf LA group and that proposed statement did not reflect their views.

Diaz-Ordonez (Dominican Republic) asked what he should do in any vote on satellite countries. He said his delegation was instructed vote against satellites but also to follow lead of U.S. and he wanted USGADel to know that if negative vote would interfere with U.S. plans he would be willing abstain. He said he had made no definite commitment regarding Dominican vote to Trujillo. Carias (Honduras) also stated that he had not yet made commitment to Trujillo. Paraguay, as reported previously, has been instructed vote against Outer Mongolia and abstain on four satellites, and Paraguayan Delegation states they have made their position clear to Trujillo. Cuba has announced it will vote against all satellites.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1955. Confidential.

3. Ambassador Lodge telephoned Trujillo this afternoon to report on four-power consultations.[2] In course conversation Trujillo invited Ambassador Lodge to address LA caucus next week on membership question.

Lodge

---

[2] See *supra.*

---

173. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Japanese Ambassador (Iguchi) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, November 19, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Japanese Membership in the United Nations

Ambassador Iguchi had asked to see the Secretary, which proved impossible, and then arranged to see Mr. Robertson on the urgent instructions of his Government. He gave Mr. Robertson a Note (copy attached to original only).[2] The Note stressed the keen interest of the Japanese in early admission to the United Nations and the "honest wish of Japan" that Japanese admission should be effected through the good offices and efforts of the United States rather than those of any other country. It then concluded, "Although Japan fully understands the United States' position regarding the application of Outer Mongolia, it is desired that the United States will give full regard to the trend of opinion within the United Nations and contribute positively to a favorable settlement of this long pending question." Mr. Robertson said that we are glad to have the Note, especially since there will be a meeting within the Department later today on the membership problem.

Ambassador Iguchi said that a part of the Japanese interest stemmed from the fact that once Japan is in the United Nations the Soviet Union will lose a bargaining point in the negotiations in London. On the attitude of the Soviet Union he commented that he understood Kuznetsov had said publicly at the United Nations that the Soviet Union was ready to approve eighteen countries, which would include Japan.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1955. Confidential. Drafted by McClurkin.

[2] Not printed; a copy is attached to the source text.

Mr. Robertson said that we are not certain of the Soviet position since, to his knowledge, all that they had said is that they would not vote for anyone unless Outer Mongolia is included as well. In addition to this problem with the Soviet Union, the French position is completely unclear. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Soviet Union is equating all of the other seventeen applicants with Outer Mongolia in adopting the position which it is taking. However, he could assure Ambassador Iguchi that the United States will make every effort for Japanese membership and will not make any arrangement with the Soviet Union which would exclude Japan in favor of some other country or group of countries.

---

174. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 21, 1955—6 p.m.

Delga 321. Re membership.

1. Martin (Canada) told me today that the ad hoc committee would take up the membership resolution Thursday or Friday. I urged him to give us at least until next week to try to persuade the ChiNats to come to a reasonable view. Martin professed great sympathy but did not commit himself.

2. By way of background, it should be recalled that when I first pointed out to Martin the seriousness of his activities, I stressed the likelihood that they would provoke a ChiNat veto, and that this would create a great strain on US–UK relations which could not but have dangerous implications for Canada. . . .

3. Request instructions on US policy on Canadian resolution and Soviet amendments.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2155. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.

175. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 21, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Outer Mongolia and the UN Membership Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Director of Chinese Affairs
Miss Ruth Bacon, UN Adviser, FE

Dr. Tan called at Mr. Robertson's request in the absence from Washington of Ambassador Koo. Mr. Robertson referred to the Ambassador's call on November 17 [2] during which the Ambassador had stated the Chinese Government's decision to veto Outer Mongolia's application for UN membership and had requested US support in this position. Mr. Robertson said that we had also received a report of the Chinese Government's position from Ambassador Rankin.

Mr. Robertson said that he had discussed the Chinese Government's request with the Secretary who had asked that his views be conveyed at once to the Chinese Ambassador. Mr. Robertson reviewed the reasons which had led the Secretary to decide upon the membership position announced by Ambassador Lodge on November 13. Mr. Robertson followed the general lines of Ambassador Lodge's press statement of that date but also emphasized the mounting pressures among UN members to find a solution of the membership impasse; referred specifically to the Secretary's talks in Italy and Spain which had impressed the Secretary with the strength of feeling on the part of these countries over the membership issue; mentioned the restiveness on the part of other qualified candidates against their long continued exclusion from the UN; and pointed out that although this impasse resulted from Soviet vetoes, feeling was also coming to be directed against the US and other permanent members for their failure to find a solution.

Mr. Robertson said that negotiations on the membership question were in progress in New York, that we were doing what we could to prevent Outer Mongolia's inclusion, but that so far the USSR was insistent on its inclusion. While it was possible that the USSR might not stand in the way of the admission of other applicants if Outer Mongolia were not assured admission or that the necessary votes might not be forthcoming for Outer Mongolia, we had to face the probability that the USSR would remain adamant and that in these circumstances the desire of UN members for the admission of qualified candidates might be so great that the needed votes would be provided for Outer Mongolia. He referred to reports from Ambassador Lodge that the Latin American states would almost certainly favor Outer Mongolia rather than permit the membership arrangements to fail over that issue and that the overwhelming majority of UN members apparently shared this view. He referred to the Vandenberg Resolution and said that the US would not use its veto to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia against the will of the overwhelming majority of UN members.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2155. Secret. Drafted by Bacon.

[2] See Document 168.

Mr. Robertson continued that if in these circumstances China were to veto the Outer Mongolian application the resentment of UN members against China would be so strong that it was to be anticipated that the question of Chinese representation would be reopened, perhaps at once. While we had been successful in maintaining the position on Chinese representation under the moratorium at the beginning of the current General Assembly, he believed that the Chinese Government could foresee what reaction might result if China's vote had been decisive in blocking the admission of qualified members desired by the great majority of the United Nations. He said he did not believe that he needed to stress the seriousness of this situation. He mentioned that in 1946 China itself had felt constrained to vote for Outer Mongolia just as at a later date the US had felt constrained to abstain on one occasion on Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Robertson concluded by saying that the Secretary felt that he had no alternative but to urge strongly his hope that the Chinese Government would see its way clear to instruct the Chinese Delegation not to use its veto to obstruct a solution of the membership problem.

Minister Tan said that the Chinese Government felt strongly that it must veto the Outer Mongolian application. He sketched briefly the history of Outer Mongolia's creation mentioning the Yalta Agreement and the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty and subsequent Communist aggression against the National Government. He said that President Chiang held strong views on this question as well as George Yeh and the Legislative Yuan. He said that he would at once inform Ambassador Koo in New York of the US position and would also inform Taipei without awaiting the Ambassador's return.

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Lodge had already talked with Mr. Tsiang in New York who had informed Ambassador Lodge of the Chinese Government's determination to use the veto if necessary to prevent Outer Mongolia's admission. In view of the seriousness with which we viewed the problem, Mr. Robertson said that the Secretary also intended to send a personal message to President Chiang.

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China[1]

Washington, November 22, 1955—1:56 p.m.

304. Request you convey following message urgently to President Chiang Kai-shek from President:

"Dear Mr. President:

Secretary Dulles is cabling you separately[2] about the problem of United Nations membership. As you know, there is a proposal to admit 18 nations, including 5 Soviet satellites. Among them is Outer Mongolia. It is painful to contemplate more satellites in the United Nations. But the other side of the picture is that 13 free nations ardently desire admission and that a great majority of the free nations which are now United Nations members feel that it is worth while to pay the price of 5 satellites to get the 13 non-satellites.

Whatever may be our own national judgment, I feel that we cannot properly interpose a veto to block arbitrarily the will of the great majority. As you doubtless know the United States has never been sympathetic to the use of the veto in membership matters. To use it now would strengthen the Communist cause and do grave damage to our influence in the United Nations. It would not be necessary for you to vote for membership you disapproved of but only to abstain.

For our part we do not intend to be in the position of endorsing any of the satellites. We shall, if the procedure permits, abstain from voting on them, if it seems that all of the free countries are going to be admitted.

This issue is so important to us both, and could have such far-reaching consequences, that I venture to make this personal appeal that our two countries should not seem divided in this matter.

With my warm personal regard, I am,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower".

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255. Secret; Niact. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "Written by the Secretary and sent at his request (FE–Robertson)."

[2] *Infra.*

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China[1]

Washington, November 22, 1955—1:57 p.m.

305. Request you convey following message urgently to President Chiang Kai-shek from Secretary:

"I have received and considered most carefully the views of your Government, as presented to Mr. Robertson by Ambassador Koo[2] and also as transmitted to Ambassador Rankin, on the situation which may arise over Outer Mongolia during Security Council voting on the membership problem. The issue is so serious for both our Governments that I wish to give you my views fully.

Our opposition to the Soviet satellites has been expressed repeatedly and there can be no doubt that we share your views as to their lack of qualifications. It has, however, become increasingly apparent that some solution must be found for the UN membership problem. In an effort to break the membership deadlock and meet the increasing pressures for the admission of qualified candidates to the UN excluded by Soviet vetoes, we announced on November 13 our willingness to refrain from use of the veto on the satellites. This position is in accord with the general spirit of the Vandenberg Resolution which was overwhelmingly approved by the U.S. Senate in 1948 and which looked toward a general agreement among the permanent members not to use the veto on membership questions. As Ambassador Lodge indicated, we then believed that Outer Mongolia would receive so little support that the question of a veto would not arise.

Negotiations on membership are now in progress in New York. While it is possible that the USSR may not stand in the way of the admission of other applicants if Outer Mongolia is not assured admission, or that the necessary votes for its admission may not be forthcoming in the Security Council, our estimate is that the USSR will make the admission of the qualified applicants turn upon admission of Outer Mongolia. In such circumstances we believe that the intense desire of the overwhelming majority of UN members for a solution of the membership problem, and specifically for the admission of such candidates as Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ceylon, Ireland, and others, will be so great that the needed votes will probably be forthcoming for Outer Mongolia.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Brown and Bacon. Cleared by Wilcox, Robertson, and Phleger. Approved for transmission by Dulles.

[2] See Document 168.

In view of this probability I feel that I must in frankness inform you that in these circumstances the US would not use its veto to stand in the way of the will of the great majority on this issue. If, in this situation, China were to cast a veto, thus preventing the admission of the qualified applicants, the consequences for China's continued position in the UN would be of the utmost seriousness. While the Chinese representation question was carried successfully at the beginning of this General Assembly under the moratorium arrangement, you can, I believe, foresee the disastrous consequences which might be expected, perhaps at once, if China's veto were to be decisive to prevent solution of the membership issue when every other Permanent Member will be renouncing its right to veto despite its strong objection to one or more of the candidates.

I believe that world opinion will understand and respect the position of our two Governments if, in the interests of the whole, we do not permit the hoped-for goal of admission of 13 qualified applicants to be blocked over Outer Mongolia. Accordingly, I express my strong hope that you will see your way clear to instruct the Chinese Delegation not to employ the veto to obstruct a solution of the membership problem. Your Delegation could, of course, explain its position fully as the US Delegation would also expect to do, so that we would not seem to be giving moral support or approval to these satellites.

I am, with best regards,
Very sincerely yours,"

Dulles

---

178. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State [1]

Taipei, November 22, 1955—10 p.m.

485. President Chiang asked me to see him tonight re Outer Mongolia. Foreign Minister acted as interpreter.

Message from Chinese Embassy in Washington leads Chiang to believe US has changed policy re Outer Mongolia. He understood we firmly opposed its admission to UNO; now we were asking GRC to abstain in case of vote which probably would result in Outer Mongolia entering UNO. GRC also dislikes idea of European satellites gaining admission but would go along with US in abstaining to that extent. In case of Outer Mongolia however GRC would use every legal means to prevent entry including veto if necessary.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Hong Kong and Tokyo.

Admission of Outer Mongolia would be widely regarded as significant step toward entry of Red China into UNO, President believes. Moreover, it has none of attributes of sovereignty. Defense and foreign affairs are in Soviet hands; no country of free world has diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia. Of all Soviet satellites it is most complete puppet. GRC could not sit at table with its representatives and could not justify before own people anything less than strongest opposition to Outer Mongolia's entry into UNO.

President indicated surprise at mention of GRC's 1945–1946 attitude towards independence and UNO membership for Outer Mongolia.

GRC had taken steps most reluctantly at that time because compelled to do so following Yalta. Subsequent actions by Soviets had removed any obligation to continue along same line and GRC had abrogated Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1953.

Chiang proposed to issue statement on subject and asked my opinion on this and on subject in general. I said clear statement might be useful once GRC definitely decided but that timing important and statement should not be premature. As to US policy I knew of no change as regards Outer Mongolia but supposed we were in embarrassing position because of our desire see such countries as Japan, Spain and Italy gain admission.

President asked me transmit his views urgently.

In recent conversation Japanese Ambassador told me he understood GRC position that detaching Outer Mongolia was first step in dismemberment of China. [2]

Rankin

---

[2] The Department's response, telegram 308 to Taipei, November 22, drafted by Dulles and Robertson, reads as follows: "Your 485 just received. Regret Deptels 304 and 305 [Document 176 and *supra*] did not reach you prior to this meeting. It is imperative that President Chiang realize gravity this situation and there was nothing perfunctory about President's and my messages to him. The President spent about an hour at Camp David this morning before Cabinet meeting working on his message with me. He dictated most of it himself, personally marked it up and then signed personally the penciled draft now embodied in the cable. Also there were drawn into the discussion Under Secretary Hoover and Ambassador Lodge." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255)

179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, November 22, 1955—7:56 p.m.

Gadel 121. Re UN Membership. Department agrees it would be most unfortunate if Canadian resolution were brought up this week in Ad Hoc Committee for action. We had assumed Palestine refugee item would occupy Committee until end of week. However, in view Martin's intentions reported Delga 321 [2] we believe important make renewed efforts to persuade him (1) move in GA this week most unwise and undesirable, (2) SC action first preferable.

Canadian Embassy informed Department November 7 Canada would be reluctant see situation move too quickly in GA, recognized it might not be helpful to precipitate Assembly vote before attitudes of permanent SC members were clear and wished concert with US, UK and French on timing. We fail understand why, particularly in absence clarification of Chinese position, Martin now determined move regardless our opposition and certainly without French and probably UK concurrence.

Suggest you emphasize to Martin our view that premature Canadian initiative in GA might jeopardize prospect for membership solution, particularly our judgment that operation can succeed only on the basis of careful advance planning. If you think it would be persuasive in deterring Martin from pressing for early GA action you could indicate US would undoubtedly have to request separate votes on individual applicants listed in Soviet amendment. Probable result of this procedure would be significantly smaller vote for satellites (probably less than required two-thirds), which might arouse Soviet suspicions re satellites' prospects for admission and thus undermine basis for going ahead. Should any such situation eventuate review of membership problem in its entirety would be required.

You might also reiterate need for further consultations with Chinese and in confidence indicate that US is taking every feasible step to induce China not to block settlement.

Request you report results your conversation with Martin soonest so we may consider together whether matter should also be taken up in Ottawa. This message and Delga 321 being repeated

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255. Secret. Repeated to Ottawa.

[2] Document 174.

Ottawa for background in event it becomes necessary raise subject with External Affairs.

Dulles

---

180. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 23, 1955—7 p.m.

Delga 338. Re membership. I delivered the substance of Gadel 121 to Martin. He said that probably the ad hoc committee would not meet until Monday but that in any case the matter was "out of his hands" and was in the hands of the 25 co-sponsors of the res. I told him he was the leader. I told him that we were making strenuous efforts in Taipei but that everything I had seen so far was profoundly discouraging and indicated a ChiNat veto.

I said I presumed Mr. Pearson knew what he was doing in deciding to give this all-out support to Outer Mongolia, but that it was hard for me to contemplate with equanimity the reaction which would follow from a ChiNat veto of the membership deal and the convulsion on Anglo-American relations which would inevitably result, to which no Canadian statesman could, it seemed to me, be indifferent.

He implied that the Canadian policy was adopted in response to pressure from India and that it was one in which Australia and New Zealand had joined. I am sure that I shook Martin and I observed him in very serious conversation with Mackay, the permanent Rep and Heeney, their Amb to the US after my conversation. Martin was also engaged subsequently in what appeared to be an equally serious conversation with Tsiang (China).

When I told Nutting that I anticipated very heavy weather ahead and ventured a guess as to the reaction in the House of Commons if the ChiNats vetoed membership, he confirmed my worst fears.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2355. Confidential; Priority.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

Taipei, November 23, 1955—5 p.m.

490. Deptels 304, 305, 308.[2] President's and Secretary's message re Outer Mongolia were in President Chiang's hands one o'clock this afternoon. He expressed thanks and said he would reply as soon as possible.

Meanwhile I had further discussion with Foreign Minister after he had read above messages and was given substance of Department's 308.

Yeh[3] indicated GRC position adamant. Chiang is influenced largely by domestic considerations, he said, particularly reaction in Legislative Yuan. Foreign Minister's own opposition to Outer Mongolia equally strong on international grounds. In fact would continue oppose even if President Chiang should relent, of which there is no indication.

Foreign Minister admitted Chinese are "emotionally involved" in present case. But he has given it most careful study during past week and is convinced GRC has no alternative but to veto if necessary to keep Outer Mongolia out. At worst, he said, effect on GRC would be no more that to shorten somewhat prospective time during which Free China can remain in UNO. Trends established past year or so make entry of Chinese Communists regime into UNO inevitable, he believed unless reversal takes place of which no present prospect. Yeh noted Chiang remarked yesterday that GRC might as well get out of UNO and avoid giving US so much trouble.

Minister fails to understand how Soviets could be allowed to get away with making entry of free nations contingent upon actual acceptance of Outer Mongolia. GRC was taking no such extreme positions; it was simply opposing the entry of one puppet for which Soviets were applying. Also he could not understand how Ambassador Lodge's November 13 statement[4] could have been made without previously establishing whether Outer Mongolia could in fact "make the grade". Moreover, he did not believe all was necessarily lost if US made sufficient effort to line up votes; Turkey, Peru and France should be willing to go along with US and GRC.

Last two sentences in previous paragraph illustrate frame of mind with which Foreign Minister returned from recent extended

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2355. Secret.

[2] Telegrams 304 and 305 are printed as Documents 176 and 177. Telegram 308 is not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 178.

[3] George Kung-chao Yeh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.

[4] See Document 160.

American visit. He has distinct impression US interest in and willingness to support GRC definitely waning. That present impasse over Outer Mongolia was permitted to come about he regards as further evidence in that direction.[5]

Rankin

---

[5] Delga 357 from USUN, November 25, reported that T.F. Tsiang visited Lodge at Tsiang's request. It reads: "He has been asked to transmit his views on membership situation to his government in order to help Chiang decide how to answer President's letter. After studying all the pros and cons he has decided to recommend that if by abstaining on four European satellites a membership deal could be made, he would abstain on the four satellites but would veto Outer Mongolia. If this is not possible he wants to veto all five communist countries because that would put him on the 'ground of principle' whereas vetoing Outer Mongolia alone would appear merely 'expedient.' In any event he wants to veto Outer Mongolia." When Lodge noted all the dangers inherent in the situation, Tsiang admitted them while maintaining his position that this decision would certainly weaken his government's position in the United Nations, but that it was necessary to keep faith with anti-communist Mongolians. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-2555)

---

182. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires (Glazebrook), Department of State, Washington, November 23, 1955[1]

In the absence from town of Ambassador Heeney, the Secretary asked Mr. Glazebrook to come in. The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that in the spirit of frankness which characterized Canadian-American relations he wanted the Canadian Government to know that its initiative on the package resolution in the UN had been damaging to our interests and had not been accompanied by consultation between our two governments of the character called for by the gravity of the proposal. During the conversation the Secretary said that whereas he understood our Delegation in New York had received a copy of the draft resolution a few days earlier, his first knowledge of its text was from a copy given to him by General Franco in Madrid on November 1. He said that the proposal created great problems for us with certain of our allies, and that he foresaw great difficulty in Congress. The admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations would, in effect, be the final ratification of the Yalta Agreements, on which agreements the Soviets had scandalously defaulted.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-2355. Confidential. Drafted by Merchant.

Mr. Glazebrook said that he was disturbed that the Secretary felt the Department had not been adequately consulted. He said that in August he personally, as Chargé, had talked to the officers of IO just after Mr. Pearson had explained to the External Affairs Committee in Ottawa that he believed all the applications for membership should be considered at the forthcoming General Assembly and that the 4 great powers should get together in an effort to find a solution to the membership question. He said that the Department at that time and in subsequent conversation had explained the extreme difficulty that possible admission of the satellites, particularly Outer Mongolia, would create for the United States. He said that there had also been exchanges in New York between our representatives. The fact was that, Mr. Glazebrook said, things began moving extremely rapidly in the General Assembly and that an original proposal that the four great powers reach agreement on this matter had become transformed into a package membership draft resolution.

The Secretary repeated in strong terms the serious problems that were created for us. He felt that consultations had not been of a character or at a level which was required by the importance of the issues. He went on to say that at the very least he hoped that the Canadian Government would find it possible to delay a few days in order to enable us to do some of the work which the situation now required. Martin, in New York a day or two ago, had said in response to Ambassador Lodge's request that he refused agree to any delay in presenting the matter and he understood that the resolution was now scheduled for submission on Friday. He doubted that the Canadian Government had thought through all the implications of their action. A possible consequence was the question of the United States even remaining within the United Nations. He said that he had debated and argued with Molotov at length on the membership question in Geneva but that his bargaining position had been destroyed by the Canadian initiative. All Mr. Molotov kept saying was that he was supporting the Canadian resolution for a package of 18 countries.

Mr. Glazebrook repeated that he believed that the Canadians both in Washington and New York had kept us fully and currently informed of the developments of their thinking. He repeated that the situation had begun to move very fast in the General Assembly. He said that of course he would report the Secretary's views and the request that there be a delay at least of a few days of the presentation.

The Secretary closed the conversation by saying that he had spoken frankly as was customary in our relations with the Canadians.

---

183. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 25, 1955—9 p.m.

Delga 358. Re: membership. I met with Nutting (UK) at his request, and in response to his query, I informed him of the substance of the conversation which Rankin had with Yeh, pointing out this was an interim reply, and that we have not as yet received a firm reply to our representation at the highest level.

Nutting reported that [name deleted] has instructions giving him discretion on his vote on Outer Mongolia, but he does not wish to be put into a position of casting an abstention which would be the deciding vote.

Nutting agreed with me that if Martin does not insist upon interpreting his resolution to mean 18 and is willing to resist the Soviet amendment on the grounds it is not within the spirit of the Canadian proposal, our bargaining power would be improved with the Soviets.

Nutting said it was desirable to have another round with the Soviets—"the earlier the better otherwise it will become obvious to the Russians that the Chinese veto is holding us up." In the meeting we should try to make it clear that support for Outer Mongolia is not forthcoming, Nutting said.

It was agreed that Nutting and I would try to meet with Pearson today to attempt persuade Canadians to inform Soviets their amendment contrary to spirit of Canadian resolution and to get Canadians to resist Soviet amendment.

It was also agreed that we should meet with the Soviets on Monday. (It was not possible by close of work today to meet with Pearson.) We believe this would give Pearson time to work on this matter. We would let it be known beforehand that there will be another meeting with the Soviets in order to take some of the pressure off moving ahead on Monday in the ad hoc committee. Dixon said he thought it was important that the consultations among the Big Four are not left in their present status. He felt that since we had last met with the Soviets at their request, it would be well if we took the initiative and demonstrated our desire to continue to consult on trying to find a solution.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2555. Secret; Priority.

Conversation then focused on the Soviet amendment. Dixon expressed view that we could get a bigger vote against the Soviet amendment as a whole, rather than on individual applicants in a country-by-country vote, because it is clearly a package. I said if the Canadians are willing to resist the Soviet amendment I would see merit in changing our strategy regarding separate votes on individual applicants.

I stressed once again the explosive effects in the Atlantic Alliance, and the UN itself, of a Chinese veto about which we are greatly concerned. Nutting agreed, and at the same time he said he felt it would be difficult to organize abstentions on Outer Mongolia in the SC and negative votes in the GA. He pointed out, for example, that of the two LA's on the Council, one is a co-sponsor of the Canadian resolution and the other is chairman of the Good Offices Committee.

Lodge

---

184. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 26, 1955—6 p.m.

Delga 362. Re: Membership. Ramsbotham, U.K.,[2] informed us this morning that the U.K. Delegation had talked at length yesterday with Martin of Canada concerning (a) a meeting between Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. and (b) interpretation of the Canadian resolution and the Soviet amendment.

Re (a) Ramsbotham said that they had been unable to arrange a meeting . . . . Re (b) he said that they had argued with little success in favor of Martin's interpreting his resolution as meaning only the widest feasible membership as opposed to eighteen. Martin said that it did mean eighteen; that all the sponsors meant eighteen, and that a majority of the Assembly meant eighteen. The best that U.K. Delegation was able to get Martin to consider was a possible statement, on his part, to the effect that while his resolution meant eighteen to him, some of the co-sponsors might have different views, and that, some members of the Security Council having different views, it might be unwise to specify the number intended. Martin did not agree to make such a statement but only to think about it.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2655. Secret; Priority.

[2] Peter Edward Ramsbotham, member of the British Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

Ramsbotham reported also that Nutting and the U.K. Delegation had met for over an hour yesterday with Kuznetsov, U.S.S.R., going over much of the same ground previously covered at the four power luncheon. They found Kuznetsov convinced that almost the entire Assembly favored eighteen and unwilling to consider anything less. They had found Kuznetsov interested still in guarantees for the four satellites, but did not feel that this indicated any basic change in his position. U.K. Delegation felt that Kuznetsov was not worried that any blame would attach to the U.S.S.R. in the event that they vetoed seventeen new members because of the failure of Outer Mongolia.

Ramsbotham reported that later yesterday he attended a dinner given by Kase of Japan, where most of the new member candidates were present. . . .

It is becoming common knowledge that the Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia is holding up the solution of the membership problem. Chinese activity in various capitals has helped to foster this impression. At a Security Council luncheon yesterday, [name deleted] told Lodge he had spoken to Tsiang of China and informed him that if China vetoed Outer Mongolia in the Security Council, he himself would move to throw China out of the UN. Lodge asked [name deleted] if it would be possible for him to abstain in the voting on Outer Mongolia. He said that, as a co-sponsor of the Canadian resolution, this would not be possible. [Name deleted] attitude seems fairly typical of General Assembly sentiment. It is possible that Chinese activity in various capitals has been designed to elicit reactions; on the other hand, it may indicate a growing and firmer intention to use the veto. It looks more and more to us that a Chinese veto on Outer Mongolia will produce results of untold gravity.

If they persist in their intention to veto, we should try to bring about a voting situation in which their veto will not be necessary—and do it, if possible, without having it pinned onto us.

On the assumption that there will be enough abstentions to prevent Outer Mongolia from being elected, I still recommend that I be authorized to introduce as I requested on November 18 (Delga

309[3]), a motion in the Security Council for the admission of seventeen nations.

The purpose of this maneuver would be to have the seventeen-nation motion the first thing on the agenda. It would then be up to the Soviets to move affirmatively to elect Outer Mongolia.

Both Belgium and Turkey have flexible instructions which would permit them to abstain. Van Langenhove (Belgium) told me his instructions were to abstain on all five satellites plus Spain. [Name deleted] (Belgium) informed us yesterday that they want to be helpful to US, and, if necessary, they could even vote in favor of Outer Mongolia. Alphand assured me the French could abstain on Outer Mongolia. New Zealand, however, is non-committal. If Outer Mongolia is not elected, I think it unlikely that the Soviet Union will permit all of our thirteen free nations to be elected if we vote on a country-by-country basis. They are very likely to veto both Spain and Japan, and maybe others, if not all thirteen.

If on the other hand, they are confronted by a seventeen-nation motion which they would have to veto en bloc, they would be in a more difficult position.

It should be possible to manage matters so that the Soviets would get a very bad press for having vetoed the package deal, however much some governments might blame us. Thereafter we would still be free to accept eighteen nations if we felt it desirable to do so.

I realize there are legal objections to a package motion of this kind, but we can get around this by stating that while we are voting on the applicants as a group, nevertheless they have been considered individually. I have discussed this with Meeker whom Department should consult upon his return Monday.

A further consideration is that neither of the two listings which could be used—either chronological or alphabetical—is satisfactory to us. But all country by country voting is to our disadvantage.

Following is text of statement I would make if authorized to introduce this seventeen-nation motion:

"This is a resolution for favorable action on 17 applicants as a whole. The United States will be interested to get reactions of all concerned on this procedure and will take these reactions very much into account.

"The purpose of the resolution is to protect the interests of the 13 free nations mentioned in my statement of November 13 and to make sure that none of them are left out. It is also proof of the good faith of the United States in taking the position I announced.

---

[3] Document 169.

Furthermore, the resolution makes possible a clear-cut decision. It would therefore seem to be mutually advantageous to all parties."

Lodge

---

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, November 26, 1955—6:33 p.m.

374. Eyes only Ambassador Lodge. Chinese Embassy today delivered President Chiang Kai-shek's reply to President Eisenhower's letter (Deptel 304 to Taipei[2]) regarding Chinese position on admission Outer Mongolia to UN. Following is verbatim text:

"I have the pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your telegraphic message and a separate message from Secretary Dulles, both of which were transmitted to me by Ambassador Rankin on November 22. I must thank you for the views you have expressed in the message regarding the admission of new members to the United Nations. I agree with you that the issue is of such importance to both our countries that we should try to avoid division in this matter.

As a consistent supporter and loyal member of the United Nations, my Government, apart from its responsibility toward its people, has the responsibility and obligation of upholding the principles of the Charter. Only two days ago, I explained in detail to Ambassador Rankin in the presence of my Foreign Minister our position regarding the admission of Outer Mongolia and requested him to convey my views to the State Department. In reply to your message, I wish to further clarify my position and sincerely hope that you will give it the most sympathetic consideration.

Outer Mongolia had been a part of the territory of the Republic of China until it became detached from her as a result of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which we entered into on the well-intentioned advice of the United States Government. Without the Sino-Soviet Treaty, there would not have been an independent Outer Mongolia and the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations may not have arisen. When we agreed to the independence of Outer Mongolia, it was our hope to trade for thirty years of amity and peace with Soviet Russia so that we could devote ourselves to the task of national rehabilitation and reconstruction. Subsequent events, however, dealt a blow to such hopes. Soviet Russia, using Outer Mongolia as the base of operation, committed further aggression against the Province of Sinkiang and the North Eastern Provinces and later openly aided the Chinese Communist rebellion resulting finally in the Communist occupation of the mainland. To this day the Chinese people recall the Government's decision in agreeing to the independence of Outer Mongolia with censure and reprobation. Since the admission of Outer Mongolia became an issue in the United Nations, official views and public sentiments have been firmly opposed to the possibility of such admission. Should our representative on the Security Council fail to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia, the whole nation as well as the loyal Chinese overseas would not only lose faith in the Government, but would also feel sadly disappointed at their long trusted ally.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2655. Secret; Niact.

[2] Document 176.

Since the abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the circumstances in which the Republic of China had agreed to the independence of Outer Mongolia no longer existed. It is therefore our view that the ultimate disposition of Outer Mongolia should be deferred to the future. If under Soviet pressure it is now admitted to the United Nations, it would amount to collective recognition and perpetuation of its present status, thus precluding the possibility of any other settlement. This is a matter which concerns our vital interests. It is analogous to our claim to sovereignty over the Chinese mainland.

The regime of Outer Mongolia is in every way a Soviet creation. Both in domestic and foreign affairs it is under rigid Soviet control. It is far from possessing the membership qualifications as provided in the Charter. As you are well aware, Soviet Russia has in the past few years made repeated attempts to secure the admission of the Peiping Communist regime. Thanks to the leadership of the United States and the support of the democratic countries, such attempts have so far been defeated. Soviet Russia has now changed its tactics by insisting on the admission of Outer Mongolia in order to pave the way for the eventual admission of the Peiping puppet regime. The success of this new maneuvre would lead to serious consequences. I am not unaware that if Outer Mongolia is prevented admission by our use of veto in the Security Council, it may adversely affect our position in the United Nations. But should we fail to block the admission of Outer Mongolia, the consequences would be equally, if not more, disastrous to us. For us thus to recognize the fruits of aggression is to abandon our basic stand as a nation. For the United Nations to admit to membership such a puppet regime in total disregard of the principles of the Charter would further undermine its prestige.

With regard to the problem of the admission of new members as a whole, we are prepared, in consideration of the keen desire of the United States to reach an early settlement and the wish of the free applicant nations, to adopt a conciliatory and tolerant stand. We are even prepared not to oppose the admission of the four Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and to agree to the admission of thirteen free nations in spite of the fact that some of those nations have in fact recognized the Peiping Communist regime. I hope you will agree that despite the extremely difficult position in which we are placed, we are making a genuine effort to cooperate with your Government to the best of our ability.

Collective admission of new members is clearly a violation of the relevant Charter provisions; it further contradicts the advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice. It may be recalled that both our Governments have in the past registered opposition to such a procedure. It is apparent that your Government is now prepared to change its stand out of consideration for the need to enable a number of nations to be admitted to the United Nations. We have no desire to block the admission of all the applicant nations. Our only objection lies with Outer Mongolia. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, now threatens to bar the admission of all the thirteen free nations unless Outer Mongolia is simultaneously admitted. Therefore it is Soviet Russia and not the Republic of China that indulges in the abuse of the veto. As the leader of the free nations and a loyal member of the United Nations, it is for the United States to rally other member States in exerting pressure upon Soviet Russia to desist from making the admission of all the other applicants turn upon that of Outer Mongolia. Should that fail, the Republic of China, in order to safeguard her own interests, would be forced to employ the only means at her disposal to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia.

I have always placed Sino-American friendship above other considerations in our conduct of foreign affairs. Our two countries should maintain closest cooperation, especially at this critical juncture. I have repeatedly told Secretary Dulles that the Republic of China is always prepared to accede to the proposals and requests of the United States regarding the settlement of international problems if by so doing it would be beneficial to the United States without affecting China's vital interests. In fact, the Republic of China has even more than once compromised her position in order to achieve a common stand with the United States, as evidenced by the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the evacuation of Tachen Islands, and concessions made on other occasions. But the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia would so seriously affect the vital interests of the Republic of China that I deeply regret that I am unable to comply with your wish that our Delegation to the United Nations be instructed to refrain from using the veto against the application of Outer Mongolia for membership unless some other solution is found." [3] End verbatim text.

Hoover

---

[3] Telegram 494 from Taipei, November 26, reads: "Assume Department has already received Chiang's replies to messages on Outer Mongolia from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles which were sent through Chinese channels. Foreign Minister Yeh and President Chiang urgently request that text of Eisenhower–Dulles messages be made available to Chinese Embassy Washington." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2655)

Delga 363 from USUN, eyes only for Dulles, November 27, reads: "In light of response from Chiang Kai-shek, I suggest Robertson and Wilcox go to Taipeh. This would show other countries that we have left no stone unturned. In making this suggestion I make assumption that it will become well known Chinese intend use veto." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–2755)

---

186. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 28, 1955—noon.

Delga 368. Eyes only for Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re membership. If no solution membership question present GA session, there is strong possibility that Tenth Session will be resumed or special session convened, possibly shortly after first of next year. Moratorium on Chinese representation expires on December 31. If membership solution has been prevented by Chinese veto to Outer Mongolia or organized abstentions (which will be readily recognized as US effort get Chinese off the hook), there will be terrific pressure at resumed or special GA to exclude Chinese Nationalists (although not necessarily to seat Chinese Communists). Strong feelings of UN members and applicants will make it most difficult (and maybe impossible), whatever we do, to prevent action inimical position Chinese government. I think such a development, particularly at present juncture, would be so serious that we must again make strongest high level effort change Chinese position on Outer Mongolia.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2855. Secret; Niact.

I recommend the reply from President Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-shek include substance of following:

1. We will continue to take every feasible step to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia into the UN.

2. We believe the best way to do this and to levy as much blame as possible on the Soviet Union is to cause a vote to be taken en bloc in the Security Council on the 17, and we expect that such a proposal will be placed before the Security Council very soon. If the Soviet Union then vetoes this en bloc 17-nation proposal as expected, we would undoubtedly next be faced with a vote on a proposal en bloc to admit 18. We ourselves do not like the idea of en bloc voting as such. However, since such a resolution listing 18 includes so many applicants which we both favor, we are hopeful it would be less difficult for the Republic of China to forebear using the veto in an en bloc vote than it might otherwise be if the applicants were voted on individually. We believe the vital interests of both the US and the Republic of China are involved and that we would be held responsible by large segments of world opinion if a membership solution was to fall as a result of the veto of the Republic of China. We urge that the Chinese not use the veto on such an en bloc proposal for 18.

3. Failure to achieve a solution of the membership question in the short time available to present session (December 10 or shortly thereafter) will undoubtedly lead to irresistible pressure for a resumed or special session of the GA after the first of this year. As the Republic of China is aware, the moratorium arrangement with respect to Chinese representation in the GA, which was adopted once again in September of this year, expires on December 31. While the US will continue actively to make every effort to insure the continued seating of the Republic of China in the GA under such circumstances, the Chinese government must bear in mind that the feeling of many countries, generated by the reactions of the applicants themselves, will be so strong that it may not be possible, whatever we do, to hold the line on the question of Chinese representation.

We do not share your view that if we fail to block the admission of Outer Mongolia the consequences would be equally, if not more disastrous, than if Outer Mongolia is prevented admission by the use of the Chinese veto in the SC. In this connection the willingness of the Chinese government not to use the veto on Outer Mongolia will strengthen its position in the UN rather than weaken it. This is not only because there will be greater support as a result of the admission of new members on the question of Chinese representation but also because it will be known to such countries as Spain, Italy, Austria and others that it was the willingness of the Chinese government to abstain on Outer Mongolia, in light of Soviet insistence on 18 or nothing, which permitted their entrance into the UN. Finally, we are convinced that use of the veto by the Chinese government, which would undoubtedly lead to the undercutting of its international position in and out of the UN, would have graver consequences among the Chinese people in Formosa and overseas than an abstention permitting the admission of Outer Mongolia.

Lodge

---

187. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 28, 1955—noon.

Delga 369. Re membership in Ad Hoc Committee. Unless we should decide to proceed with 17-nation proposal in SC in next day or two, membership item will undoubtedly come up in Ad Hoc Committee about Wednesday. In these circumstances, I would proceed, subject to Department's views, as follows:

1. Ad Hoc Committee decided its order of items at beginning of session and Indians in South Africa item is scheduled next. However, if as is likely, a move is made to take up membership next instead of the Indian item, I believe we should acquiesce. I am convinced that even if we undertook an active campaign, which I do not believe is desirable, we could not prevent move take membership item next. (Canadian resolution now has 28 co-sponsors and with the support of the Soviet Bloc we would be unable to prevent membership coming up next.) Moreover, ad hoc consideration would give us a little more time to try to convince Taipei to change its position—which I continue to believe is absolutely essential if this whole membership question is not to have the most serious repercussions on the US, the Chinese Nationalists and our relationships with the free world in general.

2. I would vote in favor of the Canadian resolution. It requests the SC to consider all pending applications for membership other than the divided states. It is not unlike last year's resolution refer-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2855. Secret; Niact.

ring pending applications to the SC which we voted for and which was adopted by the Assembly unanimously. I would make clear in my statement, however, that our vote in favor of the Canadian resolution should not be construed as endorsing any specified number of applicants. If we can get a few others to take similar line, it would help somewhat to keep the question open as to 17 or 18.

3. I do not believe it is possible to defeat the Soviet amendment, even if we oppose it as a whole on the grounds that it is a package (rather than on a country-by-country vote). Most of the 28 cosponsors of the Canadian resolution interpret it as meaning 18 and are likely therefore to support the Soviet amendment. In these circumstances, I believe we should:

Acquiesce in a country-by-country vote on Soviet amendment if it seems inevitable that one will be had; and in that case vote in favor of our 13, abstain on their 4, and vote against Outer Mongolia;

Abstain on the amendment as whole (even if Outer Mongolia gets majority as we expect).

The Soviet amendment would be adopted by a substantial majority, I believe, and this would undoubtedly have the effect of Assembly pressure on the SC for 18. This nevertheless I believe reflects the Assembly's view on this matter. I believe that if we voted in the negative in vote on the Soviet amendment as a whole, it would be interpreted by the LA's as a vote against Spain and Italy and by the Afro-Asians as a vote against the Bandung list.

4. Department will have noted also that a final operative paragraph of Canadian resolution requests the SC make its report during present session. I expect that there will be great pressure to complete consideration of this item in the ad hoc committee as quickly as possible in order to give Council opportunity to take early action and report back at present Assembly. In event Council action then delayed or is negative, we may be confronted with resumed Tenth Session or a special session (possibly in January) limited to Assembly consideration of the SC report on membership. Since moratorium on Chinese representation expires on December 31 of this year, we would be confronted with this problem at such session.

All of this points up clearly how absolutely essential it is for us to continue our efforts to change the Chinese position on Outer Mongolia.

Lodge

188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China [1]

Washington, November 28, 1955—8:02 p.m.

317. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Following for Chiang Kai-shek from President Eisenhower:

"Dear Mr. President: I have received through your Embassy under date of November 26 your message in reply to mine of the twenty-second. [2] I am impressed by the strong case to be made against the independence of the present régime controlling Outer Mongolia. I agree that it should be perfectly clear that neither of our countries admits that Outer Mongolia is now independent any more than is Byelorussia, the Ukraine or Albania. Neither should we accept the legality or the rightfulness of the enforced detachment of Outer Mongolia from the Republic of China.

Both of our countries can, and I think should, make clear our attitude toward Outer Mongolia. The central issue is not whether there is or is not a good case against Outer Mongolia, but whether a good case can be made for use of the veto in the Security Council, a highly artificial voting procedure whereby any one of the 5 permanent members can thwart the will of the great majority.

The United States has never believed that the veto power should be used in the Security Council to prevent an election to membership of those approved by two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and by 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council. We have never ourselves used the veto under these circumstances. Three of the other 4 permanent members, namely, France, the UK and the Soviet Union, although each finding that the proposed admissions of 18 involve admitting certain states highly distasteful to them have nevertheless felt that they should bow to the weight of world opinion and accept the result wanted by the great majority of the present members and by 13 other free nations who are applicants for membership.

I greatly hope that instead of resorting to a highly technical voting right which would have the effect of defeating the overwhelming desire of the members in effecting the solution of the membership problem on an over-all basis, you will decide that your legal and moral position which you so eloquently set forth can be maintained by a clarifying statement made at the time that you act. We expect to follow the same procedure.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Lodge. Drafted by Dulles. Telegram 501 from Taipei, November 29, reported that this message was delivered to Foreign Minister Yeh that afternoon and he promised to relay it to Chiang as the latter was leaving town that evening. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–1955)

[2] See Documents 185 and 176.

You will recall that at San Francisco all 5 of the permanent members agreed that the veto power should be used with great caution and that it should not be abused. I am afraid that the use by your Government of the veto under these circumstances would be judged by the world opinion which we all need to value and respect as an "abuse" in view of the fact that you can by a timely statement make clear the juridical position which you describe.

Permit me therefore in the name of our friendship and the friendship of our two countries to urge that you should reconsider the matter in the light of the point of view which I take the liberty of presenting. Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Dulles

---

189. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

Washington, November 29, 1955—5 p.m.

Delga 378. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re: membership. Pursuant to our telephone conversation this morning, I invited Belaunde to see me and suggested to him that he propose a motion in the SC:

(a) For the election of 17, and
(b) To refer the application of Outer Mongolia to the standing subcommittee of the SC on membership under rule 59. [2]

I put it to him that this was a compromise proposal midway between the proposal for 17 nations and the proposal for 18 nations and stressed to him the seriousness of the situation, having in mind the ChiNat announcement of their veto with all its serious consequences.

He at first said that he couldn't make such a motion, but I impressed upon him the seriousness of the situation and the threat that it held out to the UN and to the unity of the free world. He asked to have the night to think it over.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2955. Secret; Niact.

[2] The number "39" was corrected on the source text to read "59".

I recommend that if by tomorrow morning we have not had a favorable reply from Belaunde, that I be authorized to introduce the 17 nation motion with the proviso for referring Outer Mongolia to the subcommittee on membership at an early meeting of the SC, Friday if possible.[3]

Lodge

---

[3] In Delga 385 from USUN, November 30, Lodge reported: "Since my wire November 18 (Delga 309), the change in the public opinion factors concerning the membership question and recent other developments bring me to the conclusion that we should not now commit ourselves to voting for the package of 18. If we go ahead and propose a package of 17 and it gets vetoed, we could then consider whole question afresh." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–3055)

In Delga 386 from USUN, November 30, Lodge reported: "UK intention to introduce 18 nation package res in UN makes it more advisable than ever for us to introduce our 17 nation res. The connotation concerning Outer Mongolia is so unpleasant that I would rather see no membership deal at all this year (if this could be avoided without our getting the blame) rather than see a deal which included Outer Mongolia." (*Ibid.*)

---

190. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, November 30, 1955—7 p.m.

Delga 390. For Secretary and Wilcox. Re membership. Lodge asked Belaunde (Peru) what he had decided regarding suggestion of yesterday that he put in a motion providing for the admission of 17 and for reference of the application of Outer Mongolia to the Council's Committee on Admission of New Members.

Belaunde said he would not do this and he gave the following reasons. The Good Offices Committee at its first meeting decided that there should be no discrimination among any of the applications. The Committee also decided that it should make no proposals, and that since the East had already made a proposal, all proposals should come from the Western powers. He also added that the Good Offices committee had been elected by 60 members and that it would therefore be difficult for him to submit a proposal. He asked Lodge to "tell Dulles I am deeply sorry."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–3055. Secret; Priority.

Lodge met with Nutting at latter's request at noon today. Nutting asked for our reactions to UK introduction in SC of the following proposal:

[Here follows a draft resolution recommending that all applicants be admitted to the United Nations, except Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.]

Nutting and Dixon explained that the rationale for the above proposal was that it would be much more difficult for the Chinese to veto a package of 18 because there are so many states included which they and we want in. Secondly, it would have the effect of getting all 18 in if the Chinese were willing to forebear the use of the veto. Dixon explained that they envisaged a procedure whereby the Chinese would seek to amend the above resolution to exclude Outer Mongolia and/or to put it in category of divided states, that this amendment would be defeated, and then the Chinese would be faced with either acquiescing in the 18 or vetoing the entire 18—something which, the UK believes, the Chinese would find more difficult to do than to veto Outer Mongolia separately. Dixon envisaged exploring this matter both with the Canadians and the Belgians if we are agreeable.

Lodge put to Nutting the idea of a 17 nation proposal plus referral of the application of Outer Mongolia to the Security Council's Committee on admission of new members.

Nutting said "we absolutely cannot do it." Both he and Dixon alluded to Ceylonese pressure, Canadian pressure in favor of 18, and the fact that supporting such a 17 nation proposal would mean putting the UK in the position of voting in favor of Albania while excluding Outer Mongolia—something which public opinion in the UK would not understand.

Lodge said his offhand personal reaction to UK proposal was negative. He said we should proceed with the proposal for 17 with view to focusing failure for a solution on the Russians. If we proceed with the UK proposal, it would mean that blame would be directed to Chinese Nationalists. Lodge said that it would be better to go through the ad hoc and not have the SC consider the membership question at all, rather than proceed with a proposal for 18.

Dixon said you cannot get away without SC consideration of the membership question and that, in his view, it was a question of either the UK putting in a proposal for the 18 or being confronted with a proposal on the 18 put in by the Soviets. Nutting added you cannot smother the SC exercise and there is no hope of having membership question wither away. Moreover, he said our 17 nation proposal would not get seven votes because several SC members were already committed to 18 and a proposal for 18 was bound to be introduced. Dixon said it should be less difficult to support a proposal on the 18 made by the UK than a proposal made by the Soviets.

Lodge said this was his personal reaction and that he would refer the UK proposal to Washington immediately. In the meantime, he asked UK not to go ahead on this matter until we had received word from the State Department. Both Nutting and Dixon agreed that they would hold off until they had heard from us.

It was agreed that we would not oppose a move in the ad hoc committee to take up membership next.

Wadsworth

---

191. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State [1]

Taipei, December 1, 1955—5 p.m.

511. Department's 322 and Taipei's 507.[2] Quarters interpreting November 29 statement by Tsiang's spokesman as reply to President Eisenhower, that GRC would veto Outer Mongolia for UN "if necessary", presumably drew inference from sentence in unfortunate USIA release FEF–57 November 29 which also stimulated spate of

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–155. Secret; Priority.

[2] Telegram 322 to Taipei, November 30, reads: "Chinese UN Permanent Representative Tsiang announced to press New York November 29 that his Government would if necessary veto Outer Mongolia's admission UN. We assume Generalissimo did not intend that this announcement should constitute reply President's November 26 message although announcement has been so interpreted in some quarters. Advise soonest." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–3055)

In telegram 507 from Taipei, November 30, Rankin expressed great concern "at tone of release in USIA bulletin FEF–57, United Nations, NY, November 29, just received entitled 'UN Membership Solution Threatened by Republic of China.'" Rankin stated that he considered this bulletin "highly inappropriate for USIS dissemination in Far East and have forbidden use in Taiwan", adding that the bulletin seemed inconsistent with the purpose of the U.S. Information Agency which was to advance U.S. interests. The Ambassador objected specifically to the passage "indicating 'desire [China] commit suicide so far as UN concerned.'" He concluded with the expressed belief "we are playing into Russian hands by putting blame on GRC instead of USSR where it belongs." (*Ibid.*)

Telegram 323 to Taipei, November 30, replied that "Department shares fully your concern at unfortunate USIA release FEF–57 and commends your alertness in preventing Taiwan dissemination. FYI Secretary has requested USIA recall this despatch and prevent its distribution or use." (*Ibid.*)

stories at this end. Release not published here but GRC, of course, learned of it and local press carried wire service stories incorporating full details with improvements.

Eisenhower's second message (November 28)[3] arrived just prior President Chiang's departure from Taipei for few days. Substance of message relayed to Chiang orally by Foreign Minister evening of November 29 but full Chinese translation reached him only following morning. He instructed Foreign Minister by telephone to acknowledge message with thanks and to say he would reply shortly. Chiang added that GRC position unchanged but hoped alternative to veto could be worked out.

Foreign Minister today assured me once more of his anxiety to avoid use of veto. However, he regards it as pure "power politics" that Soviets have used veto more than 70 times with impunity while dire effects on GRC are predicted if it uses veto once on excellent historical grounds.

Minister Yeh regretted US had not informed GRC at earlier date that signals being changed to permit more adequate preparation here and in New York. Also he continues to wonder whether US had made commitment to Soviets. Meanwhile, he is working actively on possible means to avoiding veto.

Rankin

---

[3] See Document 188.

---

192. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, December 1, 1955—6 p.m.

2256. Adverse comment on news ChiNats intend veto Outer Mongolia membership in UN widespread. *Times'* editorial today of particular interest. Aside from expressing general disapproval, it points out question of Chinese seat in SC has hitherto been concerned with nature and performance Peiping regime, but if threatened action taken, "many more members would say it time to end anomaly and put Peking in Chinese seat". Editorial points out

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–155. Official Use Only.

"grotesqueness" of present threat when Chiang in 1945 agreement with Stalin recognized separate status Outer Mongolia.

There is little doubt that if threat carried out to detriment of package deal, UK will find it most difficult if not impossible to maintain coordination with US in future re ChiCom–UN problem.

Aldrich

---

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, December 1, 1955—2 p.m.

1243. Foreign Minister yesterday afternoon gave me following which is text of statement made to Government of China:

Begin verbatim text:

You are well aware that the admission of Japan to the United Nations has been a longstanding and fervent national aspiration. Viewed in the light of the present international situation, Japan's role as a member state of the United Nations will be a most significant one, contributing to the strengthening of the solidarity of free nations."

However, in view of the current discussion in New York on the admission of new members, it seems the admission of Japan to the United Nations along with other free nations depends upon the attitude of your country—namely whether or not your country will exercise the veto powers in the Security Council on the admission of Outer Mongolia. If your government should resort to veto, it would not be of any help in solving your problem of Outer Mongolia, but would gravely affect the international position of your country. Moreover, such act would be extremely regrettable to Japan, because it would close the door to Japan's admission to the United Nations.

The Government of Japan earnestly desires that your country will proceed with prudence and circumspection.

End verbatim text.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–155. Confidential. Repeated to Taipei.

Foreign Minister commented that Chinese Government being very short-sighted on this issue, is losing friends when not in good position suffer such losses.

Allison

---

194. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, December 1, 1955—10 p.m.

Delga 400. For Secretary and Wilcox. Re membership. After great deal of hard thinking on membership question I have come to following conclusions:

1. The sentiment on membership has grown to such proportions that an 18 applicant solution seems like the least objectionable outcome in view of the fact that events since my last wire have moved so fast that we cannot either shelve the membership question or have it fail without serious consequences which would include a great share of the blame for US and a determined effort by numerous delegations to expel the Chinese should they use their veto. The possibility of the 17 package proposal which would have been so effective is now, I fear, outdistanced by events.

2. We should continue to use every effort we can to convince the Chinese that they should not veto. If this is unsuccessful, the procedure which might make it most possible for them to refrain from the veto is to see that an 18 state resolution without division is voted in the Security Council. I feel that voting on the candidates separately may well open a Pandora's box and produce all the worst aspects of a failure in the membership question. If the Chinese should insist and veto an 18 state resolution, which I think will be very difficult for them to do, it will indicate that they have deliberately thwarted the will of the great majority of the UN members. If this should happen, despite our strong representations, we would not have to bear the full onus both for a failure on the membership problem and for what subsequently might happen to the Chinese in the UN. This means that we should, whatever the Chinese do, vote for an 18 state resolution in the Security Council.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–155. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

We can also make clear that we are voting for a total solution of the membership problem without affirmatively supporting the individual satellites.

3. Since this appears to be the best way to deal with the dangers to US in the membership question, our position on the Canadian resolution in the ad hoc committee should be reasonably consistent with our vote in the Security Council. The essential thing is that we not be prevented, by our action in the ad hoc committee, from supporting an 18 state resolution in the Security Council.

I appreciate the validity of the legal arguments, which the Department had in mind, particularly the advisory opinion of the court, but it does seem to me that we are faced with a condition and not a theory and that political considerations here are overwhelming and would seem to dictate the course I am recommending.[2]

Lodge

---

[2] In a memorandum to Barco and Sisco, December 1, Irwin sent "some thoughts spoken aloud" by Lodge today while returning from the airport:

"Mr. Lodge feels that at the proper moment in the Ad Hoc debate on membership, he would like to say that it is evident that there are two arbitrary positions on this question, both of them apparently irreconcilable—one, the USSR position and two, the Chinese Nationalist position. In view of this situation, it would seem to him that there is no use in calling a Security Council meeting on membership.

"Mr. Lodge feels that the effect of such a statement would be to put off until after the U.S. elections the whole question of membership. He also feels that the majority of the delegations in the UN would gang up to kick the Chinese Nationalists out. We would continue to stand by them, of course, but we would expect them to lose in the end." (USUN Files, IO, Membership)

---

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, December 1, 1955—2:03 p.m.

390. Personal for Lodge from Secretary. I have spent some two hours this morning with my associates going over this very delicate and difficult problem of membership. I have come to the following conclusions:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–155. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved for transmission by Dulles. Cleared by Merchant and Robertson. The substance of this telegram was conveyed to Taipei, eyes only for Ambassador Rankin, in telegram 326, December 1. (*Ibid.*)

We should in committee abstain on the Soviet amendment to the Canadian Resolution. We should then abstain in the vote on the Canadian Resolution whether or not the Soviet amendment has been adopted and in plenary we should similarly abstain.

In connection with our votes, we should make clear our basic position with reference to the membership problem.

1. Our desire is to bring about promptly membership of the qualified nations which have applied.

2. We do not, however, desire to be committed to a "package" procedure which seems to be incompatible with the provisions of the Charter as interpreted by the Court of International Justice.

3. We do not wish to endorse for membership countries which, in our opinion, are not independent sovereign states and whose subject status constitutes or derives from the violation of treaties and wartime agreements.

4. It is not, however, our intention to use the veto in the Security Council to thwart what may prove to be the will of a qualified majority in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

5. We abstained, and do not vote against, the Canadian Resolution and Soviet amendment because they are in form at least merely a request to the Security Council to consider certain applications. We do not wish to vote for the Resolution because that could be misinterpreted as, in fact, approving a procedure and certain membership applications as regards which we have grave doubts as above set forth.

In view of the extreme importance which this whole matter has assumed as regards our relations with friendly countries in Europe and in Asia, who in turn have strong supporters in this hemisphere, we expect to prepare a text elaborating the points 1 to 5 which we will transmit tomorrow morning after it has been cleared here in the Department by the Assistant Secretaries concerned with the various areas involved.

Dulles

196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, December 2, 1955—1:42 p.m.

Gadel 141. Re membership—Delga 390. [2] In view of problem we face with China and current suspicion of possible deal with British inspired by fact UK recognizes Communist China, we do not think UK sponsorship of SC proposal on eighteen would be wise or desirable. For this reason we suggest you approach Belaunde again informally to see whether he would be willing to submit proposal for eighteen. We assume misgivings he had concerning seventeen-state proposal and problem he raised concerning role of GOC would be obviated if proposal he submitted included all pending applications except divided states.

Language of British draft not satisfactory. In particular it accords to North Korea and Viet Minh status we have always successfully opposed giving them, namely equality with ROK and Viet-Nam. We would prefer simple resolution noting SC consideration of membership question and recommending to GA admission of eighteen countries with no specific reference in resolution to divided states.

Of course Belaunde should know that U.S. will not vote for but abstain in SC on resolution for eighteen.

Timing of Security Council meeting should await further information on Chinese position.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–3055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brown. Cleared by Robertson, Merchant, and Monsma.

[2] Document 190.

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China [1]

Washington, December 2, 1955—4:06 p.m.

329. Eyes only Ambassador. Lodge proposes making following statement Ad Hoc Committee reference admission new members.

"In this matter of the admission of new members, the United States is guided by three basic principles:

1. To bring into membership all qualified states which apply;
2. To follow the provisions of the Charter as to judging the qualifications of the applicants;
3. To avoid thwarting the will of a qualified majority by use in the Security Council of the "veto", a voting privilege given to five nations in the expectation that it would only be used in exceptional circumstances. I recall that the Vandenberg Resolution, overwhelmingly adopted by the United States Senate in June 1948, expressed the view that there should be agreement never to use the veto to prevent the admission of new members.

In application of the foregoing principles, we shall continue to seek the admission of all qualified states which have applied. They would be members already if the great majority had its way. Only the Soviet veto, or threat of veto, bars them.

There are 6 European applicants clearly qualified for membership, namely, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. There are the 7 Asian-African applicants whose membership was recommended by the Bandung Conference for present admission, namely, Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya and Nepal.

All of these 13 we support. We believe that there are other qualified applicants. For example, we do not believe that the Republic of Korea should be barred from membership merely because part of its territory is wrongfully and forcefully detached from the authority of what this General Assembly has held to be the only lawfully elected government in Korea. The Republic of Vietnam is another qualified applicant, barred only by Soviet veto.

We shall not support in any form the applications made for Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Outer Mongolia and Rumania. In our opinion, the governments of these states are not now independent, and their present subject status constitutes, or derives from, a violation of treaties and other international engagements.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–255. Secret; Niact. Drafted and signed for the Secretary by Robertson. Gadel 142 to USUN December 2, from Wainhouse to Lodge, contained the verbatim text of the statement on the membership item which Lodge was to make before the Ad Hoc Committee. According to Wainhouse, this statement was one "which the Secretary personally drafted and which was discussed and considered by him with his colleagues." (*Ibid.*)

The United States recognizes, however, that the issues before us are those about which there can be honest differences of opinion. For this reason, among others, it is not our intention to use the veto in the Security Council to thwart what may be the will of a qualified majority in the Security Council and in the General Assembly in relation to the subject matter of the Canadian Resolution. If and as this brings before the Security Council resolutions on admission which, in our opinion, involve infractions of the Charter, we shall, in accordance with the spirit of the Vandenberg Resolution, abstain from voting so as not to exercise, in this matter of admissions, the veto power.

We shall abstain from voting on the Canadian Resolution now before us, and on the proposed Soviet amendment thereto, because while in form this Resolution only requests the Security Council to 'consider' certain applications, some practical interpretations of that Resolution are such that we hesitate to vote for it lest that might seem to involve us in a departure from our principles enumerated above.

It is our earnest hope that out of the present discussion will come the admission of those qualified states whose exclusion clearly violates our Charter, and whose presence amongst us will add greatly to the wisdom of our councils and to the weight of moral authority which is exercised by this Organization."

There may be minor textual changes but statement embodies substance US position.

Discuss with Yeh and make every effort obtain his compliance with this procedure. Your 514 [2] indicates President Chiang adamant on decision veto Outer Mongolia. Whatever the correctness of his position there can be no question that the result of a veto would seriously endanger his government's position in UN.

Dulles

---

[2] Telegram 514 from Taipei, December 2, is not printed. (*Ibid.*)

198. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

Taipei, December 2, 1955—5 p.m.

513. Department pass USUN. Embassy's 511.[2] I share Department's apprehension over repercussions should GRC feel forced veto UNO admission of Outer Mongolia. Natural tendency among sponsors of free world candidates whose hopes thus frustrated would be to censure China, perhaps in intemperate terms already used by some to press. This seems to me neither justified historically nor to our interest.

Furthermore some nations in past have supported GRC in UNO only with reluctance, and above development (if it occurs) would provide excuse and opportunity for more open opposition to GRC. Such trend could greatly facilitate early replacement of GRC by Red China in UNO.

Atmosphere of vexation could lead some delegates, after voting, to indulge in strong criticisms GRC, which could snow-ball as each orator sought new phrases to express his indignation. Since it is in long-run interest of US that GRC retain its position and stature, I suggest that if GRC uses veto, US delegate arise promptly and preferably as first speaker deliver best possible explanation GRC action, recognizing its right exercise veto under Charter regardless our disagreement (in contrast to Red satellites) and hoping thus set calmer tone for any succeeding speaker.

While US delegate need not recapitulate all reasons for China's decision, he could express sympathy with GRC's problems, cite its past record (in contrast to USSR's) and present reluctance use veto, pointing out no free nation's candidature opposed by China, but that real issue is frequent and persistent efforts USSR (through veto or threat thereof) to impose its candidates UNO in contravention clear wording and intent Charter's membership provisions.

Rankin

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–255. Confidential.

[2] Document 191.

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China[1]

Washington, December 3, 1955—2:13 p.m.

333. Re ur 513.[2] Chain of events envisaged your 513 was precisely type of situation which has led President, Secretary and Department exert strongest efforts seek persuade Generalissimo forego use veto in China's interest as well as in interest free world generally. US position set forth in messages to Generalissimo from President and Secretary was decided upon only after exhaustive consideration of entire situation at highest levels. That decision is final and will not be changed. Efforts US deflect indignation from China in event veto would be futile in face reaction UN members generally over frustration long awaited resolution membership problem. You will also realize impossibility of our being able defend China for course of action we ourselves, despite strength US feeling concerning satellites, have publicly renounced as against general interest.

Membership issue will probably reach SC early next week.

It is imperative you exert every feasible effort persuade Generalissimo that statement Lodge for GA Department's 329[3] provides basis which China can likewise utilize in support of decision to forego veto and that that decision is only practicable course now open to China, if as it appears disastrous consequences are to be avoided.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–255. Secret; Niact; Eyes only. Drafted by Bacon and signed by Robertson for the Secretary.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 197.

200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State [1]

Taipei, December 4, 1955—2 p.m.

516. Reference: Department telegram 317.[2] Following is President Chiang's response to President Eisenhower's second letter on Outer Mongolian question. GRC has transmitted this response to its Embassy Washington but requested we also transmit via our facilities which are faster.

"December 3, 1955.

"Dear Mr. President:

"Your telegraphic message in reply to mine of November 26 was transmitted to me through your Embassy on November 29. I am happy to note that we are in agreement in not accepting the legality of the enforced detachment of Outer Mongolia from the Republic of China. It is a position of primary importance to my Government and my people.

"Since the receipt of your second message I am sure you will agree that the best possible solution would be one in which we would not *have* to use the veto against Outer Mongolia's application. I wonder whether something could be worked out by your representative and ours at the United Nations either to have the application of Outer Mongolia dropped or to have its consideration technically postponed. As I stated in my last message, we are fully prepared to go along with you if Outer Mongolia is dropped or detached from the present list of 18 applicants, even though the admission of the 17 new members would possibly weaken my government's position in the United Nations. We have taken this conciliatory attitude solely out of our desire to cooperate with you to the best of our ability. You will no doubt understand that even without your friendly advice we are naturally anxious to avoid having to use the veto in view of our present position in the United Nations.

"I well know that to other governments Outer Mongolia may seem just another Soviet satellite. But to us, the consequences of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations would be extremely unfavorable and far-reaching. It would also, I feel seriously damage the prestige of the United Nations as well as the moral leadership of the United States.

"By resorting to the technique of a package deal, it is clearly Soviet Russia's design to induce all of us to accept Outer Mongolia's application without any reference to Charter provisions. The acceptance of such a "deal" would set a precedent whereby any applicant state not possessing the necessary qualifications for membership and having committed acts of aggression may be admitted, thus paving the way for the eventual entry of the Peiping Communist regime. That the Soviet insistence on Outer Mongolia's admission as a condition for not using the veto on 13 of the other applicant states is an act of unadulterated blackmail is clear to all. It is most regrettable that a number of member states of the United Nations should be giving it support and even pressing my Government to accept this deal by threatening to raise again the question of China's representation. Should this be tolerated, the United Nations would no longer be an instrument for international peace and justice; it would soon become a tool of Soviet Communism. I honestly feel that it is incumbent upon the United States, with all its strength and prestige, to firmly oppose the admission of Outer Mongolia as a condition for the admission of the other applicant states. So far as China is concerned, a mere statement of our opposition to the admission of Outer Mongolia would not be adequate. It would be tantamount to forfeiting our national stand and failing to fulfill our obligations under the Charter.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–455. Secret; Niact. Passed to USUN.

[2] Document 188.

"I, therefore, once more appeal to you as a friend and hope that you will find it possible to instruct your permanent representative at the United Nations to further explore the possibility of a solution in which the application of Outer Mongolia for membership will not be involved.

"I am greatly cheered by reports of your speedy recovery and trust that this will find you in your best health.

"Sincerely,
"Chiang Kai-shek" [3]

Rankin

---

[3] In telegram 517 from Taipei, December 4, Rankin reported, inter alia, that the reply indicated the Chinese position was "no less firm than ours" and "based upon what we know here" everything that could be said on the matter had been said; that "President Chiang quite evidently is leaving matter almost entirely in hands of Foreign Minister and seemingly is prolonging his stay at Sun-Moon Lake to avoid further direct involvement;" and that "In all of this GRC evidently feels it has been offered no offsetting advantage in return for compliance. Rather it seems to them simply another step along road of appeasement and retreat, pursued past ten years on US and other well meaning advice. With end of road almost in sight they are making stand, however mistakenly." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–455)

201. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, December 5, 1955—4 p.m.

Delga 415. Reference membership. Alphand called on his return from Paris where he had gone to get instructions on the membership question. His instructions are to vote yes on all 18 applicants provided there has first been in the GA a vote requiring that inscription of items on the agenda of the GA shall be by a two-thirds vote.

He said I was the first person he had seen, that he next intends to see Dixon (UK) and Maza (GA President) [2] that if we four are in agreement we would then approach the Russians, and if the Russians agree we would then approach India. Thereafter a few small countries would be selected to cosponsor the proposition so that it would not look "anti-democratic".

He says . . . that if he is unsuccessful in securing the adoption of this new rule he will not vote in favor of the 18 new members.

I am very much drawn to the idea of a two-thirds rule for inscription and request Department instructions as soon as possible because he is in a great hurry to get going.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–555. Secret; Niact.

[2] José Maza of Chile.

---

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China [1]

Washington, December 5, 1955—4:08 p.m.

335. Your 517. [2] All essential elements of US position on membership issue and situation in UN have been set forth fully in President's and Secretary's messages to Chiang and Department's supplementary telegrams. Department knows of no additional information which would have been of assistance to Embassy in present-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–455. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bacon and signed by Robertson for the Secretary.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 200.

ing case to Chinese authorities. Developments in New York have been moving on an hour-by-hour basis. Detailed description even if feasible (which was not the case) would have been outdated before received by Embassy. Neither Department nor USUN had any advance knowledge substance UKDel's proposals (Department's 334 [3]). Department first learned of these proposals on Saturday afternoon and forwarded information instantly to Embassy. There have been no behind-the-scenes "understandings" whatsoever by US with USSR, UK, Canada or any other country on this issue. Our position was stated publicly by Lodge on November 13 and remains unchanged. Reasons for our decision to forego use of veto with respect to European satellites and Outer Mongolia have been explained in detail. That decision which was taken only after most exhaustive consideration of entire situation at highest levels is final.

President Chiang's reply (Embtel 517) suggests he may still believe Outer Mongolia can be dropped and remaining candidates admitted to UN. It is imperative that you make certain that Chinese authorities are under no misapprehension on this point. Issue is not whether we want Outer Mongolia or other satellites in UN or whether China should be given an "offsetting advantage". Issue is whether use of veto in circumstances is justifiable. Plain fact is that a Chinese veto in anticipated circumstances will be regarded, rightly or wrongly, by most UN members as an abuse of privilege and that consequences it appears will be of utmost gravity for China.

You should spare no effort to bring this situation home to President Chiang and other Chinese authorities and to convince them that in China's interest and interests of Free World generally they should join US in foregoing use of veto to obstruct will of overwhelming majority of UN members on membership issue.

FYI: Department has informed USUN that we are favorably impressed with UK Delegation's proposal in numbered paragraph 1 Deptel 334 with understanding no change our position on Chi rep after expiration suggested moratorium, and that our initial reaction to proposals in numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 is also favorable. We have asked to be informed of UK Cabinet decision soonest. End FYI.

Dulles

---

[3] Dated December 3, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–355)

203. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Prospective Chinese Veto of Outer Mongolia's Application for UN Membership

Ambassador Koo asked about the reaction of the President to the Generalissimo's reply to the second letter of the President on the UN membership question.

Mr. Robertson said the reaction was very bad. He feared that neither the Generalissimo nor George Yeh realized the full implications of what they were doing. There was no United States-Soviet deal, as they seemed to suspect. The U.S. was trying to save the position of the Chinese Government in the UN. The fact that two personal messages from the President and one from the Secretary were dispatched to President Chiang shows how seriously we view the situation. This was no ordinary procedure. When appeals of such extraordinary character are summarily turned down by the Chinese Government, the effect naturally is unfortunate.

He said that the U.S. does not think any of the five satellite states are qualified for UN membership but the Vandenburg resolution of 1948 recommends against U.S. use of the veto on membership questions to frustrate the will of the majority. The Chinese representation problem is different. China is already a member of the UN and the dispute is one of accreditation.

Ambassador Lodge will state the U.S. position, and will abstain on the vote, but the U.S. will refrain from using the veto so as not to frustrate the will of the majority. It is not correct to assume that the admission of the 18 countries would represent a complete Communist victory. The Soviets do not like a number of the countries that would be admitted: Spain and Ireland, for instance. The U.S. was only asking President Chiang if he would exercise a restraint similar to that of the U.S. as to the veto. He is not being asked to swallow his objections. The U.S. would expect him to voice them freely. But the use of the veto to defeat the majority will, would be likely to arouse widespread indignation in the UN. The free countries involved would say that they were kept out of the UN as a result of the Chinese veto.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–655. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

Ambassador Koo said his Government had made quite a concession in withholding its objections to the applications of the four European satellites.

Mr. Robertson remarked that Outer Mongolia was no different in principle from the four European satellites.

Ambassador Koo disagreed, so far as the Chinese viewpoint was concerned. He said that the creation of the puppet state of Outer Mongolia was a direct result of Soviet aggression and a violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.

Mr. Robertson recalled that for a long number of years the Chinese Government had never had more than a very tenuous control of Outer Mongolia. For whatever reason, the Chinese Government had agreed to the plebiscite which had resulted in Mongolia's nominal independence. The Chinese Government had recognized Outer Mongolia independence and in 1946 had voted for Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN.

Ambassador Koo said that China had acted in this way because of its obligations under the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. His Government had tried to observe the Treaty in good faith. But the Treaty had been flouted by the Soviet Union. The UN itself had condemned the Soviet Union for breaking the Treaty. The Chinese Government was no longer obligated by the Treaty and had therefore denounced it. Outer Mongolia presented a different situation from the European satellites, so far as China was concerned. This was because of the special relationship of Outer Mongolia to China. He said that the problem was a very difficult one for his Government.

Mr. Robertson said it was also difficult for the U.S. Government which considered none of the five satellites qualified for membership under the Charter. However, the overwhelming majority of the other countries favored admission of the satellites in order to obtain admission of the thirteen deserving candidates. The U.S. Government thinks the Chinese Government is right in principle but does not agree that it is right as to its procedure, if a veto is contemplated. The U.S. position is consistent as to all five satellites. But the U.S. cannot see that the Chinese position is consistent in not exercising the veto as to four, and exercising it as to one. We do not see any logical distinction between the four and the one. As far as the Charter requirements are concerned, there are no differences between Outer Mongolia and the other four.

Ambassador Koo said that his Government had never used the veto on a membership question before. But the present situation had never arisen before.

Mr. Robertson said that if the Chinese vetoed, they would relieve the Soviets of the calumny which should attach to them. He was confident that the Soviets would pay money to get the Chinese to veto. It was more important to them than obtaining UN membership for the satellites.

Ambassador Koo said that he felt that the moral authority and dedication to principle of the UN would be gone once it yielded to blackmail.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania all stood indicted by the UN for nonperformance of treaty obligations and violation of human rights. It did not seem that the Chinese Government was consistent in overlooking the shortcomings of these four while singling out Outer Mongolia for veto.

Mr. Robertson then read excerpts from a telegram sent to Ambassador Rankin the preceding day which set forth the serious situation created by the Chinese position. It seemed to us that the position of the Chinese Government indicated that it was out of touch with the realities of the situation. The Chinese Government was not being asked to express approval. We expected and wanted the Chinese Government to express disapproval, as the U.S. representative would do.

Ambassador Koo said that failure to exercise the veto would allow the Russians to have their way.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that it would be the "way" of the majority and that the Soviets by no means would have their way completely. It was a compromise.

The Chinese were about to walk into a Soviet trap. A veto would transfer all the onus from the Soviet Government to the Chinese Government.

Ambassador Koo thought it was still a question of moral principle.

Mr. Robertson said T.F. Tsiang's recent interview in New York amounted almost to a slap at the President, since it seemed to be in the nature of a rejection of the second appeal of President Eisenhower to the Generalissimo. T.F. Tsiang had called in the press before a reply was sent by President Chiang to the President.

Ambassador Koo said he felt that Tsiang had been trapped by *N.Y. Times* correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton, who had telephoned Tsiang and pressed him for a statement of his intentions. T.F. Tsiang was not actually replying to the President's message.

Mr. Robertson said it was interpreted in some quarters as a reply, although he felt certain it was not intended to be.

Ambassador Koo assured Mr. Robertson that nothing said by T.F. Tsiang was intended as a reply to the President.

Ambassador Koo asked if there would be a third message from the President. Mr. Robertson answered negatively. The President had already been turned down twice.

Ambassador Koo mentioned T.F. Tsiang's suggestion that a special committee be appointed to study the qualifications of Outer Mongolia for membership. This would delay matters and afford an opportunity to work things out.

Mr. Robertson said he did not know whether there was any hope in such a suggestion. The situation was desperate. Many of the enemies of China were working to get the Chinese in the very position its representatives seemed determined to take.

Ambassador Koo mentioned that Cuba had proposed that the Republics of South Korea and South Vietnam be added to the list of candidates.

Mr. Robertson said this would be fine if it could be limited to these Governments. But the Soviets would then put up the puppet regimes of North Korea and the Viet Minh for membership. So this would merely compound the problem. The ratio would be two against two which was not as favorable as 13 against five.

Ambassador Koo asked if we felt that there was any chance of a delay.

Mr. Robertson said it was doubtful. The question might come up at any moment. The U.S. was terribly concerned. It was an issue of the utmost gravity to the vital interests of China. Yet we had the impression that the matter had been left largely in the hands of Foreign Minister Yeh while the Generalissimo was off at Sun Moon Lake.

Ambassador Koo said that his Government attached great importance to the messages from the President. It was for this reason that some time had been taken for the replies.

Ambassador Koo said that the Generalissimo had raised a question as to the possibility of a compromise. This might open the way for a further exchange of messages. He felt it would be very desirable for the President or the Secretary to send another message replying to the specific question raised by the Generalissimo as to whether every possibility had been fully explored. If we informed the Generalissimo that every channel had already been explored and there was no possibility of any new approach, the Generalissimo might have something more to say.

Mr. Robertson remarked that Ambassador Rankin had been discouraged by the Chinese from going to Sun Moon Lake to present the President's second letter in person.

Ambassador Koo said that the Generalissimo sometimes wanted to be alone when he was considering weighty issues. Furthermore, the inn at Sun Moon Lake was often crowded. This would certainly be the case with six visiting Congressmen at Sun Moon Lake with the Generalissimo.

Mr. Robertson said the fact remained that Ambassador Rankin never got to present the second message personally. It appeared that George Yeh had drafted the reply. We felt that we were at the end of our rope. We had exhausted every possibility.

Ambassador Koo reiterated that he felt the second reply from President Chiang left the door open a little. It invited some reply. Another message through Ambassador Rankin might help.

Mr. Robertson said we have already made every effort imaginable to have the Outer Mongolian application dropped. We have made this clear to Taipei but there is no evidence that our points have ever been appreciated. But if it might help, we would be willing to send one more message from the Secretary pointing out that no stone has been left unturned; that we have explored every possibility open to us; and that we urge once more that the Generalissimo reconsider his proposed course of action.

(See separate memos on two other topics covered in same conversation: "Geneva Ambassadorial Talks"; and "Chinese Membership on Administrative Council of International Court of Arbitration". [2])

---

[2] Neither printed.

---

204. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

UN Membership

PARTICIPANTS

The Italian Ambassador
Secretary of State Dulles
Mr. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organizations
Mr. Jones—EUR:WE

The Italian Ambassador called today under instructions from his Prime Minister (the Foreign Minister has not yet returned from the Far East) to present Sig. Segni's views on the UN membership problem for the Secretary's consideration. The Ambassador began by saying that the Italian Government and the Embassy here were extremely grateful for everything that the U.S. had done to support the Italian application for membership in the UN; that should Italy be admitted this year it would be through the efforts of the U.S. and not by the grace of the USSR. The Italian Government understood, Sig. Brosio continued, the problem which a package solution created for the U.S., particularly one including Outer Mongolia. This situation, according to reports, had led the U.S. to a decision to abstain on the entire membership question.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, December 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. Cleared in draft by Wilcox.

The Secretary, who indicated agreement with the Ambassador's statement thus far, interrupted to explain the American position. He said that our decision was influenced by three considerations:

1. That we wish to see as many as possible of the eligible and qualified states in the UN.
2. That we wish to see them admitted within the spirit of the UN charter as interpreted by the advisory opinion of the International Court.
3. That UN membership was not an appropriate subject in which to exercise the veto.

In reviewing these considerations, it had been decided that the most appropriate course for the U.S. to follow with respect to the membership proposal for all 18 applicants, which is now before the General Assembly, was to abstain.

The Secretary went on to say that the primary consideration at the moment was the threat of the Chinese Nationalist veto in the Security Council of Outer Mongolia's application. He reviewed the history of the creation of Outer Mongolia stemming from the Soviet Chinese Treaty of August, 1945 in which Chiang Kai-shek paid a heavy price for the promise of Soviet support of his government. The Secretary described the Soviet Union's duplicity in this instance as one of the greatest frauds in history. He added that similar cases could be made against the European satellites such as Albania, etc. and that we could not bring ourselves to cast a positive vote for them or Outer Mongolia.

The Italian Ambassador expressed his understanding of our feelings on this question but added that his government had a public opinion problem also. He went on to say that should Italy enter the UN with the Soviet Union voting in favor and the U.S. abstaining, the Social Communists in Italy would be presented with a powerful propaganda weapon: i.e. that Italy had entered the UN with a favorable Russian vote and in spite of the abstention of the U.S. In order to insure that the U.S. position be clear to the average Italian, the Prime Minister had asked the Ambassador to submit for the Secretary's consideration three proposals for action:

1. That the resolution proposing the admission of the 18 applicants for membership be "global" in character in the introductory phrases but that it so list each applicant separately that the U.S. would have an opportunity to indicate its favorable vote for Italy, Spain, Austria, etc. and its abstention on Albania, Outer Mongolia, etc.

2. If his suggestion to vote on each applicant separately would endanger the entire proposal, then the Italian Premier hoped that the U.S. would be able to cast an affirmative vote for the package proposal with a clear statement rejecting any implication that its vote favored the satellites. (Premier Segni felt that a positive vote by the U.S. would influence the Chinese Nationalists at least to abstain on Outer Mongolia while an abstention on our part would make it easier for them to veto the package.)

3. The same effect as in No. 2 might be achieved if the U.S. decided to abstain by making a clear statement at the time of our vote that our abstention implied no disinterest in the admission of our friends such as Italy, Spain, Austria, etc., whose membership we had consistently supported and welcomed.

The Ambassador added that he had been instructed to say that his Prime Minister hoped that the United States would find it possible to vote affirmatively on the membership resolution rather than abstain; in other words, follow alternative No. 2 rather than 3.

The Secretary replied that he had been in Rome recently and that he knew and appreciated the views of the Italian Government on this question and the problem which it had in the face of its public opinion. He added, however, that we had a public opinion problem here as well. With respect to our influence on the Chinese Nationalists, the Secretary said that our position of abstention was one which the Taipei Government might find possible to accept for themselves, although he was not hopeful. If we should switch to an affirmative vote we would lose all influence on them and they might be more inclined to cast a negative note [*vote*].

The Ambassador said that, if he understood correctly, he would report as follows to his Government:

1. That the Secretary did not believe that U.S. abstention on the membership question would in fact encourage the Chinese Nationalists to exercise their veto—rather, the contrary.

2. That should the U.S. feel obliged (which apparently was the case) to adhere to its decision to abstain on the membership question, that our abstention would be accompanied by a clear statement that we favored admission of such countries as Italy, Spain, Austria, etc., and that our abstention related only to our distaste of the satellites.

The Secretary indicated his concurrence with the Ambassador's understanding of the U.S. position.

205. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

Taipei, December 6, 1955—6 p.m.

528. Department pass USUN. Before boarding plane for Okinawa this morning Chairman Zablocki[2] asked me transmit following statement on UNO membership to Department:

"The apparent US approval of the 'package deal' approach on UN applicant was called to the attention of the Far East study mission when the committee was visiting the South Asian countries. Responsible people and officials expressed grave concern regarding US position in this matter. The committee withheld comment or report of its concern and alarm until opportunity to discuss this subject with Ambassador Rankin. Unfortunately he does not have full information on reasons for US position because lack of information from Washington and New York (UN). The members of study mission are further alarmed and desire to report the gravity with which our friends in the Far East view the 'package deal' despite their strong desire to see Spain and other free world allies as members of UN. The Far East Sub-committee unanimously wishes to urge that our country not compromise a moral principle and United States historical righteousness for the sake of expediency and what appears to be at present a 'beneficial' deal. We hope the Executive Department will reconsider its reported position of approving a 'package' admittance of applicants—or at least initiate postponement on this question.

"We believe action on part of US to stand by moral principle and UN Charter provisions is imperative."

Comment: Above was drafted by Zablocki last night at Sun Moon Lake and subsequently concurred in by all other Congressmen in group (Adair, Byrd, Church, Jarman, Judd and Wigglesworth[3]). Their opinion was fully formed before arriving Taiwan but talks here with President, Vice President and Foreign Minister probably further encouraged despatch of above message. I was in position to add very little to what they already knew. For example, I was unable to explain why on November 13 Lodge statement specifically dismissed any possibility of Outer Mongolia's entering UN, and hence any package including that state, while few days later US was pressing GRC to accept Outer Mongolia, at least tacitly, as essential part of package.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–655. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Hong Kong.

[2] Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisc.).

[3] Representative A. Ross Adair (R-Ind.), Representative Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), Representative Marguerite Stitt Church (R-Ill.), Representative John Jarman (D-Okla.), Representative Walter Judd (R-Minn.), and Representative Richard B. Wigglesworth (R-Mass.).

Rankin

---

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China [1]

Washington, December 6, 1955—8:06 p.m.

340. Your 516. Transmit following message from Secretary to President Chiang:

"The President has discussed with me your reply of December 3 to his second letter [2] regarding pending candidacy of 18 countries for membership in the United Nations. The President has asked me to inform you of his disappointment and profound concern at the continued prospect of your use of the veto in the impending Security Council vote on the membership question.

"A question is raised in the second paragraph of your letter as to whether something more might be done to have the application of Outer Mongolia dropped or its consideration technically postponed. The possibility of such a solution has been fully explored by U.S. representatives to no avail. While no one can predict with confidence the course of events in the Security Council when this item comes up, there is every indication that no maneuver along this line would be successful.

"It is our considered judgment that a Chinese veto on this membership issue would play squarely into the hands of our worst enemies and jeopardize the position we have jointly striven to maintain."

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–455. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy and signed for the Secretary by Robertson. A typewritten notation on the source text indicates it was cleared in draft by the Secretary.

[2] See Documents 200 and 188.

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China[1]

Washington, December 6, 1955—8:10 p.m.

341. Secretary attended meeting Organization of American States in Washington today at which he was approached by number of Latin American representatives on question Chinese attitude on UN membership. Main theme these approaches was surprise over "ingratitude" of GRC, in light consistent support LA states for GRC position in UN, in threatening block membership solution which LA states deeply desire see brought about, in order primarily achieve admission to UN of such countries as Spain, Portugal, and Italy, which bound to LA countries by strong ties of language, culture and tradition.

At your discretion convey substance foregoing to President or Foreign Minister.

Dulles

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–655. Confidential. Repeated to USUN. Signed for the Secretary by Niles W. Bond after Dulles' clearance.

---

208. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

Taipei, December 8, 1955—8 p.m.

533. Department pass USUN. Department's 335, 340, 341, 342 and 347.[2] Substance of Department's 335 and 341 re Outer Mongolia membership in UNO discussed with Foreign Minister and Secretary's message (Department's 340) was translated by Foreign Minister over telephone late yesterday to President Chiang.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Hong Kong.

[2] Telegrams 335, 340, and 341 are printed as Documents 202, 206, and *supra*. Telegram 342 reported a Japanese initiative on the membership question. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–655) Telegram 347, December 7, reads: "It now appears probable membership issue will reach Security Council December 9. Ad Hoc committee this afternoon approved Canadian resolution by vote of 52 in favor, 2 against (China, Cuba) and 5 abstentions (Belgium, France, Greece, Israel, U.S.). It is evident that support for 18-member proposal overwhelming." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12–755)

Last night I received first intimation President would discuss Outer Mongolia with me if I requested interview. I did so and today went to Sun Moon Lake where I had over two hours plus luncheon time with Chiang. Foreign Minister and Mme. Chiang were only others present.

Foreign Minister apparently brought with him lengthy telegram describing conversation between Robertson and Koo. After reading it Chiang expressed astonishment that Department thought GRC did not understand gravity of situation. On contrary Chinese regard situation more seriously than US which seemed concerned solely with matters of UNO membership. It was a far bigger question.

President then asked me to state my case. I said that it had been presented in two messages from President Eisenhower and two from Secretary Dulles. I had no official information to add, but I was under instructions to emphasize strongly to him the seriousness with which the United States regarded the matter. I took occasion however to review developments as far as known to me. We seemed to be in box. Something had happened about mid-November (communications from Department suggest November 17–21) but I did not have details. US had done its best, I was sure, but we were now confronted with a most difficult and complex situation.

I then sketched briefly UNO history as regards universality of membership, collective security etc. My purely personal view was that events had overtaken question of revising charter. For better or worse UNO was again moving toward universality of membership with responsibility for collective security passing largely over to multilateral and bilateral defense arrangements. Unhappily many provisions of Charter could no longer be taken literally. While GRC had excellent legal case, it must be considered in light of laws already outdated and which no one would enforce. I thought GRC also had good moral case from its point of view, but there was another moral case. All countries of free world including GRC wished to see number of states admitted to UNO (I mentioned Spain, Japan and Italy in particular). Many nations among our friends felt strongly on subject while only China and Russia were interested in Outer Mongolia as such. To most of free world, bringing deserving nations into UNO was much bigger moral issue than that with which GRC at present concerned.

I added that whatever future in store for UNO, membership in organization remained very important: witness strong desire of additional countries to enter. We wanted GRC to remain in UNO and to maintain its position, both because we valued its presence and support for our side and because it was block to entry of Red China. In summary US had done its best in present case but had not succeeded. We were asking GRC to go along in its interest and ours, making best of difficult situation.

President then reviewed history past several years (memorandum follows)[3] explaining how US had frequently misunderstood China's problems. All experience had shown that any form of neutralism was bad for GRC; it must stick to principles. He cited League of Nations in Manchuria, pro-Japanese British policy before war, Sino-Soviet Treaty, Marshall mission etc. GRC's continued stay in UNO would be for two reasons only: (1) as symbol of anti-communism and (2) as acknowledgment of moral support it continues [receive] from US. Otherwise its continued presence in UNO could bring more shame and disgrace to China than if not there. GRC not proposing use veto as blackmail in hope of getting something; US should understand that.

Chiang then mentioned Russia, stating he could not understand how in present case GRC considered worse rascals than Soviets, who have used veto 25 times on membership questions. US puts all blame on GRC in present case (Foreign Minister noted he was referring to messages from Eisenhower and Dulles) thereby placing seal of approval on Soviet actions. No Chinese with sense of justice can accept this, President said.

Chiang then compared package deal with Sino-Soviet treaty, particularly in light of US-GRC relationships. Present proposal not only against GRC interests but conclusion inescapable that US giving deal at least tacit support. Therefore this case affects US moral leadership of free world far more than in case of Sino-Soviet treaty as he believed history would prove. He considered Secretary Dulles very able and a friend who has made no mistakes so far, but he warned that package deal might wipe out all previous achievements.

Comment: Despite strong statements described above, I believe Chiang may be softening slightly. He remarked my presentation of US case was best he had heard. But he still convinced we have made deal behind GRC back and took second paragraph of Secretary's December 6 message as further confirmation, particularly since France and Belgium have abstained in committee vote. If we could take GRC somewhat more into our confidence on what US representatives found when they explored possibilities, it might help. Also we have offered him no "out" or "steps to get down" as Chinese say. I was in position only to suggest showing deference to desires of Spain, Japan et cetera, in latter connection.[4]

---

[3] Not printed.

Rankin

---

[4] In telegram 535 from Taipei, December 9, Rankin reported: "Late last night I received relayed telephone message from President Chiang reply to Secretary Dulles December 6 message on UNO membership for Outer Mongolia. Chiang said all points he had intended make in his reply were covered in December 8 conversation with me. Could this be considered as his reply? I thought so and review of Taipei's 533 this morning confirms my opinion if Secretary does not object to form of reply." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–955)

---

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China[1]

Washington, December 8, 1955—8 p.m.

349. Eyes only Rankin. Your 528.[2] Visit Far East Subcommittee offered unique channel influence Chiang's decision membership issue under especially advantageous circumstances. Subcommittee also constitutes influential segment Congressional opinion. In view of Depcirtel 322, Deptels 304, 305, 308, 317, 326, 329, 333, 334,[3] which we assume you received prior to your conversations with Subcommittee, Department unable understand your statement "I was in position to add very little to what they already knew". Included in foregoing messages were two detailed and reasoned statements of US position prepared for use by Ambassador Lodge, two comprehensive expositions of US position on membership and the reasons therefor prepared by the President for Chiang and one prepared by the Secretary for Chiang. You were also informed of President's direct concern with issue, of finality of US decision, of importance which US attached to obtaining Chiang's agreement to forego use of veto and of probable gravity of consequences in event of failure

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–655. Secret; Priority. Drafted and signed by Robertson for the Secretary. Cleared by Wilcox.

[2] Document 205.

[3] For telegrams 304, 305, 317, 329, and 333, see Documents 176, 177, 188, 197, and 199, respectively. Regarding circular telegram 322 and telegrams 308 and 326, see footnote 3, Document 160; footnote 2, Document 178; and footnote 1, Document 195; respectively. Telegram 334, December 3, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–355)

obtain such agreement. In response to your 513[4] a further message reviewing US position was sent. The answer to your query in the last sentence your 528 is given fully by the Secretary in his message to Chiang (Deptel 305).

It is improbable that this collective information could previously have been available to Subcommittee or that being in possession of it, Committee could reasonably conclude that you "unfortunately" did not "have full information on reasons for US position because lack of information from Washington and NY (UN)". It would seem that the information supplied you would have enabled you not only to give Subcommittee effective guidance but to engage its aid with Chiang.

We are attempting to establish contact with subcommittee in Tokyo to clarify US position.

Vote on Canadian proposal in General Assembly today was 52 in favor, 2 (Cuba, China) against and 5 abstentions including US. It is now expected Security Council will meet on December 10.

Dulles

---

[4] Document 198.

---

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan[1]

Washington, December 8, 1955—7:33 p.m.

1200. For Allison. Department's 1197 repeating Taipei's 528.[2] If Chairman Zablocki and other members House Foreign Affairs Far East Subcommittee are in Tokyo deliver following message from Dept to them:

"Department has received your message of December 6 sent from Taipei regarding UN membership question now before UN, and written after discussion of subject with Ambassador Rankin. We are surprised that Ambassador Rankin felt he did not have 'full information reasons for US position because lack of information from

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2–655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Robertson and McConaughy. Signed for the Secretary by Robertson and cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Roderic O' Connor and Wilcox.

[2] Document 205.

Washington and New York (UN)'. Ambassador Rankin was sent nine messages on this subject which he should have received before his conversation with you. These messages make it clear that US not support package deal, that we have no behind the scenes understanding with any country on membership question, that we will not vote for or otherwise support the candidacy of the five Communist satellites, and will not ask Chinese Government do so. US decision to abstain in the Security Council is based on belief that it would be abuse of veto power to exercise veto on membership question to frustrate will of overwhelming majority of UN members. This decision is in line with spirit Vandenberg Resolution which was passed by Senate 64 to 4 in 1948. There are quoted below three messages to President Chiang setting forth US position and stating our deep apprehension that international position of free China may be gravely impaired by use of veto on this membership issue; and text statement for Ambassador Lodge during Ad Hoc Committee discussion membership issue.

We hope information contained in Deptels 1203 and 1204 [3] will give you a clearer understanding of the considerations which guided our decision in this crucial matter, and that there will be opportunity to discuss the issue further with you upon your return to Washington. Sincerely yours."

Dulles

---

[3] Telegrams 1203 and 1204 to Tokyo, December 8, repeated the texts of the messages previously sent to President Chiang Kai-shek by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles in telegrams 304, 305, and 317 to Taipei; Documents 176, 177, and 188.

---

211. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, December 9, 1955—7 p.m.

1315. Eyes only for Secretary. I have given Zablocki Committee information contained in Dept's 1200, 1203, and 1204. [2] Judd's immediate reaction was most violent and was in large part shared by other members Committee, all of whom apparently feel strongly on this issue. It was obvious from reaction of Judd and other members of Committee that there would be no point in asking Judd to intercede with Generalissimo. Judd seems to feel, and says this feeling is shared by Generalissimo that if Nationalist China's action in vetoing package deal results in threat to its international position and even to its expulsion from UN it can do no other. Judd seems to believe that Chiang's moral position in this case is completely sound and that what we are doing by "acquiescing" in package deal is to strike death blow at UN as it originally conceived. According to Judd, who says he was not personally present, Zablocki and other members of Committee told Generalissimo while in Taiwan that he had their full support in his position.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–955. Secret; Priority.

[2] See *supra* and footnote 3 thereto.

I am afraid that in this case all members of group are completely emotional and do not understand long-term implications of Nationalist China's veto of the package deal. In fact, Judd even suggested they should talk to Japanese leaders in endeavor to persuade them that it was solely attitude of Soviet Union that was keeping Japan out of UN and that Nationalist China is completely right in its stand. I am not sure that I have persuaded them that such action here would be unwise. Committee will be in Tokyo until morning of twelfth if you desire communicate with them further.

Allison

---

212. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State [1]

Taipei, December 10, 1955—1 p.m.

541. Department's 349. [2] Suggestion that visit Far Eastern subcommittee offered "unique channel influence Chiang's decision membership issue" underestimates intensity sub-committee's feelings and intimate individual and collective knowledge this and related issues. I feel certain they would say their position resulted from their own convictions regardless any guidance they received or might have been given in Taipei. I said "I was in position add very little to what they already knew" because they were as fully informed as I with

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1055. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Eyes Only."

[2] Document 209.

their extensive background and worldwide press coverage of almost every detail in present case.

Sub-committee arrived Taiwan, after some 8 weeks travel, shocked, alarmed at expansion of Communist influence and power in various areas and correspondingly sensitive to any evidence of what might appear to them as new Communist successes. Department will have noted that sub-committee's message made no reference to Outer Mongolia but reflected grave concern with larger issues implicit in package deal. Presumably they felt that UN membership for this or that country was comparatively secondary consideration. If so, it is scarcely surprising that President Chiang takes similar view re both new applicants and GRC's own membership.

Of course I discussed with them messages from President and Secretary, which already widely known through press and USIA coverage including latter's November 29 release. I stressed US anxiety obtain GRC's agreement refrain from using veto. I told Zablocki and Judd directly that Washington would be most grateful if they could change Chiang's mind. Response clearly presaged sub-committee's message subsequently transmitted in Embassy telegram 528. [3]

I did not feel free show Embassy's file this subject to sub-committee and saw no purpose doing so. If Department still dissatisfied after reading above I suggest complete file of exchanges on this matter between Washington and Taipei from November 13 to date be made available to sub-committee upon arrival Washington. If this done, however, I believe much fuller explanation be available of apparent change in US position than that given in Department's 305. [4] I should appreciate learning results of such steps, with Department's comments.

Rankin

---

[3] Document 205.

[4] Document 177.

---

213. Editorial Note

On December 10, the United Nations Security Council met on the question of the admission of new members. Before the Council for consideration were the applications of the countries seeking admission to the United Nations and 13 draft resolutions submitted by the Government of the Republic of China, each one recommending the admission of 1 of 13 countries: Italy, Japan, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Portugal, Ceylon, Jordan, Libya, Austria, and Ireland in that order.

During the meeting, the following draft resolutions were presented to the Council: (1) by the Soviet Union providing that the General Assembly vote on the recommendation of the Security Council on each application for membership before the Council proceeded to vote on the next application; (2) by Brazil and New Zealand providing for a Council recommendation to the General Assembly to admit 18 specified countries to the United Nations with the stipulation that a vote would be taken on each of the 18 countries named within the resolution, on each paragraph of the resolution, and then on the resolution as a whole; and (3) 18 separate resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union recommending the admission of each of the 18 countries respectively.

The Security Council at its December 10 meeting chose neither to vote nor to reach a decision on the applications or resolutions before it, but adjourned to reconvene on Tuesday, December 12.

---

214. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, December 12, 1955—4 p.m.

1323. For Secretary. Reference Department's telegram 1200. [2] Prior to their departure this morning House Foreign Affairs Far East Subcommittee requested me to send you following message:

"Your prompt reply to our message has been received via Allison. Unfortunately the case presented leaves us quite unconvinced that present position of our government on package deal is right or advisable. We feel compelled to urge again that United States reconsider its position.

We believe that US should itself return and urge other governments to return to their firm opposition to such package deals as was shown from 1948 until recently, such opposition having been in accordance with the 1948 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1255. Secret.

[2] Document 210.

We cannot agree with the argument that any UN member should accept the will of a majority when that involves violation of the letter and spirit of UN Charter. If principles are to be abandoned whenever a majority believes it expedient, why should we have charters or even constitutions?

Is it not better to thwart the will of the majority of nations than to ignore the principles and provisions of the UN Charter?

We believe surrender to Soviet ultimatum would weaken the UN and lead inevitably to increased pressure for admission of Red China. Would not the United States have lost its ability to resist effectively such admission which is overwhelmingly opposed by the Congress and the American people? We believe such surrender would surely weaken the hopes and the will to resist on the part of the enslaved peoples behind the iron curtain. Moreover, it is bound to decrease respect for the United States which we must regretfully report is dwindling alarmingly all through the Middle and Far East. All these would strengthen the Communist world position, lead to further Communist ultimatums, and greatly increase the dangers of war.

It is the opinion of government leaders in several of the countries our subcommittee has recently visited that the United States would be compromising on a moral issue. We are convinced that what is morally wrong can never be politically right.

Our primary concern is not for the fate of the Chinese Nationalist Government, important though that is. History may well record its veto and steadfast adherence to the UN Charter as its finest deed. Our primary concern is for the honor and moral leadership and the future welfare of our own country. Signed Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, John Jarman, Robert C. Byrd, Walter H. Judd, Marguerite Stitt Church, E. Ross Adair."

Ailison

215. Memorandum From Charles Allan Stewart, Adviser to the Mission at the United Nations, to Joseph J. Sisco of the International Organization Affairs Staff of the Mission [1]

New York, December 12, 1955.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Supporters of Canadian Resolution on Membership

Following a telegraphic invitation to all 52 members which had voted for the Canadian resolution calling for the admittance of 18 countries to the UN, a meeting was held at 2:30 today in Conference Room 1. Three countries—Panama, Honduras and Nicaragua—were not present. Possibly others were not either.

Ambassador Martin opened the meeting by stating that the supporters of the Canadian resolution should guarantee any "doubting Thomases" that they would assure the entry of all 18 countries into the UN if they successfully passed the Security Council. Menon of India made a speech along the same line. Thereafter Ambassador Freitas Valle of Brazil arose and stated that he saw no reason for giving such a guarantee, since it was clearly evident that the 52 votes on the Canadian resolution guaranteed the entry of all the countries. Ambassador Arenales of Guatemala objected to the wording of the telegraphic invitation, which mentioned something about harmonizing views on the admittance of the new members. He said it would be difficult to harmonize the views, since the countries all had very divergent ideas on the various candidates.

Sir Percy Spender of Australia then stated that he was not entirely happy with the idea of being brought in to give guarantees for anybody. He said his country's viewpoint had been clearly stated when the vote was held and he did not propose to be crossexamined about how he would vote. He then left the room, leaving a representative of his delegation as an observer.

Ambassador Urquia of El Salvador proposed that a resolution should be passed by the group, declaring that once the 18 countries had successfully been passed by the Security Council, the block of 52 countries which voted for the Canadian resolution would guarantee that all 18 countries would pass the Plenary. In view of the objection to the nature of the meeting as expressed by the Brazilian, Guatemalan and Australian, Ambassador Trujillo of Ecuador, who presided, did not put the motion to the vote. Trujillo closed the meeting by expressing the hope that those present would think the matter over during the night and attempt to come up with some solution which would assure the happy conclusion of the 18 nation package deal.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Official Use Only.

In short, no action was taken and the question of what will occur in the Security Council meeting is as confused as ever.

The telegram sent out to the various delegations today, according to my sources, was signed by Trujillo, Menon and Martin.

---

216. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Brazilian Ambassador (Muniz) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Lyon), Washington, December 12, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

United Nations Caucus on Package Deal

I telephoned the Brazilian Ambassador today and told him that we had just heard that the Canadians and the Indians were calling a caucus for this afternoon at 2:30 p.m. on the question of the package deal, that all the 52 nations which had supported the Canadian proposal were being invited, but those countries which had not supported it were not being included in the invitation. Among those were Cuba, which had opposed the motion, and ourselves who had abstained. I explained to the Ambassador that we were concerned at this since we felt that we were all interested in solving this important question and that we did not feel a meeting should be called excluding countries which were also seeking a solution to this difficult problem. I said the Secretary feared that if this became public knowledge it might have an adverse effect on public opinion of the United Nations in this country. That being the case, we hoped some of the Latin American countries would point out this fact; and perhaps, if the situation could not be clarified, refrain from attending.

The Ambassador said he understood entirely; that never in his knowledge had the Latin American countries agreed to attend a meeting from which we were excluded. He would, therefore, get in touch immediately with their Ambassador at the United Nations in New York and see what could be done.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1255. Confidential. Drafted by Lyon.

The Ambassador called me back a little later and said that he had talked with Freitas-Valle, their representative at the United Nations, who said that he would attend the meeting; he would try to have the United States included; and if they were not able to effect that, they would leave the meeting.

The Ambassador called a second time at about 5:00 p.m. and said that Freitas-Valle had reported to him that he had gone to the caucus, and said that he didn't see why a meeting of this character should be held, that the United States should be included or there should not be any such meeting; after which, according to the Ambassador, the caucus was called off.

I expressed the appreciation of the Secretary to the Ambassador for the fine help which Brazil had given us in this matter.

---

217. Memorandum From the Senior Political Adviser to the Mission at the United Nations (McSweeney) to Joseph J. Sisco of the International Organization Affairs Staff of the Mission[1]

New York, December 12, 1955.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the "52"

The meeting was surrounded by UN security guards.

Shortly after 2:30 Dixon (UK) retired from the meeting and sat outside the better part of ten minutes before returning to the meeting.

A few minutes later Kidron (Israel) and Nisot (Belgium) came out together. Kidron told me that Dixon had objected to the fact that Maza was to be chairman of the meeting on the grounds that the meeting had no relationship to the General Assembly or the President thereof. The meeting then reverted to one of the "52" at which point those others who had been present, including Israel, Belgium and Greece, departed.

About 3:15 Spender (Australia) came out under a full head of steam. He said he had thought that he had prevented any possibility of a recording of votes. He said he had spoken to the meeting to the effect that if the delegate of the Soviet Union wished to ascertain how he, Spender, would vote he need only read the record of his speeches. He thought it most improper that the delegations should be convened in this fashion.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Official Use Only.

When the meeting broke up Mir Khan (Pakistan) said it had been completely chaotic and without any result. A half a dozen people had spoken, among these was Dixon who said it was his understanding that the purpose of the meeting was to reassure the Soviet delegate as to the vote in the General Assembly on membership. The Soviet delegate apparently did not speak.

After a half dozen speeches Trujillo (Ecuador) adjourned the meeting with a statement something to the effect that no vote, of course, would be taken, that the purpose of the meeting and its sense was well known.

---

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, December 13, 1955—11 a.m.

1334. Eyes only for Secretary. Re Emb's 1315 and 1323. [2] I believe you should know that message sent in Embassy's 1323 was primarily work of Congressmen Judd and Byrd, although other members of group unhesitatingly signed message. There was some indication, however, that if it had not been for Judd's vehemence on this matter and strong backing given him by Byrd that other Committee members might have been content with message they had sent from Taipei. I have learned that during reception given committee by FonMin Judd and Byrd brought up question of "package deal" with various Japanese present and they were fortified in their stand by statement of . . . that although Chinese Nationalists' action in vetoing membership proposal would go against Japan's interest, nevertheless, he admired moral position of Chinese Nationalists. Later at dinner at Embassy in evening . . . made similar statement. . . .

During interview with Prime Minister Hatoyama, Congressman Byrd raised this issue and expressed hope that Japanese government would understand that true villain in matter was Soviet Union and not Nationalist China. Judd went so far as to say that there were many Americans in Congress and out who disapproved of present United States Government stand on this question. Hatoyama blandly replied that he greatly appreciated efforts President Eisenhower had made to obtain agreement of Chiang Kai-shek not to use veto. Fact that Shigemitsu called me in late yesterday to renew plea for our intervention with Republic of China, as reported in Emb's 1332,[3] indicates that Japanese government view has not changed in this matter and that it will take serious view of veto action by Chinese Nationalists. . . .

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1255. Secret; Priority.

[2] Documents 211 and 214.

It is hoped above information will be helpful if upon their return Congressmen allege that Japanese leaders approved their stand on vetoing "package" proposal.

Allison

---

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1255)

---

219. Editorial Note

The Security Council of the United Nations once again considered the question of membership at its 703d meeting on December 13. Following lengthy discussion and debate on a number of draft resolutions, the Council decided by a vote of 8 to 1 (China) with 2 abstentions (Belgium and the United States) to give the draft resolution of Brazil and New Zealand calling for the admission of 18 new members (including Outer Mongolia) priority over all other draft resolutions. Paragraph by paragraph votes indicated the impossibility of attaining agreement on the Brazilian-New Zealand draft resolution.

At the request of the Soviet Representative, Kuznetsov, the Security Council met again on December 14, to consider the admission of new members. At this time, Kuznetsov stated that he wished to withdraw his delegation's previous negative votes with respect to a number of states and that he would vote in favor of 16 of the applicants listed in the draft resolution sponsored by Brazil and New Zealand. The question of the admission of Japan and of the Mongolian People's Republic would have to be deferred to the next session of the General Assembly. Kuznetsov then submitted a draft resolution similar to the one sponsored by Brazil and New Zealand, but recommending to the General Assembly the admission of only 16 countries (i.e. the 18 listed in the joint Brazilian-New Zealand draft resolution excluding Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic). Henry Cabot Lodge promptly submitted an amendment to add the name of Japan to the 16 states listed in the Soviet draft resolution.

The United States amendment was voted on first and received 10 votes in favor and 1 against (the Soviet Union) but was not carried since the negative vote was that of a permanent member of the Security Council. The Soviet draft resolution was voted upon next paragraph by paragraph with each applicant being voted on separately. Although China, the United States, and Belgium abstained from voting for or against certain proposed states, there were no negative votes cast and the Soviet draft resolution as a whole was approved by 8 votes to none with 3 abstentions.

Following the vote on the Soviet draft resolution, Henry Cabot Lodge submitted a draft resolution to recommend the admission of Japan at the Eleventh Regular Session of the General Assembly. Lodge noted that Soviet Representative Kuznetsov had made a statement in which he expressed the wish to see Japan admitted to the United Nations at the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly. But the Security Council decided to defer consideration of the United States proposal until the following meeting.

Discussion of Lodge's draft resolution and several others concerning early admission to membership not only of Japan but of the Mongolian People's Republic continued in the Security Council until December 21, when the Council accepted a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom expressing the belief that Japan was fully qualified for membership and the hope that Japan would soon be admitted to the United Nations. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain adoption of a draft resolution that would link the Mongolian People's Republic to Japan on the issue of membership qualification and acceptance, the Soviet Representative placed on record his abstention in voting on the United Kingdom resolution.

Meanwhile, at its 555th plenary meeting held the evening of December 14, the General Assembly agreed to admit the 16 applicant states whose admission had been recommended earlier the same day by the Security Council.

Further information on the debate, discussions, and votes concerning the admission of new members to the United Nations in both the Security Council and the General Assembly is in the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1955 (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1956), pages 22–29.

Following initial discussions in the Security Council and the decision of the General Assembly to admit 16 new members, the Department sent telegram 2088 to Saigon, December 16, repeated to Paris, which reads as follows: "You may wish tell Mau and Diem that U.S. in Security Council again expressed its conviction Viet-Nam fully qualified for admission UN, as we had done in General Assembly. We voted in favor of Chinese amendment which proposed Viet-Nam and Korea and we regret Viet-Nam once more kept out only because of Soviet veto." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1655)

---

220. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, December 15, 1955—7 p.m.

1371. Japanese evidencing considerable bitterness as result exclusion from UN membership proposal approved yesterday by Security Council. News of Security Council action virtually blanketed front page afternoon papers. Japanese stunned by unexpected development. Immediate reaction has been criticism government handling UN membership question and re-evaluation Japanese position in London negotiations with USSR. [2]

Prior receipt report yesterday's action by Security Council, every Tokyo daily this morning played up membership question and devoted top editorial to subject. Editorials generally reflected strong disappointment and particularly critical of Nationalist Chinese for veto Outer Mongolia, predicting its position in UN will suffer. Soviet veto also criticized by *Asahi, Yomiuri* and several other papers.

After Security Council approved 16 nations, Socialists in upper and lower house Diet sessions this morning launched bitter criticism of government for failure assure Japanese admission to UN and inadequate attitude towards Commie China and Soviet Union. Socialists also threatening non-confidence motion against Foreign Minister. Hatoyama in Diet replied to Socialist attack, stating that it was not right change attitude toward the two Chinas before ascertaining international situation but agreeing to need for greater efforts in Japan–USSR talks, since "it our responsibility to take next best step". Shigemitsu [3] echoed need push London talks and also mentioned desire keep close relations with Afro-Asian bloc. Neither Shigemitsu nor Hatoyama pointedly critical of Soviet Union.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1555. Official Use Only.

[2] Reference is to discussions at London during 1955–1956 regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

[3] Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister of Japan and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In other comment, Cabinet secretary Nemoto critical of Foreign Office for over-optimism and stated Soviet action points up "importance of London peace talks". According *Tokyo Shimbun*,[4] Foreign Office views Soviet veto as increasing demands for early conclusion Japan–USSR talks and forcing consideration compromise settlement on Southern Kuriles.

Allison

---

[4] Japanese daily newspaper.

---

221. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State[1]

Tokyo, December 15, 1955—1 p.m.

1361. Re Deptel 1255.[2] In accordance with instructions I called on Shigemitsu at 12:15 pm at House of Councillors. He expressed appreciation of United States efforts to obtain Japan's admission to United Nations and said he had no objection to press release concerning my call. Verbatim text of statement released to press 1:00 pm Tokyo time in my immediate following unclassified telegram.[3]

Shigemitsu said he and government had been subjected all morning in House of Councillors to vigorous attack as result of Soviet Union veto. He and Prime Minister are being held responsible and Shigemitsu said there was real danger that he might not be able to remain in office. Government is being attacked for too much dependence on United States and for stubbornness in negotiations with Soviet Union which, according to Socialist opposition, is cause of Russia's veto. He said Government would remain firm in its position and it realizes that Soviet action had been taken for deliberate purpose of causing trouble between friends and putting pressure on Japan to speed up negotiations. I have never seen Shigemitsu look as worried as he did this noon and I believe there is real substance in his fears that he may be forced to assume responsibility and have to leave government.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1555. Confidential; Niact.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12–1455)

[3] Not printed.

Allison

---

222. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

Washington, December 16, 1955—12:52 p.m.

396. You should deliver following personal message from Acting Secretary to Foreign Minister:

I am pleased on the occasion of the admission of (insert name of country) to the UN to have the opportunity to express the deep gratification of the United States that the long overdue entry of your country into the United Nations has at last taken place. It gives me real pleasure to extend our sincere congratulations and to express our satisfaction that (insert name of country) is now a fellow Member of the UN. I know that the participation of (insert name of country) in the work of the UN will add greatly to the effectiveness and influence of the Organization.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1655. Official Use Only. Sent to Amman, Colombo, Dublin, Helsinki, Lisbon, Madrid, New Delhi (for passage to the Nepalese Embassy for appropriate delivery to Katmandu), Rome, Tripoli, Vienna, and Vientiane. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary who was there to attend the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, December 15–16.

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China [1]

Washington, December 16, 1955—7:34 p.m.

368. Japanese Minister called at Department late today with last minute appeal for US intervention with Chinese Nationalist Government in effort have latter forego veto against Outer Mongolia thus making possible arrangement tomorrow with Soviets for admission of Japan to UN. Department explained that General Assembly would probably adjourn tonight but even if reconvenes tomorrow procedural difficulties and delays inherent in new approach Chinese Government would make intervention nonproductive. Minister was also told Department's view that new appeal to Chinese Government after previous unsuccessful appeals on highest levels would most probably be fruitless. Assume you concur in Department's views but if you should see any point in further representations you are authorized to make them, bearing in mind presumed deadline of December 17.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo. Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Sebald. Cleared by McConaughy, Bacon, Robertson, and Brown.

---

224. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, December 17, 1955—2 a.m.

1367. Pass USUN. Soviet press covers admission 16 new members into United Nations under headline such as "Diplomatic Initiative of USSR". TASS New York reports debate on vote December 14 giving text Kuznetsov's final statement. Indian representative Menon reportedly said Chinese Nationalists to blame for non-admission Japan and Mongolia and called for seating Chinese Communist government in United Nations. TASS roundup American press comment on admission new members says "press of opinion that in this process Soviet diplomacy achieved new success and American diplomacy suffered significant damage . . . [2] American press notes that days in United Nations of Chiang Kai-shekists, who tried with United States support to prevent positive decision question on admission new members in United Nations, are numbered". Other TASS press reports on local reaction from Peiping, London, Rome and Stockholm emphasize criticism Chinese Nationalists and demands for their expulsion from United Nations. TASS Peiping says Tokyo radio reports indicate Japanese press and official circles exasperated at delay Japanese admission because of Chinese veto.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1755. Official Use Only.

Pravda and *Izvestia* both have front-page editorials on theme "important event in life United Nations". *Izvestia* says "fact decision this question became possible thanks to initiative Soviet delegation will be given due weight by world opinion". Editorial blame[s] "certain countries headed by United States", who pursued policy discrimination against some applicants and favoritism toward others, for prolonged deadlock in membership question. Soviet Union, however, has received recognition wide circles many countries. Molotov at Geneva informed Western Foreign Ministers Soviet Union favored Canadian proposal for admission 18 members. In Security Council solution blocked only by obstruction Chinese Nationalists who would not be in United Nations at all except their patrons desire prevent Communist China's admission. "No secret to anybody who was inspirer of Chiang Kai-shekists obstruction in Security Council. American papers speak clearly enough on that. They openly acknowledge that American delegation would prefer question on admission new members into United Nations not be resolved and blame for this put on Soviet Union".

Admission new members, editorial concludes, represents failure positions-of-strength policy "basic in United Nations was manifested in intrigues and attempts force on international organization course of discrimination against states according to social structure". Principle peaceful coexistence upheld by decision.

Pravda editorial making essentially same points says dispute over United Nations membership "occurred as result activity these forces who were bent on converting United Nations for implement of unity of nations into means of dividing and setting up some peoples against others . . . This took place during years when policy of setting up military blocs and alliances was recognized by ruling circles of number Western powers as sole correct policy for our time and principles this policy set up against United Nations charter".

Comment: Soviets obviously content with membership solution since Outer Mongolia presents no problem to them whereas United

---

[2] All ellipses are in the source text.

States-Japanese relations by no means so easily handled. While blocking Japanese admission to United Nations can be attributed propagandawise to Moscow, situation nevertheless will increase pressures in Japan for recognition Chinese People's Republic and USSR.

Bohlen

---

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, December 17, 1955—6 p.m.

1385. UN membership question continuing to dominate Japanese attention. Yesterday issue was focal point of Diet and Cabinet discussions, and received heavy press play and editorial comment in almost every paper. Russians receiving harsher criticism but Soviet vetoes have not brought wave of indignation.

Diet debate yesterday keyed to Socialist-sponsored non-confidence motion against Shigemitsu which defeated in straight party line vote 259–135. Shigemitsu during Diet interpellations stated Soviet veto placing great pressure on Japan but stressed government intends follow original policy in London talks and not make any major concessions, sticking to demand for Southern Kurile return and consideration of Northern Kuriles and South Sakhalin by international conference. Shigemitsu also said "Japan was victim of unlucky side blow thrown during wrangling between USSR and US in UN Security Council", held membership developments not require change in Japanese policy toward US.

According press, Shigemitsu also took strong line at Cabinet meeting, pinning entire blame for failure to gain UN entry on USSR and specifically absolving Nationalist China. Shigemitsu warned Cabinet that Soviet veto part of strategy gain bargaining leverage not only at London treaty talks but also with respect seating Commie China in UN. Hatoyama, however, reportedly pushed for new, bipartisan approach in treaty negotiations. Cabinet decided to reach full policy agreement on Soviet talks prior departure of Ambassador Matsumoto for London—now scheduled in early January.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1755. Official Use Only.

Press comment yesterday reflected general bitterness, moderate indignation against Russians, and continued undercurrent of resentment against Nationalist China; editorials pointed to need for reassessment of Japanese diplomatic strategy for admission. All papers cited pressure on London talks. *Mainichi*, *Tokyo Shimbun* and *Sankei* Jiji also viewed Soviet veto as leading to possible deal on seating of Commie China in UN in exchange for Japanese membership. *Yomiuri* called for Japan to follow example of Asian-Arab bloc in carrying out policy in face of US and Britain (this approach also strongly recommended in Diet and in press comment by right-wing Socialist diplomatic expert Eki Sone). *Tokyo Times* was only paper to question openly continued reliance on US although others implied as much of suggestion of other diplomatic courses of action. Influential columns in *Yomiuri* and *Tokyo Shimbun* expressed admiration for "brilliance" of Soviet tactics and contrasting lack of skill on part USG.

Asahi which withheld comment yesterday devoted lead editorial ("Japan abandoned") today to UN membership question. Paper's speculation centered around West's proposal 15th that Japan be admitted next session, vetoed by USSR, and latter's proposal linking Japan and Outer Mongolia, which defeated as result West's abstentions. *Asahi* appreciated West's support, but said gratitude greatly diminished by West's rejection Soviet plan. Paper also sharply condemned USSR, which it noted had used veto three times since 13th to block Japan's admission. Essence of *Asahi's* criticism however was that West and particularly Soviet utilizing Japan's UN membership as bargaining weapon to promote own diplomatic ends, ignoring needs of Japanese people. In this connection *Asahi* said that, though Soviets apparently intended relate UN membership to negotiation Japan-Soviet settlement, Japan should not let Soviet pressure this issue influence her stand in negotiations. *Asahi* also deeply wounded by fact small nations which originally sponsored 18-nation package deal were ready to drop Japan without making serious effort in her behalf. *Asahi* brooded about this, said not only memories World War II but Japan's callous treatment small Asian countries in post-war era responsible for fact that when chips down no one was ready to rush to Japan's aid. *Asahi's* conclusion was that Japan must radically improve relations with small countries, and be on guard in future against danger of being used as tool of great powers.

Asahi today also featured report by Washington correspondent Nakamura analyzing US reactions. Nakamura said US officials' public comments confined to reiteration charge that USSR solely responsible for Japan's rejection; no one would speculate about future developments. However, on basis information gathered from "informed sources", Nakamura drew following conclusions:

A. US recognizes Japan's admission tied to admission Commie China, not Outer Mongolia.

B. US probably will try prevent special Assembly session in spring, in any event will make all-out effort to block seating Commie China (Eden–Eisenhower meeting first move in this campaign[2]).

C. Fact 1956 is Presidential year will exercise determining influence on US strategy in UN.

Allison

---

[2] Presumably a reference to the Anglo-American conversations on matters of common concern, held at Washington, January 30–February 1, 1956.

---

226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

Taipei, December 19, 1955—2 p.m.

562. Department's 368.[2] Concur Department's view that new representations to GRC on Japan's behalf to forego veto against Outer Mongolia would be fruitless. Moreover it could harm Japan–GRC relations to place latter in embarrassing position of again refusing Japanese request in which this time no other free nations have direct interest.

With above in mind I simply asked Foreign Minister at dinner Saturday (6 a.m. Washington time) whether Japanese had approached him on possible two-country package deal. His indicated surprise I interpreted as negative reply and his subsequent comments confirmed impression such approach would be fruitless.

Foreign Minister went on to indicate that he regarded latest UK proposal re Japan's UNO membership, presumably to be considered by Security Council December 21, as most promising step available for time being. He thought Soviets probably would not be in position to oppose.[3]

Rankin

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1955. Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.

[2] Document 223.

[3] See Document 219.

227. Memorandum From William O. Hall, Senior Adviser on the International Organization Affairs Staff to the Mission at the United Nations, to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

New York, December 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

UN Membership

Mr. Andre Ganem (French national on the Advisory Committee) told me at the end of the Assembly he had come to the personal conclusion that the balance of power had now so shifted toward the underdeveloped or anticolonial countries that it would be impossible for the French and other countries with African possessions to deny them self-government for a very long period without coming under very heavy attack in the UN, an attack which would bring together the anticolonial and Soviet countries.

It seems to me that there is a great deal of merit in this view, and it occurs to me that it might be worthwhile for the U.S. to catalogue all of the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories which have nearly reached the point where they might be expected to demand and obtain self-government. If we find there are a number of these countries, like Morocco, Tunis, the Gold Coast and Somaliland, then it might be very wise for the U.S., Britain and France to join as their co-sponsors for admission to the UN next year. It is clear that if we do not do this, the Soviets and the Bandung powers will very shortly do so.

It would appear to me that for the next two to three years in any case the Western European countries and the U.S. may expect to be in a minority on many questions in the GA. We will escape from this minority position only when some of the existing blocs begin to break up. I think we may expect the Latin American bloc to be broken at the next Assembly by some of the countries attaching themselves to Spain and others maintaining their primary loyalty to the U.S. Similarly, if additional countries could be introduced into the Afro-Asian bloc and if this bloc no longer had the common rallying point of anticolonialism, I would think that within a year or two it would tend to disintegrate under the pressures of conflicting leadership from Krishna Menon, the pro-Western leaders and the anti-Western leaders.

This solution would intensify somewhat the demands on us for assistance in economic development, but this increased pressure would be relatively slight compared to the political dividends we would get from sponsoring these countries for Membership and the final liquidation of the anticolonial issue.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership.

One further thought on Membership is the possibility that we may be confronted in the next round with demands for Membership for the Baltic Soviet states. This would present more complications than were presented in the admission of the most recent group of satellites, and I think that some thought should be given now to what our policy should be in case a request for admission is received.

Another proposal, which is related to Membership, which I would like to renew is the suggestion that we make it possible for one member of every UN Delegation, other than the Satellites and the Soviets, to engage in a lecture tour throughout the U.S. at the expense of the U.S. Government. I have often been impressed by the fact that most of the people coming to the U.S. for the first time from the underdeveloped countries, because of their shortage of foreign exchange, see only New York City and, in fact, very few of them even get as far away from New York as Connecticut. It would be desirable it seems to me to expose them to a bit of New England and particularly to the beauties of the Pacific Northwest. This could be arranged through the Leadership Exchange Program of USIA, I believe. If you think the idea has any merit, I would be glad to put the suggestion in proper form for transmittal to the Department.

---

228. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meetings to the Department of State[1]

Paris, December 17, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 11. At my request Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson called at Embassy residence yesterday morning. Conversation lasting half-hour devoted exclusively to discussion and clarification of recent Canadian initiative in UN re membership.

Saying that I had asked to see him for purpose of clearing up matter which had been source of irritation and some bitterness in US-Canadian relations, I outlined at some length basis for unfavorable view US took of Outer Mongolia's candidacy for membership. I said that Soviets had violated 1945 agreements with China and that its action had been condemned by the UN. Never had there been a more perfidious action on the part of the Soviets, and, in formulating their 18-member package deal, the Canadians had asked the UN to put the seal of approval on this perfidy. I said Canadian proposal had been made without adequate consultation with the US and had put us in an awkward and embarrassing position. I reminded him that when I had spoken to Molotov in Geneva on this subject he had replied that USSR was only "supporting the Canadian resolution" on membership.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1755. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ottawa.

Pearson thought Canadians had taken care to consult us. He cited speech he had made in Parliament some months ago in which he declared if admission of Outer Mongolia price that had to be paid for admission other eligible countries he thought price not too high. Canada had all along Outer Mongolia in mind as part of package deal and he believed State Department had been kept currently informed, as had USUN Delegation. Martin of Canadian UN Delegation had done no more nor less than carry out policy of his government and Pearson had no complaints re his tactics. He conceded that if they had known how strongly we felt on question they might not have been so active. Pearson said he particularly resented reports he had made deal with Molotov while in Moscow and denied it emphatically.

I said that Under Secretary Hoover and I are readily accessible to Canadian Ambassador on matters of such importance as this. Pearson said he appreciated this. While not apologizing for Canada's action he said that henceforth Canada would not fail to exchange views on all important matters at a high level and he expressed hope misunderstandings such as this would not recur.[2]

---

[2] Upon Secretary Dulles' return to Washington, Canadian Ambassador Arnold D.P. Heeney called on December 21 at his request to state that both he and Pearson now believed that the membership issue that had divided the two countries was closed and that both countries had learned a lesson on the need for closer cooperation. Dulles agreed and the two men then turned to a discussion of other matters. Attached to the memorandum of this conversation, however, is a Canadian document which, according to the memorandum of conversation, Heeney had left with Livingston Merchant the day before, December 20, containing a summary of all dates and circumstances of Canadian consultation with the Department of State on the matter of the membership "package deal." (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

229. Despatch From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State[1]

No. 355 *Taipei, December 23, 1955.*

SUBJECT

China's Veto Of Outer Mongolia For United Nations Membership

Note: The present despatch is not intended as a definitive account of the episode which involved the veto of Outer Mongolia for United Nations membership on December 13, 1955, nor does it cover in detail the numerous telegraphic exchanges between Washington and Taipei in this connection. Rather, it endeavors to fill in certain gaps which may help in an understanding of the position taken by the Chinese. Their actions were based in considerable part upon a belief that, in this case, much had been done by other countries without consulting the Government of the Republic of China. In retrospect this feature may seem of secondary importance, but during a period when events are moving rapidly, what information is currently available and what is believed to be true at the time may be more significant than actual facts which become known only after decisions have been taken and acted upon.

On November 11 the Canadian representative at the United Nations, Paul Martin, reportedly told T.F. Tsiang about the 18-nation membership "package". Tsiang understood that a deal had been made in Moscow last October by Molotov and Pearson. The latter then appears to have obtained Whitehall's blessing and to have turned the project over to his United Nations representative for implementation. Martin told Tsiang that 25 nations would back the scheme, which led the Government in Taipei to assume that the United States must have been privy to it. Tsiang informed Martin that his standing instructions to veto Outer Mongolia "if necessary" were so definite as to require no removal, but that he would ask Taipei about the other satellites concerned.

Two days later, on November 13, Ambassador Lodge issued a public statement in New York which included the assertion, "it is obvious that Outer Mongolia cannot make the grade," with reference to the latter's application for United Nations membership. On November 16, the Japanese Ambassador at Taipei called on the American Ambassador to say that he was under instructions to see the Chinese Foreign Minister about the possibility of a veto of

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–2355. Confidential.

Outer Mongolia. (See Taipei despatch No. 326 of December 8.[2] Presumably the text of the Aide-Mémoire which he delivered was that given in Embassy Tokyo's telegram of December 1.[3]) On the following day, November 17, V.V. Kuznetsov was quoted as having stated at a press conference, "The Soviet Union will vote for 18 candidates with one condition, that all be admitted. We categorically refuse to consider any other proposal."

Meanwhile, the Chinese Foreign Minister telegraphed to Ambassador Koo, instructing him to seek United States support for a position involving abstention in the voting on all of the Soviet satellites except Outer Mongolia, which China would veto if necessary (Embassy Taipei's telegram of November 17[4]). The resulting Robertson–Koo conversation, at a later hour on November 17,[5] indicated that the American position toward a possible Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia had not been finally determined, since it was still hoped that other means might be found to exclude that particular satellite from the United Nations. On November 21 (Robertson–Tan conversation,[6] of which a memorandum was received by the Embassy in Taipei on December 7), the American position was made definite in that China was strongly urged to refrain from a veto.

A telegraphic report of the November 21 conversation in the Department reached the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the following day, and President Chiang asked the American Ambassador to see him, with the Foreign Minister. The President restated the Chinese position, which was reported in an Embassy telegram of November 22.[7] Up to this time no instructions had reached the Embassy in Taipei from the Department.

On November 23, three "niact" telegrams arrived in the Embassy from the Department, the first two of which were personal messages from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles,[8] both addressed to President Chiang and strongly advising against a veto of Outer Mongolia. The President was about to leave Taipei for Sun Moon Lake for a few days rest, but through the Foreign Minister the two messages were translated to him on the day they arrived; he left

---

[2] Despatch 326 summarized press accounts of meetings between officials of the Government of the Republic of China and ambassadors of various nations seeking U.N. membership. It also mentioned that retiring Japanese Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa had called on Rankin on November 16 to inform him that the Japanese Government was one of those seeking Chinese support for Japan's admission to the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12–855)

[3] Document 193.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 168.

[5] Document 168.

[6] See Document 175.

[7] Document 178.

[8] Documents 176 and 177.

Taipei on the morning of November 24. President Chiang remained at Sun Moon Lake until December 14, when he returned to Taipei in order to receive Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker. During this period numerous telegrams were received by the Embassy from the Department dealing with the present subject. These messages were discussed in detail with the Chinese Foreign Minister, whom the American Ambassador saw nearly every day. The Minister, in turn, was in frequent touch by telephone with the President regarding United Nations developments, but evidence was not lacking that President Chiang prolonged his holiday in order to avoid further direct involvement in the matter of Outer Mongolia, and to meditate undisturbed on all of its implications. The Foreign Minister's initial reaction to the messages from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles was telegraphed to the Department on November 23.[9]

Through the Chinese Embassy in Washington, President Chiang replied on November 25 to the two American messages.[10] Although courteous and restrained, he was adamant in maintaining the position that Outer Mongolia would be vetoed if necessary to keep it out of the United Nations. The Embassy at Taipei then telegraphed certain suggestions to the Department (on November 28) as to how the Chinese Government might be offered offsetting advantages which conceivably would persuade it to forego the veto.

On November 28 President Eisenhower sent a second message to President Chiang; it was received in Taipei and relayed to the President on November 29.[11] Also on November 29, USIA issued a release in New York which criticized the Chinese Government's attitude and suggesting that it desired to "commit suicide" as far as the United Nations was concerned. This departure from the established policy of recent years, under which United States-Chinese differences have been dealt with discreetly, was highly annoying to the Foreign Minister and other Chinese. If anything, it further stiffened their position (Embassy Taipei's telegram of November 30[12]). On December 3 President Chiang replied to President Eisenhower's second message, with no change of position.[13]

Secretary Dulles also sent a second message to President Chiang (December 6)[14] which was transmitted to Sun Moon Lake on December 7. That evening the Foreign Minister intimated that if the American Ambassador wished, President Chiang would see him at Sun Moon Lake. The next morning, the Foreign Minister and the

---

[9] Document 181.

[10] Document 185.

[11] Document 188.

[12] Reference is presumably to telegram 507, see footnote 2, Document 191.

[13] See Document 200.

[14] Document 206.

Ambassador flew to Taichung, motored to Sun Moon Lake, spent about three hours with President and Madame Chiang, and returned to Taipei the same day. The conversation was summarized in a telegram to the Department that evening (a more detailed Memorandum of Conversation is enclosed with the present despatch [15]). Again, President Chiang maintained his position, and five days later China vetoed Outer Mongolia. Subsequent events, including the admission of 12 qualified countries out of the original package, brought measurable relief to the Chinese Government in its difficult position.

Comment: It may be noted that from the Chinese standpoint most of the factors which might have permitted a change of front were lacking in this case. These missing ingredients included (1) early information on the precise nature of the "package deal", with consequent lack of time to prepare public and official opinion for a possible shift of position, (2) a quid pro quo, which is so essential to a small, weak nation when it is called upon to make a sacrifice, (3) any threat of sanctions other than eventual ejection from the United Nations, which the Chinese have come to regard as almost inevitable in any case, (4) any "out", or "steps to come down" as the Chinese say, which might have saved face for them in the absence of either carrot or stick. In brief, the Chinese took what they regarded as a sound moral (and legal) position, which happened to coincide with their previous policy and basic inclinations; in this they were impelled by a horror of taking any action which might appear as weakness in the eyes of their own public or of the world at large. Only the strong are likely to feel that they can afford the luxury of yielding unless actually forced to do so.

Throughout this episode matters were made increasingly difficult by excessive publicity, including strenuous efforts by the world press to publish all of the news before it happened. Moreover, the atmosphere was clouded by Chinese suspicion that the United States and others had made a deal behind their backs. The Department's categorical denial (telegram of December 4 [16]) was conveyed immediately to the Foreign Minister and repeated subsequently. This was received with incredulity, which appears to have persisted until December 14, when the Foreign Minister told the Legislative Yuan that the United States "did not learn about the package deal very much earlier than we." Until that time, it had been inconceivable to the Chinese that the Canadians (and British) could have made a deal in October about which the United States was not informed until about November 22. While not accusing the United States directly of having reached an understanding with other countries, while not informing China, President Chiang on December 8 described the package deal as a British project, with the clear implication that perfidious Albion was once more leading the United States down the primrose path toward acceptance of the Peiping regime and a consequent "solution of the problem of Taiwan." Soviet insistence on Outer Mongolia in the present instance was regarded in the Taipei Foreign Ministry primarily as a move to facilitate Peiping's entry into the United Nations. The Red maneuver would seem to have been calculated to further this purpose whether the Government of the Republic of China abstained or vetoed. Accepting their eventual ejection from the United Nations as almost inevitable in view of existing trends, therefore, the Chinese Government felt compelled to take the course of resistance rather than acquiescence.

---

[15] Not found, but the reference conversation is summarized in Document 208.

[16] Not further identified.

Department please pouch copies to Hong Kong, Tokyo, London, Ottawa.

K.L. Rankin

---

230. Memorandum of a Luncheon Conversation, White House, Washington, January 31, 1956, 1 p.m.[1]

ETW MC–4

PARTICIPANTS

US	*UK*
President Eisenhower	Prime Minister Eden
Secretary Dulles	Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Ambassador Aldrich	Ambassador Makins
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Merchant	Sir Leslie Rowan
Mr. Allen	
Mr. Robertson	
Colonel Goodpaster	

[Here follow brief opening remarks by Secretary Dulles concerning his morning meeting with Lloyd and a short discussion of Vietnam.]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted on February 7. This conversation was one of several held between (Continued)

Chinese Representation in the UN

President Eisenhower said that he wished to make clear the American position with reference to Chinese representation in the UN at this time. He stated that sentiment in the country and in Congress was overwhelmingly against the admission of Red China and that under present circumstances he, himself, shared this view. The Communists were still aggressors in Korea, they had tortured our prisoners, had thrown our Nationals into jail without trial and were still holding Americans in prison in violation of their commitment to release them. In international relations, the Red Chinese had violated all the decencies supposed to exist between civilized nations and so long as they remained as they were, he would be opposed to their admission to the UN. If and when they changed, he, at least, would be willing to take another look but even then he would still have a difficult public relations problem with the country at large. The American people, said the President, were deeply resentful of the 140,000 casualties suffered in Korea and he referred to Chou En-lai's recent statement threatening to take Formosa by force, adding that if Red China were voted into the UN, it would not be thirty minutes before a resolution would be introduced upon the floor of the Senate for the US to get out. . . . Secretary Dulles reminded that in the past the period covered had been the calendar year. He pointed out that the 11th Session might not begin until November which would mean that sessions would be continued into 1957. He, therefore, suggested that the new moratorium cover the entire period of the session rather than the calendar year 1956 in order to avoid having to bring up the question again in the middle of the session.

President Eisenhower referred again to US opposition. He pointed out that the UN Charter required members to be "peace loving". The Red Chinese, he said, were still branded as aggressors by UN Resolution; they still had troops in North Korea in defiance of the UN and they should not be allowed to shoot their way into membership.

(Continued)
President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, and their respective delegations during Eden's visit to Washington, January 31–February 1. The identity of the drafting officer is not indicated, but a note on the source text reads: "The attached memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level *only* is now being given restricted circulation to appropriate officials of the U.S. Government *on a need to know basis*." This memorandum was also sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Gordon Gray, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Radford, and to the Embassy in the United Kingdom as well as to the White House.

. . . .

[Here follows discussion of the offshore islands.]

---

231. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, February 1, 1956—11 a.m.

546. Re Chinese representation. For the Secretary from Lodge.

1. There is evidence that the British are seeking to persuade European representatives here of their view that the 11th GA should be called in September, on the grounds that in September it will be easier for the British Cabinet to agree on a moratorium on Chinese representation than it would be in November. This is on the grounds that British Cabinet can give as its excuse the fact of US elections.

2. The trouble with this argument is that it is implicit in all these conversations that the moratorium would not extend beyond the calendar year 1956. Inasmuch as the 11th GA would inescapably go over into January and possibly February of 1957, regardless of when it starts, a moratorium that extends only through 1956 is virtually worthless.

3. What we should have is a moratorium which covers the whole term of the 11th GA and a starting date after US elections, not only because of Chinese question but also because of the fact that Cyprus could also embitter Anglo-American relations.

4. If we are not to have this, I would rather fight the substantive question here on the floor. As I envisage it, this would have to involve initially a motion by a supporter of ChiComs to declare the China seat vacant. This would require a two-thirds vote and if we cannot get a blocking third on an issue of that kind after the election we certainly ought to know it. I think we could get enough votes, allowing for abstention of those who, while not agreeing with us, would abstain in order to prevent split of UN. Am also sure we would be enthusiastically supported by our own public opinion.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2–156. Secret; Niact.

232. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, March 1, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Eden–Eisenhower Talks

The Ambassador then referred to the recent Eisenhower–Eden talks in Washington.[2] He said he was gratified to note the strong position the President had taken in opposition to the Chinese Communists. He asked if it were true that Eden had promised to consult with other members of the cabinet upon his return to London with a view to insuring the continued exclusion of the Chinese Communists from the United Nations.

Mr. Robertson said Eden had not promised anything. The President had stated in the most unequivocal terms the unqualified opposition of the United States to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Eden had simply said that his Government would carefully consider the possibility of continued British support for the present "moratorium" arrangement in the United Nations, and let us know the decision as soon as possible. We have not heard anything from London yet. The President's strong statement as to the unacceptability of Communist China was made to the full British delegation and left them in no doubt where the United States stood on this question.

Ambassador Koo asked if the proposed arrangement was the same as before.

Mr. Robertson said this was correct. It was only the strong stand of the United States which made this arrangement possible.

Ambassador Koo said that various countries which had been friendly now seemed to be receptive to the admission of Communist China. This made the position more difficult.

Mr. Robertson said the situation had been more difficult ever since the Chinese Government's veto of the membership application of Outer Mongolia. Notwithstanding the difficulties of holding the line, the United States is adamant in its stand against Communist China. The United States is absolutely firm on this. There has been no wavering at any time. Both the Republican and Democratic parties are solid on this issue. It is not a partisan question.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Dels, China. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy. A note on the source text indicates that separate memoranda were prepared on the following topics: "Resignation of Ambassador Koo," "Neutralist Trends in Italy and Cambodia," "Geneva Talks with Chinese Communists," and "Secretary's Visits to Taipei and New Dehli," none printed.

[2] See Document 230.

---

233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, May 29, 1956—8:22 p.m.

7212. Believe time has come take preliminary sounding on progress British have made toward decision to support moratorium arrangement on Chinese representation at Eleventh UN General Assembly. In Eden–Eisenhower talks, President and Secretary stressed importance US attaches maintaining position in UN of Government Republic China and exclusion Chinese Communist regime, and Secretary asked UK support for moratorium extending duration next GA—i.e., from November 12 opening through conclusion presumably early 1957. Eden noncommittal but indications were that matter would go to Cabinet and decision be reached near future.

Suggest early opportunity be taken initiate inquiry at appropriate level Foreign Office as to status British consideration this question. Inquiry should avoid appearance of concern at delay, recognizing considerable problems involved for UK, but elicit clues principal factors British thinking. (FYI whether they view problem as straightforward question continuation present formula but for full session or as one of attaching conditions. End FYI.)

We have in mind informal follow up here at Murphy–Makins level.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/5–2956. Confidential. Repeated to USUN. Signed by Wilcox for Hoover.

234. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, June 2, 1956—noon.

5585. Department please repeat USUN. Responsive Deptel 7212 May 29, EmbOff called yesterday on head of Far Eastern Dept FonOff take preliminary sounding on UK willingness continue support moratorium arrangement at 11th session of GA. Embassy recalled Secretary's conversation with Eden on this subject at time of Eden–Eisenhower talks, reminded FonOff of strength of US feeling this subject which bi-partisan in nature, and stated that, whereas there was no question of urgency, it seemed time that UK gave serious consideration to question. Embassy expressed assumption that UKG would doubtless agree to moratorium for duration of session.

FonOff representative stated that issue had lain dormant since Eden–Eisenhower talks and that it had not yet been referred to Ministers, but he agreed that it was time active consideration be given to problem. He said that issue basically political and not one for decision by FonOff. There seems to be some feeling that, whereas UKG might acquiesce in moratorium for balance of calendar year, Ministers might well hesitate acquiesce for entire session which conceivably could extend well into 1957.

For Dept's consideration Embassy suggests that approach outlined reftel might be modified in future conversations to improve negotiating position with British on this issue. We have in mind that completely open-ended inquiries as to status British consideration problem tend to facilitate British injection conditions etc. More promising approach would seem to us to be to imply that there can be little if any question of Brit going along with US in continuing moratorium given importance to Brit of maintaining global US–UK solidarity and that, in assuming their concurrence on continuance, we should concentrate on obtaining decision appropriate tactics for achievement and stress importance moratorium cover full session in view unusual schedule 11th session. Embassy endeavored inject note such confidence re Brit position in conversation reported above.

Aldrich

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6–256. Confidential.

235. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, July 16, 1956—4 p.m.

51. Re Chinese representation. Various conversations recently have given me cause for concern everything necessary is not being done for handling Chinese representation at forthcoming GA.

In addition conversations with Nunez-Portuondo (Cuba) and earlier with Urquia (El Salvador) (mytel No. 40, July 12[2]), I have distinct impression British feel they can temporize on reaching decision re moratorium until elections. I am further convinced there are many among British and others who feel U.S. can be forced into changing its position subsequent to elections.

. . . .

I feel we must seek capitalize this . . . opinion of [name deleted] soonest, taking advantage at same time of reported stand of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in order reach earliest decision on moratorium covering entire session. Suggest Secretary consider early letter to Lloyd requesting decision in favor of moratorium for entire 11th session.[3]

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7–1656. Confidential; Priority.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/7–1256) Emilio Núñez Portuondo, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from Cuba. Miguel Rafael Urqúia, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from El Salvador.

[3] Dulles replied in telegram 28 to USUN, July 20, as follows: "Agree on necessity obtaining UK agreement to moratorium formula covering whole of 11th GA at earliest practicable time. However I do not believe that letter from me to Lloyd would be most effective tactic at this juncture. At my request Murphy, Robertson and Wilcox discussed matter with Makins on June 22 recalling President's conversation with Eden last January and requesting early affirmative reply by UK. There are indications from Embassy in London and from UK Embassy here that reply may be forthcoming shortly. If reply should be unduly delayed however, or in negative, additional steps will have to be considered. In meantime I believe most effective tactic is to assume UK agreement and avoid impression undue concern." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/7–2056)

At the Secretary's Staff Meeting on July 24, Robertson noted that the Senate voted 86 to 0 and the House 391 to 0 against the admission of "Red China" to the United Nations. The Assistant Secretary "said it was his impression that diplomatic circles in Washington and at the UN expected that following US elections there would be an accommodation worked out which would eventually permit the admission of Red China to the UN." Robertson went on to say we should notify the posts of these Congressional actions. Acting Secretary Hoover, who was presiding, agreed, and on August 14, the Department in CA–1391 transmitted to 78 missions abroad the text of H. Con. Res. 265 of July 16 opposing the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations together with a lengthy Report by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Notes of the Secretary's Staff Meeting, July 25; *ibid.*, 310.2/7–2556; CA–1391, August 14; USUN Files, IO, Dels, China)

236. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary's Suite, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, October 7, 1956, 7:45 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Communist Chinese Membership in UN

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Ambassador Lodge	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Douglas MacArther II	Mr. Coulson
Mr. William R. Tyler	Mr. Adam Watson
Mr. William Macomber	

Mr. Lloyd said the UK was prepared to support the moratorium proposal for the full length of the Tenth [*Eleventh*] General Assembly. He thought that to do so might be helpful in connection with the National Chinese Government's attitude toward the Suez item.

The Secretary said he thought this would certainly be helpful. Mr. Lloyd said he understood that the present thinking of the National Chinese Government was that it would abstain from voting on the resolution, and perhaps the UK decision to support the moratorium for the whole GA Session might help.

He added that he would prefer not to inform Ambassador Tsiang himself, as it might smack of trying to "make a deal", and hoped that the matter could be handled so that there would be the best chance of getting Chinese support in the Security Council debate. Perhaps Ambassador Lodge could speak to Tsiang.

It was agreed that Ambassador Lodge would talk to Ambassador Tsiang and inform him of the British decision.

Mr. Lloyd said this notification to the Secretary will come into effect tomorrow morning since he first had to inform the members of the British Commonwealth about it.[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, October 1956. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.

[2] On October 8, Lodge drafted a memorandum for his files that reads as follows: "I told T.F. Tsiang today that I thought I could get the British to agree to extension of the moratorium through the entire period of the next General Assembly if he would agree to vote for the Anglo-French Suez resolution. He said he would vote for the resolution and would make a statement explaining his vote." (USUN Files, Chi Rep)

237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, October 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

Renewal of United States Sponsorship of Japan's Application for U.N. Membership

Discussion:

The recent agreement between Japan and the U.S.S.R. states that the "U.S.S.R. will support Japan's request for admission to membership in the United Nations", but this commitment does not appear to become effective until ratifications have been exchanged. We have been able to obtain no further information with respect to the extent of this commitment.

Ambassador Allison approached the Foreign Office on our instruction (Tab A)[2] and was informed that subject to the report of the Japanese delegation to Moscow on its return to Tokyo, it appears unlikely that Japan will push for reconsideration of its membership application until after a special session of the Diet, convening around November 12, has ratified the agreement (Tab B).[3] The Foreign Office believes that precipitous action now might result in another Soviet veto. This belief on the part of the Foreign Office, together with the possibility, which cannot be precluded on the basis of our present information, that the U.S.S.R. may again try to tie in some manner the admission of Japan with that of Outer Mongolia, makes undesirable any U.S. initiative on this matter until Japan desires it. Otherwise if such an initiative resulted in another Soviet veto, the Japanese might be encouraged to shift to the United States the onus for their continued exclusion from the U.N.

The Foreign Office has also informed Ambassador Allison that it is thinking in terms of a broad co-sponsorship of Japan's application, which would include Australia, Iran, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and asked what the U.S. reaction would be to the inclusion of the U.S.S.R. if the latter so desired. Ambassador Allison on his own volition had the Foreign Office informed that we would consider Soviet co-sponsorship "an insult after all that has transpired." I nevertheless believe that we should be prepared to accept Soviet co-sponsorship if this is necessary to ensure favorable Security Council action on the Japanese application.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, 310.2/10-2656. Secret. Drafted by Virginia F. Hartley. Approved by FE and EUR. A notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum was also approved by Secretary Dulles.

[2] Reference is to telegram 876 to Tokyo, October 23. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10-2356)

[3] Reference is to telegram 945 from Tokyo, October 24. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10-2456)

Mr. Robertson, when he sees Premier Hatoyama in New York on October 25 and 26, will reaffirm the United States strong support of Japan's membership application. He will also express the Department's continuing desire to be of assistance and willingness to request Security Council reconsideration of the Japanese application whenever Japan so desires.

Recommendation:

That the Department stand ready to initiate, alone or with others, a request for Security Council reconsideration of the Japanese application but continue to be guided by Japanese wishes with respect to the timing of such a request and with respect to co-sponsorship in addition to the United States.[4]

---

[4] In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, October 30, reporting on discussions in New York with Prime Minister Hatoyama and other Japanese officials on October 26, Robertson stated that the Japanese had "confirmed our fears" that Japan "obtained little in the way of concessions in their negotiations with the Russians. They *hope* that the Russians will support their application for UN membership. However, they are uneasy due to the fact that the Russians refused to use the word 'unconditional' in describing their support. For this reason the Japanese do not wish to have the question of their admission broached prior to ratification of the Joint Declaration. I assured the Prime Minister that the United States wished to extend all possible help and that Ambassador Lodge would keep in touch with the official Japanese Observer Mr. Kase as to how the Japanese thought we could be most useful." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10–3056)

238. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 8, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Representation of Communist Chinese Government in the UN

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy
Mr. John Maybee, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Robertson—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Miss Bacon—FE
Julian L. Nugent, Jr.—BNA

Ambassador Heeney remarked that the State Department was undoubtedly well aware of the somewhat different emphasis which the Canadian Government placed on the question of Communist Chinese representation in the UN and the general recognition of that country. He simply wanted to say that, despite the somewhat different viewpoint held by Canada, the Canadian Government was prepared to support the "moratorium" procedure at the forthcoming GA.

The Ambassador pointed out, however, that the ability of UN members to renew the moratorium might become very much more difficult next year. He said it was hard to overlook the fact that such a large portion of the world's population was being excluded from the precincts of the UN and thereby deprived of the useful influence which that body was established to foster. Consequently, the present notice of Canadian support for a moratorium should not be taken to imply an indefinite projection of policy that would be adhered to in any and all circumstances.

Mr. Robertson thanked the Ambassador for his notice of support and mentioned that the U.K. had likewise informed us that it would support the moratorium procedure. Mr. Robertson then took the opportunity to remind the Ambassador of the intensity of U.S. opposition to the seating of the Communist Chinese. Congress had made its position unmistakably clear in recent months through a series of resolutions and riders to bills in the course of its sessions. There are probably a number of Congressmen who do not have very definite opinions concerning the matter but the unanimity marking Congressional action shows quite definitely that the legislators are reflecting a popular determination. He commented that highly placed officials from other countries did not always seem to appreciate fully the firmness of U.S. opinion. Ambassador Heeney referred to the planks in both parties' platforms and said that it was his impression that U.S. opinion with regard to the Chinese Communists had hardened rather than softened during the past six months and that he had so reported to his government in Ottawa. He mentioned also the President's conversation with Prime Minister St. Laurent at White Sulphur Springs last March and commented that his Prime Minister had apparently for the first time realized the strength of the U.S. position on this question. Ambassador Heeney gave assurance that he now well understood the U.S. position. He had simply wished to remind us that situations change with world events and that Canada could not regard itself as pre-committed to any specific attitude over an indefinite period.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–856. Secret. Drafted by Bacon. At the end of the source text Bacon wrote: "approved in substance by Mr. Robertson. RB."

Mr. Robertson asked hypothetically, how, in view of the UN Charter and the UN resolution naming the Chinese Communists as an aggressor, the UN could find it procedurally feasible to admit representation from that regime. The Ambassador said that he had not thought through the technicalities of the situation. He thought, however, that the U.S. might find itself confronted at the General Assembly a year hence with a growing demand on the part of UN members to seat the Chinese Communists and wondered what the U.S. would intend to do in that situation. Mr. Robertson referred to the President's statement to the British Prime Minister last January with regard to anticipated Congressional reaction to the seating of the Chinese Communists and said that he thought in this situation other UN members would have to decide whether they preferred U.S. participation in the UN or Chinese Communist participation. Ambassador Heeney replied that of course there was no question on Canada's decision in such a choice.

The Ambassador then asked whether any information was available concerning Soviet plans with regard to Japanese admission into the UN. Mr. Robertson replied that the Japanese, on the basis of carefully recorded minutes, believe that they have a commitment from the Soviets not to veto their application. The Japanese, however, are somewhat worried by a remark by Soviet representatives that it was not possible to say whether or not some other country would invoke a veto. All in all it is believed that the Russians will not actively oppose the Japanese case per se. The Japanese unfortunately are in a basically difficult situation vis-à-vis the Russians since the agreement signed at Moscow on October 19 has still to be ratified. The Japanese Government does not wish to have the Japanese membership application brought up in the Security Council until this agreement has entered into force for fear that the U.S.S.R. might withhold the support promised in the agreement.

The difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S.S.R. over certain islands does not help the general situation. The agreement provides that the Habomais and Shikotan will go to Japan, once a peace treaty is concluded, but the agreement gives no indication of the date when negotiations for the peace treaty are to be initiated. The agreement makes no mention of Etorofu and Kunashiri, the islands which have been the main bone of contention during the entire negotiation and there is every indication that the U.S.S.R. will make conclusion of the peace treaty contingent upon Japan's recognition of Russia's claim to these islands.[2]

---

[2] In a conversation with Christopher Phillips on November 12, Charles Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy, indicated that France would support the existing moratorium concerning the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation, *ibid.*, 310.2/11-1256)

---

239. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly[1]

US/A/3766 *Washington, November 26, 1956.*

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

The Problem

Three applicants have been recommended for United Nations membership by the Security Council since the Tenth Session of the General Assembly—the Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. These three states were admitted without difficulty at the opening plenary of the Eleventh Session.[2]

Three other applicants found qualified for admission to the United Nations by the General Assembly remain outside the Organization because of Soviet vetos in the Security Council. These are Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Viet-Nam. A fourth applicant, Outer Mongolia, has never received the separate endorsement of the General Assembly, although it was included in the membership

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, 11th GA P Books, Committees 1-6. Confidential.

[2] On November 12, at the first plenary meeting of its Eleventh Session, the General Assembly unanimously adopted three separate draft resolutions, submitted by 23 nations, admitting the Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia, respectively, to membership.

"package" proposal adopted by the Assembly in 1955. It has never been recommended for admission by the Security Council. The United States considers Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Viet-Nam well qualified for membership and has urged their admission. We oppose the admission of Outer Mongolia, which we do not regard as an independent state. Outer Mongolia has recently renewed its application, and the USSR may again tie its admission to that of Japan. It may also seek to link the admission of the Republic of Korea and of Viet-Nam with the admission of the Viet Minh and North Korean regimes.

United States Position

1. When Japan is prepared to press its application for admission, the United States in consultation with Japan should be prepared to initiate or support a proposal that the Security Council be convened without delay to recommend admission of Japan.

2. The United States should seek an appropriate occasion as early in the session as possible to make a brief statement reaffirming its belief that Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Viet-Nam are well qualified for membership and deploring their continued exclusion.

3. Following Security Council consideration of the Japanese application, the United States should co-sponsor 1) either a resolution admitting Japan to membership if the Security Council has so recommended; or 2) if the USSR, despite any commitment to Japan, again vetoes the Japanese application in the Security Council because of the Council's failure to act favorably on Outer Mongolia and unless Japan desires otherwise, a resolution reaffirming the Assembly's previous endorsements of the Japanese candidacy and deploring the repeated Soviet vetoes.

4. The United States should consult with other delegations to ascertain their views on an Assembly resolution again endorsing the applications of the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam. The delegation should then consult the Department on whether the United States should take the initiative toward co-sponsoring a suitable resolution; otherwise the United States should limit itself to making clear, in an appropriate statement under this item, its support of these two applicants.

5. In the event any action on Outer Mongolia is proposed, the United States should oppose General Assembly endorsement of the Outer Mongolian application. The United States should seek to avoid Assembly action that would couple Japan and Outer Mongolia in a "package" recommendation.

Comment

Under Article 4(2) of the United Nations Charter, new members are admitted to the United Nations by decision of the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. Soviet vetoes in the Security Council prevented the admission of any new members from 1950 until 1955, when during the Tenth General Assembly sixteen new members were admitted. The USSR, however, again vetoed the applications of three states previously found qualified for membership by the General Assembly—Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Viet-Nam.

Since the Tenth Session of the Assembly, the Security Council has acted favorably on the applications of three newly independent states—the Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. These states were admitted at the opening plenary of the Eleventh Session.

The recent agreement between Japan and the USSR states that the "U.S.S.R. will support Japan's request for admission to membership in the United Nations," but this commitment does not appear to become effective until ratifications have been exchanged. Japan has indicated that it does not desire Security Council consideration of its application before this exchange can take place. Therefore the addition of Japan to the group of states being admitted under Item 5 appears to be precluded by the fact that the Japanese Diet is not scheduled to meet to consider the agreement until November 12. There is, however, a second agenda item on the admission of new Members, and the Assembly can act at any time to admit Japan pursuant to a Security Council recommendation.

In the Security Council in 1955 after an 18 member package failed of adoption following Soviet vetoes of free world candidates and a Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia, a 16 member package which did not include Japan and Outer Mongolia was approved. At that time the U.S.S.R. delegate voiced "the expectation that the question of the admission of Japan and the Outer 'Mongolian People's Republic' . . . [3] will be referred to the next session of the General Assembly". The U.S.S.R. vetoed a United States proposal recommending Japan's admission and a subsequent United States proposal recommending Japan's admission at the 11th General Assembly. A Soviet proposal recommending both Japan and Outer Mongolia for admission at the 11th General Assembly then failed of adoption with only the U.S.S.R. voting affirmatively and all other Council members abstaining. The U.S.S.R. had also vetoed Korea and Viet-Nam. We cannot be sure that the U.S.S.R. may not connect the Japanese application with Outer Mongolia in some form.

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

If the U.S.S.R. should again veto the Japanese application, despite any commitment of support, the United States should be prepared to take the necessary initiative to obtain a reaffirmation by the Assembly of its findings that Japan is qualified for membership and should promptly be admitted. Since there is widespread support among United Nations Members for Japan's admission, an Assembly resolution to this effect would serve to underscore Soviet responsibility for its continued exclusion and to keep pressure on the U.S.S.R. However, in view of the importance attached to United Nations membership by both the Government and the people of Japan, the United States should, before taking such an initiative, consult with Japan and should only proceed if Japan concurs. Otherwise, a United States initiative might be prejudicial to United States-Japanese relations.

The Republic of Korea has been pressing for renewed consideration of its application, and the Republic of Viet-Nam also, though to a lesser extent, is eager for admission to the United Nations, and regardless of the status of the Japanese application, a reaffirmation of United States support of their candidacies as early as possible is desirable. However, so long as the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam continue to be divided states, another Soviet veto in the Security Council appears inevitable, and it was the majority view at the Tenth General Assembly that under these circumstances their applications should not be pressed. This may well be the view of the Eleventh Session also. Refusal of the United States to be guided by the consensus would be badly received under the circumstances as divisive rather than constructive in intent. Moreover, such an item would open the way for consideration of Outer Mongolia's application and for the U.S.S.R. possibly to raise the questions of the North Korean and Viet Minh regimes.

On the other hand, Korea and to a lesser extent Viet-Nam, attach considerable importance to General Assembly consideration of their membership applications and the political consequences of a failure by the General Assembly to discuss the applications would have to be carefully considered.

The decision whether the United States should take the initiative in looking toward reaffirmation by the Assembly of its finding that both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam are qualified for membership should be taken in the light of the degree of support among United Nations members generally and of the wishes of the Korean and Vietnamese Governments.

The United States is opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia. However, in 1955 the United States abstained first in the General Assembly on the "package" proposal which included Outer Mongolia and then in the Security Council votes on Outer Mongolia, in accordance with the spirit of the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution calling for voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to remove the veto from the admission of new Members. Since the last General Assembly, we have consistently and successfully opposed the admission of Outer Mongolia to other organizations and agencies. The deadlock on the admission of new members to the United Nations no longer presents a serious problem, and it should be possible to assure that any Assembly consideration of Outer Mongolia's application this year is not tied in with its consideration of other applications. Forthright opposition to Outer Mongolia at this Assembly is consistent with the position we have taken in other organizations and with our well-known views on this subject, and does not require us to shift from an abstention in the Security Council consistent with the Vandenberg Resolution. Moreover, it is to our interest to make clear our firm opposition to Outer Mongolia with a view to forestalling the build-up of pressures that might again lead to a Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia in the Security Council. As China exercised its veto last year under circumstances in which its United Nations position was involved and despite appeals from the President and the Secretary, we can definitely anticipate that China will again veto Outer Mongolia if that candidacy should receive seven affirmative votes in the Security Council.

---

240. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 14, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Korean Membership in the UN

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Kim Dong-jo, Chief, Political Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Phillip Han, Minister
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, UNP

Ambassador Yang called at his request to reaffirm his Government's strong interest in having the General Assembly take favorable action on its application for UN membership. Ambassador Yang stressed the importance of the U.S. taking the lead so that world opinion can focus on the right of the Republic of Korea, in light of its special relationships to the U.N., to membership in the Organization. Ambassador Yang underscored that the Assembly at this time is particularly favorable to a U.S. initiative.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1456. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Sisco.

Mr. Wilcox emphasized the continued strong support of the U.S. of the Republic of Korea for membership in the UN. He pointed up the importance of not taking any step in the Assembly, unless careful consultations indicate that there will be at least as much support for the Korean application at this time as there has been in the past. Mr. Wilcox added that the U.S. would give careful consideration to the request made by Ambassador Yang.

---

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State[1]

Tokyo, December 14, 1956—6 p.m.

1306. Department repeat USUN. Shigemitsu has sent me letter referring to SC action on Japanese admission[2] and saying:

"On this memorable occasion, I have the honour to express my heartfelt thanks for the part your government has played as a member of the Security Council in bringing about this desired result.

"I shall be very much obliged if you would be good enough to transmit the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government to your government".

Does Department wish suggest specific terms of acknowledgement?

Horsey

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–456. Official Use Only.

[2] Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu's message anticipated the favorable vote in the General Assembly on the admission of Japan to U.N. membership; see footnote 1, Document 243.

242. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)[1]

New York, December 15, 1956.

DEAR BOB: I was very sorry that I had to disturb you last Wednesday with the question of Outer Mongolia in the Security Council, but I had no choice because of the last minute word I received to change the United States position, when I left my arduous negotiations on the "condemnation" resolution to rush out to the Security Council for the election of Japan.

I find that on November 21, we wired the State Department (Delga 150[2]) saying that Japan expected to ask for a Security Council action in early December. Even before that, on October 19th, I raised with Kase the question of how Outer Mongolia was to be handled and reported this to the Department in USUN telegram 378.[3] On December 8th, we notified the Department that the Russians had put in a separate item on Outer Mongolia. The Position Paper on the Admission of New Members (US/A/3766), November 26, 1956, contains this sentence: "Forthright opposition to Outer Mongolia at this Assembly is consistent with the position we have taken in other organizations and with our well-known views on this subject, and does not require us to shift from an abstention in the Security Council consistent with the Vandenberg Resolution."

I understand that the Department had been considering a change in this position for some time before last Wednesday, but that for reasons on which I am not informed, it proved impossible to get instructions to us until we were called on the phone on the morning of the 12th. No one would have been happier than I to vote against Outer Mongolia, but in the absence of instructions to the contrary, everyone here assumed that we would follow the same tactics that we followed last year. Had a firm decision been taken to vote "no" on Outer Mongolia, it would have been necessary for us to explain to the other members why we were making the change. We could have easily done this if we had been given a day or two advance notice.

You are always so good natured that I am sorry when anything arises which creates difficulty for you. I am sure, however, that if I had made a last-minute change of tactics on Outer Mongolia, it would not have been understood and would have caused a great deal of adverse comment here. As it is, we have done what was expected of us and nobody is under the impression that we are lukewarm or uncertain in our opposition to the Outer Mongolian application. And we can still change our position to a "no" if that is what the Department decides it wants to do.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–1556. Limited Official Use.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/11–2156)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10–1956)

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Cabot L.

---

243. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama[1]

December 19, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Please accept my heartfelt congratulations to the Japanese Government and people upon Japan's achieving long-deserved membership in the United Nations. All free nations repose in this organization their confidence for the peaceful future of mankind. The membership of Japan makes this concept more meaningful than ever before. The American people rejoice in the action of the General Assembly today and welcome Japan as a new and worthy associate in the world's struggle for peace.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–1756. Official Use Only. Transmitted in telegram 1285 to Tokyo, December 17, which is the source text. Telegram 1285 instructed the Embassy to deliver to Hatoyama "Soonest upon Japan's admission UN." At the close of the message, the following instructions were also given: "Advise Niact time delivery and arrangements for local release to permit White House to release simultaneously. Department considers public release desirable. In event Hatoyama resigns prior to delivery substitute name of new or acting Prime Minister and inform Department."

On December 18, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a 51-nation draft resolution to admit Japan to membership. These General Assembly resolutions followed Security Council recommendations for the admission of the Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Japan, and Ghana to U.N. membership approved at Security Council meetings of February 6, July 20, and December 12.

On December 18, Chargé Horsey reported from Tokyo in telegram 1339 that "On assumption General Assembly will have acted favorably, have appointment with Hatoyama at 9:30 morning December 19 Tokyo time to deliver message and they agree to release of text simultaneously Tokyo and Washington at that hour. If General Assembly action delayed, I will of course delay delivery and advise new release time." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12–1856) Horsey further reported in telegram 1344 from Tokyo, December 19, that the message was delivered on schedule. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12–1956)

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

244. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, December 20, 1956.

DEAR CABOT: I fully share your regret at the confusion that ensued over the Outer Mongolia vote last Wednesday. We were, of course, aware that this item was on the agenda, but assumed until Monday morning that no further guidance to you was necessary. This assumption was based on the belief that the Secretary's decision of last year with respect to this matter still held, since no change in policy was suggested when the position paper you refer to in your letter was cleared with all the interested areas in the Department. A change in position was not suggested until Monday morning at the Secretary's staff meeting, and no Departmental position could be reached on this suggestion until Wednesday morning.[2] You were informed immediately thereafter.

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership.

[2] At the Secretary's Staff Meeting on December 13, it was reported that Outer Mongolia's application for membership had not been accepted by the Security Council because of five abstentions including that of the United States. "Mr. Murphy said the Department's opinion yesterday was that we should vote against Outer Mongolia, but, after communicating with Ambassador Lodge, it was found that he had promised other Delegations that the U.S. would abstain and could not at that late hour withdraw from that commitment. Ambassador Lodge explained he was following the policy set forth in the Vandenberg resolution that we should avoid wherever possible using the veto on a membership application." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, SM N–493)

For documentation on the Senate Resolution of Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.) approved by President Truman on May 7, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. III, pp. 1–351, *passim*. The text of the resolution concerning international peace and security matters is *ibid.*, p. 118.

I can appreciate your concern over our "last minute change of tactics" and the repercussions it might have had. We will do our best to avoid similar situations in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Bob

---

245. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, January 15, 1957—10 p.m.

Delga 514. Re UN membership (Deptel 485, Gadel 97). [2] We have canvassed following dels on ROK and Vietnam membership res: Canada, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tunisia, Argentina. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Burma, India, Philippines, Denmark, Norway, UK and France.

Only ones who gave definite "no" on ROK were Austria, India, Denmark, Afghanistan, Egypt. Sudan indicated probable abstentions. Tunisia and Burma indicated no instructions and Norway that it hoped issue would not be pressed.

On basis tally so far we think ROK would get two-thirds vote with solid LA support, most of Europe, and scattered Afro-Asian votes, probably along lines vote on hearing ROK in first committee. LAs and most WE states canvassed would also vote against North Korea. Positive support North Korea expressed only by Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Our guess is that North Korea would also be rejected by vote roughly like that against it in first committee, i.e., about 40–20.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–1557. Confidential.

[2] Telegram 485 to USUN, January 3, requested the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations to inform other delegations of "our staunch support ROK and Viet-Nam admission and endeavor elicit support for admission this session." On the basis of these exploratory conversations, the telegram continued, the Department would decide whether a U.S. initiative in this matter would be constructive. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/12–1056) Gadel 97 to USUN, January 11, reported that the Korean Embassy had twice approached the Department in recent days urging "in strongest terms" that the United States table a membership resolution before the United Nations. The telegram then requested the U.S. Delegation to make its own canvass and report the results "soonest." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/1–1157)

Voting on South Vietnam less certain. Canada indicated they faced problem because of ICC membership; Italy stated position not clear but would probably support US; Portugal said had assumed divided countries would not be pressed; Greece, Egypt, Afghanistan and Sudan thought might abstain; Mexico would abstain although other LAs would vote yes; Denmark and Austria would vote no. While two-thirds majority possible on South Vietnam it would be weaker than for ROK and might only be achieved because of number of abstentions and possibly without support several Western countries. Vote on North Vietnam would fail of two-thirds support, again probably with large number of abstentions.

USSR has indicated to Mexicans they would introduce res on Outer Mongolia if res on ROK introduced but would be willing see no action taken otherwise.

In summary, we could probably obtain good majority on ROK and weaker one on South Vietnam, with votes against North Korea and North Vietnam being satisfactory but not too strong.

Aside from this voting check, there is considerable reluctance to take question up at all. UK continues urge against pressing issue, as do Denmark and Norway, with general lack enthusiasm also shown by other friendly dels. Secretariat has prepared paper for possible use Sarper when item reached in committee proposing that he be authorized to inform GA that committee has no recommendation to submit on this issue. This is based on their sense of situation and not, of course, intended to be used if we decide to press issue.

We think that question initiative on ROK should be considered in connection Vietnam and Outer Mongolia and that initiative on one may result in consideration of all.

It would be appreciated if we could have Department's decision by Thursday so that we may inform Secretariat and friendly dels before conclusion apartheid debate.

Lodge

246. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, January 16, 1957—8 p.m.

Delga 527. Re membership. Supplementing Delga 514 of Jan. 15: Munro (New Zealand) told USDel he would support res on ROK and Vietnamese membership and sees no objection to its introduction in GA, realizing Soviets would veto in SC.

Gunawardene (Ceylon) without instructions strongly favors res for ROK membership but tells us Vietnamese membership is complicated and would get less support from Asians and others. Believes we should go forward with ROK res.

Nong Kimny (Cambodia) will ask for instructions but advised USDel to consider Cambodia questionable since his govt may tell him to abstain.

Laos and Thailand will support ROK membership but Laos is uncertain on Vietnam.

Australia supports ROK but is worried over implications of Vietnamese res.

Yang (Korea) informs us two-thirds vote is certain and wants US to introduce res in special political committee at appropriate time. He strongly urged that ROK not be coupled with Vietnam.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–1557. Confidential.

---

247. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, January 16, 1957—8:02 p.m.

104. Re UN membership. View estimate GA support ROK membership application contained Delga 514, [2] Delegation authorized introduce resolution along following lines when Special Political Committee reaches admissions item:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–1557. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Seoul and Saigon. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

[2] Document 245.

The General Assembly

Recalling the resolution of its Fourth Session (296(IV)) finding the Republic of Korea qualified for United Nations membership,

Noting that the Republic of Korea has been excluded from membership in the United Nations because of the opposition of one of the permanent members of the Security Council,

Reaffirms its belief that the Republic of Korea is fully qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations,

Requests the Security Council to reconsider the application of the Republic of Korea with a view to a favorable recommendation thereon. End Verbatim text.

Delegation should at once inform ROK representatives, other friendly delegations, and Secretariat of its intention. Delegation should also endeavor obtain wide co-sponsorship its resolution, particularly among Afro-Asians, order maximize whatever impact GA action may have on USSR from standpoint moral suasion.

Department informing Embassy Saigon Delegation's estimate situation respect Viet-Nam's application and requesting it ascertain Vietnamese desires in those circumstances. If Viet-Nam Government wishes proceed, Delegation should introduce similar but separate resolution on Viet-Nam when it introduces that on ROK. Delegation should not therefore introduce ROK resolution until Vietnamese reaction known.

Department recognizes US initiative behalf ROK and Viet-Nam likely result requests consider applications North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Viet Minh. Delegation should on customary grounds strongly oppose all three applications and vote against them. Avoidance as in past any vote on substance North Korea and Viet Minh applications desirable.

Dulles

248. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Embassy in Laos [1]

New York, January 22, 1957—9 p.m.

4. Re admission Vietnam. Laos acting chief delegate has questioned decision Ourot [2] join US and dozen co-sponsors on introducing resolution calling for admission Republic of Vietnam, and asked his government for instructions on co-sponsoring and supporting draft resolution which has already been circulated with Laos listed among sponsors. To avoid embarrassment for Laos, and others, USDel hopes Lao Foreign Ministry will send affirmative instructions soonest. Debate begins in special political committee Wednesday afternoon, January 23 or Thursday morning. USDel would appreciate any action Embassy Vientiane can take discreetly stimulate favorable decision.

Ourot in Washington scheduled leave New York Wednesday for Vientiane.

FYI—deletion Laos from sponsors would have deleterious psychological effect on Vietnam membership.

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–2257. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to the Department as Delga 561, which is the source text.

[2] Ourot R. Souvannavong, member of the Laotian Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly.

---

249. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State [1]

Vientiane, January 23, 1957—5 p.m.

1187. Department pass USUN/NY niact. Reference: Usun 4 repeated information Department Delga 561. We called on Secretary State Foreign Affairs afternoon 23rd soonest after receipt reference telegram but he had already referred matter to Prime Minister (titular Foreign Minister). This at best makes success doubtful; if Secretary State considered question too hot for him to handle in view Laos present ticklish position vis-à-vis neighbors, Prime Minister may be expected be even more chary of affronting Viet Minh Government. Without wishing shown overanxiety re issue, we nevertheless primed Secretary State re embarrassment to Laos of backing out after co-sponsorship inscribed, as well as effect on relations South Vietnam. Secretary State agreed, particularly with latter in view anomaly wherein Saigon Government has mission accepted and installed here. Again not wishing appear over anxious, we pointed to time factor. Secretary State promised see Prime Minister on matter tonight 23rd if able, if not morning 24th that latest, and get reply off soonest.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–2357. Official Use Only; Niact.

While we not sanguine re affirmative reaction, USDel may wish try stall till morning 24th. Message leaving here afternoon 24th reaches New York morning 24th with international time difference.[2]

Parsons

---

[2] On January 23, Nguyen Qui Anh, First Secretary of the Vietnamese Embassy, telephoned Thomas J. Corcoran of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs from New York to report that the United States, Japan, Cuba, Italy, the Philippines, and Thailand had all spoken in favor of the Vietnamese membership resolution and to record his "great surprise at the Lao decision to withdraw cosponsorship after the Lao Ambassador had promised the Vietnamese Ambassador that Laos would be a cosponsor." What had made "matters worse," Anh continued "was the fact that the senior Lao delegate, Khampan Panya, insisted on raising a point of order and formally withdrawing Lao cosponsorship." (Memorandum of a telephone conversation; *ibid.*)

---

250. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Embassy in Laos[1]

New York, January 24, 1957—1 p.m.

5. Re: membership. USDel appreciates Embassy's immediate action (Vientiane 1187[2] repeated USUN). Unfortunately Lao delegation already received instructions abstain on admission Viet-Nam. Acting representative Panya afternoon January 23 asked Secretariat issue correction deleting Laos as co-sponsors which was circulated at afternoon session of special political committee. Panya made point of order at opening of meeting that Laos listed as co-sponsor as result

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–1457. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to the Department as Delga 576, which is the source text.

[2] *Supra.*

of misunderstanding, he was removing Laos from list, and reserving Laos position. He told USDel that after Laos removed from list he would telegraph Vientiane recommending affirmative support for resolution and change in instructions. Vietnamese ambassador considerably annoyed and upset since Ourot had personally assured him of Laos sponsorship and support. Ourot departed New York evening January 23.

Lodge

---

251. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, January 24, 1957—7 p.m.

Delga 579. Verbatim text. Re membership. Argentina today proposed following amendments our Korean resolution:

Begin text.

"1. Replace the second paragraph of the preamble by the following:

Noting that in the absence of a unanimous recommendation by the permanent members of the Security Council, the Republic of Korea has not been admitted to membership in the United Nations notwithstanding Resolution 296 G (IV) referred to above,

2. Replace operative paragraph 2 by the following:

Requests the Security Council to reconsider the application of the Republic of Korea in the light of this determination, and to report to the General Assembly during the current session or, if that cannot be done, as soon as possible."

End text.

Same amendments with appropriate changes on Vietnam resolution.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–2457. Official Use Only.

Request instructions.[2]

Lodge

---

[2] A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that this telegram was seen by Hartley. Gadel 120 to New York, January 25, reads: "Confirming Pratt-Hartley telecon, Delegation authorized accept Argentine suggestion that in lieu two Argentine amendments there be added end second operative paragraph draft resolutions phrase 'and to report Assembly soon as possible.' " (*Ibid.*) Pratt was presumably James W. Pratt of the Political and Security Affairs Staff of the Mission at the United Nations.

---

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, February 13, 1957—5:11 p.m.

625. Re ROK and Viet-Nam membership. In connection pending GA action ROK and Viet-Nam membership resolutions, Dept disposed believe early SC consideration desirable so that report requested by GA resolution can be made to current session, particularly view US sponsorship "soon as possible" phrase included this resolution. Also obviously desirable avoid possible SC consideration next month when USSR chairman. On assumption SC recommendation again prevented by Soviet veto, GA could then adopt simple resolution in plenary, noting SC failure recommend and regretting continued exclusion ROK and Viet-Nam from membership.

Dept recognizes USSR almost certain raise North Korea, Viet Minh, and possibly Outer Mongolia in connection SC consideration ROK and Viet-Nam applications. You should be prepared vote negatively all three Soviet-sponsored candidates. Neither North Korea nor Viet Minh has ever been found qualified UN membership by GA. GA action Outer Mongolia at tenth session taken only as part of package proposal and not test of latter's qualifications. Moreover, following most recent SC rejection Outer Mongolia last December, GA has taken no further action, even USSR not raising question during recent committee discussion of membership item. View number anticipated negative votes and abstentions believe certain negative votes would not constitute vetos, and could not be interpreted as going against expressed wishes GA. You should also inform other friendly representatives our intention with view to organizing maximum number negative votes and where this not possible, abstentions.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1–1357. Confidential. Repeated to Saigon and Seoul. Signed by Wilcox for the Secretary.

Dulles

---

253. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, March 7, 1957—7 p.m.

Delga 859. Re membership. Confirming Wilcox–Barco telecon was decided not ask SC add ROK and Vietnam membership applications on agenda for meeting today after explaining situation to ROK and Vietnam representatives. Decision taken on basis considerations explained Delga 851 which crossed Gadel 158[2] in transmission. Mission's feeling that today's meeting not appropriate time consider these applications confirmed by canvass other members SC which showed that only China prepared in advance even to call attention to GA resolution favoring admission ROK and Vietnam. As result U.S. requests Philippines, Australia, UK, France, Colombia, and Cuba agreed speak in favor admission. It was obvious no SC member favored consideration these applications this meeting; this especially true of UK and Australia who were anxious focus meeting on new Commonwealth member. We were unable however find any member ROK observer office or representative of Vietnam to explain U.S. intentions. This situation prior to meeting was explained to Department.

U.S. statement referred to GA resolution this session favoring admission Vietnam and Korea and noting their exclusion due only to Soviet veto. Statement asserted U.S. intention request SC meeting to consider GA resolution. Statement also pointed out Korea and Vietnam had successfully established independence, had resisted aggression, occupied respected place in community of nations and fully deserve "to have their voices added to those we have already admitted."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/3–757. Confidential.

[2] Delga 851 from USUN, March 6, dealt with the question of U.N. membership for Ghana and reads as follows: "UK and Australia today requested SC meeting tomorrow morning to take up Ghana. I do not think we should take up Vietnam and ROK during Soviet presidency and propose limit myself tomorrow to statement supporting their membership and indicating our intention to ask for SC meeting in future in accordance GA resolutions. We can then pick time after Soviet presidency which will provide more attention to them and better conditions in SC." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/3–657) Gadel 158 to USUN, March 6, reads in part: "Dept believes UK initiative re Ghana . . . appropriate and you authorized support if UK decides proceed. However, Dept believes SC should at same time reconsider ROK and Viet-Nam applications as requested recent GA resolution, and Mission should so arrange." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/3–557)

Suggest Department may wish inform Seoul and Saigon of situation, explaining awkward facts of Soviet presidency, desire of Council members play up Ghana, and efforts USUN resulting in useful reaffirmations support for ROK and Vietnam.

Lodge

---

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea[1]

Washington, March 9, 1957—5:05 p.m.

670. Following summary USUN report on Security Council consideration ROK Vietnam membership:

Mission feeling March 7 meeting not appropriate time consider ROK Vietnam applications confirmed by canvass other members SC which showed only China prepared in advance call attention to GA resolution favoring their admission. As result US requests Philippines Australia UK France Colombia and Cuba agreed speak in favor admission. It apparent no SC member favored consideration these applications this meeting; this especially true UK Australia who anxious focus attention meeting on consideration Ghana membership.

US made statement at meeting asserting intention request early SC meeting consider GA resolution ROK Vietnam membership. Several other members agreed desirability early meeting and reaffirmed support ROK Vietnam admission. Soviet presiding over SC this month.

Herter

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/3–957. Confidential. Also sent to Saigon.

255. Telegram From Minister of Foreign Affairs Dong to the President of the United Nations Security Council (Sobolev)[1]

Hanoi, March 13, 1957.

Further to my letter of 25 January 1957,[2] on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, I protest to the Security Council against the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 February 1957 recommending to the Security Council that South Viet-Nam should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. This recommendation, which was made at the proposal of the United States and certain other countries, constitutes a violation of the Geneva agreements consecrating the principle of the unity of Viet-Nam. Since Viet-Nam is an indivisible whole, South Viet-Nam cannot be considered as a separate State nor be admitted as such to the United Nations. Moreover, the recommendation is contrary to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth session to the effect that the admission of temporarily divided countries should not be considered. I call upon the Security Council to reject the recommendation of the General Assembly and to refuse the admission of South Viet-Nam to the United Nations.

Pham Van Dong

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, Membership File. A notation on the source text indicates that it is a copy of the translation of the original telegram, which was in French. Presumably translated by officers of the Mission at the United Nations. No copy of the original telegram has been found.

[2] Not found.

---

256. Telegram From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mau to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld[1]

Saigon, April 4, 1957.

With reference to the message addressed on 13 March 1957 to the President of the Security Council by Mr. Pham Van Dong, on behalf of the so-called Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, protesting against the General Assembly resolution of 28 February 1957, recommending the admission of Viet-Nam to membership in the United Nations, a message which you transmitted to me, I should be grateful if you would forward to the President of the Security Council the following communication:

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. A notation on the source text indicates that it is a copy of the translation of the original telegram, which was in French. Presumably translated by officers of the Mission at the United Nations. No copy of the original telegram has been found.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has the honour to draw the attention of the President and members of the Security Council to the fact that it legally represents the entire territory of Viet-Nam, including the area occupied by the de facto Viet-Minh authorities. The instrument known as the Geneva "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam" signed on 21 July 1954 by the French and Viet-Minh High Commands, cannot in international law affect the legal position of Viet-Nam, which remains the same single State that, through the referendum of 23 October 1956, became the Republic of Viet-Nam. That change in the constitutional status of the country is not a factor which can affect the principle of the continuity of the State.

Hence, having examined the application for admission submitted by Viet-Nam, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution of 28 February 1957, requested the Security Council to reconsider the application of Viet-Nam, and not of "South Viet-Nam", as Mr. Pham Van Dong incorrectly expressed it. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam accordingly requests the Security Council to reject outright the protest made by the de facto Viet-Minh authorities and to give effect to the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly.[2]

Vu Van Mau

---

[2] On May 23, Nguyen Duy Lien, Counselor of the Vietnamese Embassy, called on Thomas J. Corcoran on instructions from Saigon "to say the Government of Viet-Nam had heard that the USSR intended to introduce a new proposal in the UN calling for the admission of two Germanies, two Koreas and two Viet-Nams to the UN. Mr. Lien had been instructed to say that the Government of Viet-Nam desired to maintain its previous position that it opposed any proposal that denied the unity of Viet-Nam. He remarked that he had just returned from a three-day stay in New York where he had attended, as an observer, a meeting of the Security Council and that he had heard no rumors of such a Russian proposal. He said that he was unaware of the source of his government's information and requested our comment on the likelihood of such a Russian move." (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/5–2357)

257. Letter From Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[1]

Washington, June 6, 1957.

My Dear Cabot: As you know, I was one of the four delegates who went to Ghana with the Vice President. You know also that in 1955 I took three specialists with me on a long trip in 24 countries of Africa. You have had the report I submitted on that study trip. Since then various departments and bureaus have taken an increasing interest in that great Continent and the people who live there. More and more people will be going to Africa and little by little we shall know more about the hopes and fears, the dreams and the aspirations of the Africans.

That the United Nations saw fit to take Ghana into its membership before it was 24 hours old, highlights what is to me a serious situation, particularly for the United States and the other major countries. Without question the "Asian Bloc" is in control and we shall be finding ourselves more and more at the mercy of small countries too new to responsibility to be able to act for the general benefit of a free world.

Why should there not have been set up a trial period for all "emerging" countries?

When one sees the tragic mistakes being made by Nkrumah, one trembles for him and his country. They may seem but small matters, such as his face on a stamp, the taking over of Christiansborg Castle, his dismissal of Gbedemah, the best financial brain in Ghana, because he refused to mint coins with Nkrumah's face on them, etc., but they are clear indications that he is developing delusions of grandeur that may well wreck his own country and the chances of other countries for their freedom.

My experience at the United Nations is still too vivid for me to have forgotten the problems with which you are surrounded. Perhaps because of this I felt I must give you my sense of it all.

My warm regards to you and that charming wife of yours, and always my appreciation.

Cordially yours,

Frances P. Bolton

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership. Bolton was a Republican from the 22d district of Ohio and served as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighth General Assembly.

258. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton [1]

New York, June 18, 1957.

DEAR FRANCES: Many thanks for your letter of June 6, and for the comments you made on the role of African nations. I share your fears as to the dangers involved in loading the burdens of international responsibility of the kind required by the United Nations upon those not yet ready for them.

But if the State is independent, well-established countries should help in the maturing process and the United Nations is one place where this can be done.

I am not pessimistic regarding the influence of the Asian and African countries in the United Nations. The United States continues to occupy a unique position, which is not subordinate to any "bloc". This was most recently demonstrated during the recent Suez difficulties. Moreover, the Asian-African nations are so diverse that there appears little likelihood that they will ever constitute a solid voting bloc. This too has already been demonstrated at the last General Assembly.

Your suggestion of a trial period is interesting and I will study it myself and will also transmit your thoughts to the Department of State where, coming from you, they are automatically guaranteed the fullest consideration.

Emily joins me in sending you our warmest regards.

Cordially yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge [2]

---

[1] Source: USUN Files, IO, Membership.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

259. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation at the 12th Session of the General Assembly

Problem

Ambassador Lodge's letter to you of August 6 (Tab B) [2] states we have not yet received definite word that the British will support the moratorium on the issue of Chinese representation at the 12th Session of the General Assembly and asks that you seek soon to obtain this assurance.

Discussion

The approach of June 12 mentioned by Ambassador Lodge was made in response to a Department request that he seek United Kingdom agreement to support the moratorium to cover the entire duration of the 12th General Assembly.

The British have given us several indications that they will continue at the 12th General Assembly to support us on the Chinese representation issue, but have not yet given us a specific commitment. In informing Embassy London on July 25 that the United Kingdom would adhere to the moratorium at the IAEA Conference, the Foreign Office asked that this position be kept confidential until mid-August when the United Kingdom would disclose the position to be taken at the General Assembly.

Embassy London was informed by the Foreign Office on August 8 (Tab C) [3] that the Cabinet has now made its decision on the moratorium issue with regard to the Assembly. The Foreign Office informant remarked that, while he could not yet reveal this decision, the recent British decision with respect to the IAEA Conference "should give the Embassy a clue" to the nature of the Cabinet's action. The Embassy expects that formal United Kingdom notification to the United States will be made shortly, probably at USUN.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, 12th GA Session. Confidential.

[2] Not found attached. In this letter Lodge reported that the Mission had no definite word that the British would continue to support the moratorium on Chinese representation. (USUN Files, IO, Dels, China)

[3] Reference is to telegram 1004 from London, August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901/8–857)

Recommendation

It is recommended that you approve the attached draft letter (Tab A)[4] which refers to the report from our Embassy in London, received after Mr. Lodge's letter, that a formal United Kingdom reply is expected shortly.[5]

---

[4] This draft letter to Lodge reiterated the Secretary's concern over the British position on the moratorium on Chinese representation and reported that formal notification from London was expected shortly.

[5] The draft letter cited in footnote 4 above was not sent. Instead, Dulles wrote Lodge on August 20, that according to telegram 1008 from London, August 14 (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8–857), the Foreign Office has instructed the U.K. Delegation to support the moratorium on Chinese representation. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/8–2257) On August 22, Wadsworth reported in telegram 261 from USUN that Crosthwaite had officially informed the U.S. Delegation that day of British support for a moratorium. (*Ibid.*)

---

260. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, September 23, 1957—5 p.m.

Delga 33. Verbatim text. Re UN membership. We propose to discuss following draft resolution on membership Vietnam with UKDel and few others with view cosponsorship if Dept has no objections to it.[2] We doubt whether reference to "veto" will have any adverse effects on voting, but if we find opposition in informal discussions would delete it. Res on Korea on which we will consult at same time, would be identical except for substitution of appropriate resolution numbers and "Republic of Korea".

The General Assembly

Recalling its Resolutions 620 C (VII) and 1017 B (XI) finding Vietnam qualified for membership in the United Nations,

Noting with regret the continued inability of the Security Council to recommend the admission of Vietnam to membership in the United Nations owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council,

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–2357. Official Use Only.

[2] The U.N. General Assembly opened its Twelfth Session on September 17.

Reaffirms that Vietnam is fully qualified for and should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.[3]

Lodge

---

[3] Gadel 15 to New York, September 25, authorized the delegation to proceed with the procedure suggested in Delga 33. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–2357)

---

261. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, September 25, 1957—5 p.m.

Delga 48. Re Chinese representation.

1. Following new votes and changes from 11th GA resulted in 47–27–7 vote for moratorium yesterday. Ghana negative, Japan and Malaya supported. Changes were Ireland and Morocco from support at 11th GA to negative; Pakistan from support to abstention; South Africa from support to absent; Jordan and Libya from abstention to support.

2. GADel will express gratitude to all supporters with emphasis given new supporters, especially Dr. Ismail of Malaya whose short statement towards end of debate was most helpful. Suggest Department express gratitude in Washington and capitals as appropriate, particularly Malaya, Jordan and Libya.

3. Conversely, after Foreign Minister's assurances of support (Karachi 516[2]), we believe unexpected change of Pakistan should not be passed over silently, and will explore here informally and report soonest with recommendation for appropriate representation.

4. We will explore Ghana position . . . . We suspect Ghana, Morocco and others (possibly Ethiopia whose position not clear) influenced by view that support of moratorium would be inconsistent with their support for inscription of Algerian question.

5. . . .

6. Suggest Department use statement Lodge made in plenary just before vote which was accurately calculated meet viewpoint of doubtful states and may be useful to our Ambassadors in their conversations with foreign offices.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2557. Confidential.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 310.2/9–957)

7. Since above prepared we talked to Khan Noon[3] (Pakistan) expressing our surprise they had abstained on final vote. . . . Some hours later Mir Khan informed us it had been error and they had notified Cordier (Secretariat) they wished change vote officially in favor resolution whether or not it had been circulated as official document.

Lodge

---

[3] Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Permanent Representative from Pakistan to the United Nations.

---

262. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State[1]

New York, October 4, 1957—7 p.m.

Delga 117. Re UN membership. We are consulting with dels who cosponsored both membership res last year with view to same group this year. These are Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines, UK and US.

Possibility adding remaining members of 16 who fought in Korea has also arisen. This would include Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Thailand, and Turkey. (South Africa will not be present.) Addition these states would provide advantages for ROK and maintain Dept's continuing contact with them. On other hand it seems unlikely Canada, Thailand and Ethiopia will want sponsor Vietnam.

Would Dept prefer add other members of 16 to ROK with as many as possible to Vietnam or to maintain identical co-sponsorship, which seems easiest to do on basis last years co-sponsors? Would appreciate reply Monday.[2]

Lodge

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–457. Limited Official Use.

[2] Gadel 34 to USUN, October 4, reads: "Dept sees no reason change co-sponsorship ROK and Viet-Nam membership resolutions as arranged last year (Delga 117) but agreeable any group co-sponsors that in Delegation's view likely facilitate impressive affirmative vote both resolutions." (*Ibid.*)

263. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CA–3391 *Washington, October 10, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation Issue at Twelfth Session UN General Assembly

Before the Twelfth Session convened, India requested the inclusion on the General Assembly's agenda of an additional item entitled: "The Representation of China in the United Nations." Pursuant to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure the Indian request was referred to the Assembly's General Committee [2] for consideration.

In the General Committee the U.S. representative proposed that the Committee recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of a draft resolution reading as follows:

> "*The General Assembly*
>
> "1. *Decides* to reject the request of India for the inclusion in the agenda of its twelfth regular session of the additional item entitled 'The representation of China in the United Nations';
>
> "2. Decides not to consider, at its twelfth regular session, any proposal to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

On September 19, 1957, after voting separately on each paragraph, the General Committee approved the draft resolution as a whole by a vote of 9 to 4 (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Ceylon, Norway) with 2 abstentions (Guatemala, [3] Tunisia). (The Chairman of the Committee, by practice, generally does not cast a vote, except to break a tie.)

The General Assembly, in plenary meeting, took up the recommendation of the General Committee on September 23, and after rejecting an Indian amendment, which would have substituted "accede to" for the word "reject" in the first paragraph by a vote of 43 to 29, with 9 abstentions, approved the two-part resolution the following day by a roll-call vote of 48–27, with 6 abstentions.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–1057. Sent to 82 posts and to the Political Adviser on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

[2] The General Committee is made up of the: 1) President of the General Assembly (Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand); 2) eight Vice Presidents; and 3) Chairmen of the seven Standing Committees of the Assembly. The following 16 countries are represented: US, UK, USSR, France, China, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Iran, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] The Guatemalan representative explained his abstention by saying that while he supported the first paragraph of the draft resolution, he had procedural doubts as to the competence of the General Committee to recommend the second paragraph. [Footnote in the source text.]

The final result of the roll-call vote on the resolution quoted above was as follows:

In favor: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan,[4] Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Syria, Sweden, Ukraine, USSR, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Abstentions: Cambodia, Israel, Laos, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia.

Absent: Union of South Africa.

This is the first time that Japan, Ghana and Malaya had an opportunity to vote on this issue in the General Assembly. Of the three, only Ghana cast a negative vote. The speech of the Malayan representative in support of the US proposal on September 24 was most helpful. The text of his short statement is enclosed (enclosure 1).[5] The text of Ambassador Lodge's statement at the end of the debate, which may be useful when discussing Chinese representation with the Foreign Office, is also enclosed (enclosure 2).

Compared to the voting at the Eleventh Session, the following shifts should be noted: (1) Morocco and Ireland, which supported the moratorium in 1956, voted negatively in 1957; (2) Jordan and Libya, which abstained in 1956, voted affirmatively in 1957; and (3) the Union of South Africa, which voted affirmatively in 1956, was absent in 1957.

At their discretion, the posts in those countries which voted affirmatively at the Twelfth General Assembly should express the appreciation of this Government for the support rendered on this issue, even though similar action has been taken by USUN, in New York.

Herter

---

[4] Pakistan abstained when the vote was taken on September 24. The following day, however, Pakistan announced in plenary meeting that it wished to change its vote from abstention to voting in favor. [Footnote in the source text.]

[5] Enclosure 1, "Statement by Dr. Ismail Bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Representative of Malaya, on Chinese Representation in Plenary Meeting of the Twelfth UN General Assembly September 24, 1957," is not printed.

Enclosure 2

Statement by the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)[6]

New York, September 24, 1957.

Mr. President,

The United States and many of those who share our views about this matter have avoided any discussion of substance, but there has been so much said about substance that, under the right of reply, I wish to speak very briefly about that.

The argument that has been made by those who wish to inscribe this item about the representation of China boils down to the one word "realism". In other words, no matter how much you like it or dislike it there it is, and that ought to be enough.

Well, I think that it is true insofar as internal affairs go. It is none of our affair here in the United Nations whether the internal administration of a country is Marxian communist or Soviet communist, whether it is liberty loving believers in social welfare or dictatorial socialists, whether it is competitive capitalism for a great many or monopoly capitalism for a few, or whether it is a mixture of all those things. That is not our business here.

But the question of what they do when they try to spread across their borders is another matter.

We may question, too, how "realistic" the current realism about Communist China is. When one reads the reports of large numbers of refugees streaming into Hong Kong, one remembers Mr. Quisling and the other puppets who governed Europe under Hitler. That makes you remember that the world is in a state of evolution, and that if there is one state of mind which one should not have in 1957 it is a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of things.

But, Mr. President, even if this judgment about the Chinese communists is realistic, let me point out that the United Nations is an organization that is not engaged in promoting realism. It is an organization that has a moral standard. This hall here is not a mere cockpit in which the criminal and the law-abiding are indiscriminately scrambled up. The United Nations Charter says that member states shall be "peace-loving"—"peace-loving", that is the word.

Now if some of us here think that this Assembly, this United Nations, should become a cockpit in which the criminal and the law-abiding are indiscriminately scrambled up—and they have a right to that opinion—the thing for them to do is to go and get an amendment to the Charter converting the United Nations into that type of organization. They should go ahead by amendment to promote their views. But they should not seek to do it by nullification. That is what is involved in the contemplation before us.

---

[6] Delivered in a plenary meeting of the Twelfth U.N. General Assembly.

Now, the record shows abundantly that the Chinese communist regime is not peace-loving. What they did in Korea, what they did in Viet-Nam, what they have done in Tibet, what they have attempted in the Philippines and in Formosa, and what they have tried to do in Malaya—which was listened to when the Representative of Malaya spoke of it with deserving respect—all prove beyond doubt that this Chinese communist regime is not peace-loving. In fact, I don't think they themselves even pretend to be.

I think as the Representative of the United States you would all, putting yourself in my position, understand that I make mention of the fact that in the United Nations military action in Korea to repel communist aggression there, we in the United States suffered 140,000 casualties, of which 35,000 were deaths, and that these were almost all of them inflicted by the Chinese communists—and that is something that it is only human for us to remember.

The fact is, Mr. President, that the United Nations itself officially and formally and after due consideration branded the Chinese communists aggressors in Korea. And it seems to me reasonable to hold that the United Nations settled this issue when it took that position. If it wants to unsettle it, let it repeal that decision. That has never been done.

Now, Mr. President, before I take my seat, let me say that I speak as a friend of the Chinese people, as one who admires the great soul of the Chinese people, its steadfastness, its courage, its individualism, its culture. I speak as the representative of a country whose citizens have had wonderfully close and intimate relations with the Chinese people ever since the beginning of the United States of America.

We oppose this proposal not because of our disapproval of the interior social system, not because the present regime was not popularly elected, not because it came to power by violence, but simply because to admit the Chinese communists would stultify the United Nations and would thus destroy the usefulness of the United Nations.

Feeling this way, it must be clear to all how devastatingly divisive debate on this question would be and why, therefore, we urge our colleagues to oppose the Indian amendment and to support the American proposition.

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan[1]

Washington, October 10, 1957—8:58 p.m.

859. Deptel 851; Tokyo's 1051.[2] Japanese delegate to UN Miyazaki told USDel October 9 Japan had instructed him sponsor resolution Vietnam but not ROK. . . . USDel replied difficult include Japan one resolution and not other in view fact all other co-sponsors identical both resolutions. Resolutions subsequently submitted without Japanese. . . .

Department believes Japanese co-sponsorship both resolutions of greatest importance especially in view Japan's recent election Security Council. Possible for Japan add its name to list co-sponsors in addendum during debate. Its failure co-sponsor Korea because of present stage Japanese-Korean negotiations would be harmful Japan, make Koreans more intransigent and hurt Korea's case in the UN. Department agrees [name deleted] Japanese offer co-sponsor Vietnam but not Korea constitutes conspicuous discrimination against Korea.

Embassy is instructed to raise matter directly with Fujiyama with view convincing him necessity Japan co-sponsor Korean resolution as well as Vietnam resolution. . . .

Herter

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–1057. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN.

[2] Telegram 851 to Tokyo October 9, reported that in view of the importance of Japanese-Korean relations, the Embassy should consider the possibility of directly approaching Foreign Affairs Minister Fujiyama on Japanese cosponsorship of the existing membership resolutions at the United Nations since Japan "might gain good will from announcing decision co-sponsor during debate." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10–957) Telegram 1051 from Tokyo, October 10, reads: "Do not believe approach suggested Deptel 851 would be productive." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10–1057)

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, October 11, 1957—8 p.m.

1082. Pass USUN New York. ReDeptel 859. I saw [name deleted] this afternoon at 4:30 pm and strongly urged desirability of Japanese co-sponsorship of both Vietnam and ROK resolutions. I said in light Japan's co-sponsorship both resolutions last year, failure to do so this year might possibly be construed by some as change in Japan's position with unfortunate implications re Japanese position on Communism. If Japan co-sponsored neither resolution it might also have (a) adverse effect on Japanese reparations negotiations with Vietnam, and (b) make Koreans even more intransigent and difficult. If Japan should only co-sponsor Vietnam resolution, effect on Japan's position might be damaging since some might misconstrue it to mean that Japan using its new and important position in UN as means of pressure on Korea in matter with which UN was not seized. Also I believed it would do damage to ROK.

. . . .

I replied that while I was not personally in position to make such appraisal our people in both Washington and NY sincerely believed such action by Japan would be misinterpreted. I suggested [name deleted] might like to obtain first hand report and recommendations from his own UN delegation.

[Name deleted] said the GOJ had already made decision not to act as original co-sponsor for ROK and that both resolutions have now been tabled. However, he would now make further study of matter and would arrive at decision shortly on Japan's future course of action. He expressed sincere hope that whatever Japan's decision would be, it would not in any way disturb friendly relations between Japan and US.

We agreed to say in answer to press queries as to reason for my call on [name deleted] that I had come to deliver text of Surgeon General's statement re toys and that I would be meeting with [name deleted] again Monday to review his Washington visit. . . . [2]

MacArthur

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/10–1157. Confidential; Niact.

[2] Telegram 1087 from Tokyo, October 12, reads: "Foreign Vice Minister Ohno called this afternoon to state that after studying matter further GOJ had decided to sponsor both ROK and South Vietnam and that instructions to this effect were being sent to Japanese UN delegation in N.Y." (*Ibid.*, 310.2/10–1257)

266. Editorial Note

On October 25, the United Nations General Assembly in plenary session adopted a resolution sponsored by 13 nations, including the United States, calling for the admission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations by a vote of 51 to 9 with 21 abstentions. A similar resolution on Vietnam was adopted by a vote of 49 to 9 with 23 abstentions.

However, neither country was admitted to membership because of repeated vetoes of membership resolutions in the Security Council by the Soviet Union whose representatives argued that the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic Republic of North Korea also were deserving of immediate membership as they fulfilled all of the qualifications set forth in Article 4 of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Representative refused to accept the argument that the General Assembly had recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea.

Thus, as a result of the Soviet vetoes in the Security Council, neither the Republic of Korea nor Vietnam were admitted to United Nations membership.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE LAW OF THE SEA [1]

267. Memorandum by the Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier) [2]

Washington, December 31, 1954.

SUBJECT

Problems of Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf in Inter-American Relations

[Here follow a general introduction and sections dealing with the interests of the United States and of Latin American countries concerning these subjects and with the status of international discussion.]

United States Position

The U.S. position on the entire subject must be considered with close reference to the chain of events indicated above which cannot insofar as it now seems possible be avoided, and which will have an important influence on the final resolution of the problem if any international agreement is to be reached.

Heretofore the United States has, insofar as Latin America is concerned, largely confined its position on this subject to protesting acts or declarations by other governments asserting claims to areas of the high sea in excess of three miles, and to indicating its willingness to enter into conversation agreements where U.S. fishing interests were directly concerned. It is generally recognized that the protests have had little effect on the tendency of these countries to continue to advance, and attempt to enforce, their claims. Nor have projected conservation agreements made much progress.

It has been suggested that the United States should take a firmer position, and perhaps even exert economic or political pressure on other states to induce them to change their position and withdraw from excessive claims. Anyone familiar with Latin American psychology will recognize that overt attempts by the United States to force other states to back down from claims of sovereignty could only have the effect of inflaming public opinion against the United States and making it impossible for the Latin American governments affected so much as to consider any deviation from their claims.

---

[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1656 ff.

[2] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.022/1–355. Confidential. Transmitted to four officers in IO by Dreier under cover of a memorandum of January 3, 1955.

A course of action more likely to be effective is to seek international agreement on the problem of territorial waters, continental shelf and fisheries, with a view to accommodating the genuine interests of other countries while at the same time protecting our interests as fully as possible. A firm insistence on our own rights and expressions of serious concern over the explosive potentialities of conflicts arising over the freedom of the high seas would have a part in the negotiation of such agreement. To accomplish any constructive results, however, the United States would have to develop a position which would gain substantial support from other American republics. The main elements in such a position would probably have to include the following:

1. We must be prepared ultimately to accept a limit of territorial waters to the extent of six or nine miles in place of the three-mile limit which we have traditionally observed. It seems clear that only a small minority of the Latin American countries would accept confirmation of the three-mile limit, and viewing the world-wide situation, it is equally clear that only a minority of nations would support us to the end on this issue. The timing of any statement of our willingness to abandon the three-mile limit would, of course, be determined from the standpoint of tactful [*tactical?*] advantage.

2. Recognition would have to be given to some kind of contiguous zone in which the littoral state would have special jurisdiction, particularly if it were possible to limit territorial waters to six miles.

3. Of special importance would be the development of clear and convincing methods and proposals for achieving the conversation of fishery resources by international agreement so that the necessity for exercising sovereignty over adjacent high seas could not be effectively argued.

4. The economic interest of the coastal state in adjacent high seas and its resources should be recognized. For example, the coastal state might be granted a right to participate in any conservation agreements affecting waters within a given distance from its shores, whether or not the coastal state engages in extensive fishing. It might also be necessary to grant to a state, which did not actively participate in fishing activities, the right to collect fees, in an agreed amount, from fishermen of other nationalities as a means of translating their economic interest into tangible return. Such a right might be eliminated in the event the fishing activities of the coastal state reached a predetermined minimum level.

5. Full support should be given to the claims of coastal states to the resources of the continental shelf along the lines of the ILC

articles.[3] We have already, of course, adopted this position.

6. The effect of a policy along the lines suggested above upon our security should be reviewed with the Department of Defense. If a fundamental conflict is encountered, ways and means might be devised of protecting our security interests by special inter-American agreements based upon the fundamental obligation of continental defense in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

If the general approach indicated above is adopted, our specific policy on the various points mentioned should be formulated with careful consideration as to their effect upon the political support we might hope to get from other Latin American countries. This would very likely require special consultations on this subject with individual countries beginning early in 1955. At the same time as clear a statement as possible should be prepared of just what our maximum and minimum objectives should be at each of the international deliberations listed on page 6, so that tactics as well as substance could form the basis of consultation with others.[4]

---

[3] For text of the Provisional Articles on the Regime of the Territorial Sea prepared by the International Law Commission, see United Nations, *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1954, vol. II, *Documents of the Sixth Session including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly*, pp. 153–162.

[4] This memorandum was revised on January 6, according to a memorandum of February 3, by Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs. (Department of State, Central Files, 720.022/2–1055) No copy of the revised paper was found.

---

268. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, undated.

COMMENTS ON ILC DRAFT ON THE REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations has the honor to refer to the note LEG 292/9/01, dated August 31, 1954,[2] from the Principal Director in Charge of the Legal Department, concerning the Draft Articles on the Regime of the Territorial Sea of the International Law Commission set out in the Report covering the work of its sixth session, 3 June–28 July 1954.[3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.31/1–3155. Sent to USUN in A-249, January 31, for transmittal to the United Nations. The note verbale sent to the United Nations was dated February 3.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 320.22/9–1554)

The Commission prepared a provisional text for all but four of the articles of the proposed draft and requested the comments of Governments on these articles. Among the articles for which no text has yet been drafted is Article 3 concerning the breadth of the territorial sea. With respect to this article, the Commission requested views and suggestions which might help it to formulate a concrete proposal.

So far as concerns the articles now drafted, the Government of the United States believes that they constitute, as a whole, a sound exposition of the principles applicable to the regime of the territorial sea in international law. The Government of the United States has, however, certain suggestions to make with respect to Articles 5 and 19.

Article 5 provides inter alia that where circumstances necessitate a special regime because the coast is deeply indented or cut into "or because there are islands in its immediate vicinity" the base line may be independent from the low-water mark and may be a series of straight lines. The Government of the United States presumes from the comments which follow the article that it was not intended that the presence of a few isolated islands in front of the coast would justify per se the use of the straight line method. The islands, as the comments indicate, would have to be related to the coast in somewhat the same manner as the *skjaergaard* in Norway. In the view of the Government of the United States, the words "or because there are islands in its immediate vicinity" are too general and do not convey as accurately as desirable what the Commission apparently had in mind.

With respect to Article 19, the Government of the United States is satisfied that the text incorporates principles upheld by the International Court of Justice in its judgment of April 19, 1949, in the Corfu Channel case,[4] but it believes that the comments on this article should include a short statement of the factual circumstances upon which the court was ruling, since such a statement would point up and illustrate the significance and meaning of the principles embodied in Article 19.

So far as concerns the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and the various suggestions set out in paragraph 68 of the

---

[3] For text of this report to the General Assembly, see *ILC Yearbook*, 1954, vol. II, pp. 140 ff.

[4] For text of this judgment, see International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders*, 1949 (Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff's Publishing Company, no date), p. 4.

Report,[5] the guiding principle of the Government of the United States is that any proposal must be clearly consistent with the principle of freedom of the seas. Some of the proposals amount to a virtual abandonment or denial of that principle. In this connection it must be pointed out that the high seas are an area under a definite and established legal status which requires freedom of navigation and use for all. They are not an area in which a legal vacuum exists free to be filled by individual states, strong or weak. History attests to the failure of that idea and to the evolution of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas as a principle fair to all. The regime of territorial waters itself is an encroachment on that doctrine and any breadth of territorial waters is in derogation of it; so the derogations must be kept to an absolute minimum, agreed to by all as in the interest of all.

That the breadth of the territorial sea should remain fixed at three miles, is without any question the proposal most consistent with the principle of freedom of the seas. The three-mile limit is the greatest breadth of territorial waters on which there has ever been anything like common agreement. Every one is now in agreement that the coastal state is entitled to a territorial sea to that distance from its shores. There is no agreement on anything more. If there is any limit which can safely be laid down as fully conforming to international law, it is the three-mile limit. This point, in the view of the Government of the United States, is often overlooked in discussions of this subject, where the tendency is to debate the respective merits of various limits as though they had the same sanction in history and in practice as the three-mile limit. But neither 6 nor 9 nor 12 miles, much less other more extreme claims for territorial seas, has the same historical sanction and a record of acceptance in practice marred by no protest from other states. A codification of the international law applicable to the territorial sea must, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, incorporate this unique status to the three-mile limit and record its unquestioned acceptance as a lawful limit.

This being established, there remains the problem of ascertaining the status of claims to sovereignty beyond the three-mile limit. The diversity of the claims involved bear witness, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, to the inability of each to command the degree of acceptance which would qualify it for possible consideration as a principle of international law. Not only does each proposed limit fail to command the positive support of any great number of nations, but each has been strongly opposed by other nations. This defect is crucial and, in view of the positive rule of freedom of the sea now in effect in the waters where the claims are made, no such claim can be recognized in the absence of common agreement. A codification of the international law applicable to the territorial sea should, in the view of the Government of the United States, record the lack of legal status of these claims.

---

[5] Reference is to the nine divergent opinions on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea expressed during the Commission's debates. For text of paragraph 68, see *ILC Yearbook*, 1954, vol. II, p. 153.

While unilateral claims to sovereignty or other forms of exclusive control over waters heretofore recognized as high seas cannot be regarded as valid, this is not to say that the reasons, legitimate or otherwise, which motivate such claims should be ignored. In some cases, at least, these attempts of the coastal state to appropriate to its exclusive use large areas of the high seas seem to be based on a real concern for the conservation of the resources of the sea found in such waters. Efforts of the Commission and of the nations to settle such problems should be unceasing. But the remedy is not unilateral action in defiance of long established and sound principles of law applicable to other matters. In many cases the nations taking such action would seem to have little to gain from abandonment of such principles and reversion to a condition of anarchy on the high seas. The sounder approach would appear to be an effort to reach agreement on the principles applicable to the real matters at issue, such as conservation of natural resources and rights to fish.

---

269. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs (Yingling) to the Legal Adviser (Phleger)[1]

Washington, February 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

Problems of Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf in Inter-American Relations

This paper is in response to your request for comments on Ambassador Drier's memorandum entitled "Problems of Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf in Inter-American Relations".[2] The background part of that memorandum will not be considered, since it is largely derived from other memoranda or position papers of this office or of the Government. The comments will be confined to that part of the memorandum on "United States Position" and the numbered paragraphs will relate to the numbered paragraphs in the memorandum beginning on page 8. [3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, L/SFP Files: Lot 68 D 47, Box 1594. Confidential.

[2] Document 267.

The suggestion that the use of discreet firm pressure on Latin American Governments should be carefully considered is strongly seconded. Recently the Mexican authorities have apparently stopped seizing American shrimp fishing boats. It has been publicly reported that this change of attitude has been brought about by threats of American shrimp fishing interests to support legislation barring the sale of shrimp in the United States markets by Mexican fishing interests. If there are any official reports in the Department on this I have not seen them. However, the story seems to make sense. Also pertinent in this connection is a recent report from our Embassy in Lima in connection with the imposition of fines on two American fishing boats which put into Callao. The Embassy reported that Peru had expressed regret at the incident due especially to its possible unfavorable effect on the tuna tariff question in Washington. It is suggested that when the Latin Americans are given to understand that seizures of our boats outside the three-mile limit no longer are going to result in easy money, but are going to be met with economic retaliation or such other measures as will make such action unprofitable, seizures will stop. Where the South American countries are actually concerned with conservation, we can meet them at least half way, but where their objective is the exaction of tribute, we might well revert to a famous historic position on that subject.

1. The suggestion that the United States position should recognize the economic interest of the coastal state in the resources of adjacent high seas is concurred in and is consistent with present United States fisheries policy as this office understands it and with the statement of policy [4] which went to the Secretary after general departmental clearance. As indicated above, it is believed that in such matters we can meet the South Americans more than half way in an effort to conclude conservation agreements.

2. The contiguous zone principle is not inconsistent with American interests or policy as we understand them. There is already fairly general recognition in international practice of the right of coastal states to exercise jurisdiction outside of territorial waters with respect to customs, fiscal and, perhaps public health matters. However,

---

[3] The numbered paragraphs in Yingling's memorandum do not coincide with those in Ambassador Dreier's memorandum of December 31, 1954. Apparently, Yingling used the revision of January 6, 1955, as his reference source; see footnote 4, *ibid.*

[4] Not further identified.

it is believed that recognition of other rights in contiguous zones is a matter which must be developed on a worldwide basis, and that while its discussion with the Latin Americans is not precluded, agreement should be reached only on a worldwide basis.

3. This paragraph requires no comment, since United States policy and United States law recognize the right of the coastal state to the resources of the continental shelf along the lines of the ILC articles. The conflict with the Latin Americans is over the status of the waters above the shelf outside of a proper limit of territorial waters. On this United States law and policy are firm and we cannot recede.

4. While the United States might ultimately be willing to accept some wider limit of territorial waters than three miles, if world agreement could be reached thereby, it is believed that thinking along this line at the present time is not only inconsistent with United States law and policy but is premature and dangerous. The policy of the executive branch of the Government, contained in a paper "National Claims in Adjacent Seas"[5] approved in 1953 by all executive departments having an interest in the matter, is that the United States must continue to maintain its traditional position and to oppose claims to territorial waters more than three miles in breadth. This policy was confirmed by the President in a letter to Senator Daniel and others in which he stated that there had been no change in the traditional position of the United States, and that it would continue to be the policy of the United States to assert the right of its nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas outside of the three-mile limit for territorial waters.[6] The three-mile limit of territorial waters was written into law in the Submerged Lands Act subject to the right of the Gulf coast states to establish an historic claim limited to nine miles. It is understood that the Department of Justice will take the position in a suit soon to be filed in the Supreme Court with respect to the Tidelands Oil legislation that the Gulf coast states' claim to more than three miles is without legal basis. Until there is a change in the law and policy our position vis-à-vis other countries is clear and even a suggestion that we might be willing to abandon the three-mile position could be disastrous. Not only is that the only breadth of territorial waters which has ever had any sanction as a general rule of international law, but it is the one most consistent with the freedom of the seas which is a cardinal position of United States policy. These views have just been af-

---

[5] Dated March 19, 1953; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 2, p. 1674.

[6] See the memorandum of October 29, 1953, from Under Secretary of State Smith to the President, *ibid.*, p. 1695.

firmed in the United States comments to the United Nations on the draft articles on territorial waters submitted by the United Nations International Law Commission. Once we indicate any willingness to abandon the three-mile limit with its strong legal, traditional and logical basis, we will have had it as far as any bargaining position with other nations on such matters as fisheries, conservation of natural resources, etc. is concerned.

While it may be true that "only a minority of nations would support us" on the three-mile position, if "minority" is based on a head count, the implication that this position cannot therefore be maintained does not necessarily follow. As pointed out in the statement of policy recently sent to the Secretary, the states still adhering to the three-mile rule represent not only most of the powerful states of the world, but they represent a great preponderance of its merchant shipping and naval power. It is not likely that any matter of such serious concern to these nations as freedom of the seas is going to be determined ultimately on a head count, except in a superficial sense. This is not to say that the views of the less powerful countries can or should be ignored, or that our efforts to change their position by one legitimate means or another can be relaxed. It *is* to say that our position cannot be abandoned simply because it is faced by a numerical majority.

5. Perhaps the most adamant adherent of the three-mile position, and the policy to support that position, is the Department of Defense. It is because of the effect which a change in that policy would have in wartime, perhaps more than any other single reason, that the United States must maintain its traditional position on the three-mile limit. It is doubted, however, that there will be any serious conflict on this aspect of the matter with the Latin American countries.

The proposal for special consultations with individual countries of Latin America as early as possible in 1955 is believed to be a good one, provided the necessary preliminary preparation is made. Such preparation would necessitate close collaboration between L and ARA. It is suggested that such conversations should have two general objectives: (a) to assure the Latin American countries that the United States is sympathetic to their desires for fisheries conservation in the waters off their coasts and is prepared to work out with them agreements concerning conservation and fishing rights; and (b) to persuade the Latin American countries to change their views concerning the breadth of territorial waters.

With respect to (a), it should be made clear in whatever way is most feasible that, while the United States recognizes their interest in the resources of the sea off their coasts and is willing to negotiate agreements which will protect the interests of all parties concerned, it is not going to pay tribute for the exercise of its right to fish in the high seas. As pointed out in our statement of policy sent to the Secretary, the International Technical Conference called by the United Nations to meet in Rome in April 1955[7] affords the United States a major opportunity to contribute to the solution of fisheries conservation problems through international agreement. It is not known whether the position to be taken by the United States at that Conference has yet been fully developed. The major responsibility for this is U/FWs, but it is hoped that the position will be developed in conjunction with the other interested offices of the Department.

With respect to (b), it should be made clear that in the view of the United States the extreme positions taken by the Latin American countries with respect to territorial waters are without legal sanction, that they cannot win in the long run and that in the meantime they can only be harmful to good relations with the United States and with other friends of Latin America, and that they are not the right way to achieve such legitimate objectives as motivated them.

. . . .

---

[7] For text of Resolution 900 (IX), adopted on December 14, 1954, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its Ninth Session from 21 September to 17 December 1954*, p. 51.

---

270. Memorandum From Warren F. Looney of the Office of the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Director of the Office of International Conferences (Kissick)[1]

Washington, February 8, 1955.

SUBJECT

International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, to be convened at Rome April 18, 1955

During its Ninth Session the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted, on December 14, 1954, a resolution calling for an International Technical Conference on the Living Resources of the Sea, to be convened at Rome on April 18, 1955.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.245 RO/2–855. Confidential.

The United States initiated this resolution after consulting with a number of other governments and winning their support as co-sponsors. Its ultimate aim in so doing is not fully apparent on the face of the resolution and the nature, extent, and importance of the U.S. interests involved must, therefore, be viewed in the light of other current developments. These are:

(1) The pronounced trend, during the last decade, toward the unilateral assimilation by coastal states of adjacent high seas to the national control for the purpose of controlling the exploitation of natural resources in and under those waters;

(2) The forthcoming meeting (Spring, 1955) of the International Law Commission during which it will take up the subject of the regime of territorial waters as well as certain aspects of the regime of the high seas. Included in the latter are high seas fishing rights in relation to conservation, and it is on this subject that the Rome Conference is expected to advise the ILC;

(3) The meeting in the fall of 1955 of the Inter-American Council of Jurists on the subject of territorial waters and related matters. This is another forum in which, by its terms of reference from the Organization of American States, opportunities will be large for subjective recommendations to the OAS prejudicial to U.S. high seas fisheries and territorial waters policies;

(4) A projected 1955 Specialized Inter-American Conference on the submarine shelf and oceanic waters at which attempts will be made by proponents of extended territorial waters and sovereignty to establish a basis in law and practice for existing and future high seas claims by endorsement of such action on a regional basis;

(5) The mandate given the ILC by the UN to complete and submit its recommendations on the whole of the topics "Regime of the High Seas" and the "Regime of Territorial Waters" for consideration by the GA at its Eleventh Session in 1956.[2]

These are the events and they are tied together by a common denominator: The future course of generally accepted state practice in regard to the breadth of territorial waters and extraterritorial controls of one kind or another over natural resources. The underlying problem involved in the various meetings is the desire of a large number of countries to retain for their own future exploitation the resources of the continental shelf, and superjacent waters, and the efforts of some countries for that purpose to extend their sovereignty not only over the continental shelf but also over areas of the high seas extending as far as 200 miles from their coasts. The U.S. has no argument with claims to the continental shelf. But claims to territorial waters in excess of the three-mile limit conflict with the U.S. position and damage our traditional policy of maintaining the freedom of the seas.

---

[2] For text of General Assembly Resolution 899 (IX), adopted on December 14, 1954, see GA (IX), *Resolutions*, p. 50.

The work of the Rome Conference, therefore, can have wide implications favorable to the U.S., depending upon the extent to which perhaps the heaviest contributor to high seas claims—fishery conservation, can successfully be extricated from the overall problem and dealt with on its own merits. The fundamental position of the United States with reference to the fisheries problem is that conservation can best be achieved by application of soundly executed scientific programs involving international agreement among states concerned, and does not in any sense require the extension of sovereignty over coastal waters beyond the three-mile limit. Establishment of a sound precedent in this respect at Rome would affect the consideration of this matter in other forums throughout the world.

For your future information, I am attaching a copy of the provisional agenda and related documents for the Rome Conference;[3] a copy of a recent circular instruction; and a copy of a draft of instructions to the U.S. Delegation to Rome.[4] The latter has not been cleared as yet. This will be attended to as soon as Mr. Herrington returns from abroad in mid-February.

The matter of an appropriately sized and constituted delegation to represent the U.S. at the Rome meeting has been given careful thought. Taking into consideration that (1) the U.S. is responsible for this Conference having been called, that (2) it is expected by the co-sponsors to assume the leading and coordinating role; that (3) the Conference is world-wide in scope; that (4) it brings into issue questions affecting U.S. high seas fishing operations east, west, and south; and that (5) treatment of its subject will have a heavy impact upon the related subjects of territorial waters and continental shelf; it is recommended that the delegation should be comprised of a minimum of nine persons (six delegates, three advisers), as follows:

[Here follow a list of the names and qualifications of the six proposed delegates (three from the Department of State, three from the Department of the Interior, and three advisers from the American fishing industry), and a request to take the necessary steps to secure approval of the delegation.]

---

[3] The provisional agenda, annotations to the agenda, and a list of background papers (A/CONF. 10/1, 2, and 3) were transmitted to the Department by USUN in despatch 610, February 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.245 RO/2–855)

[4] Regarding the instructions sent to Herrington, see footnote 2, Document 272.

271. Memorandum by the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife (Herrington)[1]

Washington, April 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position Relative to International Fisheries Conservation Principles

1. Our Past Position.

In the past the U.S. has not favored or encouraged the development of world-wide conservation principles or regulations and has not participated in discussions and suggestions in response to inquiries circulated by the International Law Commission. It was our position that no action at the world level was needed since we had been successful in negotiating and implementing satisfactory conservation agreements covering our international fishery problems and we have felt that as new problems developed it would be possible to negotiate agreements suitable for their handling. It was thought that this was the most practical procedure and could be used elsewhere if true conservation problems existed. We have played an important role in negotiating and operating seven international conventions for the conservation of living resources of the sea. These range from the Fur Seal Convention which became effective in 1911 to the North Pacific Fisheries Convention which became effective in 1954. The older Conventions, Fur Seal, Halibut, and Fraser River Sockeye Salmon, have been brilliantly successful in establishing and maintaining the resources. The newer conventions are generally making encouraging progress toward solution of their problems.

The interested segments of the U.S. public, particularly the commercial fishing interests of the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf areas, were particularly in strong support of the policy that we avoid commitment to general policies at the world level in favor of ad hoc action with respect to specific problems.

2. New Developments.

Many of the nations of the world have, or believe they have, serious unresolved international conservation problems. In consideration of this, the International Law Commission, on instructions of the General Assembly of the U.N., has proceeded with the exploration and development of proposals for international law respecting high seas fisheries. The U.S. has taken no part in this development and the results in their present form do not appear either practical or acceptable to the U.S. or, we believe, to a majority of nations.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.245 RO/4-1355. Official Use Only. Dictated by Herrington before his departure for the Rome conference, with a request that it be sent to Meeker.

A number of countries have claimed jurisdiction over wide areas of the high seas which they tried to justify as providing the only way in which fisheries conservation could be assured. The differences between these claimants to extreme jurisdiction and the supporters of the traditional concept of the freedom of the seas have become increasingly great and there has been a strong tendency recently for the more extreme groups to solidify their positions by joint action. A small group of states of Latin America are striving strenuously to establish a regional position on international fishery principles and to implement these claims. There is increasing probability that such unilateral claims implemented by force will be countered by force unless means are developed for resolving the differences at a world level. The differences cut across the free-world countries; the argument between the U.K. and Iceland, affecting NATO; the Japan–Korea fishery jurisdiction question, affecting cooperation in the Far East; and growing differences between the U.S. and certain Latin American countries, disturbing relations in the Western Hemisphere.

3. Current U.S. Position.

Because of these developments the U.S. has shifted from a passive to an active position with respect to developing agreement on a satisfactory set of world-wide conservation principles. This new position has been taken because it now appears to offer the most promising approach to resolving or reducing jurisdictional disputes. If agreement is reached on a satisfactory set of conservation principles, then the question of jurisdiction over oceanic areas can be resolved on its merits without becoming entangled in the conservation problem.

Through an extensive series of meetings and discussions with representatives of the U.S. fishing industry, these groups have come to appreciate the over-all problem involved and have been brought into sufficient agreement with respect to international conservation principles as to permit the U.S. to take the initiative in promoting world agreement in this field. This enlightened position of the U.S. industry has been greatly facilitated by the fact that in our various international fishery conventions we have worked out practical solutions for most of the international problems which the International Law Commission has been studying. It is believed that by generalizing and expanding some of these proved solutions a basis is provided for the development of international principles which are both sound and practical.

4. Action.

In 1953 the International Law Commission recommended to the United Nations General Assembly's consideration a set of fisheries articles.[2] These were received too late for consideration at the 1953 session of the General Assembly. Since then these fisheries articles have been studied at length by the United States. It is our opinion that the International Law Commission has in these articles done an excellent job in pointing up basic international fisheries problems for which new principles are needed. However, we have some technical disagreement with respect to the wording and to certain of the procedures recommended. It is our opinion that some of these procedures would be impractical in their application and that there is no possibility of developing support for them from the majority of nations. In view of this, the U.S. took the initiative in sponsoring a General Assembly decision to convoke an international technical fisheries conference to study these problems and types of solutions. This Conference, to be convened at Rome April 18, 1955, has two functions; (1) to acquaint nations with the nature and seriousness of the problems and develop agreement on acceptable solutions, and (2) to bring the conference's findings and recommendations to the attention of the International Law Commission to assist that body in a reconsideration of its fisheries articles. With this background, the International Law Commission would be enabled to make recommendations to the General Assembly which have a far better chance of general acceptance.

5. Implementation.

At its Ninth Session the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution to convene a world fisheries conference at Rome on April 18, 1955, which conference is to report its findings to the International Law Commission. It is expected that the International Law Commission will have for consideration during its Spring 1955 session the report of the fisheries conference. It should have an opportunity to make any changes in its draft fisheries articles as it sees fit and to submit these revised articles to member governments for their study and comment later this year. It is expected that the International Law Commission will in 1956, prepare its final recommendations on fisheries articles and submit these to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly.

At the regional level, the problems concerned with the regime of the high seas will be considered by the Inter-American Juridical Committee during the summer of 1955. The report of this Committee will be considered by the Inter-American Council of Jurists at its meeting early in 1956. The regime of the high seas and the matter of the continental shelf will be considered by a Specialized Technical Conference to be convened by the Organization of American States, probably in the Spring of 1956.

---

[2] See *ILC Yearbook*, 1953, vol. II, pp. 217–218.

It will be noted that the first in this series of meetings will be at the world level. This appears to be highly desirable to minimize the possibility of regional blocs reaching positions which the world bodies will be unable to reconcile.[3]

---

[3] For additional information on the U.S. position on the conservation of fisheries resources, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1955, pp. 696–698.

---

272. Current Economic Developments[1]

Issue No. 468 *Washington, May 24, 1955.*

[Here follow pages 1–18 of the report.]

UN Conference on Fisheries

The UN International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea was held at FAO headquarters in Rome April 18 to May 10, 1955.[2] Its purpose was to make scientific and technical recommendations to the International Law Commission on problems related to the development and conservation of fisheries, so as to better enable that Commission to discharge its responsibility of making recommendations on the regime of the high seas to the UN General Assembly. It was the consensus of the conference that it was not competent to express any opinion as to the appropriate extent of the territorial sea, the extent of the jurisdiction of the coastal state over fisheries, or the legal status of the super-adjacent waters of the continental shelf. The over-all results were considered satisfactory or better by most of the delegations present, including our own.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, *Current Economic Developments:* Lot 70 D 467. Secret.

[2] Herrington was appointed Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, which included two other delegates (Oscar E. Sette and Arnie J. Suomela, both from the Department of the Interior) and six advisers. The list of delegates and advisers is *ibid.*, Central Files, 398.245 RO/4–1155. The Department's instructions to Herrington, dated April 12, with detailed annexes, are *ibid.*, 398.245 RO/4–1255.

Forty-five countries participated as voting members, and six sent observer delegations. In addition, twelve international organizations had observers present.

Conference Conclusions The final report and conclusions were accepted by all except a few delegations, which filed reservations. Among the latter were Chile, Peru and Ecuador. In the report's conclusions the conference notes with satisfaction conservation measures already carried out in certain regions and for certain species at the national and international level. International cooperation in research and regulation for the conservation of high seas fisheries is deemed essential, and the conference considers that wherever necessary further conventions for those purposes should be negotiated. The conclusions show agreement on a definition of the objectives of conservation, of which the principal one is to obtain the maximum yield which will be sustainable. The conference agreed that when formulating conservation programs, account should be taken of the special interests of the coastal state in maintaining the productivity of the resources of the high seas near to its coast. It endorsed the present system of international fisheries regulation, which is based on the geographical and biological distribution of the marine populations covered by individual conventions signed by the nations concerned.

Seven guiding principles are set forth for formulating fisheries conventions: 1) A convention should cover one or more stocks of marine animals capable of separate identification and regulation, or else a defined area, taking into account scientific and technical factors. 2) All states fishing the resource and the adjacent coastal states should have the opportunity of joining the convention and of participating in the consideration and discussion of regulatory measures. 3) Conservation regulations introduced under a convention should be based on scientific research and investigation. 4) All signatory states should as far as practicable participate directly, or through the support of a joint research staff, in the scientific research and investigation carried out for the purposes of the convention. 5) All conventions should have clear rules regarding the rights and duties of member nations and clear operating procedures. 6) Conventions should clearly specify the kind or types of measures which may be used in order to achieve their objectives. 7) Conventions should provide for effective enforcement. Nothing in these guiding principles is intended to prevent states from making agreements on such other fishery matters as they may wish or to limit the authority or responsibilities of a state to regulate its fisheries on the high seas when its nationals alone are involved.

The conference concludes that conventions and the regulatory measures taken thereunder should be adopted by agreement among all interested countries. It recognizes, however, that disagreements may arise over scientific and technical matters relating to fishery conservation and recommends that nations agree to refer such differences to the findings of suitably qualified and impartial experts chosen by the parties concerned on an ad hoc basis.

The conference considered the problem created when the intensive exploitation of offshore waters adjoining heavily fished inshore waters affects the abundance of fish in the inshore waters pending the establishment of an adequate conservation regime for the area. It was agreed that this problem required further study.

During the discussions the Latin American bloc made a strong attempt to obtain a conference decision that the coastal state should regulate fisheries off its coast when the states concerned are unable to reach agreement on a conservation program. The conference was more or less evenly divided on the question of whether consideration of the rights of coastal states was outside its competence. By a vote of 21 to 20 the conference decided it did not have the necessary authority.

The results of the conference substantially reinforce the US position on fisheries conservation and, it is hoped, will enable the International Law Commission to make recommendations to the UN General Assembly which will be satisfactory to the US. The conference conclusions are indirectly favorable to the US position on the juridical question of territorial waters, since they disclose that proprietary claims over the high seas are not necessary to ensure the conservation of resources. Conservation objectives are usually cited as the basis for claims to sovereignty over the high seas.

---

273. Editorial Note

On May 13 Herman Phleger delivered an address before the American Branch of the International Law Association in New York City entitled "Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High Seas." Among the matters discussed by Phleger were freedom of the seas, conservation of fishery resources, and the Continental Shelf. The text of the address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1955, pages 934–940.

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece[1]

Washington, June 16, 1955—6:04 p.m.

3312. Department informed International Law Commission adopted following at Geneva:

"1) The Commission recognizes that international practice is not uniform as regards traditional limitation of the territorial sea to 3 miles. 2) The Commission, without taking any decision as to the question of the proper extension of the territorial sea, considers that in any case international law does not justify the extension of the territorial sea beyond 12 miles."[2]

ILC now considering additional proposals by François.[3] "Subject to any historical right which a state might claim over a greater breadth, the breadth of the territorial sea which a state can lawfully claim against all other states is 3 nautical miles. Other states are under an obligation to recognize territorial waters fixed by the coastal state at a greater breadth than that laid down in the foregoing paragraph only if: one, they have assumed treaty obligations in the matter or claim an equal or greater breadth for their own territorial sea; two, they have been parties in a case which has given rise to a judgment by the International Court of Justice or an award by a court of arbitration recognizing the legitimacy of .the extension."

These proposals favored by 6 members Fitzmaurice (UK), Scelle (France), El Khouri (Syria), Sandstrom (Sweden), Edmonds (US), Garcia Amador (Cuba), Francois (Netherlands). Opposed by 6 members Krylov (USSR), Zourek (Czechoslovakia), Salamanca (Bolivia), Amado (Brazil), Spiropoulos (Greece), Hsu (China).[4]

US Government considers proposals Francois essential to prevent chaotic world conditions respecting territorial waters and numerous bitter controversies between States. Effective fisheries conservation can be much better and more cooperatively handled on a friendly basis through fishery articles now favorably considered by ILC than by extension of territorial waters. Extension of territorial waters would increase complications of navigation and effectiveness of naval patrols as well as have other disadvantages to maritime and naval nations.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.022/6–1655. Confidential; Niact. Also sent to Taipei and repeated to Geneva.

[2] See draft articles on the Regime of the Territorial Sea adopted by the International Law Commission at its seventh session, which met from May 2 to July 8, 1955, in *ILC Yearbook*, 1955, vol. II, pp. 34–41. The Commission, at the same session, also adopted draft articles on the Regime of the High Seas; for text, see *ibid.*, pp. 20–34.

[3] Professor J.P.A. François of the Netherlands, Rapporteur Spécial of the International Law Commission for the Regime of the High Seas and the Regime of the Territorial Sea.

[4] Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Georges Scelle, Faris el-Khouri, A.E.F. Sandstrom, Douglas L. Edmonds, Francisco V. Garcia Amador, S.B. Krylov, Jaroslav Zourek, Carlos Salamanca, Gilberto Amado, Jean Spiropoulos, and Shuhsi Hsu, Members of the International Law Commission for their respective countries.

You are instructed immediately make strong representations to the Governments of Greece and China[5] in support of Francois proposals making clear importance to security interests of Allied Powers and expressing hope that an adequate understanding of the situation can be brought to the attention of Mr. Spiropoulos, Athens and Mr. Hsu, Taipei.

Hoover

---

[5] Appropriate representations were made to the Chinese and Greek Governments. Shao-Hwa Tan, Minister of the Chinese Embassy, informed various officers of the Department of State on June 29, that his government had suggested to Dr. Hsu his full cooperation with the U.S. Delegation. The Department spokesman pointed out to Tan the great importance attached by the United States to the 3-mile limit, particularly from the standpoint of allied naval operations. (Memorandum of conversation by Yingling; Department of State, Central Files, 320.31/6–2955)

The Greek Foreign Office, on July 1, advised the American Embassy that in the interests of its national security, the Greek Government would not support the François proposals. (Telegram 2 from Athens, July 1; *ibid.*, 700.022/7–155)

---

275. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Kirlin) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hughes)[1]

Washington, November 28, 1955.

DEAR MR. HUGHES: Reference is made to the letter from Mr. Jones of September 21, 1955,[2] requesting the views of the Department concerning a proposal by the Secretary of Defense that, subject to the approval of the President, certain areas of the Outer Continental Shelf be restricted from exploration and exploitation pursuant to the provisions in Section 12(d) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 1953 (67 Stat. 462) which provides in part as follows:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.022/9–2155. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Yingling and Joseph M. Sweeney.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

"The United States reserves and retains the right to designate by and through the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, as areas restricted from exploration and operation that part of the outer Continental Shelf needed for national defense; . . . [3]"

(1) In Section 2(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Outer Continental Shelf is described as the submerged lands lying seaward of the three-mile limit and "of which the subsoil and sea bed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control". Section 2(a) appeared in exactly the same words in the Senate bill which eventually became the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In connection with this section, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated in its report:

"The Continental Shelf is defined as the extension of the land mass of the continents out under the waters of the ocean to the point where the continental slope leading to the ocean bottom begins. This point is generally regarded as a depth of approximately 100 fathoms, or 600 feet, more or less". Report No. 411, 83d Cong., 1st Session 4 (1953)

It will also be noted that, when the United States first claimed jurisdiction and control over the resources of the continental shelf in the Presidential Proclamation of September 28, 1945, the Press Release accompanying the proclamation stated:

"Generally, submerged land which is contiguous to the continent and which is covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered as the continental shelf". [4] Senate Report No. 411, 83d Cong., 1st Session 53 (1953).

It is thus clear that in proclaiming the jurisdiction and control of the United States in the continental shelf adjacent to its coast, this Government meant, both in 1945 and in 1953, to claim jurisdiction and control of submerged lands up to the 100 fathom line.

A large number of the areas which the Secretary of Defense proposes to restrict from exploration and exploitation extend beyond the 100 fathom line. To the extent that they do they appear not to be within the purview of Section 12(d) of the Act and consequently not appropriate for designation by the Secretary of Defense thereunder.

The position adopted by this Government with respect to the 100 fathom line has become an accepted feature of the continental shelf principle as it is now understood in international law. It has been embodied in the drafts prepared on this subject by the International Law Commission of the United Nations.

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

[4] The full text of the White House press release is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, p. 1528.

One of the most serious difficulties with which the United States has to cope in this field is the attempt by a number of states to claim, by invoking the continental shelf principle, rights which have no direct genuine relationship to it. An order purporting to extend the control and jurisdiction of the United States beyond the edge of the continental shelf could only serve to reinforce the contention of these states that they do not have to limit their claims to the continental shelf. It would clearly weaken our own position, as well as the strength of the international support which our position presently receives.

Yet, these adverse consequences would be incurred without any prospect of securing a worthwhile advantage in return; for the exploitation of resources beyond the edge of the continental shelf is generally not considered, so far as can be foreseen at present, to be a practical possibility, and hence there is no need to prohibit such exploitation.

(2) The designation of restricted areas in those portions of the continental shelf where there is a boundary problem with adjacent states seems premature and could lead to undesirable controversies.

The Presidential Proclamation of September 28, 1945, stated with respect to boundary problems which might arise in connection with claims relating to the continental shelf:

> "In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another state, or is shared with an adjacent state, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the state concerned in accordance with equitable principles". 59 Stat. 884.

No action has yet been taken to determine the boundaries between our continental shelf and that of Canada and Mexico. So long as the termini of our boundaries with these states have not been extended from the coast to the edge of the continental shelf, it is advisable to restrict from exploration and exploitation only such areas as are sufficiently remote from the boundary region to be clearly within our jurisdiction and control.

In the present order, however, certain of the areas or parts of the areas which have been designated as restricted are located in boundary regions and may not be within our jurisdiction and control. If the eastern terminus of the United States-Canadian boundary were extended to the edge of the continental shelf, the eastern edge of Area No. 1 and the whole of Area No. 6 in the proposed order might well be on the Canadian side of the shelf. And Area No. 76 appears to embrace portions of the continental shelf belonging to Mexico since they are located far south of the western terminus of the United States-Mexican boundary.

Moreover, a special problem is raised by Areas No. 49 and No. 50. Their eastern edge embraces a portion of what appears to be a submerged area of a depth of 100 fathoms or less, separated from the Florida Keys in the North and from Cuba in the South by channels deeper than 100 fathoms. The status of this area is by no means clear, but Cuba might conceivably also claim some jurisdiction and control over it.

(3) What has been said above relates solely to the proposed restrictions on the exploration and exploitation of the outer continental shelf as shelf and is not to be taken as the expression of any views as to the use of the superjacent seas and air space for the defense purposes indicated. It has been the position of this Government since the Presidential Proclamation of 1945 that the rights of a state in the continental shelf cannot affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas or the legal status of the air space above them, a position which has been endorsed by a large number of nations and by the International Law Commission of the United Nations as representing a correct statement of applicable international law. In order to avoid any implication that the defense activities planned in the superjacent waters or air space necessarily rest on claims to the continental shelf it would seem preferable to designate the restricted areas simply by their geographical limits and without reference to specific military purposes.

(4) The Department of State believes that it is not in the interest of the United States, from the standpoint of its foreign relations, for the President to approve the proposed order as it is now drafted.

Sincerely yours,

Florence Kirlin[5]

---

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

276. Editorial Note

The Tenth Inter-American Conference, which met in Caracas in March 1954, passed a resolution calling on the Council of the Organization of American States to convene a Specialized Conference to study the juridical and economic aspects of the continental shelf and oceanic waters, and their natural resources. To prepare for the Conference, the Council requested the Inter-American Council of Jurists, its technical advisory organ on legal matters, to make a preparatory study on the legal aspects of the subjects to be treated at the Specialized Conference. The Council of Jurists met at Mexico City from January 17 to February 4, 1956, and passed a resolution by a vote of 15–1, with 5 abstentions. The resolution stated that the 3-mile limit for territorial waters was insufficient and did not constitute a rule of international law and that each state was competent to establish the extent of its territorial waters within reasonable limits, taking into account geographical, geological and biological factors, and its economic and security needs. The resolution also dealt with the continental shelf, conservation of the living resources of the high seas, base lines, and bays. The measure was vigorously opposed by the United States Representative. For an account of the meeting, as well as the texts of the resolution and of the formal declaration and reservation by the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1956, pages 296–299.

Instruction 6347 to all American diplomatic offices in the other American Republics, February 18, informed them of United States concern over actions taken at the Inter-American Council of Jurists meeting in Mexico City in January. The Department of State concluded that vigorous action should be taken to correct the situation created by the adoption of the Mexico City Resolution, and requested the Chief of each Mission to communicate the United States position to the President or Foreign Minister of the country to which he was accredited. He was to emphasize the fact that the extension of territorial waters was of particular concern from the standpoint of security. That extension over wide areas of the sea, and airspace above, would create large and complicated problems in connection with necessary naval and air activities, not only in the Western Hemisphere but also in other areas of the world associated with the defense of the Americas. In addition, the Mexico City action had led to a highly unfavorable reaction in the United States, and similar actions at the Ciudad Trujillo Conference were likely to reduce seriously Congressional and public support for programs planned to contribute to the progress and development of Latin America.

Emphasis was to be put on the fact that the Mexico City resolution was completely unacceptable as a basis for discussion at Ciudad Trujillo. If it became the basis of consideration there, the United States saw no way to avoid open controversy, with unfortunate political consequences. The United States believed that a positive solution would be for a mutual understanding in advance of the

Ciudad Trujillo Conference regarding a resolution to be adopted there.

The Chief of Mission was instructed to deliver an Aide-Mémoire to the President or Foreign Minister, incorporating paragraphs 6 to 8 of the instruction which read as follows:

"6. The United States believes it would be extremely helpful for a firm understanding to be reached in advance of the Ciudad Trujillo Conference regarding a principal declaration which would constitute the main resolution to be adopted there. This resolution should be drafted in such a way as to take advantage of agreement wherever agreement exists and to avoid resolutions on aspects which remain the subject of sharp controversy. Specifically, the United States has in mind that the Ciudad Trujillo Conference adopt a resolution covering recommendations on the following points:

> "a) that all States accept the responsibility to cooperate in international efforts to assure the conservation of the resources of the sea.
>
> "b) that States directly concerned with specific fishery conservation problems enter into agreements for the purpose of establishing and maintaining adequate conservation regimes for the fishery resources involved.
>
> "c) that the special interests of the coastal State in the continued productivity of the fishery resources in the high seas contiguous to its coast be recognized through granting it the right (1) to participate in any research and regulatory program for the conservation of such resources even though its nationals do not engage in the fishery, and (2) to impose conservation measures based on scientific findings which are required to maintain the productivity of such resources and which will be applicable to the nationals of other countries, when the need for such action is urgent and agreement between the States concerned has not been possible, and subject to adequate provision to protect other nations against discriminatory or arbitrary measures.
>
> "d) A declaration regarding the rights of the coastal State over the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf (a relatively noncontroversial subject).

"7. The above declaration would, of course, be in addition to the various technical reports which the Ciudad Trujillo Conference might make, and would, in the opinion of the United States, constitute a definite and constructive contribution to the inter-American consideration of these important questions. It is recommended that the Ciudad Trujillo Conference not attempt to resolve the question of the breadth of territorial waters, but that if some expression on this subject is felt necessary, a resolution be adopted recognizing that the diversity of views with regard to territorial waters must be resolved on a world-wide basis through appropriate international consultation taking into account the numerous legal, economic, technical and security considerations involved.

"8. Thus, the Ciudad Trujillo Conference could adopt a program which would:

"a) set aside the problem of the breadth of territorial waters, without favoring or opposing the divergent positions of any of the States;

"b) give due recognition to the importance of international cooperation as the basis of the conservation of the resources of the sea; and

"c) recognize limited special rights and interests of the coastal State to be taken into account in the future development of the juridical regime of the high seas and continental shelf." (Department of State, Central Files, 397.022 IA/2–1856)

---

277. Memorandum Prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Group [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Basic Position of the United States re OAS Specialized Conference on Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the basic approach of the United States to the OAS Specialized Conference on the Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters which is to be held at Ciudad Trujillo in March 1956.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.022 IA/1–2356. Confidential. Approved by Murphy on January 30. A covering memorandum attached to the source text from Holland to Murphy, January 23, indicates that the paper was prepared by an informal working group established to carry out preparations for the conference. The group was composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Navy, Interior, and USIA.

A letter from Phleger to J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, dated January 31, transmitted a copy of the paper to the Department of Justice for clearance. (*Ibid.*, 397.022 IA/1–3156) Rankin, in a letter to Phleger, dated February 3, reported that Justice saw no objection to the paper. (*Ibid.*, 397.022 IA/2–356)

Another copy of the source text in Department of State files was attached as Tab B to a memorandum from Kissick to Wilcox, dated February 17. Tab A was a report on the agenda for the conference; Tab C, a memorandum from Holland to the Secretary of State, February 10, and an attachment that Holland proposed as a supplement to the source text. Holland's memorandum stated that irresponsible action disregarding the U.S. position, such as the resolution passed at Mexico City, undermined the usefulness of the OAS. He proposed that the United States make Latin American countries aware "that any repetition of the Mexico City performance at Ciudad Trujillo will inevitably impair our ability to implement the generous and constructive policies of economic cooperation which we have been pursuing with them. . . . We must be prepared to risk the consequences of making good on our warning regarding economic assistance if the Conference at Ciudad Trujillo does not produce an acceptable resolution." (*Ibid.*, 397.022 IA/2–1756)

Situation

The Conference is not one which the United States views with pleasure. The resolution calling for it was adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas as a means of avoiding a thoroughly undesirable resolution supporting the thesis of Chile, Ecuador and Peru that States have a right to claim 200 miles of the ocean off their coasts. The decision of the Caracas Conference has made it inevitable that the Ciudad Trujillo Conference be held. It is, therefore, necessary that the United States attend and exercise a restraining influence on the deliberations and conclusions insofar as they tend to oppose U.S. policy.

The United States has interests throughout the world in the problem of the regime of the high seas. Our views on this problem are shared by countries with important high seas fishing and maritime interests, most of which are located outside the Western Hemisphere. Opinion of the Latin American States generally favors wider extension of territorial waters than the United States would agree to and would grant other forms of jurisdiction to the coastal States over adjacent oceanic waters. For all these reasons, the United States prefers that any ultimate agreement on principles of international law to be incorporated in a regime of the high seas should be developed in a United Nations meeting rather than in a regional meeting of the OAS. The United States is, therefore, not prepared to make any basic concessions in its position on the regime of the high seas at the Ciudad Trujillo Conference.

Three factors create special difficulties for the United States at the Ciudad Trujillo Conference. The Latin American States generally lack trained scientists in the fields of geology, oceanography and related studies, particularly marine biology. This opens the Conference up to the danger that conclusions in the scientific field will be pressed on the basis of preconceived political opinions rather than scientific knowledge.

Moreover, there is a strong tendency on the part of the Latin Americans to think in juridical terms and enunciate basic juridical principles as the final product of any conference. This tendency is directly in conflict with the desire of the United States to avoid the adoption of resolutions on the regime of the high seas at a regional meeting.

Finally, it is clear that the Ciudad Trujillo Conference will be the scene of a determined effort by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, parties to the Santiago Declaration of 1952, to press for the adoption of resolutions which will support the principles of the Santiago Declaration, including the alleged right of coastal States to claim sovereignty or jurisdiction over wide areas of the high seas to a distance of at least 200 miles.

Basic U.S. Position

In the face of this situation, the basic position of the United States must be to urge that the Ciudad Trujillo Conference be conducted with the view to discussing, exploring and clarifying the nature of the problems which face the American republics in regard to the conservation of the resources of the continental shelf and oceanic waters rather than for the purpose of reaching conclusions on those subjects. As the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic recommended, it should be recognized that the Conference is the first one to be held on this subject by the OAS; that the subject is in all its ramifications one of extreme complexity; and that sustained and detailed study of the various technical, economic and legal phases of the problem is necessary before sound conclusions in any of these fields can be reached. Ill-advised and premature conclusions must be avoided. Methods of pursuing further study of the various problems referred to should be indicated as one of the principal results of the Conference. The various committees at the Conference should therefore be encouraged to submit to the plenary reports summarizing discussions rather than the usual batch of resolutions.

In order to reinforce that position, it is necessary for the United States to make clear in advance its firm decision to oppose any efforts to come to conclusions at this Conference on such controversial matters as the extent of territorial waters, the granting of a right to the coastal State to impose its jurisdiction over the high seas, or the creation of a recognized contiguous zone beyond territorial waters wherein fishing will be subject to control by the coastal State. It must be made clear that any attempt to put across decisions on these subjects will promote open controversy with the United States and other interested countries, and that the Conference will under those circumstances run the danger of failure and consequently of bringing discredit upon the OAS.

Specific U.S. Objectives

In the scientific field, the United States should emphasize the importance of the scientific approach as the basis for conservation particularly with reference to fisheries. Our Delegation should come prepared with a series of papers to be presented which will outline the present state of knowledge in these fields and the significance thereof; stress the lack of adequate knowledge in all parts of the

Hemisphere; and indicate the areas in which additional study and research is most urgently required. The nature of research procedures should be clarified. In this connection, emphasis should be placed upon the need for national studies of domestic fisheries and fishery resources and establishment of adequate records of fishing operations and catches, as the basis for sound development of the fisheries and conservation. The establishment of any centralized OAS institute of oceanography for the Americans should be discouraged as being a less effective procedure for solution of problems concerned with development and conservation of fishery resources than national studies and cooperative undertakings among directly interested countries. The experience of European countries, in fact of all countries with major fisheries, might be cited as examples.

In the economic portions of the agenda, the United States should stress the importance of the conclusions of the Rome Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea. A strong demonstration should be given of U.S. achievements in the field of fishery conservation. An opportunity should be given to hear the accomplishments of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission preferably through a statement by its Director. It should be made clear that economic utilization of the resources of the continental shelf are not inconsistent with the maintenance of the superjacent waters as high seas.

In the juridical field, the United States must firmly and consistently oppose any thought of drafting conventions or treaties of any kind at this meeting. We should emphasize that as a general rule clarification of scientific and economic aspects should precede the adoption of legal conclusions. Moreover, the United States should take the position that resolutions should not be considered on subjects on which a wide cleavage of positions is evident at this stage. While most of the juridical discussions should be summarized in the form of reports, in general keeping with the general policy mentioned above, the United States can indicate its willingness to go along with resolutions on the following subjects: acceptance by States of a responsibility to promote the conservation of the living resources of the sea; desirability of agreements negotiated directly by all interested parties for the conservation of such resources; and the right of coastal States to participate in any such agreements covering waters adjacent to their coasts.

278. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to Secretary-General of the United Nations Hammarskjöld[1]

Washington, March 9, 1956.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to note No. LEG 292/9/01, dated August 24, 1955, from the Legal Counsel,[2] concerning the report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its seventh session, May 2 to July 8, 1955.

Chapter II of the report contains provisional articles concerning the regime of the high seas, and Chapter III contains draft articles on the regime of the territorial sea. The Commission has invited comments on these drafts.

1. Provisional Articles Concerning the Regime of the High Seas

Article 1 defines the high seas and Article 2 affirms the principle of freedom of the high seas. There follow thereafter three chapters: Chapter I—Navigation; Chapter II—Fishing; and Chapter III—Submarine Cables and Pipelines.

Articles 1 and 2

The Government of the United States is in agreement with the definition of high seas in Article 1 and with formulation of the principle of freedom of the seas in Article 2.

Chapter I. Navigation

The Government of the United States believes that the articles in this chapter constitute as a whole a sound exposition of the principles applicable to problems of navigation.

Chapter II. Fishing

So far as concerns the articles in this chapter, the Government of the United States submits the following comments:

Article 26: The first paragraph of this Article would enable a State operating only occasionally in a fishery to insist that a State with a substantial operation in the same fishery enter into negotiations with it for a conservation program; failing such negotiations an arbitral procedure would be invoked. In order to remove the possibility of abuse, the United States suggests the insertion of the word "substantial" before "fishing" in paragraph 1.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.31/3–956.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 320.31/9–255)

Also under this paragraph, a State could request another State to enter into negotiations even though their nationals were not engaged in fishing the same stock of fish. In the view of the United States, the right of a State to request such negotiations, and consequently to initiate the arbitral procedure contemplated in the next paragraph, should be limited to instances where their nationals are engaged in fishing the same stock of fish. It is suggested, therefore, that the words "fishing in any area of the high seas" be replaced by the words "substantial fishing of the same stock or stocks of fish in any area or areas of the high seas", and that the words "conservation of the living resources of the high seas" be replaced by the words "conservation of such stock or stocks of fish".

Under paragraph 2 the scope of the authority of the arbitral body in making determinations under Article 26 is not clear. For example, the role of the arbitral body with regard to conservation proposals that may have been made by one or more of the disagreeing States is not indicated. Nor is it indicated whether the arbitral body would be authorized to originate proposals for conservation measures. The United States is of the opinion that, so far as proposals are concerned, the authority of the arbitral body should be limited to consideration of conservation proposals of the parties to the dispute; and that the arbitral body should not be empowered to initiate conservation proposals or to enlarge upon any that originate with the parties.

Moreover, it would seem advisable and appropriate to specify criteria for the guidance of the arbitral body in making determinations under this Article.

In the view of the United States, the arbitral procedure contemplated by the second paragraph of Article 26 should be based on criteria specifically set forth in this Article. These criteria should be:

"If these States do not, within a reasonable period of time, reach agreement upon the need for conservation or as to the appropriateness of conservation measures proposed by any of them, any of the parties may initiate the procedure contemplated in Article 31, in which case the arbitral commission shall make one or more of the following determinations, depending upon the nature of the disagreement:

> "(a) whether conservation measures are necessary to make possible the maximum sustainable productivity of the concerned stock or stocks of fish;
>
> "(b) whether the specific measure or measures proposed are appropriate for this purpose, and if so which are the more appropriate, taking into account particularly:

"(1) the expected benefits in terms of maintained or increased productivity of the stock or stocks of fish;

"(2) the cost of their application and enforcement; and
"(3) their relative effectiveness and practicability.

"(c) whether the specific measure or measures discriminate against the fishermen of any participating State as such.

"Measures considered by the arbitral commission under paragraph 2(b) of this Article shall not be sanctioned by the arbitral commission if they discriminate against the fishermen of any participating State as such."

Article 27: The comment of the United States on paragraph 1 of Article 26, in so far as it relates to identifying the fishing with stocks of fish as against areas, applies also to paragraph 1 of Article 27.

Likewise, the comment on paragraph 2 of Article 26 that the scope of the authority of the arbitral body should be limited and that specific criteria should be set forth, applies to paragraph 2 of Article 27. The criteria suggested for Article 26 should be incorporated in Article 27.

Furthermore, the United States believes that the operation of Article 27 should be subject to an important qualification, the principle of abstention. This principle is described in detail hereinafter.

Article 28: The United States understands the special interests of the nonfishing, contiguous coastal State to be of two principal types.

First, the coastal State is interested in seeing that the living resources in high seas near to its coast are maintained in a productive condition, since its nationals might at some future time desire to participate in these resources. Such an interest would be protected by assurance that an adequate conservation program is being carried forward.

Second, the coastal State has an interest in conservation measures applied to high seas contiguous to its territorial waters in so far as these specific measures affect, directly or indirectly, resources lying inside territorial waters. Furthermore, in most instances, a fishery resource occurring in contiguous high seas will extend into the territorial waters. For these reasons the nonparticipating coastal State may have an interest in the specific conservation program referred to above. The interests described in this paragraph can be safeguarded by giving the coastal State, upon satisfactory showing of a special interest, a right to participate fully in the conservation program.

Article 30: The United States understands that this Article is intended to safeguard the interests of the nonfishing States whose nationals may depend on the products of the fishery or who might some day desire to participate in fishing the resource. Specifically, the interest is in the continued productivity of the resource and should be exercisable through assurance that such States have an opportunity to challenge the fishing States as to the adequacy of the over-all conservation program for the resource, as distinguished from a voice in the specific conservation measures. In this connection, specific criteria should be established for the guidance of the arbitral body, as well as language which would clearly except from challenge the programs of States within their own boundaries, for example, the erection of dams which might affect the runs of anadromous fish.

The United States suggests that the words "If no agreement is reached within a reasonable period, such State" in the second paragraph of Article 30 be replaced by the words "If satisfactory action is not taken upon such request within a reasonable period, such requesting State . . . . "[3] The United States also suggests that the following criteria be incorporated in this Article:

> "The arbitral commission shall, in procedures initiated under this Article, reach its decision and make its recommendations on the basis of the following criteria:
>
> "(a) whether scientific evidence shows that there is a need for measures of conservation to make possible the maximum sustainable productivity of the concerned stock or stocks of fish; and
>
> "(b) whether the conservation program of the States fishing the resource is adequate for conservation requirements.
>
> "Nothing in this Article shall be construed as a limitation upon the action a State may take within its own boundaries."

Article 31: With respect to the appointment of an arbitral commission when the parties have not agreed upon a method of settlement, the United States would suggest the following modifications:

The Commission should be composed, in any combination, of seven members well qualified in the legal, administrative or scientific fields of fisheries, depending upon the nature of the dispute.

Three of these members should be from countries neutral to the dispute and might be appointed, at the request of any State party to the dispute, either by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or as follows: one, who shall act as chairman, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations; one by the President of the International Court of Justice; and one by the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

If the dispute involves only two States, each should appoint two members of the arbitral commission. If there is more than one State on either side of the dispute, each side, irrespective of the number of

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

States on that side, should appoint a total of two members of the arbitral commission. If either side fails to appoint its members within three months of the date of the original request for settlement, these appointments should be made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Under this proposal, a situation could conceivably arise, for example, under Article 26, where the dispute would involve a divergence of views of three or more States, thereby creating an issue not clearly divisible into two sides. The opportunity to initiate an arbitral procedure should not be defeated by this fact. In the view of the United States, it is essential that any State should be enabled to challenge, bilaterally, in turn if necessary, any of the other States in disagreement.

Article 33: The determinations of the arbitral commission should be by a simple majority of four votes and should be based on written or oral evidence submitted to it by the parties to the dispute or obtained by it from other qualified sources.

Additional Comments: The United States desires to call to the attention of the International Law Commission the absence from the draft articles of two propositions which the United States feels are essential to their completeness. The first of these concerns a definition of the term "conservation" as applied to the living resources of the sea. Since the principal purpose of these articles is to codify a set of rules to guide States in their relations with one another in regard to the conservation of such resources and it is proposed that States accept certain responsibilities and commitments in order to assure adequate conservation regimes, it would be essential to define specifically the key term "conservation" in the context of the articles. The Rome Fisheries Conference considered this matter and concluded that the "principal objective of conservation of the living resources of the seas is to obtain the optimum sustainable yield so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products" and that "When formulating conservation programmes, account should be taken of the special interests of the coastal State in maintaining the productivity of the resources of the high seas near to its coast." It will be noted that the "special interest" aspect of this conclusion has been worked into and given expression by the proposed articles themselves, thus obviating any necessity for defining or clarifying that particular term. The following draft article would cover the balance of the definition of conservation for the purpose of the International Law Commission articles on high seas fisheries.

"For the purpose of these articles, conservation of the living resources of the sea is defined as making possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products."

The second proposition relates to situations where States have, through the expenditure of time, effort and money on research and management, and through restraints on their fishermen, increased and maintained the productivity of stocks of fish, which without such action would not exist or would exist at far below their most productive level. Under such conditions and when the stocks are being fully utilized, that is, under such exploitation that an increase in the amount of fishing would not be expected to result in any substantial increase in the sustainable yield, then States not participating, or which have not in recent years participated in exploitation of such stocks of fish, excepting the coastal State adjacent to the waters in which the stocks occur, should be required to abstain from participation.

This proposed rule takes into account the fact that under the stated conditions the continuing and increasing productivity of the stocks of fish is the result of and dependent on past and current action of the participating States and that the participation of additional States would result in no increase in the amount of useful products. Rather than increasing production the advent of additional States is almost sure to stimulate the abandonment of such conservation activities through removing the incentive for maintaining expensive and restrictive conservation programs. In fact, such advent very probably would encourage the idea that if the resource declined to a less productive level, it would offer less inducement to distant States. In recognition of a "special interest" on the part of a coastal State, the adjacent coastal State could be excepted from the operation of the rule. Strict and precise criteria should be laid down in the qualifications of a fishery for the rule, and questions arising as to qualifications made arbitrative. These criteria should include (a) whether the stock is subject to reasonably adequate scientific investigation with the object of establishing and taking the measures required to make possible the maximum sustainable yield; (b) whether the stock is under reasonable regulation and control for the purpose of making possible the maximum sustainable yield, and whether such yield is dependent upon the program of regulation and control; and (c) whether the stock is under such exploitation that an increase in the amount of fishing will not reasonably be expected to result in any substantial increase in the sustainable yield.

Chapter III. Submarine Cables and Pipelines

The Articles in this chapter appear to state principles which are, generally speaking, already applied by the United States. The Government of the United States, however, would question whether it is necessary to include in the draft the specific requirement in Article 37 that every State shall regulate trawling. In the view of the United States, it would be preferable that this Article, instead of being a mandate, be a recommendation, and that the recommendation be couched in general terms and not single out trawling gear.

2. Articles on the Regime of the Territorial Sea

This draft is organized in three parts: Chapter I—General; Chapter II—Limits of the Territorial Sea; and Chapter III—Right of Innocent Passage.

Chapter I. General

The Government of the United States has no particular comments to make with respect to the Articles in this chapter.

Chapter II. Limits of the Territorial Sea

The Government of the United States has the following comments to make with respect to Articles 3, 5 and 7:

Article 3. This Article concerns the breadth of the territorial sea. The Government of the United States agrees with paragraph 1 of this Article as a statement of fact. However, the Government of the United States does not agree with it as a proposition of law, except in so far as it recognizes that the traditional limitation of territorial waters is three miles. For the reasons indicated in its previous comments, the Government of the United States considers that there is no valid legal basis for claims to territorial waters in excess of three miles. Since it considers that claims in excess of three miles are not justified under international law a fortiori it agrees with the statement of law in the second paragraph that international law does not justify an extension of the territorial sea beyond 12 miles. Consistently with these views the United States is also in agreement with the statement of law in the third paragraph that international law does not require States to recognize a breadth of territorial waters beyond three miles, i.e., that it does not require recognition of claims based on unilateral determination and lacking common acceptance. The United States practice has been uniformly consistent with this position as witness its formal protests against claims of foreign governments to territorial waters in excess of three miles, except where such claims could be justified on an historical basis.

Article 5. This Article deals with straight base lines. The Government of the United States was in agreement with the draft of this Article previously adopted by the Commission. In the view of the Government of the United States the Article as now drafted is too broad and lacks the safeguards which were present in the former draft. The removal of the 10-mile limit on the length of the base lines which may be used, and the removal of the requirement that the base lines should not be further away from the coast than 5 miles, open the way for abuses of a principle which should be restricted to extraordinary cases as was made clear by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case between the United Kingdom and Norway.

Furthermore, it seemed to be implicit in the previous draft that, aside from historical reasons, the only circumstances which would justify use of straight-base lines were a deeply indented coast or islands in its immediate vicinity. With reference to the latter the previous comments of the United States are apposite.

Although it appears to have been the intention of the Commission to predicate this article on the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case, the Article now drafted appears to go beyond that decision in that it recognizes as grounds for using straight base lines *either* a deeply indented coast *or* the presence of islands in its immediate vicinity *or* the existence of peculiar economic interests, whereas the Fisheries Case was not based on any one of these factors but on a combination of factors.

With respect to the sea areas lying within straight-base lines, Article 5 proposes that they must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. This amounts to no more than saying that water cannot be treated as inland unless such treatment is justified, an impractical and completely circular standard.

With the provision that base lines shall not be drawn to and from drying rocks and drying shoals the United States is in agreement.

Article 7. This Article is concerned with bays. The Government of the United States cannot agree to the proposal in paragraph 3 that the entrance to bays not exceeding 25 miles could be closed by a straight line drawn across their mouth. The Commission indicated in its comments on this paragraph that the 25 miles length was chosen because it was slightly more than twice "the permissible maximum width of the territorial sea as laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 3." Even if it agreed that the permissible width of the territorial sea could be 12 miles, which it does not, this Government does not see why it necessarily follows that the opening of a bay susceptible of closing by a straight line should be 25 miles.

It would seem to this Government that since there has been no serious objection in the past to the 10-mile principle that this limit should be maintained.

Chapter III. Right of Innocent Passage

The Government of the United States has no specific comments to make with respect to the Articles in this chapter.

Accept [etc.]

For the Acting Secretary of State:
Herman Phleger[4]
The Legal Adviser

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

279. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife (Herrington) to the Legal Adviser (Phleger)[1]

Washington, March 9, 1956.

SUBJECT

Positive U/FW Activity Vis-à-Vis the Territorial Waters Problem

During the discussion in Assistant Secretary Holland's office on February 9, 1956 concerning plans for the coming Ciudad Trujillo conference, certain references were made to U/FW's position and activities with respect to the territorial waters problem, which implied some lack of knowledge in this field. I am taking this opportunity to attempt to rectify this lack.

For several years prior to 1953 U/FW strongly advocated effective counter measures to the increasing incidents developing from interference by several Latin American Governments with the operation of U.S. fishing boats on the high seas. Our concern with this accelerating trend toward the expropriation of areas of the high seas found little reflection in the Department. To highlight this "galloping trend" U/FW prepared a study of this subject which was finalized in February 1953 and circulated in the Department. A copy is attached.[2] For your convenience, particular attention is called to the "Conclusions" beginning on page 14 and our "Recommendations" commencing on page 15. I quote the following from the Conclusions and Recommendations:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.022/3–956. Confidential.

[2] This 16-page study, dated February 20, 1953, entitled "The Problem of Territorial Waters Claims", is not printed. (*Ibid.*)

Conclusions:

"At the present stage of events, what alternatives does the United States have to its present semi-spectator's role? It appears that it has three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, courses of action:

"(1) Persuade as many of the claiming states as possible that extension of the breadth of territorial waters is against their national interests;

"(2) Apply economic and/or political pressures to induce individual states to agree on limits which the United States can accept;

"(3) Take the issues to the International Court of Justice, before the positions of the extreme claimants are further consolidated by additional claims and by joint action.

"It is obvious that no philosophy of the high seas is now extant which, of itself, convinces the non-seafaring nations that a narrow band of territorial waters is in their interest. However, some arguments to this effect do exist but require to be further developed and discreetly brought to the attention of the states concerned. This is, essentially, a long-range program which cannot be realized soon or expected, by itself, to have great influence on the trend of events. Nevertheless, it should certainly be undertaken, but in connection with alternatives (2) and (3) above.

"Alternative (2) is the most practical and the only one likely to yield a band of territorial waters anywhere near three miles in breadth and base-lines applied within narrow limits. Success of this approach depends primarily upon how far the United States is willing to go with counter pressures in order to minimize territorial and inland waters. The objective would be to obtain agreement on three miles or a little more for territorial waters, and on the use of straight base-lines only in special situations clearly justifying them, such as a highly irregular coast line, as in the case of northern Norway, and then to be drawn between relatively close points of land. It is important to achieve conservative use of straight base-lines, by some concessions on breadth of territorial waters if necessary, in order to minimize inland waters through which there is no right of innocent passage."

Recommendations:

"(1) That special attention be given to developing arguments and projects for convincing the claiming states of the advantages of restricting territorial waters to a narrow coastal belt;

"(2) That the United States determine as expeditiously as possible the desirability and practicability of applying effective counterpressures, particularly against those states whose high seas claims have been implemented to the detriment of United States interests;

"(3) If pressures are found undesirable or impracticable, that the United States consider adjudication of the issues before the International Court of Justice. In this connection, it should be noted that any action looking to such adjudication of Ecuador's baseline system and a ruling on the scope of innocent passage would necessitate proposing to Ecuador the negotiation of a special agreement for that purpose."

It will be noted that we suggested, as the first and key countermove by the United States, the use of economic and/or political pressures, measures which comprise the real substance of present Department plans for overcoming the tidal wave confronting it. Had these recommendations been taken more seriously at that time, the situation today in the matter would, to say the least, not be so crucial.

I think the record indicates that U/FW has not been asleep or lacked initiative in proposing counter measures. Our regret is that we have not been sufficiently eloquent or noisy to persuade the Department that the trend was as rapid and contrary to U.S. interests as it appeared to us. However, in extenuation, I must point out that we haven't enjoyed a particularly responsive audience until recently.

---

280. Instruction From the Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics[1]

CA–8300 *Washington, April 20, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Report on Cuidad Trujillo Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters

The purpose of this instruction is to give the Embassy background information on what took place at the recent Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources of the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.022–IA/4–2056. Confidential.

Continental Shelf and Marine Waters held in Ciudad Trujillo, March 15–28, 1956,[2] and an analysis of the results achieved.

From the outset of the Conference it was evident that an entirely different atmosphere prevailed from that which had existed at the Mexico City Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists. The change was manifest in the composition of some of the key delegations, particularly those of Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Guatemala which were headed by experienced diplomatic officers not personally committed to extremist doctrines on the subject matter of the Conference. Informal conversations also soon revealed that most of the Latin American delegations, especially those which had taken a lead in adoption of the "Principles of Mexico" Resolution, had come to Ciudad Trujillo with instructions to follow a cooperative course of action and make every effort, within the limits of their respective national policies, to reach an accommodation of differences. The efforts made by the Embassies prior to the Conference may therefore be considered as having produced the atmosphere desired.

The principal effort of the U.S. Delegation during the opening days of the Conference was to speak to other leading delegations for the purpose of gaining general acceptance at the Conference of a policy such as that outlined in the aide-mémoire presented by the Embassies to the Foreign Offices pursuant to circular instruction 6347,[3] namely that agreement should be stated in regard to subjects on which agreement was found to be possible, and that issues on which agreement could not be reached should be defined with a view to further efforts toward their resolution. The U.S. Delegation found a receptive attitude to this approach which within a few days was generally accepted by all delegations.

A desire to avoid open clashes and polemics was also reflected in a decision to dispense entirely with general debate. Only two delegations had signified their intention of addressing the Conference as a whole, namely Mexico and the United States. When these two delegations agreed to omit the general debate, several other delegations expressed their pleasure since it relieved them of the necessity of taking fixed public positions on issues on which they would have had to differ with the United States.

The Conference was organized into three Committees: I—Continental Shelf, II—Marine Waters, and III—Other Subjects. It was intended that the first two Committees would consider scientific, economic and legal aspects of their respective subjects. However, it also was decided informally to have the heads of delegations meet in closed session in the Dominican Foreign Office in an effort to decide how the basic juridical problems facing the Conference could be worked out. Committees I and II therefore concentrated on scientific and economic aspects of their subjects while the heads of delegations proceeded to tackle the basic political and legal questions. The heads of delegations met daily, sometime two or three times, for about a week. At these meetings, all the main issues facing the Conference, and deriving from the Mexico City Resolution, were debated fully and at times with considerable insistence, but in the last analysis the general policy to which reference was made above prevailed and unanimous decisions were reached in regard to all subjects incorporated in the final resolution.

---

[2] Assistant Secretary Holland was appointed Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Specialized Conference; and Ambassador John C. Dreier was appointed Vice Chairman. William C. Herrington and William Sanders of the Department of State and Ralph L. Miller of the Department of the Interior served as Delegates. A full list of the U.S. Delegation is in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 19, 1956, p. 487.

[3] See Document 276.

The resolution entitled "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo" (copy attached [4]) represents the end product of the negotiations which took place among the heads of delegations. At the outset this group had before it separate proposals submitted by the delegations of Cuba, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, as well as the draft resolution circulated by the United States in advance of the Conference. The United States proposal was accepted as the working document and served as the basis for the discussions. Part I of the "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo" embodies the maximum agreement which could be reached among all the delegations represented at the Conference on the points covered by the United States draft. Four of the seven paragraphs contained in this section represent positive areas of agreement. The other three refer to areas where it was impossible to achieve a conciliation of views and where the most which could be done at this stage was to agree that disagreement exists. Part II of the Resolution was included at the insistence of Mexico. Indicating that his instructions required him to seek a provision which would specify that the statement of points of disagreement did not in any sense imply a judgment by the Conference on the respective positions of the participating governments on these points, the Mexican Representative made very clear that some such provision was a sine qua non to Mexican approval of the Resolution. The language finally approved represents a compromise between those delegations which would have preferred a provision which would have virtually negated the positive value of the Resolution and those, including the United States, which regarded a provision of the type desired by Mexico to be wholly unnecessary considering that Mexico could achieve its purpose through the usual practice of a unilateral declaration.

---

[4] Not printed as an attachment; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 28, 1956, p. 897.

Agreement on the "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo" was accompanied by a gentleman's understanding among the heads of delegations that once the Resolution left the closed sessions and moved through Committee III and Plenary for final approval, no efforts would be made to modify the Resolution in any way, the delegations confining themselves to making explanations of vote if they so desired. This agreement was closely observed. The Resolution received unanimous support. Several delegations took advantage of the opportunity to explain their affirmative vote as well as to include declarations with respect to the Resolution in the Final Act. Copies of these declarations are also attached.

The results of the Conference are in general indicative of the efficacy of the strong approach made by the United States to the Latin American governments prior to the meeting. While it would have been preferable from our standpoint to have a resolution which more explicitly set aside the "Principles of Mexico" Resolution, it was evident that any direct attack on the Mexico action would have seriously jeopardized the chances of obtaining the constructive resolution produced at Ciudad Trujillo.

The discussions of technical aspects of the continental shelf and marine waters which took place in Committees I and II were, in the opinion of the U.S. Delegation, important and useful. The very fact that scientific and economic aspects of these problems were being discussed by qualified people from several countries had a beneficial effect on the deliberations during the Conference and should have a salutary influence on future consideration of the problems. Moreover, the direct contact among the scientific and technical personnel of the various delegations was useful in laying the groundwork for future contact and continued effort to broaden the scientific understanding of the problems involved. A specific beneficial result was to undermine seriously from the scientific standpoint the "biome" theory which had been developed in Chile, Ecuador and Peru to form a pseudo-scientific basis for extensive claims of the coastal states over adjacent waters of the high seas.

The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the Ciudad Trujillo Conference:

1. The Conference served to restore consideration of the important question of conservation of the resources of the continental shelf and marine waters to the customary and desirable procedures of full and frank discussion and accommodation of differing views as is traditional in the inter-American system, thus correcting the serious deviation from this pattern which took place in Mexico City.

2. The Conference served to check further the strong bid of the extremist countries (Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, El Salvador, and Costa Rica) for support among the other countries for their broad claims to territorial waters. It is believed that the movement for the 200-mile thesis of Chile, Ecuador and Peru has lost its momentum.

3. By introducing, at the insistence of some Latin American countries, the concept of "exploitability" as a means of determining the land area beneath the sea which belongs to the coastal state, the Conference decided upon an outer limit for controls over the continental shelf so indefinite and subject to future adjustment as to render the shelf less suitable as a basis for claiming that the territorial sea is coextensive with the epicontinental sea, as Mexico, Argentina and others have done.

4. The broader consideration of scientific and economic as well as legal factors involved achieved a wider recognition of the fact that the issues concerning the regime of the high seas are extremely complex and not susceptible of facile solutions.

5. At the same time the Conference confirmed the existence of widespread support for according to adjacent coastal states more extensive rights over the fishery resources in the high seas than the United States is willing to agree to.

6. There was increasing recognition of the fact that the United States had important security reasons for its position on the three-mile limit of territorial waters, but the impossibility of reaching any common stand on this question was so clear that little time was devoted even to discussing it.

The effect of the "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo" on the "Principles of Mexico" Resolution is a matter on which each government will have its own interpretation. From the statements made by some delegations, particularly Mexico, El Salvador and the CEP countries, it is evident that they wish to regard the Mexico City Resolution as being unaffected by the Ciudad Trujillo action with respect to the areas of disagreement set forth in the "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo". The United States, on the other hand, as indicated in our Delegation's statement in the Final Act, regards the "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo" as the more authoritative expression of the OAS on the subject matter, given the fact that it is based on a broader consideration of the factors involved and came subsequent to the Mexico City Resolution.

The next round in the consideration of this general subject will take place in the ILC which meets in Geneva late in April and May. Next fall the General Assembly of the United Nations will also take up the matter. In preparation for the General Assembly, the Department will in due course send appropriate instructions to the Embassy. Meanwhile, the Embassy is requested to keep the Department informed of significant developments with respect to reaction to the Ciudad Trujillo Conference and preparations for the meeting of the

General Assembly with respect to the regime of the high seas and the regime of the territorial sea.

As the opportunity arises, the Ambassador in his discretion may inform high government officials with whom he dealt in preparation for the Ciudad Trujillo Conference of the satisfaction of the United States with the responsible and cooperative manner in which the Conference carried out its assignment. While the Conference achieved limited agreement on the important issues before it, the handling of the controversial areas of disagreement proceeded in the best spirit and traditions of the inter-American system.

Dulles

---

281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland[1]

Washington, October 20, 1956—1:11 p.m.

227. 1954 UN General Assembly requested International Law Commission complete study Law of Sea for consideration 11th session Assembly (1956). ILC completed work July 1956 and submitted final report General Assembly. Report contains 73 articles on Law of Sea.[2]

ILC report (paragraph 28) recommends "General Assembly summon international conference plenipotentiaries examine law of sea, taking account not only legal but also technical, biological, economic and political aspects problem, and embody results work one or more international conventions or such other instruments as appropriate."

ILC proposals include new concepts far reaching importance. To be sound and persist, essential they be considered carefully in relation technical, biological and economic effects as well as legal aspects. If new propositions not create more problems than they resolve, they should be studied relation various problems by technical experts and specialists affected fields so as to minimize chances of hasty emotional decisions and conflicts.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10–2056. Official Use Only. Repeated to Athens, Djakarta, Tehran, Monrovia, Stockholm, Bangkok, Manila, and Copenhagen.

[2] The report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth session is printed in *ILC Yearbook*, 1956, vol. II, p. 253. Its 73 draft articles concerning the law of the sea are *ibid.*, pp. 256–264, and its commentary on the articles is *ibid.*, pp. 265–301.

In view close relationship various sections proposed Law of Sea, action taken respect one section may directly affect nature action required resolve problems covered by other sections; e.g., determination breadth territorial sea directly affects fishery, air and surface navigation, security and other problems. Those problems also affected by decisions regarding scope articles re fishery conservation, contiguous zones, continental shelf, base lines, and special jurisdiction. Hence clear that adequate solutions various problems can be achieved best by special conference equipped consider all aspects subject.

After careful consideration Department has decided support ILC recommendation, since for reasons indicated special international conference method dealing entire subject preferable consideration subject General Assembly.

Bring matter attention local Foreign Office and endeavor obtain expeditious reply since time for planning action General Assembly short.

If reaction favorable, supply Foreign Office copy our draft resolution pouched,[3] stating Department will also supply copy to UN Delegation that Government.

Inform Department all developments promptly.[4]

Dulles

---

[3] The Department forwarded the U.S. draft resolution to the recipients of telegram 227 in circular airgram 3438, October 19. The key paragraph proposed the following: "[The General Assembly] *Decides*, in accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph 28 of the Commission's report, that an international conference of plenipotentiaries should be convened to examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problem and to embody the results of its work in one or more international conventions or such other instruments as it may deem appropriate." (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10–1956)

[4] Circular telegram 182, similar in content to telegram 227, was sent to all diplomatic missions in the American Republics on September 7. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/9–756)

282. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of the Navy[1]

Washington, undated.

FACTORS WHICH MILITATE IN FAVOR OF A NARROW BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA

An extension of the territorial sea beyond a narrow belt may, on cursory examination, offer an apparent economic advantage to the coastal state in assuring to it the exclusive right to exploitation of the fisheries resources within those areas. Any discussion of the consequences flowing from a universally agreed upon breadth of the territorial sea must, however, take into account not only those immediate consequences to the coastal state but also the more far reaching effects upon maritime trade and commerce and upon international stability and the security of the nations of the free world.

I. Effects upon Commerce and Navigation of a Twelve-Mile Rule

Difficulties of Navigation Beyond Twelve Miles

The difficulties and uncertainties of piloting are substantially augmented by navigation beyond twelve miles. The reasons for this are various. Many landmarks employed in visual piloting are not visible at a range of twelve miles. Only 20 per cent of the world's lighthouses have a range of twelve miles or more. Radar navigation at twelve miles and beyond is of only marginal utility in most instances because many targets normally used for radar navigation are unidentifiable at such distance. Thus, the more closely ships can pass to a coastline, the more accurate and safe their navigation. The seizure of the Swedish ship "Flying Clipper" by the Russians in the Baltic Sea on 29 August is a case in point. That ship had crossed into the Soviet twelve-mile zone because it had drifted off course in a storm during the night and wanted to use the Baltic lighthouses to check its position.

Consequences of Subjecting Shipping to Sovereignty of Coastal State within Twelve Miles

For the reasons outlined, ships find it convenient to navigate within twelve miles of a coast but beyond three miles (except when proceeding into port) and are therefore beyond the sovereignty of a coastal State with a three-mile territorial sea for all purposes other than that limited form of jurisdiction exercised in the contiguous zone, i.e., prevention of infringement of customs, fiscal and sanitary regulations. In the event of a collision involving ships navigating in such waters, namely three–twelve miles or in the event of any other incident of navigation in such waters involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, proceedings may be instituted against such persons only before the authorities of the flag flown by the ship or of the State of which such persons are nationals. While on the high seas no arrest or detention of the vessel may be ordered, even as a measure of investigation, by any authorities other than those whose flag the ship is flying. Any extension of the breadth of the territorial sea will subject ships passing through the extended area, the masters of those ships, and the members of their crews to arrest and detention by the coastal state. The potential interference with normal commerce which would accompany the adoption of a broad territorial sea can thus be readily foreseen. The Suez Canal crisis amply demonstrates the danger to world peace and stability created by unilateral action, albeit legal, taken by a coastal State which affects merchant shipping to the point of exerting the power of life or death over world commerce. The increased risk of interference with the normal passage of ships proceeding through a twelve-mile territorial sea would result in increased insurance rates and, consequently, increased shipping costs. Efforts by merchant ships to avoid such interference by navigating beyond the territorial sea would result in longer, less economical runs and hence in the incurrence of increased shipping rates. The brunt of such increase in rates is borne ultimately, not by the nations engaging in maritime commerce, but by those nations dependent upon that commerce for their economic existence.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.022/10–2456. Confidential. Copy obtained from the Department of the Navy on October 25, 1956, by Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs.

The very factors which render navigation difficult and uncertain at a distance of twelve miles from shore will themselves give rise to myriad disputes where the issues of jurisdiction will be one involving disproportionate expense and time consumption by virtue of the extreme difficulty of proving a vessel to have been within or beyond a twelve-mile limit. The danger that such disputes may give rise to international incidents with an accompanying increase in international tensions is one which has already materialized. The seizure of the Swedish ship in the Baltic by Russian forces is a case in point, as are the seizures of United States and Cuban shrimp boats off the coast of Mexico, and those of Japanese fishing boats by South Korea. To adopt a twelve-mile rule which for the reasons stated would inevitably lead to an increase in the number of such incidents, would be to knowingly place in jeopardy world peace and stability.

Burden Imposed upon Coastal State of Patrolling a Broad Territorial Sea

Any extension of the breadth of the territorial sea would impose a burden on the coastal State to patrol effectively the larger area. This burden would entail a concomitant increase in the fiscal expenditures of the coastal State stemming from an increased workload in both merchant marine safety and law enforcement. For example, the United States estimates an approximate initial outlay of $8,000,000 and an increase in annual operating cost of $1,500,000 per hundred miles of coast for an extension of the territorial sea from three to twelve miles. Any failure by a nation to exercise effective control over areas to which it has laid claim would risk the incurrence of international embarrassment to the nation asserting the claim. At least one nation is presently faced with this realization. Sporadic attempts at enforcement would only result in an increase of international disputes and international tensions.

II. Preservation of Neutrality

The neutralist tendencies and policies of some states are sufficiently clear to suggest that in a future conflict neutrality and the international law pertinent thereto will be matters which may have to be taken into account. It is with this thought in mind that one can approach the question of what effects are likely to be generated should the territorial waters of a neutral be extended from three to twelve miles in breadth. There are certain facile attractions to the twelve-mile limit for a neutral State. If it could safely be assumed that the contending belligerents would respect the territorial sea of a neutral, the possibility of hostile incursions into neutral coastal areas would be materially lessened. Such an assumption would not, unfortunately, be justified. There are many historical illustrations which demonstrate that belligerents have been less than circumspect in their observance of the sanctity of neutral waters. In this regard there is little prospect that the acts of belligerents in a future war will vary in pattern from the past. Moreover, it may be safely assumed that a belligerent in any future war would be even less inclined to accord complete respect to a twelve-mile coastal belt of neutral waters than to a three-mile zone—particularly in view of the probable inability of the neutral to control the broader belt. The problem of the neutral with a twelve-mile territorial sea in defending itself is further demonstrated by the greatly increased ocean areas which would have to be patrolled to insure the inviolability of its sovereignty. As an example of this, the position of traditional neutrals, e.g., the Scandinavian countries, who claim only a three-mile territorial sea for purposes of defense, while claiming a broader belt for other purposes, is significant.

To illustrate the attractiveness of neutral waters to a belligerent, we turn to the submarine. For reasons of its own safety, a submarine will seldom attempt to operate within three miles of shore. The hazards to a submerged submarine are usually lessened materially as the distance from shore increases. Thus, it can be seen that a belligerent submarine might look upon a neutral with a broad territorial sea as offering a particularly attractive haven if she were hard pressed by anti-submarine aircraft or surface vessels of the enemy.

Similarly, other combatant types of belligerent merchantmen may be enticed within the territorial waters of a neutral hoping, however wishfully, to find there a safe refuge from pursuit by enemy forces. There is still another factor which would serve to lure belligerent vessels within twelve miles of a neutral coast. For reasons already discussed, navigation at a distance of twelve miles from shore is, in most cases, inexact and unsatisfactory for purposes of accurately ascertaining a ship's position. Captains and masters are accordingly strongly disposed to navigate at a distance less than twelve miles from charted navigational objects on shore. In view of all of these considerations, belligerent violation in time of international conflict of the sovereignty of a state with a twelve mile territorial sea, unwittingly or otherwise, is highly probable. It would be unduly optimistic to expect one belligerent to stand idly by while the ship of another belligerent entered the territorial sea of a neutral either by accident or design. In such a case the neutral may not reasonably expect the belligerent to seek his remedies through diplomatic protest. Rather, it is believed that a solution of the problem would more likely be sought through the belligerent's resort to self-help. Having the war brought to the neutral's doorstep in this manner would appear altogether likely in the event the neutral were unable to exercise adequate means to preserve its neutrality. Under such circumstances, the ability of a neutral to remain neutral would be highly problematical.

It is highly likely that the ships of a neutral would be drawn into hostilities in attempting to repel belligerent incursions into its territorial sea. At the very least, strained diplomatic relations with the belligerent nation which felt itself aggrieved by the neutral nation's failure to prevent belligerent use of its territory would result. Repeated belligerent use of the territorial sea of a neutral by one belligerent could, not unlikely, lead ultimately to the invasion of the neutral by the opposing belligerent.

The possibility of belligerent use of the territorial sea of a neutral as a base of operations, as a refuge, or as a means of transit (such as in the case of the *Altmark* in World War II)[2] cannot be increased with any increase in the limit of the territorial seas. A three-mile zone would appear to reduce the possibility of belligerent violation, and to that extent would tend to insure a neutral state's remaining neutral in the event of a future war.

III. Effects upon Military and Naval Strategy and Tactics

Intelligence Collection

The possession of adequate photographic and visual intelligence is vital to many military operations. Amphibious operations, bombing missions, mine-laying and mine-sweeping operations, missile guidance—all are dependent upon information assembled from intelligence. In the collection of such intelligence ships and aircraft fulfill a vital role. The intelligence obtainable from photographs taken at three miles, particularly when taken from a ship, is of considerable value, but that from twelve miles is negligible. If an aircraft engaged in low altitude photo reconnaissance could operate approximately three miles from a coast, the depth of photo penetration would be nine miles further inland than if the aircraft were operating just outside a twelve-mile limit.

Photographic reconnaissance is particularly vital to amphibious planning and operations as well as special attack missions. Close-in beach photographs, for example, which have sufficient detail, will provide information on obstructions, gradients, tidal range, consistency and composition of the soil, defenses and defensibility, trafficability, accesses, landing points, underwater depths, reef and bar areas. Further, for minimum altitude special weapon attack approaches, the photo aircraft must be able to approach as close as possible to the beach or target area in order that the landfall check points, en route landmarks, initial point, and if possible, the target itself, will all be visible on the photographs. With present equipment, satisfactory low-level attack photography can be obtained at a six-mile range under ideal conditions; however, it is considered most desirable to obtain coverage in to three miles. (Annex I)[3]

Restrictions upon Operational Mobility

Modern concepts of war consider the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore task groups are dispersed for defense against attack. In order to maintain the highest state of readiness practicable frequent exercises are held in which two or more task groups participate. Defense against nuclear attack and realistic training require freedom to maneuver and the use of as many high seas passages as can be made available. When, in the Mediterranean Sea, for example, high seas passages are reduced in number, thereby curtailing the flexibility and maneuverability of task groups, effective exercises are difficult to conduct.

---

[2] The *Altmark*, a German prison ship, had entered Norwegian territorial waters. England protested to Norway and upon the failure of the Norwegian government to force the *Altmark* from its territorial waters, HMS *Cossack* entered Norwegian waters and captured the *Altmark*, 25 March 1940. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] Entitled "Photographic Interpretation", not printed.

The following criteria have been used to establish the reduction in maneuverability of a task group operating in a sea where the territorial waters of adjacent countries are extended from three to twelve miles.

Unlimited maneuverability requires sea room to conduct offensive and defensive aerial and submarine warfare maneuvers.

Limited maneuverability requires sea room to zigzag and the ability to avoid interference from other surface traffic.

Marginal maneuverability requires sea room to maintain a formation of minimal diameter.

Increasing territorial waters from three to twelve miles in the Mediterranean Sea would have a pronounced effect upon high seas maneuverability in those waters. In a passage where adjacent states have a limit of three miles, a single ship or column of ships could effect high seas transit if the passage were more than six miles in breadth. There are 38 such passages in the Mediterranean Sea. The effect of increasing the breadth of the territorial sea to twelve miles in that area would be extensive. For example, of the 38 high seas passages now available to single ship movement, only 16 would remain with a twelve-mile territorial sea in force. In like manner, of the twelve high seas passages in the Mediterranean now available for unlimited task force maneuverability, only three would remain.

Maneuverability on the high seas would be similarly severely restricted in the Baltic Sea, the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Java Sea—to mention but a few potentially critical areas.

For the sake of illustration, we shall examine the effect in distance and time if a task group were ordered to proceed from Guam to Saigon in the event a twelve-mile rule were adopted. At the present time the shortest high seas route is through the Suragao Straits—a route of about 2200 miles. If a twelve-mile limit were in force and the task force were required to take a route to the north of Luzon to remain outside the twelve-mile limit, the route would be increased in length to 2600 miles, or by using a 16 knot speed of advance, the steaming time would be increased by 25 hours. If for strategic or tactical reasons the route north of Luzon proved undesirable, the only alternative would be one via the Makassar Strait, the Java Sea and the South China Sea—a route of about 3500 miles. Here the steaming time at 16 knots would be increased by 81 hours.

Pursuing this latter route, through rather restricted waters, would permit only marginal opportunities for flight operations, zigzagging or stationing of pickets.

Thus, it can be seen that any extension of the territorial sea constitutes an encroachment upon waters which now constitute the high seas and could operate to restrict severely the mobility of the fleet and fleet operations.

Restrictions upon Mobility of Soviet Submarines

In order to prevent, in any future war, a repetition of the extensive damage to allied shipping and general disruption of sea lines of communications wrought by the German U-Boat fleet in World War II, sound strategy would call for denying enemy submarines free access to the high seas.

The Russian Navy now has a large, modern submarine fleet. There is no reason to deny Soviet capability of building submarines capable of launching guided missiles against coastal cities and industrial complexes.

One of the most effective ways to combat this submarine menace would be the employment of various types of blockade in order to prevent as many as possible from reaching the open sea.

In the North Atlantic, for example, Russia has only two avenues of access to the open seas; namely, through the Barents Sea and through the Baltic. Sound strategy would, for example, dictate that a barrier patrol be set up between Iceland and Norway to prevent passage of Russian submarines. It is apparent that if . . . were neutral and had a twelve-mile territorial sea, which allied ships could not penetrate, a possible avenue of escape twelve miles wide would be provided for the Russian submarine. Russian strategy is apparently heavily dependent on a large submarine fleet operating on the high seas. There is no doubt that they would use any means to get their boats to sea, and violation of a neutral's territorial waters would most likely cause them very little concern.

Allied policy in general would most likely be against violation of neutral waters except under circumstances of known violation of those waters by enemy forces. The crucial point is that with a twelve-mile band of territorial sea along the coast of any country, enemy submarines could pass through those waters undetected. With a three-mile limit in effect, this sort of passage would be less likely. This situation would likewise exist in the Mediterranean and in the Far East—Russia's only other accesses to the high seas.

Conclusion

In summation, an extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles would remove an area of more than 3,000,000 square miles from the domain of the high seas. Such an extension although perhaps gaining an apparent economic advantage for the nation claiming it, would work against a nation's fiscal interests in terms of the increased burden of effectively patrolling the enlarged area. A broad limit would jeopardize the status of a neutral in any future conflict. Universal recognition of a broad territorial sea would encumber maritime commerce and navigation throughout the world and would result in an increase of disputes and international tensions. Most important from a military point of view, such an extension would hamper intelligence collection activities, restrict fleet mobility, and permit greater mobility to Soviet submarines. The cumulative effect of these considerations would be to disserve the cause of world peace and undermine the security of the free world.

---

283. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

Washington, October 26, 1956—8:32 p.m.

316. Attention chief of mission. In line this Govt's opposition to extension territorial sea beyond traditional three-mile limit and expected discussion this question in coming session UNGA, Defense Department is desirous that effects on naval operation of an extension territorial sea be fully understood by other UN members with view to obtaining their support for US position on three-mile limit. [2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.022/10–2656. Confidential; Niact. Sent to Manila, Bangkok, Taipei, Copenhagen, Rome, Oslo, Lisbon, Dublin, Stockholm, Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, Addis Ababa, Jidda, Athens, Rabat, Monrovia, New Delhi, Karachi, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, La Paz, Bogota, Santiago, San José, Ciudad Trujillo, San Salvador, Guatemala, Quito, Port-au-Prince, Tegucigalpa, Panama, Lima, Mexico, Asunción, Managua, Montevideo, and Caracas, and to USRO at Paris for information. The message contains a notation that it was not to be distributed outside the Department.

[2] In a letter of October 21 to the Secretary of State, Acting Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson expressed the grave concern of the Department of Defense over the effects on naval operations of an extension of the territorial sea beyond the traditional 3-mile limit. He strongly recommended that three teams assembled by the Department of the Navy present that Department's tactical arguments to countries in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America that are militarily allied to the United States and whose claims extended beyond the 3-mile limit. (*Ibid.*, 700.022/10–2456)

Navy Dept has conducted extensive research this subject and has prepared detailed tactical arguments[3] against departure three-mile rule. Navy has assembled two-man teams to assist in presenting these arguments to appropriate officials of country to which you accredited. These teams will leave Washington probably October 30. Itineraries will follow.

Department has concurred this project in view importance preventing anticipated effort to adopt resolution favoring extension beyond three miles at coming session UNGA. Dept and Navy have agreed officers will (a) act under guidance and control of chief of diplomatic mission in all regards (b) confine their contacts to naval or other military authorities, including heads of defense establishments, except as chief of mission may otherwise recommend. Teams will also indoctrinate local US personnel.

Teams would plan spend two days each post first day for briefing with Embassy and second for consultation local officials. Embassy has responsibility review with team its proposed presentation and advise re content and emphasis. Embassy should delete any portions deemed unsuitable for local use.

Team discussions will be confined to security arguments and questions naval and navigational operations in territorial waters and will not include other related subjects such as continental shelf, adjacent zones, fisheries, etc.

Recommendation requested whether teams should wear military or civilian clothing. If chief of mission has important objections to visit he should advise Dept prior morning October 29 specifying reasons.

Reply niact.

Dulles

---

[3] *Supra.*

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, November 9, 1956—4:27 p.m.

497. [Here follows a repetition of the first five paragraphs of Document 281.]

Department has already contacted all the Western Hemisphere countries and many European and Asiatic nations with view to obtaining support for special conference proposal. Majority have reacted favorably and US has asked some to co-sponsor, notably Indonesia, Iran, Philippines, plus number Latin American countries.

Would be most helpful have support as many Asian and African countries as possible. Hence bring US views attention FonOff and if response favorable invite Government join as co-sponsor of draft resolution quoted below. If Government not willing co-sponsor at this stage determine whether US can definitely count on its support.

You may, if necessary, inform FonOff that co-sponsorship or support does not commit it to any particular position with respect to the substantive problems involved. This is merely a procedural proposal.

[Here follows the text of the United States draft resolution, the key paragraph of which is printed in footnote 3, Document 281.]

Use judgment as to manner and timing in bringing this matter up in view of circumstances area, bearing in mind, however, this is part of preparation for GA session beginning Monday. Tel Aviv, Jidda, Damascus, Amman, Cairo have discretion whether or not approach FonOff.

Note: Baghdad only—UK may have already raised this subject with FonOff.

Hoover

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.31/11–956. Official Use Only.

285. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs (Whiteman) to the Legal Adviser (Becker)[1]

Washington, August 26, 1957.

SUBJECT

Office replies in re breadth of territorial seas

The replies received from "L" personnel to which L/ARA's memorandum dated August 16th[2] was sent for comment are attached.

L/C—Mr. English[3] thinks that "all reasonable steps should be taken to terminate . . . [4] the chaotic situation", and approves the alternatives suggested in L/ARA's memorandum in the order stated. He makes the further helpful suggestion that the US, if willing to compromise on the 3-mile breadth, should be able to pick up the votes of the 4-mile, and of the 6-mile States, depending upon the nature of what we propose.

L/T—Mr. Whittington[5] concurs that "a reassessment is inevitable" and that the US should be prepared to support, if not propose, a compromise.

L/UNA—Mr. Kerley[6] states that during the last session of the General Assembly, during consideration of the ILC Report in the 6th Committee (Legal), suggestions were made in informal conversations that there would probably be proposals to permit control of fishing by coastal States within a specified contiguous zone and that such proposal would receive substantial support. . . .

L/EUR—Messrs. Heinzen, Pender, Read, Keegan and Boas[7] submitted a joint memorandum, stating that it was premature to discuss a US policy on the subject until the background legal memorandum which Mr. Heinzen is preparing is distributed.[8]

L/ARA requested that any comments on its memorandum be supplied by last Thursday the 22nd. Several of the addressees were on annual leave, and should they supply comments upon their return the memoranda will be sent in to you promptly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.022/8–2657.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] Benedict M. English, the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims.

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

[5] William V. Whittington.

[6] Ernest L. Kerley.

[7] Bernard G. Heinzen, John H. Pender, Jr., Benjamin H. Read, James M. Keegan, and Frank Boas.

[8] Heinzen's report entitled "The Breadth of the Territorial Sea under Existing International Law Compared with Article Three of Part I of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles concerning the Law of the Sea" was completed in December 1957. This work of 174 pages of text, footnotes, and tables is identified as US/CLS/Leg 3. A copy is in the files of the Office of the Legal Adviser.

In addition, Col. Raymond[9] has several times stated to me (the latest occasion being August 16th) that he has been of the view for some time, that the US must be prepared to accept a "reasonable" solution in order to resolve the matter, i.e., modify our present position.

Also there is called to your attention a memorandum dated August 16, 1957, copy of which is attached, prepared in the Political Section of the American Embassy in Ottawa and addressed to the Ambassador,[10] received in "L" on last Friday. Note that it is stated that . . . .

---

[9] John M. Raymond, Deputy Legal Adviser.

[10] Memorandum by Adolph Dubs, Second Secretary of Embassy in Canada. (Department of State, Ottawa Embassy Files: Lot 64 F 89, Law of the Sea)

---

286. Instruction From the Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA–10106 *Washington, May 29, 1957.*

SUBJECT

International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea, March 1958

The United Nations General Assembly adopted on February 21, 1957, at its 11th Session a Resolution providing for the calling in early March 1958, of an "International Conference of Plenipotentiaries" to examine the law of the sea. The Resolution was sponsored by the United States and 22 other countries. A copy of the Resolution is enclosed (Enclosure 1). A brief account of the discussions at the Assembly is also enclosed (Enclosure 2).[2]

The United States attaches great importance to this Conference. It will be concerned with highly difficult and controversial issues in which the United States has a vital interest, including the limits of the territorial sea, freedom of the high seas, international fisheries, and rights over the continental shelf. Under the terms of the General Assembly Resolution the Conference is to examine the law of the sea "taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic, and political aspects of the problem. . . ."[3] The Secretary General of the United Nations has already sent invitations to the Conference to 88 countries.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/5–2957. Confidential. Drafted by William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State. On June 5, Sanders was simultaneously designated Coordinator of Preparations for the Conference of the Law of the Sea. (Department of State Circular No. 262, June 5; *ibid.*, 399.731/6–557)

[2] Neither enclosure is printed; for text of Resolution 1105 (XI), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly from 12 November 1956 to 8 March 1957 during its Eleventh Session*, p. 54.

The Department and the various other interested Departments of the Government are engaged in intensive preparations for the Conference. An important aspect of the preparations will involve pre-Conference discussions with other governments. The object of these discussions will be to obtain the views of other governments and, particularly, to promote the widest possible understanding and acceptance of the United States position. The Department expects to request the Missions in the countries invited to the Conference to take appropriate action in this respect as the various aspects of the United States position are developed.

During the intervening period, the Department would be interested in receiving from the field, on a continuing basis, any information available to the Missions concerning developments in connection with the Conference. Such reports should be helpful in the present stage of United States preparations and in the formulation in due course of instructions to the Missions.

The following non-exclusive check list of items is suggested for the Missions' particular attention:

1. Indications that the countries will or will not accept the invitation to attend the Conference;
2. Indications of the nature and scope of the governments' preparations for the Conference and of positions to be taken;
3. Particular interests of the local government;
4. Indications of any plans to make diplomatic approaches to other governments.
5. Names, standing, and relative influence of individuals involved in the governments' preparations;
6. Local official and private reaction (individual, press, and radio comment).

For Embassies Paris and Rome:

Under the terms of the GA Resolution "all States Members of the United Nations and States Members of the Specialized Agencies" are invited to participate in the Conference. As members of the Universal Postal Union, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City are eligible to participate in the Conference and have been invited to attend.

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

For Embassy Moscow:

As members of the United Nations, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine have been invited to participate in the Conference.

For Embassies New Delhi and Jidda:

As members of the United Nations, Nepal and Yemen have been invited to participate in the Conference.

Dulles

---

287. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Sanders) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter) [1]

Washington, September 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Authority to Undertake Diplomatic Discussions on the Conference on the Law of the Sea; Approval of Various Positions

Discussion

Authorization is requested to undertake pre-Conference diplomatic discussions as part of the US preparations for the Conference on the Law of the Sea. It is proposed at the same time to ascertain the attitudes of certain key governments toward a Canadian and similar suggestions to recognize a limited contiguous zone for fisheries as an alternative to an extension of the territorial sea. Approval is also requested to present in the course of the diplomatic discussions the position on arbitration (Tab A) [2] relative to the fisheries and conservation problems. In connection with the same problems, the interested offices of the Department have been unable to agree on a position on abstention (Tab B) on which a decision is requested. [3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/9–2757. Official Use Only.

[2] Tabs A–C were not found attached.

[3] In a memorandum to the files dated October 2, Fisher Howe, Director of the Executive Secretariat, defined the positions taken by the interested offices of the Department concerning the major issues to be discussed by the Conference on the Law of the Sea in February 1958, as follows:

"3. The issue of arbitration and criteria is agreed within the Department and should cause no difficulty.

The subject Conference was provided for in a United Nations General Assembly Resolution which was sponsored by the United States and 22 other countries (Tab C). It will be held at Geneva, February 24, 1958.

The problems before the Conference are covered by the Eighth Report of the International Law Commission. The report contains 73 articles, which comprehensively cover the law of the sea in time of peace, including such controversial issues as the limits of the territorial sea, freedom of the high seas, international fisheries, and rights over the continental shelf. The Conference is to examine the law of the sea "taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic, and political aspects of the problem . . . ."[4] The results of the Conference's deliberations may be embodied in "one or more international conventions" or "other instruments".

Pre-Conference diplomatic discussions are considered essential to achieve the widest possible understanding and acceptance of the US positions on the most important issues to come before the Conference. Among the problems of the greatest concern to the US are those which arise from wide-spread attempts to extend the territorial sea as a means to establish preferential or exclusive rights to fish or to control fisheries for conservation purposes. For this reason the first round of diplomatic discussions would concentrate on these problems. The articles of the Commission's report on fisheries and conservation appear generally acceptable to the United States and should be helpful in offering alternative solutions to some of the problems. The Commission's proposals raise, however, the policy questions for the United States described in Tabs A and B.

Other issues will be presented for decision as the US preparations progress. One of the most important of these concerns the position of the United States on the related questions of territorial sea limits and contiguous zones for fisheries. For purposes of the first round of the recommended diplomatic discussions, the traditional position of the US on these questions—of three miles for the territorial sea with no contiguous zones for fisheries—will be main-

---

"4. The issue of 'abstention'. This relates to the desire of the Fisheries people [i.e., U/FW], opposed by L, to establish as a matter of international law the illegality of fishing in areas where, by long term agreements, there has been a mutual abstention from fishing.

"5. The issue of 'contiguous rights'. This involves the position on the area between the three-mile limit and the twelve-mile mark in territorial seas and the fishing rights related thereto. Apparently L is prepared to work out a fall-back position and believes that this is essential if we are not to lose on the whole matter; U/FW is not willing to concede that we should even probe to see whether a fall-back position is feasible." (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10–257)

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

tained. However, as a step in reviewing this position, it is proposed that American diplomatic posts in certain key countries be instructed to inquire concerning the attitudes of the Governments toward the recognition of a limited contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea within which the coastal state could exercise exclusive control over fishing. It is hoped that on the basis of information received, the Department will be able to determine the support which such a proposal might receive as a substitute measure for wide-spread claims for a limited (6 to 12 miles) extension of the territorial sea. These claims are generally based on economic considerations and probably represent the greatest threat to the US position on the territorial sea.

Recommendation

That you authorize the diplomatic discussions and approve the attached positions.[5]

---

[5] Concurrences of several offices in the Department of State, and of the Departments of Defense and Interior are indicated on the source text, but not initialed. Nor is there any indication of action taken by Under Secretary Herter. It is clear, however, from Sanders' memorandum, *infra*, that the Under Secretary approved the recommendation.

---

288. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Sanders) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)[1]

Washington, October 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea: Approval of Positions on Abstention and Contiguous Zones for Fisheries

Discussion

We are about to undertake pre-Conference diplomatic discussions in connection with the US preparations for the Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Two issues on which there are differing views within the Department and with other agencies require resolution before diplomatic discussions can commence. These issues concern the procedure of abstention (Tab A) and the question of contiguous zones for fisheries as a possible alternative to widespread claims for a limited extension of the territorial sea (Tab B).

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10–2157. Confidential.

The subject Conference was provided for in a United Nations General Assembly Resolution which was sponsored by the United States and 22 other countries (Tab C).[2] It will be held in Geneva, February 24, 1958. The problems before the Conference are covered by the Eighth Report of the International Law Commission. The report deals with such major issues as the limits of the territorial sea, freedom of the high seas, international fisheries, and rights over the continental shelf. The Conference is to examine the law of the sea "taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic, and political aspects of the problem . . . ".[3]

Recommendations:[4]

(1) Abstention: It is recommended that pre-Conference negotiations be undertaken on the procedure of abstention as a preliminary step in determining the final position of the Government on the question (Tab A).

(2) Contiguous Zones for Fisheries: It is recommended that, as a preliminary step in determining the final position of the Government on the question, guarded inquiries be undertaken to ascertain the attitudes of key governments towards the recognition of such zones as a substitute for widespread claims for a limited extension of the territorial sea (Tab B).[5]

---

[2] Not printed.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

[4] The source text indicates that Herter approved the following recommendations on October 24.

[5] The source text contains the following statement under concurrences: "L and U/FW have approved the presentation of the positions in regard to Tabs A and B and concur in a meeting to resolve the issues."

Tab A

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Sanders)

Washington, October 21, 1957.

SUBJECT

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea: Procedure of Abstention

Problem

U/FW considers that abstention as a general rule of international law is essential to the US position on fisheries and conservation at the Conference. The Legal Adviser disagrees and recommends that the US not propose abstention at the Conference.

Discussion

Abstention as previously proposed by the US consists of the concept that where the maximum sustainable yield of any stock of fish is already being obtained and its maintenance and development are dependent on an existing conservation program, states not participating in the program shall abstain from fishing such stock. Any dispute as to whether the required conditions for its application exist is subject to arbitration.

The following are the opposing views:

U/FW

That abstention:

(1) is technically and scientifically sound on its merits as a conservation measure and is the only known procedure which gives states participating in a conservation effort a strong enough incentive to develop, restore and maintain the productivity of new or badly depleted fishery resources.

(2) is the only procedure capable of protecting US salmon, halibut and fur seal fisheries against Japanese and other threats arising from the unrestricted exercise of the freedom to fish and of meeting certain potential coastal fishery conservation problems in New England and along the US coast in general. Abstention is therefore essential if the US is to accept the principle of freedom to fish. This position does not contradict our position on freedom of the seas any more than does our acceptance of other restrictions on that freedom proposed by the International Law Commission in the interest of conservation.

(3) has united the US fishing industry in its stand on the territorial sea issue; without abstention the industry would prevent US acceptance of any comprehensive agreement on fisheries and conservation such as proposed by the International Law Commission, and major segments of the industry would vigorously press for a considerable extension of territorial sea limits.

(4) may be subject to the danger of abuse, such as its extension to justify claims to exclusive or closed areas on the high seas for fisheries or other purposes. However, this danger already exists since abstention has been proposed to and discussed by the ILC and in any event is no greater than that posed by other claims to extended jurisdiction based on economic and other considerations. Safeguards against abuse can be provided by including criteria specifying conditions for its application and the obligation to arbitrate.

(5) would have the advantage of enabling the US to support the fishery articles proposed by the Law Commission to meet the conservation issue. This in itself would warrant taking the potential risk arising from reiteration of US support for abstention.

(6) has reasonably good prospects of wide acceptance once its merits as a conservation measure and the restriction on its application are understood. What is needed is a vigorous educational campaign.[6]

The Legal Adviser:

That abstention:

(1) is in derogation of the principle of the freedom of the seas which includes freedom to fish.

(2) can be used to defeat the principle of freedom of the seas by incorporation of economic and other criteria to justify the establishment of exclusive control over areas of the high seas, not only for fisheries but for security and political purposes. This could be detrimental to US economic as well as security interests.

(3) is so patently discriminatory in favor of the US that it is naive to expect other states to accept it as a principle of international law. Previous efforts to sell the principle have been unsuccessful.

(4) can be developed through other means, such as the conclusion of bilateral or regional multilateral conventions.[7]

The above opposing views raise the following basic issues:

---

[6] A fuller exposition of the views of the Office of the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife is included in a "Position Paper on Abstention", dated October 21, prepared by Herrington, Fred E. Taylor of Herrington's staff, and William M. Terry of the Office of Fisheries and Wildlife in the Department of the Interior. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/10–2157)

[7] A fuller exposition of the views in the Legal Adviser's Office is included in Yingling's memorandum of October 2 to Becker. (*Ibid.*)

Is abstention:

(1) essential to protect our Northwest Pacific and other coastal fishery conservation interests to the point that the US cannot accept the historic principle of freedom to fish on the high seas without it?

Comment: While the Northwest fisheries represent important national interests, there are other although less certain methods to protect them which make unnecessary and undesirable the adoption of a stand that is obviously prejudicial to the US position on the freedom of the seas. A provision in a formal agreement on fisheries containing the substance of the abstention proposal but without the force of a rule of law, is a possibility. A conference recommendation is another. We should be prepared to fall back to such methods if we find that abstention as a general rule lacks adequate support.

(2) susceptible of being used to defeat the position of the US on the freedom of the seas by being expanded at the conference or later on the basis of precedent to justify the setting up of exclusive or closed areas of the high seas for economic, security or political reasons?

Comment: The risks seen by the Legal Adviser are present but they can be minimized and any effort to expand abstention to include other considerations would probably have even less support than the original proposal.

(3) so patently recognizable as a measure designed primarily to protect US economic interests rather than to promote conservation that it cannot hope to receive adequate support at the Conference?

Comment: Available evidence is not conclusive one way or the other. Pre-Conference diplomatic discussions would give a more reliable estimate of governmental attitudes. They would also provide a better basis than we now have for a decision on how to proceed in protecting our interests involved in the abstention proposal consistently with a maximum acceptance of the freedom to fish.

Conclusion:

That pre-Conference negotiations concerning the US proposal on abstention be undertaken as a preliminary step in determining the final position of the Government on the question.

Tab B

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Sanders)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea: Contiguous Zones for Fisheries

Problem:

Should exploratory pre-Conference discussions be undertaken by the US to determine whether the recognition of limited contiguous zones for fisheries is an acceptable alternative to claims for an extension of the territorial sea? The Legal Adviser and U/LS recommend that this be done. U/FW disagrees.

Discussion

The principal pressures for an extension of the territorial sea arise from claims based on alleged concern for the conservation of marine resources or from alleged or real economic needs, which include employment, food and foreign exchange. The conservation motive has led to the more extreme claims. These are unlikely to rally support at the Conference. Claims based on economic considerations are generally modest and are more likely to win widespread support for departures from the three-mile rule. They constitute the main threat to the established US position and to a conclusion at the Conference acceptable to the US.

Available information indicates that the countries that can be counted upon to remain firm in support of the three-mile territorial sea will be in a small minority at the Conference. Canada has recently left this group, proposing a twelve-mile territorial sea, or, alternatively, retention of the three-mile limit but recognition of a nine-mile contiguous zone for fisheries.

The choices for the US are three, as follows:

(1) Work for a solution of the territorial sea problem acceptable to the majority and which will do the least damage to the US position.

(2) Accept the probability of a failure at the Conference on this question and face the prospects of a continuation on a worsening scale of the present situation that creates tensions and conflicts between the US and many of its friends.

(3) Face the possibility of a vote for an extension of from six to twelve miles of the territorial sea, which would be prejudicial to US

and free world security interests and which would confront us with the situation mentioned in (2), with the added disadvantage of such a pronouncement of principle.

It is clear that alternative (1) would require some flexibility in the US position on the territorial sea question.

U/FW opposes the contiguous zone concession on the ground that it would seriously affect some important American fisheries, would not solve the basic problem, and would set a precedent which would encourage further pressures not only for wider contiguous zones for fisheries designed to "fence in" marine resources but for a wider territorial sea.

The Legal Adviser and U/LS consider the proposed inquiries a necessary step in the review of the US position in the matter. A tentative estimate is needed on whether a limited contiguous zone for fisheries, as an alternative to an extension of the territorial sea, would result in a conclusion acceptable to the majority at the Conference. While the retention in the formula of the three-mile limit may create a difficult obstacle, the proposal may be found acceptable as a compromise by countries that for economic reasons are pressing either for a modest extension of the territorial sea or, like Canada, for contiguous zones for fisheries.

In undertaking the inquiries and until a final decision is made in the matter, the traditional position of the US would be maintained.

Conclusion

That the US should explore the possibility of arriving at an acceptable solution to the territorial sea question and, to this end, undertake guarded pre-Conference inquiries to ascertain the attitudes of key governments toward the recognition of limited contiguous zones for fisheries as a substitute for widespread claims for a six to nine miles extension of the territorial sea.[8]

---

[8] An unsigned draft of Tab B, dated October 10, and prepared presumably by Sanders, noted that the Department of Defense was receptive to the concept of the contiguous zone if such concession would be helpful in securing retention of the 3-mile limit at the Conference; it pointed out that the geographic bureaus of the Department of State did not object to guarded inquiries concerning the contiguous zone. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/10–1057)

289. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Sanders) to Robert L. Burns of the Executive Secretariat [1]

Washington, November 1, 1957.

SUBJECT

Conference on the Law of the Sea

As agreed over the telephone I enclose summaries of the discussions at the meeting with the Under Secretary on Monday, October 28, 1957. [2] The summaries have been prepared by the persons participating in the discussions. I also attach a rough suggested outline indicating the sequence of the discussion. [3] I do not suggest that all the material offered by the participants be included in your summary.

[Here follows a suggested distribution list.]

WS

[Annex A]

Outline for Memorandum of Discussion Prepared by the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Sanders)

Washington, undated.

The Under Secretary explained to the representatives of the Departments of Defense and Interior that the meeting had been called to consider two questions of policy concerning the positions to be taken at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea. These issues related to the procedure of arbitration [*abstention*?] and the possibility of the acceptance of a limited contiguous zone for fisheries, as an alternative to wide-spread claims to an extension of the territorial sea.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–157. Confidential.

[2] A memorandum of October 23 by Robert A. McKinnon of the Executive Secretariat reported that at the meeting on October 28, Admiral Chester Ward, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and Captain William Hearn of his office, would represent the Department of Defense; and Ross Leffler, Assistant Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife, and William M. Terry of his office, would represent the Department of the Interior. McKinnon's memorandum also indicated that Sanders, Herrington, and Becker were to be participants for the Department of State, and that Murphy was invited but unable to attend. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/10–2157)

[3] The outline is Annex A, and the summaries are Annexes B, C, and D. Annex B is not printed.

Disagreement within the Department of State had been provisionally resolved on these two questions as follows:

(1) that with reference to abstention, pre-Conference negotiations be undertaken as a preliminary step in determining the final position of the Government at the Conference;
(2) that on the question of contiguous zones for fisheries, guarded inquiries be undertaken to ascertain the attitude of key governments towards such a measure as a preliminary step in determining the final position of the US.

Abstention

With regard to abstention, Interior agreed . . . . [4] (insert paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Interior's memorandum of October 30).

Representatives of the Department of Defense were of the view that abstention . . . . (first paragraph of Defense's memorandum).

Mr. Herrington explained that . . . . (insert first paragraph of summary of Mr. Herrington's remarks).

The Undersecretary was not sure just how abstention could be incorporated in the agreements of the Conference in the form of a rule of international law but he saw the advantages of the proposed diplomatic discussions as a practical step in determining the position the US should take on the matter.

Contiguous Zones for Fisheries

With regard to the re-examination of the US position on contiguous zones for fisheries, Interior pointed out . . . . (insert final two paragraphs of Interior's summary of views).

The Defense representative stated that it was a claim to sovereignty . . . . (insert last paragraphs (two) of Defense summary).

Mr. Herrington said that Defense had expressed . . . . (insert final paragraph of summary of Mr. Herrington's remarks).

The Under Secretary summarized the discussions and stated his understanding that there was no disagreement on the recommendations that pre-Conference diplomatic discussions be undertaken on these two questions. He proposed that the group meet again at the end of 1957 to review the results of the diplomatic discussions.

---

[4] All ellipses are in the source text.

[Annex C]

Defense's Summary

At the meeting on the question of abstention which was held in the Office of Under Secretary Christian Herter, on 28 October 1957, and attended by representatives of State, Interior and Defense, Rear Admiral Chester Ward made the following comments.

That abstention was not a recognized principle of international law. Under the circumstances, it would be helpful to contact friendly nations and learn whether they would support such a principle before deciding whether it should be made a part of the U.S. position on the Law of the Sea.

He also stated that it was the claim to sovereignty over broad belts of the high seas that constituted a major threat to our national security interests and hence of concern to the Department of Defense. That it would be well, under the circumstances, to consider other means of meeting the demands of coastal states concerning fishing in coastal waters, such as the contiguous zone concept which has been suggested by the Canadians.

In connection with Interior's desire that the security disadvantages of an extension of the territorial sea be weighed against the disadvantages to the fishing industry of the establishment of the 12 mile contiguous zone for fisheries, he was unable to see how such a weighing of disparate matters could be accomplished. The security interests of the US must outweigh all other considerations.

[Annex D]

Summary by Mr. Herrington—U/FW

With reference to abstention, Mr. Herrington explained that the procedure evolved from the rapid development of long range fishing operations which made high seas fisheries accessible to an increasing number of states. He indicated that the concept is a novel and somewhat complex procedure in the conservation field; that its presentation as a proposed general rule must be accompanied by a good deal of educational work with other countries both prior to and during the 1958 Conference before international support for the concept can be appraised.

Defense had expressed concern that "abstention" would impinge upon freedom of fishing, one of the freedoms of the seas, and might therefore open the door to limitations on freedom of navigation with detrimental effect on the security interests of the United States. Mr. Herrington pointed out that "abstention" had reference to stocks of fish and not to areas of the seas and said that he found it difficult to see how the concept offered any greater opportunity for the appropriation of high seas than the proposition of a contiguous zone for fisheries which Defense apparently was willing to support as a means of lessening pressures for extended territorial waters.

---

290. Instruction From the Acting Secretary to All Diplomatic Missions [1]

CA–4339 *Washington, November 8, 1957.*

SUBJECT

International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea

REFERENCE

CA–10106 of May 29, 1957

With further reference to the Department's circular instruction of May 29, the Secretary General of the United Nations has now informed the Governments invited to the Conference that Geneva has been selected as the site of the meeting, and that the opening date will be February 24, 1958. [2]

For the Embassy's reference there is enclosed (Enclosure A), the Eighth Report of the United Nations International Law Commission. [3] This report will be the basis of the deliberations of the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–857. Official Use Only. Cleared by several officers of the Department and in draft by the Interdepartmental Committee. The committee, an informal group, normally consisted of representatives of the Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, Interior, Commerce, and Justice and the Federal Communications Commission. The message was repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw. Two earlier drafts of the message, dated August 29 and October 2, were transmitted by Sanders to various officers of the Department for comment in memoranda of September 11 and October 3, respectively. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/9–1157 and /10–357)

[2] Constantin A. Stavropoulos, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, informed the Secretary of State in letter LE 130(3–4–1), August 26, that to avoid overlapping with other U.N. meetings it was necessary to begin the Conference of the Law of the Sea at Geneva on February 24, 1958, a few days earlier than anticipated in the General Assembly resolution. The conference was expected to last for 9 weeks. The letter was transmitted to the Department by the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in despatch 178, September 3. (*Ibid.*, 399.731/9–357)

[3] See footnote 2, Document 281.

Conference. The report contains 73 articles which relate to the law of the sea in time of peace. United States preparations for the Conference are being made in terms of the articles of the report and of the special problems to which they give rise.

As an important aspect of these preparations the Embassy is requested to discuss with appropriate high-level officials of the Government the problems referred to in the present instruction.

The problems to be discussed relate to the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and the related questions of the conservation of marine resources and international fishing rights. These problems are expected to be the most controversial at the Conference and they pose the most difficult questions of policy for the Government of the United States. The Department has two principal objectives in undertaking the present round of diplomatic discussions. The first is to bring about the widest possible understanding of the United States approach to the conservation and fisheries questions. The problems involved are highly technical and governmental personnel in many countries are not familiar with them. To assist the Embassy in its discussion of some of the more difficult questions, background and explanatory memoranda are enclosed which, as indicated later, may be made available to foreign officials. The second objective of the discussions is to obtain information on governmental attitudes on the procedure of abstention and on contiguous zones for fisheries as a preliminary step in determining the final position of the United States on these questions.

It is considered highly desirable that the principal problems covered by the present instruction be discussed in the first instance by the Chief of Mission with the Foreign Minister.

At the outset of the discussions with the appropriate officials of the Government, the Embassy may indicate that these conversations are being undertaken pursuant to the recommendation contained in the General Assembly Resolution (see paragraph 11 of Enclosure 1[4] to CA-10106 of May 29, 1957) that the Governments "utilize the time remaining before the opening of the Conference for exchanges of views on the controversial questions relative to the law of the sea".

Background

The problems concerning the breadth of the territorial sea originate in the main in competing national interests in the resources of the sea of states adjacent to fishing grounds and non-adjacent fishing states. Two separate sets of problems are apparent: Those that arise from the action of the coastal state for the conservation of marine resources and those that arise from such action on the basis of alleged or real economic dependence on fishing. The requirements of conservation have been advanced as the basis for some of the more extreme claims, such as the 200 mile claims of Chile, Ecuador and Peru. This approach is frequently associated with strong or ultranationalistic reaction to the activities of the highly mechanized industries of the fishing states. The alleged economic dependence has led to more modest demands involving claims of exclusive fishing rights in waters adjacent to the coastal state or to limited extensions of the territorial sea. In both instances, the coastal states have attempted to accomplish their objectives through unilateral action either extending the limits of their territorial sea beyond three miles or claiming exclusive or special purpose jurisdiction to exploit or control fisheries in contiguous areas beyond three miles. It is expected that they will attempt to have their claimed right to do so recognized in the conclusions of the Conference.

---

[4] See footnote 2, Document 286.

The extremists will find themselves in a small minority at the Conference. These are the countries that claim a very broad extension of the territorial sea; they generally argue that the three-mile rule is obsolete and the coastal state has the right to determine on its own the breadth of its territorial sea. It may be that these countries will attempt at the Conference to develop support by other means than a broad extension of the territorial sea as such to achieve their objectives. These means would most likely be: (a) recognition of the right of the coastal state to take unrestricted unilateral action for conservation purposes; (b) recognition of broad "contiguous zones" for fisheries or conservation. As a last resort some of them may join the moderates in pressing for a limited extension of the territorial sea, with the economic factor as the main supporting consideration. The principal danger to the United States position will arise at the Conference from the possibility of a majority developing in support of such a position.

The Territorial Sea Issue

General

There are compelling reasons, in the view of the United States, for retaining the three-mile territorial sea limits. The United States considers that an extension of the territorial sovereignty of the individual states would be detrimental to the general interest of the international community and to the security of the free world. It is, moreover, of the view that such an extension is an impractical and unrealistic means by which to attempt to achieve the objective of the conservation of fisheries resources and is an overly drastic and sweeping approach to the problems raised by the economic factor. The United States is convinced that alternative solutions can be found to the problems that have created pressures for a broader territorial sea belt.

The views of the United States in support of the three-mile territorial sea are briefly stated in Enclosures B and C.[5] In summary they comprise the United States views on the legal issue, on the general interest of maximum freedom for navigation and maritime trade and commerce involved in the maintenance of the three-mile territorial sea belt, and on the factors of the security of the free world that support the same conclusion. The alternative solution, as against an extension of the territorial sea, to the objective of conservation is described below. The special problems created for the United States by the pressures for an extension of the territorial sea arising from the economic factor are discussed at the end of this instruction.

Legal

While the United States position on the legal question has been repeatedly stated in recent international discussions, the principal elements of the position have been briefly restated in Enclosure B as background information for the Embassy and for such use as the Embassy may find it necessary and appropriate to make of them. There are many Governments, particularly among the newer ones, that have not fully or actively participated in discussions on the legal merits of the issues involved. The timely exposition of United States views on these issues could be useful in some countries in bringing about a better understanding of the traditional United States position on the question of law.

This aspect of the United States position should not, however, receive undue stress during the pre-Conference discussions. With many Governments the legal considerations will carry little or no weight and in any event will not be as persuasive as others advanced by the United States in determining attitudes at the Conference. The general considerations and those which relate to the security of the free world referred to in the following section and in Enclosure C are in the latter category. They state why it is in the national interest of the individual states to support the three-mile belt for the territorial sea.

---

[5] Entitled, respectively, "Historical Summary of the United States Position on the Legal Aspects of the Breadth of the Territorial Sea" and "Memorandum on the Factors which Support the Maintenance of a Narrow Breadth of the Territorial Sea", neither printed.

Security

In connection with Enclosure C entitled "Factors which Support the Maintenance of a Narrow Breadth of the Territorial Sea", it will be recalled that substantially similar considerations were presented by the teams of naval officers which visited a number of countries in November of last year (CA–316 of October 26, 1956[6]). The Department considers that these visits served a worthwhile purpose and, in many instances, developed an interest in the military and strategic advantages of the three-mile limit which had not been previously considered. The Department desires to keep the United States position and its supporting considerations on this crucial matter fresh in the minds of officials of friendly governments. Obviously, the considerations developed in this paper must be used on a selective basis. Separate instructions will be issued concerning this matter.

Conservation of Marine Resources

General United States Position and the ILC Fisheries Articles

With respect to the conservation issue, the United States will attempt to demonstrate that it has a sympathetic and constructive position in the matter. The United States has been the strongest and most consistent supporter of the conservation of marine resources. It is convinced that the objective in its major aspects cannot be achieved by unilateral action but only by international cooperation based on tested conservation experience.

The United States desires to develop an understanding of the technical and scientific aspects of the conservation problem which support the basic approach to the problem in the ILC recommendations. This approach is that the objective of conservation can be achieved primarily through international cooperation rather than through unilateral action of the coastal state or through an extension of the territorial sea. A memorandum for the Embassy's use in discussing this problem and which may be made available to foreign officials is enclosed (Enclosure D).[7]

While the International Law Commission was unable to agree on a definition of the breadth of the territorial sea (see article 3 of its report) its recommendations on conservation were developed in detail. They are contained in articles 49–60 of the report. The

---

[6] This reference should be to circular telegram 316. The correction was made in circular airgram 5160, December 11, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–857)

[7] Entitled "Memorandum on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea in Relation to the ILC Fishery Articles", not printed.

Commission's recommendations incorporate substantial elements of proposals made by the United States and of conclusions supported by the United States of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, held in Rome in 1955. The Commission's proposed articles are therefore generally acceptable to the United States. However, in their present form they raise two important problems of omission, namely:

Arbitration and Criteria: The Commission's proposed articles contemplate agreement on rights over fisheries of the high seas going beyond existing international law. They thus provide for acceptance by states of an obligation to cooperate in the conservation of high seas fisheries, including a commitment to observe, in certain circumstances and under certain conditions, conservation regulations adopted by the coastal state and other states. That is to say, States would accept potential restrictions on their freedom to fish, one of the freedoms of the high seas, in the interest of international cooperation for conservation. It is evident that many states, including the United States, cannot accept such restrictions in the absence of an obligatory procedure for the settlement of disputes as to whether the circumstances and conditions specified exist. Although the Commission's proposal of a procedure for compulsory arbitration recognizes this fact, the United States contemplates proposing certain modifications to strengthen the procedure and to insure that the criteria for determining the circumstances and conditions mentioned are included in the terms of reference of the arbitral tribunal. There is enclosed (Enclosure E)[8] an explanatory memorandum on this question which may be left with foreign officials. For the Embassy's information there is also enclosed (Enclosure F)[9] a classified memorandum on this subject.

Abstention: The United States also contemplates at this stage of its preparations proposing at the Conference that the procedure of abstention with respect to certain developed fisheries be incorporated in any conclusions on conservation reached by the Conference. The United States looks upon this procedure as one which provides incentive to develop, restore and maintain the productivity of fisheries resources and therefore as a sound conservation measure worthy of general application. The United States abstention proposal is little understood by most countries. It is our hope that pre-Conference diplomatic discussions will not only promote understanding and acceptance of the proposal but reveal the strength of the opposition to it, and whether prospects for a wide acceptance can be improved. The final United States position on this matter will depend on the results of the pre-Conference discussions. There is enclosed (Enclosure G)[10] an explanatory memorandum on this question which may be left with the foreign office officials with whom the subject is discussed. For the Embassy's information there is also enclosed (Enclosure H), a classified memorandum which presents the considerations which have determined the United States proposal on abstention.[11]

---

[8] Entitled "Memorandum on Arbitration and Criteria in Relation to the ILC Fishery Articles", not printed.

[9] Entitled "US Position on Arbitration and Criteria in Relation to the ILC Fishery Articles", not printed.

The Economic Factor

The United States has heretofore maintained that the problem of the exploitation of the resources of the sea arising from economic considerations can be met by special agreements suited to the particular circumstances of each case rather than through a general rule extending the territorial sea or the application in the field of fisheries of the principle of contiguous zones. This position should be maintained during the diplomatic discussions undertaken pursuant to this instruction.

For the information of the Embassy, in view of the direct threat it will present to the United States position at the Conference, this problem is now under interdepartmental review. A separate instruction on this question will be sent to all American diplomatic posts.

Herter

---

[10] Entitled "Memorandum on Abstention as an Essential Conservation Procedure in Certain Situations", not printed.

[11] Because of the technical and complex nature of the concept of abstention, the Department anticipated supplemental diplomatic discussions, with the assistance of experts from Washington. The plan called for William Terry of the Department of the Interior to visit Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Karachi, New Delhi, and Tehran in November and December (telegram 1612 to Ankara, November 15; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–1557); and for Special Assistant Herrington to visit Bonn, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm, The Hague, and Copenhagen in December (telegram 1339 to Bonn, November 18; *ibid.*, 399.731/11–857, and telegram 954 to The Hague, November 27; *ibid.*, 399.731/11–2757).

Enclosure H [12]

MEMORANDUM ON THE U.S. POSITION ON ABSTENTION IN RELATION TO THE ILC FISHERY ARTICLES

I. Definition

The United States has proposed to the ILC that in addition to the limitations which the ILC would place upon freedom of fishing on the high seas in the interest of fisheries conservation, an additional limitation, generally termed the "concept of abstention", should be placed upon the freedom for the same reasons. The concept provides that when a stock of fish under exploitation by the nationals of one or more states meets the following requirements:

(i) the stock is subject to adequate scientific investigation with the object of determining and taking the measures required to make possible the maximum sustainable yield;

(ii) the stock is under such regulations by the fishing states as are required to make possible the maximum sustainable yield;

(iii) the stock is under such exploitation that an increase in the amount of fishing will not be expected to result in any substantial increase in the sustainable yield; and

(iv) the current yield is dependent upon the conservation program;

then the states whose nationals are not fishing the stock or have not done so in the recent past, excepting the coastal state adjacent to the waters in which the stock occurs, shall abstain from fishing the stock. In the event of disagreement as to whether a stock of fish qualifies for abstention, the arbitral procedure contemplated by the ILC may be utilized.

II. Origin of Abstention

Abstention had its origin in our northwest fisheries. In this area, the Government of the United States and Canada working independently in some cases and together in others have, through the expenditure of extensive effort and funds for research and strict regulation of their fishermen preserved the great salmon and halibut resources of the northwest from reduction to the minimum economic level of productivity, as happened in similar situations elsewhere, and are in the process of restoring these resources to their maximum sustainable productivity. The incentive for carrying out these extensive activities has been preservation of an important source of food for our people and increased returns to our fishermen. During the

---

[12] No drafting information is given on the source text.

1930's Japanese fishermen engaged in exploratory work for salmon in Bering Sea, preliminary to extensive exploitation of these stocks of fish by Japanese fishermen. Following strong representations by the United States, Japan agreed to restrict her fishermen from this area. Had the Japanese embarked upon the exploitation of these resources, the incentive for the United States and Canada to continue the conservation program would, for all practical purpose, have been removed.

Following World War II the question of Japanese fishing in the Northeastern Pacific once more became a problem of very considerable importance. Various proposals were considered within the U.S. to keep the Japanese from operating in the Eastern Pacific but none was found to be acceptable to the various segments of the United States fishing industry and the United States Government. Finally a proposal for abstention similar in substance to the above definition but less restrictive in conditions, was proposed as a concept that would cover the stocks of fish restored and maintained by United States and Canadian action, but otherwise not restrict Japanese fishing in the same area. This proposal, after much study within the United States Government, was finally approved as the basis for developing a United States position for negotiation with Japan. In informal discussions with Canada prior to the negotiations, the proposal was accepted by that Government. It was the key element in the United States position at the Tripartite Fisheries Conference in Tokyo (1951). At that Conference abstention was accepted as an essential part of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention and has been in operation since that Convention entered into force.

III. Development of a United States Position on ILC Fishery Articles

The ILC, since its establishment in 1947, has been engaged in the codification and progressive development of law of the sea, including a series of articles on fisheries. Prior to 1955 the United States took no position on preliminary drafts of the ILC fisheries articles. United States fishery interests are so diverse, ranging from one extreme, e.g. tuna, shrimp, desiring complete freedom to fish everywhere, to the other extreme, e.g. salmon, halibut, which would close broad areas to fishing by other countries, that the United States had not been able to develop an over-all position. As the ILC progressed with its draft articles on fisheries in directions contrary to United States interests, it became increasingly important that the United States exercise its influence in shaping the ILC articles to avoid being presently faced with a completed set of articles contrary to its basic interests. During 1952–54 U/FW convened a series of meetings with advisers from all segments of the United States fishing industry concerned with the problem. Agreement finally was developed on a series of proposals on fisheries. These proposals stemmed in large part from United States experience in successful cooperation with other countries in solving high seas conservation problems through international conventions and commissions.

In these proposals abstention occupies a key position. It meets the problems posed by salmon, halibut and fur seal. It meets certain potential coastal problems in New England and along our coast in general and does not damage the U.S. position with regard to tuna, shrimp and New England otter trawling. It is rational and based on sound biological and conservation concepts. It is supported by all major fisheries interests, by the Fish and Wildlife Service, and U/FW.

Abstention is in the best interests of the United States fishing industry whose over-all interests are not served by complete freedom of fishing on the high seas. While such overseas fisheries as the shrimp fishery and the tuna fishery have in recent years been much in the public eye because of the threats to their operations and prosperity, it is coastal fisheries which make up the greater part of the United States industry. Some 75 per cent of United states fishery production comes from waters relatively close to the U.S. coast from stocks of fish most of which are confined to nearby coastal waters. It is unlikely that this percentage will change substantially in the foreseeable future. Freedom of the seas offers little to these coastal fisheries. Indeed, their interests are best protected by extension of jurisdiction. Although a relatively modest extension of the territorial sea or the creation of a narrow contiguous zone would offer protection for some of these coastal fisheries, it would offer no real solution to the conservation problem which faces the halibut and salmon fisheries of the Northwest, the trawl fisheries in New England and other stocks which extend beyond the narrow coastal zone. The abstention principle does offer protection to these, and it does this by dealing with stocks of fish, not areas of the sea.

Abstention is not discriminatory. On the contrary, it is proposed for general application in a uniform manner and would apply to large states as well as small states if the circumstances for its application exist. The fact that comparatively few States have as yet advanced their conservation programs to the point where abstention would apply does not detract from the soundness of the concept as a conservation procedure. As additional countries advance in fisheries conservation the situations where abstention will apply will increase. The high seas fisheries of the world are by no means static.

IV. Progress in Promoting the United States Position on Abstention

At the 1955 Rome Conference on Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea the United States advanced the concept of abstention as a general rule for certain situations concerned with international conservation of fisheries. The United States Delegation to that Conference had instructions to promote abstention "as a principle".

The rationale advanced by the United States at the Rome Conference was persuasive to a considerable number of countries. However, with the pressure of other matters it was not possible to obtain full understanding of this concept by the majority, particularly those with little background in fishery conservation. In the circumstances, rather than put it to a vote with the possibility of having the proposal defeated, the United States Delegation succeeded in having abstention described in the Report of the Conference as a procedure for handling high seas conservation problems such as those of the U.S. salmon and halibut fisheries.

As a result of the Report of the Rome Conference the ILC in 1955 completely redrafted its fishery articles. It included many of the concepts proposed by the Rome Conference but did not include some of the newer ideas proposed by the United States such as abstention. Subsequently, the United States submitted to the ILC rather extensive comments on its 1955 draft [13] in which the United States stated, with regard to the fisheries articles, that the principle of abstention is "essential to their completeness". At the 1956 ILC meeting these and the comments of other countries were considered at length. The ILC members at first were completely unfamiliar with the new concept but it gradually gained support as understanding developed. The Swedish member, supporting it, expressed the favorable view when he said he "regarded the principle more as a product of the conflict between the fundamental principle of the freedom of the sea, on the one hand, and the interest of all States not to discourage the adoption of measures of conservation on the other, the second consideration having precedence over the first". However, because of the proposal of the member from Mexico to broaden the concept to include economic as well as conservation criteria and the Commission's lack of competence in scientific and economic matters, it made no proposal but included the following comments to Article 53:

> "This proposal, the purpose of which was to encourage the building up or restoration of the productivity of resources, and the proposals of some other Governments, based on the concept of vital

---

[13] See Document 278.

economic necessity, may reflect problems and interests which deserve recognition in international law. However, lacking the necessary competence in the scientific and economic domains to study these exceptional situations adequately, the Commission, while drawing attention to the problem, refrained from making any concrete proposal".

In brief, abstention as formulated in the proposed principle is newly arrived upon the international scene. The problem it was developed to handle arose with the increased efficiency of fishing methods. The abstention procedure is made possible by recent advances in research and management methods for conservation programs and might thus be properly classed as a development in the science and technique of high seas fisheries conservation. Since the United States (and Canada) first proposed abstention to world circles in 1955 (Rome Conference) as a general procedure for meeting certain international fishery conservation problems, it has received increasing support from states and international experts in the field. There is reason to believe that much further progress can be made at the Geneva Conference in 1958 by an intensive preparatory campaign and consultation with other governments directed toward an understanding of the soundness of the concept and its conditional application. Whether two-thirds or majority support for abstention can be developed in the short time remaining will not be fully apparent until the Geneva Conference gets underway.

V. Implications of Abstention as a Precedent for Economic Claims

Proposals for extending jurisdiction of the adjacent state over high seas areas, based on real or alleged economic need, inevitably will be strongly argued by some states at the World Conference. This will be done regardless of whether or not the U.S. continues to support abstention. The important question is whether the chances of their success would be materially enhanced by the continued advocacy of abstention by the U.S. The answer seems clearly to be in the negative.

Abstention was proposed by the U.S. Delegation to the Rome Conference in 1955 and strongly advocated in the U.S. comments to the ILC covering the 1955 draft articles. Abstention has also been proposed by Canada and it can be expected that it will be actively supported by Canada at the World Conference. Moreover, on the recommendation of the Committee of Experts the UN Secretariat has arranged for a background paper for the Conference covering the economic and scientific background of the principle of abstention.

From these considerations it follows that any precedent deriving from the proposal of abstention already is set; the remaining question is whether adoption of the concept would materially increase the support for claims to extended jurisdiction based on economic consideration. In considering this it must be recalled that the U.S. advances abstention as a procedure to assure an adequate conservation program in certain special situations, which does not restrict participating or adjacent coastal states and does not extend jurisdiction over areas of the high seas. Proposals of extended jurisdiction to meet real or alleged economic needs involve displacing participating states and jurisdiction over areas. Thus, two entirely different concepts are involved. It does not follow that a State favoring the abstention concept for conservation purposes would support its enlargement for an entirely alien purpose, namely to advance economic interests. Nor does it follow that a State opposed to abstention as proposed by the United States would necessarily support it if its terms were extended to include economic considerations. In any event, it should be noted that if the States desiring extended fisheries jurisdiction for economic advantage can muster sufficient strength to have abstention accepted on economic grounds, they will be strong enough to have other, broader types of jurisdiction accepted, types which better suit their purposes.

VI. Relationship of Abstention to United States Acceptance of ILC Fisheries Articles

If adopted the ILC fisheries articles would place certain new limitations on the right to fish on the high seas. At the same time they would preclude other limitations. To accept Articles 49 (right to fish) and 53 (new entrants to a fishery) without abstention being included in the series of articles would be tantamount to inviting all non-participating States to participate in the rich halibut, salmon, and fur seal resources along our coasts, built up and maintained at great cost and effort by the United States and the United States and Canada (in the case of fur seal, by the U.S., Canada, and Japan). Further, we would have no effective general international procedure open to us for handling similar problems now developing along other sections of our coast.

291. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA–4463 *Washington, November 13, 1957.*

SUBJECT

International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea

REFERENCE

CA–4339 of November 8, 1957

In the reference instruction the Embassy was informed that the traditional position of the United States on the question of the exercise by the coastal state of special jurisdiction for fisheries purposes beyond the three-mile limit of the territorial sea is under review.

In connection with the review, it is essential that the Department receive information on an urgent basis concerning the views of certain countries toward a limited application of the principle of contiguous zones in the field of fisheries as a solution to the principal problem creating the pressures for a limited extension of the territorial sea. As indicated in the instruction under reference, this problem arises from the economic factor rather than from concern for conservation. The latter concern or alleged concern has led to the more extreme and less realistic claims. These are less likely to rally support at the Conference not only because of their extreme nature but also because a solution to the conservation problem which, with some modifications, would be satisfactory is contained in the International Law Commission's proposals. It is evident, therefore, that the economic factor stands as a main threat to the established United States position and to a conclusion at the Conference acceptable to the United States. The economic problem is at the basis of many of the more restrained claims for an extension of the territorial sea and is therefore more likely to win wide support for departures from the established three-mile rule.

The Department desires to determine whether this estimate is correct and whether a proposal which would serve to meet reasonable demands based on economic considerations, but which would retain the three-mile limit, would be likely to result in a conclusion acceptable to the majority at the Conference.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–1357. Confidential. Sent to 36 posts; repeated to 47 others. Cleared by several officers of the Department and by the Departments of the Treasury, Interior, Navy, and Justice and the Maritime Administration and the Federal Communications Commission.

The Embassy is requested to advert, at its discretion, to this question with an appropriate official at a suitable early opportunity, preferably during discussion of the matters covered in the reference instruction. The discussion should be in terms of an informal inquiry concerning the attitude of the Government towards proposals such as those made by Canada at the last (Eleventh) Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and concerning its estimate of the support which such proposals might receive at the Conference.

The Canadian proposal was that as an alternative to a 12 mile limit of the territorial sea, the states agree on a three-mile territorial sea with a contiguous zone of nine miles within which coastal states would have exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries.

As understood by the Department, the Canadian proposal would confer a right on the coastal state to exercise the same powers over fisheries out to twelve miles that can presently be exercised only in its territorial sea. This would be accomplished under the guise of a special contiguous zone for exclusive fisheries rights. The contiguous zone conceived for fisheries would bestow even greater powers than are envisaged in the present ILC fisheries articles (49–60), which sanction regulatory measures but on a non-discriminatory basis.

The Canadian-type proposal contemplates, in brief, that the traditional freedom to fish within the additional nine miles, which under the existing three-mile rule is enjoyed by nationals of all states, would be terminated. However, freedom of the high seas would be retained within the nine-mile area for other purposes. This would include such freedoms as freedom of navigation, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and freedom to fly over the nine-mile expanse of waters.

Should the Embassy be questioned concerning the position of the United States with respect to the Canadian proposal or other similar proposals, the reply should be made that in recent discussions within the United Nations and the Organization of American States the United States has maintained its traditional position that the existing rule of international law provides a three-mile limit for the territorial sea, and does not recognize that the coastal state has the right to establish contiguous zones where fishing is reserved exclusively to the nationals of that state. For the Embassy's information the Department desires to avoid giving the impression at this time that the United States is re-examining its position in the matter.

The Embassy is requested to report by telegram the results of any discussions that may be undertaken pursuant to this instruction.

For Embassies receiving the present instruction for information only: They are requested to report their estimate of the attitude the

Government to which they are accredited might take toward proposals of the type discussed in this instruction.

Dulles

---

292. Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions [1]

CA–4512 *Washington, November 15, 1957.*

SUBJECT

International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea

REFERENCE:

CA–4339 of November 8, 1957

The present instruction is concerned with the use to be made by the field posts of the memorandum on "Factors Which Support the Maintenance of the Narrow Breadth of the Territorial Sea", enclosed as Enclosure C to the reference instruction. [2]

The Embassy has discretion as to whether representations based on the memorandum are made and the extent of such representations. However, the Department hopes the Embassy will make the representations in the absence of over-riding circumstances.

The paragraphs which follow are for the Embassy's general guidance in its consideration of the problem.

Section I of the memorandum deals with the effects upon maritime trade and commerce of an extension of the territorial sea. These are the considerations of a general character which are mentioned in the reference instruction as among those demonstrating why it is in the interest of the individual states to support the three-mile rule. Sections II, III and IV [3] deal with the effects of such an extension upon international stability and the security of the nations of the free world. The considerations set forth in these three sections are basic to the position of the United States on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and to its decision vigorously to support the three-mile rule at the forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/11–1557. Official Use Only. Cleared by several officers of the Department and by the Department of Defense. The message was repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Cairo, Damascus, Kabul, Katmandu, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw.

[2] Not printed.

[3] These sections dealt, respectively, with the effects on neutrality, military and naval operations, and air operations.

Notwithstanding the importance of the security considerations in the position of the United States on the territorial sea issue, the Department recognizes that political and other factors in some countries may make it undesirable to introduce them into the discussions. In other countries it may be desirable to cast the arguments of the memorandum in a different form.

In general the security considerations are particularly appropriate for pre-Conference discussions in countries that are tied to the United States by military agreement but whose position on the breadth of the territorial sea differs or may differ at the Conference from that of the United States. It is evident, however, that even in the case of countries that consider that their security interests fully parallel those of the United States, considerable variation is to be expected in the reaction to the points covered by the memorandum. The Embassy may consider that one or more of the points should be omitted. Attention is directed in particular in this latter connection to the first two paragraphs of Section III which relate to "Intelligence Collection".

It is not intended by the preceding paragraph to exclude all the so-called "neutral" countries. The Missions in certain of these countries may find appropriate uses for the memorandum, particularly Section II relating to the preservation of neutrality.

In all cases where the memorandum is used, care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the position of the United States on the maintenance of the three-mile rule rests solely on the considerations set forth in the memorandum. As indicated in the reference instructions, the position of the United States in maintaining that valid reasons have not been advanced justifying a change in the existing rule of international law on the breadth of the territorial sea has two principal aspects: that there are weighty reasons in the general interest (maritime trade and commerce and free world security) for retaining the three-mile rule and, second, that the national interests which have led to claims for a greater distance can be met by more effective methods (international cooperation for conservation along the lines of the ILC fisheries articles) than an extension of the territorial sea.

It is not the present intention of the Departments of State and Defense to send visiting teams for special briefings to the field as was done in the latter part of 1956 (see CA–316, October 26, 1956). Consideration, nevertheless, will be given to the views of the Embassy should it deem it desirable to have supplemental briefings by means of a field visit.

As a measure which could usefully supplement the presentation of the case made in the reference memorandum, the Department of Defense has developed colored slides and explanatory material which graphically illustrate the security consequences, in terms of restrictions upon navigation and on naval operations, of an extension of the territorial sea. It is believed that the slides would be helpful in visually demonstrating the validity of the principal considerations of the memorandum. The possibility of having the slides duplicated in a manner suitable for showing to foreign officials by Embassy personnel is being explored. It is the Department's hope that copies will be available for pouching in the near future to the Embassies that are likely to rely extensively on the "Factors" memorandum in the briefings. It is not suggested, however, that discussions on the basis of the memorandum be postponed until the slides are received.

The Embassy is requested to report as soon as possible significant reaction to any representations made on the basis of the memorandum.

Dulles

---

293. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA-915 *Washington, December 2, 1957.*

SUBJECT

International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea

REFERENCE

CA-4339, November 8, 1957

With further reference to the Department's circular instruction of November 8, some additional material is provided with a view to obtaining the support of landlocked countries. It should be noted that the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly convoking the conference on the law of the sea refers specifically to the special problems of landlocked states and recommends " . . . [2] that the conference should study the question of free access to the sea of landlocked countries, as established by international practice or treaties".

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12–257. Confidential. Sent to Asunción, Bern, Florence, Kabul, Katmandu, La Paz, Luxembourg, Rome, Vienna, and Vientiane. Repeated to Budapest and Prague.

[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

At the present time, twelve landlocked countries have been invited to attend the Geneva Conference; they are Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Laos, Luxembourg, Nepal, Paraguay, San Marino, Switzerland, and the Vatican City. The interest of these countries in the law of the sea has been chiefly centered on the problem of access to the high seas, and the problem of enjoyment of the freedom of the seas on an equal footing with the coastal states. A closely related problem, and one of considerable interest to landlocked countries, is the right to fly a maritime flag and to register vessels in a maritime register.

In the past, the problem of access to the sea for landlocked countries was solved mainly through the creation of port-facilities for the use of landlocked countries and the internationalization of waterways giving access to the sea. Examples of the former are Section XI of the Peace Treaty of Versailles which created the Free City of Danzig, thereby giving Poland the use of a port, and the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy which provides for a customs free port in the Free Territory of Trieste with facilities available on equal terms for various countries including the landlocked states of Central Europe. With respect to access to the sea through waterways, Article 331 of the Versailles Treaty declared the Elbe, Oder, Niemen and Danube Rivers to be international. Also of interest to landlocked countries is the "Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern" drawn up in Barcelona in 1921. In addition, Article 273 of the Treaty of Versailles recognized the right of landlocked countries to have a maritime flag and a maritime register for their vessels; the text of this Article was subsequently made the subject of the "Declaration Recognizing the Right to a Flag of States having no Seacoast," opened for signature at Barcelona, April 20, 1921. The above are cited merely as examples of some arrangements which have been made to accommodate the interests of landlocked countries.

The United Nations International Law Commission in its articles concerning the law of the sea, in Article 27, states that the high seas are open to all nations and, in Article 28, that every state has the right to sail ships under its flag on the high seas.

A number of landlocked countries already have indicated their interest in the Commission's drafts. Austria and Nepal have expressed general satisfaction with the Articles produced by the International Law Commission at its seventh session. Again in December of 1956, in the course of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the representatives of the Governments of Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Nepal and Paraguay expressed the interest of their countries in the law of the sea and especially the problem of access to the sea.

It is considered desirable that the governments of selected landlocked countries be discreetly sounded out on their potential support of the views of the United States as set forth in the Department's Circular Instruction of November 8. This might best be accomplished by inquiring whether these countries desire to place before the Conference any resolution of particular interest to them.

It should be pointed out to these governments that the views of the United States expressed in the Department's Circular of November 8 are in keeping with the best interests of landlocked countries. A prime example is the United States position in support of the three-mile territorial sea which was based on numerous legal precedents and the general interest of maximum freedom of navigation and maritime trade. All of these considerations would appear to be equally valid from the point of view of landlocked countries since it behooves nations without a territorial sea to have coastal states restricted to as narrow a territorial sea as possible. In the discretion of the Embassy, the important security factors might also be mentioned.

The United States views on conservation, designed to promote the maximum sustainable yield of the living resources of the sea, should also appeal to landlocked states who can only benefit from such a policy.

There appears to be some tendency on the part of landlocked states to explore the possibility of acting in unison at the Conference. In this connection, the Afghan delegate to the United Nations has suggested to other landlocked states that they hold a pre-Conference meeting in Vienna from February 19–26, 1958.

In order to instill in this group an attitude favorable to our views, the Embassy should indicate, at its discretion, interest in their special problems when presenting the United States views set forth in CA–4339 of November 8, 1957, by inquiring whether they have any measures aimed at solving their special problems which they would like the United States to consider prior to the Conference.

Dulles

294. Despatch From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

No. 304 *Moscow, December 17, 1957.*

REF

Department's Circular Instruction CA–4463, November 13, 1957

SUBJECT

International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea

At the end of the instruction under reference the Department requested posts receiving the instruction only for information to estimate the attitude of the governments to which they are accredited towards the proposal set forth by the instruction. This was that, in an effort to enlist the support of a greater number of states for a three-mile limit on territorial waters, there might be adopted an arrangement by which a contiguous zone extending perhaps nine miles out to sea beyond the three-mile limit might be reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the adjacent state for purposes of fisheries, but for nothing else.

The Soviet position on these matters has presumably been made clear at the various sessions of the International Law Commission[2] at which a "draft" convention on these maritime problems has been prepared. No official Soviet statements have recently been made on this subject, but an article appearing in the June 1957 issue of the authoritative magazine *Soviet State and Law* reviews the general field and reiterates the well-known Soviet stand.

It is obvious that the USSR will remain adamant on the question of a 12-mile limit for territorial waters. The article notes that this boundary was first established by Soviet decree on May 28, 1918, and that the Soviet Government has not deviated from this delineation since that time. It is further alleged that less than a third of the nations of the world have agreed to a three-mile limit (20 out of 71) and that the maritime European People's Democracies have adopted the 12-mile limit (except for 10 miles in the case of Albania). The magazine states that, in general, nations should be free to decide on the limits of their own territorial waters on the basis of historical tradition and in consonance with the demands of national security and economics.

The firmness of the Soviet stand in this matter is indicated by the fact that Moscow has chosen to denounce the supporters of a narrow three-mile zone as the major imperialistic powers of the world. Their interest in this matter is said to stem from their desire to be able to penetrate close to the shores of other states to exploit the off-shore maritime resources of those countries, especially when the latter are underdeveloped, as well as to be able legally to send their warships close to the coasts of small countries so as to conduct threatening naval demonstrations. Since the question of a three versus a 12-mile limit has thus been framed in terms of the cold war, the Soviet Union can hardly be expected to retreat from its position, and it is exceedingly unlikely that it would modify its stand even if the great majority of nations could be persuaded to adopt some common demarcation of the belt of territorial waters in a width substantially less than 12 miles.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12–1757. Confidential.

[2] S.B. Krylov was the Soviet Member on the International Law Commission.

Soviet State and Law is also quite insistent on the proposition that within the area of territorial waters, however defined, a state exercises absolute sovereignty in the same sense that it does over terra firma. This is brought out in the article's denunciation of the theories of certain "bourgeois" legal experts who contend that a state exercises only the rights of "police control" or "supervision" over territorial waters but no more, which in the Soviet view would mean that a nation would be required to allow foreigners to exploit fish and other resources in territorial waters on the same basis as it permitted its own citizens to do so.

While the foregoing would seem to dispose effectively of any idea that the Soviets might look favorably on the Canadian proposal noted in the instruction under reference in so far as two successive off-shore seaward zones of three and nine miles respectively are concerned, it should be added that the USSR may favor the idea of granting exclusive fishing rights in contiguous waters beyond the fixed territorial limit, which in their case would be 12 miles. In fact, the article offers two criteria for the determination of such fishing zones when it suggests that they can be justified either because the fish obtained are extremely important to the food supply of the particular country (although not specified, Japan may be a case in point) or because the presence of fish in these waters is a result of measures taken by the particular state to propagate them (as in the case of salmon). The article, however, tends to be somewhat vague on the question of extreme claims of a width of up to 200 miles for territorial waters based on the seaward extension of the continental shelf, and it is likely that the Soviet Government would generally not be willing to support such a stand.

For the Ambassador:
David E. Mark
First Secretary of Embassy

295. Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions[1]

CA–5615 *Washington, December 31, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Law of Sea Conference

See Department's CA–4339.[2]

The Department is very concerned over recent indications that some posts may have the erroneous impression the United States is actively working to defeat the Canadian-type proposal for a special contiguous zone for fishery matters.

The fact is that the Government is maintaining an open mind and has not determined its position on this particularly vital issue. Indeed, one of the principal purposes of these preliminary discussions with other governments is to elicit their attitudes and reactions to such proposals so that the United States will be able to intelligently assess the situation and arrive at a definitive position later.

If any officials of foreign governments have been led to believe the United States is at this stage endeavoring to scuttle any such proposal, or that the United States has no final position one way or the other on the issue, the Embassy should utilize the earliest opportunity to remove that mistaken impression as discreetly as possible. If discussions of the fisheries contiguous zone problem are to be profitable to the United States, they must be conducted in a manner which will elicit the other nation's own evaluation of the issue.

Report soonest any further reactions to this problem.

Herter

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/12–3157. Confidential.

[2] Document 290.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING ANTARCTICA[1]

296. Letter From the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on Antarctica (Dufek)[2]

Washington, January 31, 1955.

DEAR CAPTAIN DUFEK: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 18, 1954[3] requesting submission of a statement of the Department's interests and requirements relative to the United States Antarctic expedition being planned for the 1955/56 season. Reply has been delayed beyond January 15, in view of the absence of any requirements of the kind necessitating reservations of space on the expedition. The following, however, is a summary of this Department's interests in such expeditions.

The interests of the Department of State in Antarctica expeditions are largely derived from other United States interests in that region as they affect our foreign relations. Such interests can hardly be stated completely except in relation to the plans of other departments and agencies. For this reason the process of determining, through the Operations Coordinating Board, what activities will be undertaken on the next expedition is of particular importance to this Department. General comment may be useful, however, on the ways in which foreign relations become involved.

The general interests of the United States require that our Antarctic rights be protected and advanced as much as possible, within the limits of our best judgment of the possible future worth of the Antarctic. On the other hand, the damage to our relations with other countries from some kind of activities could be out of all proportion to the anticipated United States gain. Thus the balance is required in each instance to determine whether the anticipated benefit to our Antarctic rights and knowledge is sufficient to justify the expected effects upon our foreign relations.

---

[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1733 ff.

[2] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 031.1102/1–3155. Secret.

[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 2, p. 1766.

It is not likely that tangible returns from our efforts in Antarctica will be large enough in the foreseeable future to make large expenditures seem worthwhile. If disillusionment with the lack of "profit" from the venture should cause a sharp curtailment, the expenditures already made might be largely wasted as far as strengthening United States rights is concerned. In the interests of continuity of national effort, therefore, it is highly important not to "over-sell" the Antarctic in an effort to obtain popular support or to burden the Antarctic program with activities which have no essential relation to the acquisition of needed information not obtainable elsewhere or to the necessary maintenance of United States rights. As has already been seen, large-scale Antarctic activity by the United States tend to call forth greater competitive efforts from other countries, with the possible result of destroying the net advantage the United States had hoped to gain.

To some extent these are problems of properly choosing the areas in which United States expeditions will operate, in relation to the areas of operations and claims of friendly countries. This problem cannot be settled under present circumstances by marking out areas in which United States operations would be permitted or forbidden. The areas of operations for 1955/56, as now understood, are not expected to cause serious difficulties with other countries. An approach to the general problem is proposed in the paper submitted January 21, which is now before the OCB Working Group.[4]

Sincerely yours,

HR

---

[4] Not further identified. Presumably a reference to the earliest version of the special report later circulated in revised form as the OCB Staff Study on the location of U.S. Antarctic interests, dated March 29. (Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1)

Captain George Dufek, accompanied by Captain Gerald Ketchum, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Naval Support Force Antarctica, called on Grant G. Hilliker of the Office of British and Northern European Affairs on February 10 to discuss future plans for U.S. expeditions to the Antarctic with particular reference to the possibility of locating U.S. installations at Ross Island in the western part of the New Zealand claim. Hilliker told Dufek and Ketchum that the critical question of such an installation at Ross Island was whether the United States would insist on a claim under existing U.S. policy. (Memorandum for the files, February 10; *ibid.*, Central Files, 031.1102/2–1055)

297. Memorandum From the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Staats) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [1]

Washington, February 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on NSC 5424/1 (Antarctica) [2] (Policy Approved by the President, July 16, 1954)

There is attached the first Progress Report [3] by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 5424/1, "Antarctica," covering the period from July 16, 1954 through November 30, 1954. On February 9, 1955, the Operations Coordinating Board concurred in the Progress Report for transmittal to the National Security Council.

In considering the report it should be noted that the traditional policy of the United States has been to reserve its "rights" in the Antarctic (which do not necessarily carry with them sovereignty) instead of announcing "claims" which might be a basis of establishing sovereignty. The advantage of relying upon "rights," as contrasted with "claims," is that flexibility is maintained as our ultimate areas of claim while we learn more about the area through scientific and other work *in any part* of Antarctica, as could anyone else, and while we avoid or at least postpone open disputes over territorial claims by nations friendly to us. The disadvantages are that other countries, including those not now having claims, through exploration and the maintenance of stations in the area, may gradually establish stronger claims to sovereignty and confine the United States to an area not now claimed by any other country.

One of the principal problems now is to keep unfriendly nations, particularly the Soviet [Union], from establishing any claim whatsoever to any part of the region. All of the seven claimants (Argentina, Chile, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France and Norway) are friendly to the United States. Thus, if the Antarctic were divided among these claimants and sovereignty established by them, there would be none left unclaimed for the Soviet. If the principle of mere reservation of "rights" is maintained indefinitely, it is possible that the Soviets will benefit by the fact that new claimants are not excluded. They might establish a scientific station somewhere on the continent and make a claim. Even if they do not succeed in establishing a claim, their presence might be equally detrimental to our interests.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1. Secret. In a memorandum of February 8, Merchant urged Hoover to concur in this report. (*Ibid.*)

[2] For text of NSC 5424/1, dated July 16, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 2, p. 1760.

[3] Not printed. In a memorandum dated February 24, Staats informed the OCB that the Progress Report on NSC 5424/1 was noted by the National Security Council on February 17, in NSC Action No. 1334.

In its operations and activities in Antarctica, the United States should recognize that at some time it may be desirable to abandon the current U.S. policy of mere reservation of "rights." The U.S. must be alert to recognize such a situation and should be ready at the appropriate moment to explore the desirability of agreements with the other seven claimants which would seek (a) to freeze out any further claimants, (b) to settle conflicting claims among the claimants, and (c) to permit the United States to carry out in all of Antarctica all of the mapping, scientific expeditions and other activities which would have been possible under reservation of "rights," while not necessarily attempting to base claims on all such activities in all areas.

Elmer B. Staats

---

298. Editorial Note

At his news conference on March 2, President Eisenhower was asked about the purpose of the United States exploration of the Antarctic during 1954–1955. The President replied that the U.S.S. *Atka* was operating in the Antarctic on a preliminary logistical operation in preparation for the scientific expedition that would be undertaken in connection with the International Geophysical Year of 1957–1958. A more detailed description of the purposes, range of activities, and mode of direction of the United States expedition, which was scheduled to arrive in the Antarctic in November 1955, was presented in a statement issued by the White House on March 28, 1955; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 18, 1955, page 644. In a statement issued to the press on June 1, 1955, the Department of State announced that in the interest of cooperation among nations active in scientific exploration in the Antarctic, the United States had invited the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Argentina to designate observers to accompany the United States preparatory Antarctic expedition scheduled to begin in the autumn of 1955.

299. Staff Study Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board [1]

Washington, March 29, 1955.

THE LOCATION OF UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC INTERESTS

Problem

1. The interest in the Antarctic shown by other countries has increased sharply in the past several months, probably as a result of plans for the International Geophysical Year, 1957–58, and of the renewal of U.S. activities. The plans of other countries include the establishment of bases on the continent where such bases had not previously been permanently maintained and the exploration of the presently unknown interior. Such activities tend to require still greater and more extensive U.S. efforts if we are effectively to compete in the maintenance and extension of Antarctic rights in the whole continent. At the same time such activities narrow our freedom of choice concerning areas of eventual claim and broaden the areas of potential conflict between the U.S. and friendly countries.

2. Recent developments thus present a need to determine questions which have arisen in the operations and planning required for the implementation of NSC 5424/1:

a. On which major areas should the U.S. concentrate its future activities (and eventually claims)?
b. Can the existing pattern of U.S. rights in the Antarctic be adequately protected as regards legal and political requirements?
c. Can these existing rights, scattered as they are throughout the explored part of the Antarctic, be adequately maintained as regards physical and financial requirements?

Background

3. The strength of U.S. rights in the Antarctic can be gauged only by comparing them with the rights of other countries, according to rules which are by no means yet agreed upon. It is fairly certain, however, that any legal settlement would give weight to both the formal acts by which nations indicate their intention to

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1. Secret. The source text is Tab D to a memorandum of April 19 from Barbour to Hoover. That memorandum recommended that in OCB deliberations Hoover support the negotiations with seven Antarctic claimants proposed in this paper. This study also was submitted to the OCB in connection with the Board's consideration of the location of U.S. Antarctic interests (see *infra*). An earlier version of this study appears as a paper to OCB Board Assistants by the OCB Working Group on Antarctica on March 10. (Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1) An even earlier version of late January 1955 is alluded to in Document 296.

claim sovereignty and the priority, intensity and continuity of national activities in the region.

4. The U.S. is the only country of the eight primarily interested in the Antarctic which does not have an official claim dating back one or more decades. In any controversy over the significance of an early statement of claims, the seven friendly claimants would tend to be arrayed against the U.S. (and the USSR, if it should make a claim).

5. It has thus far been considered impossible, from a foreign relations and psychological viewpoint, to announce a U.S. claim extensive enough to include all existing U.S. rights. Such rights virtually circle the continent and undoubtedly will be extended by future U.S. expeditions; it may, however, be doubted whether we will ever find it desirable to announce a claim to all.

6. Irrespective of prospects for an official U.S. claim, the relative strength of all existing U.S. rights can be maintained only by matching the Antarctic activities of each of the seven countries with which we presently compete for Antarctic rights. In the past we have excelled all other countries in certain areas in respect to certain transitory types of activity, such as aerial photography.

7. U.S. plans for the IGY call for establishment of three U.S. stations in the presently unclaimed section (90°–150° West), and possibly a fourth in an area (Weddell Sea) claimed by Argentina and the U.K. but most extensively explored by an American. One or more of these stations could be continued permanently. There is also strong sentiment for undertaking a large-scale program of aerial photography and mapping of the unknown interior half of the continent.

8. To carry forward this program while at the same time trying to match the activities of other countries in areas already explored would impose an additional annual financial burden on the Government which would be difficult to defend in terms of prospects for tangible returns in the foreseeable future. If such activities had to be sharply curtailed or abandoned after a time for lack of public support, the end result would be the impairment of U.S. rights relative to those of countries maintaining a steady, though modest, tempo of activity in the Antarctic.

9. In the past the U.S. has operated on the theory that it should await the acquisition of additional information of its various parts, before defining the limits of its interests. As a practical matter, however, it may be many years before we possess detailed knowledge of the region (much less the techniques to exploit it) sufficient to make that judgment. Meanwhile, our ability to acquire such information in the interior is in direct competition with our desire to halt the deterioration of our rights in the coastal areas.

10. The general situation commends an early resolution of conflicts between U.S. rights and those of friendly countries. Such a resolution is essential if the U.S. is to frame a coherent program of Antarctic exploration and observations geared to a reliable estimate of long-term interests and capacity.

11. Any plan for definition of U.S. interests in the Antarctic should take into consideration the desirability of arousing the least opposition from friendly countries and should contemplate obtaining, if possible, the prior acquiescence of other claimants. Negotiations of this type could hardly be expected to succeed in toto in the near future.

Discussion

12. The Department of State proposes to enter into bilateral negotiations with the seven Antarctic claimant countries (Argentina, Chile, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France) to obtain their recognition of superior U.S. rights in certain areas (indicated on the map attached to this report) in return for U.S. agreement not to contest their individual claims in the remaining areas.

13. The problem of negotiations toward a definition of U.S. interests and resolution of conflicting claims involves several elements depending upon the parts of the region being considered:

a. In the sector 90°–150° West Longitude (including most of Marie Byrd Land), U.S. rights are practically uncontested. *This area could be explored and claimed with no foreign objections.* The first three U.S. IGY stations will be located here. It would logically constitute the nucleus of a future U.S. claim. (Area A of attached map)

b. Around the rim of the continent (Area B) seldom to a depth of more than a few hundred miles, from 150° West, westward to about 20° West (plus Heard Island), U.S. rights are in conflict with single claimants (New Zealand, Australia, France and Norway) which recognize each others' claims. U.S. rights here are significant, but scattered. Communications between parts of this area would be difficult by sea, surface or air, because the coastal distance from one end to the other is about 5,000 miles, and the straight-line distance about 2,000 miles. In the vast unexplored interior of those claims, but mainly the Australian and Norwegian (Part of Area C) the U.S. probably could acquire superior rights in the near future by carrying out its plan for aerial photography and mapping. *The U.S. objective here should be to seek recognition from the four claimants of an exclusive U.S. interest in the interior, and a suitable coastal outlet for the U.S. somewhere in the Australian claim, in return for U.S. agreement not to contest their claims along the coasts.*

c. In the remaining coastal areas from 20° to 90° West (Weddell Sea and the Palmer Peninsula areas (Area B)), U.S. rights are in conflict with the overlapping claims of the U.K., Argentina and Chile. Here the problem is complicated by the fact that the U.S. could not recognize any one of the claims in the areas where they conflict. We could, however, in the same terms as indicated above, *agree not to contest their claims along the coasts, in return for their individual recognitions of superior U.S. rights south of about 80° South Latitude (Part of Area C) (plus an outlet to the Weddell Sea and some coastal area near the western base of* the Palmer Peninsula, e.g., Alexander I Island). The alternative presented to these three claimants might be an eventual U.S. claim including the Peninsula and conflicting with their own.

14. While such negotiations, if successful, will tend to set the limits of any future U.S. claims, no specific recommendation for announcement of a claim can be made until the results of the negotiations are known.

15. The advantage of this proposal lies partly in the fact that it would not require disruption of the major areas of present and past activities of other claimants. They should find it easy to "give up" to the U.S. those areas which are largely unexplored, in exchange for U.S. recognition of (or non-objection to) their claims. It would give the U.S., on the other hand, a large area, accessible from several directions and just as likely to be of value in the future as the areas of its existing rights.

16. This plan also has advantages as a counter to any Soviet attempt to obtain a foothold in the region. The present fluidity of the territorial situation, maintained largely by U.S. policies, constitutes an invitation to additional claimants. Removal of potential conflicts among friendly powers would, moreover, reduce the opportunity for trouble-making between claimants by supporting one against the other. An approach to eventual "partition" of the region would leave no portion of the continent outside the cognizance of at least one of the eight friendly claimants. U.S. rights in the coastal areas need not be abandoned in relation to outside powers and, ultimately could be formally ceded to the friendly powers to strengthen their respective claims against outside encroachment.

17. To summarize, the foregoing plan would help to insure that the U.S. could:

a. proceed unimpeded with a coherent plan of exploration and scientific observations in areas where there is the greatest likelihood of ultimately acquiring undisputed possession,

b. avoid irritation of, and perhaps open controversy with, friendly powers claiming other parts of the region,

c. prevent the U.S. from dissipating its resources and efforts in areas of no certain long-term value to U.S.,

d. provide guidance to questions (para. 2 herein) presently impeding U.S. operations.

Recommendation

18. It is recommended that the State Department proceed with negotiations as outlined in paragraph 13.

300. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Satterthwaite) to the Members of the Board[1]

Washington, April 25, 1955.

SUBJECT:

Location of U.S. Antarctic Interests

For the Board's consideration May 4,[2] there are enclosed two memoranda dealing with the problem of the pros and cons of "rights" vs. "claims" in the Antarctic.

The first memorandum contains the views of the State Department, agreed to by the other agencies concerned except Defense, and requesting permission to initiate bilateral negotiations which if successful would eventually have the effect of shifting our policy from that of "rights" to one of "claims."

The second memorandum contains the Defense Department's views of why the U.S. should maintain its present position of "rights" rather than "claims."

For the Board's information there is enclosed as Attachment 3 a copy of the transmittal memo to the NSC of February 10 on this subject[3] which further describes the opposing points of view.

The Board is asked to decide: (a) whether the NSC should be asked to amend NSC 5424/1 to enable State to initiate negotiations; (b) whether State already has this capability under NSC 5424/1; or (c) whether State should be instructed not to initiate negotiations at this time.[4]

Livingston Satterthwaite

Attachment 1

STATE POSITION REGARDING LOCATION OF U.S. ANTARCTIC INTERESTS

1. Approval is requested for the initiation of bilateral negotiations with the present Antarctic claimants (Argentina, Chile, Austra-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Antarctica—5424/1. Secret.

[2] No record has been found of an OCB discussion relative to U.S. Antarctic interests on May 4 or at any other meeting during this period.

[3] Reference is to Document 297.

[4] The list of attachments to this memorandum also includes the OCB Staff Study of March 29, *supra*.

lia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France and Norway) to obtain their recognition of superior U.S. rights in certain areas (see map attached to Memorandum to Board Assistants dated March 10, 1955 [5]) in return for U.S. agreement not to contest their rights in the remaining areas. The State Department believes that these negotiations should be opened in the near future and is prepared to do so.

2. The proposed negotiations represent a positive step toward the goals of "an early resolution of conflicting claims by amicable means" and "international arrangements to promote the over-all reduction of international friction, and the orderly solution of the territorial problem among friendly powers" (Paragraph 9 b., NSC 5424/1). The U.S. would attempt to remove itself from the most strongly contested areas without, at this time, trying to settle disputes among Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom. Successful negotiations along the lines proposed would also "reassert U.S. 'rights' in the Antarctic" (Paragraph 9 a.) in selected areas more effectively than is possible by other means, and at the same time move toward the establishment of specific claims. In the remaining areas U.S. rights would be yielded in favor of friendly claimants, without abandoning them as regards present non-claimants, thus helping to "exclude our most probable enemies" (Paragraph 6). Decisions relating to an eventual U.S. claim must await the outcome of the proposed negotiations. To the degree they are successful, however, the negotiations will set the limits of any future U.S. claim in competition with present claimants. [6]

Attachment 2

DEFENSE POSITION REGARDING LOCATION OF U.S. ANTARCTIC INTERESTS

1. The United States should maintain its present policy of reserving all rights in the Antarctic area until such time as an intelligent analysis can be made to determine the areas of potential value. To arbitrarily relinquish our claims to certain areas in return

---

[5] No map was attached to the source text. Regarding the March 10 memorandum to the Board Assistants, see footnote 1, *supra*.

[6] In a memorandum dated April 29, to Barbour and Merchant, Raynor recommended that Hoover be briefed on the importance of the Department proposal for bilateral negotiations on Antarctic interests. Raynor pointed out the likelihood of Department of Defense opposition to the proposals and the undesirability of accepting the Defense position, which no one else in the Antarctic Working Group supported. (Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/4–2955)

for their recognition of superior United States rights in other areas is taking a gamble that is considered unwarranted because:

a. At the present time little is known of the potential value of any part of the Antarctic continent. Large areas have never been seen. To claim certain portions now and relinquish rights to others without knowledge of topography, geology, mineral deposits, and many other considerations which bear materially upon relative values in the Antarctic would be unwise and at best an unnecessary gamble.

b. The proposed U.S. claims outlined in the paper include large areas difficult of access in exchange for large coastal areas relatively free of access,

c. The report of the National Academy of Sciences on "Antarctic Research—Elements of a Coordinated Program", dated 2 May 1949, states as follows:

> (1) "Every square mile of unexplored territory must be assumed to have potential value at some time in the future, if not now".
>
> (2) "A continent-wide scientific program in Antarctica cannot be fully developed until we have at least a reconnaissance map embracing the entire area. It is necessary to know what are the areas of ice-free rocks, what are the approximate elevations of all parts of the continent, and where the ice surface will permit operations by different types of surface and air transport."

2. The immediate task ahead for the U.S. in Antarctica would appear to be one of utilizing all feasible means to learn as much about the continent as possible so as to place this country in an enlightened and favorable position when it ultimately enters into discussions with foreign powers for the purpose of finally delineating the respective rights of each. At that time we will be in a position to know the value of what we acquire and what we are giving up. The United States is now preparing to conduct extensive operations in the Antarctic, the results of which may be to supply valuable information relative to the potential value of various sectors of the continent and also to strengthen our claims in disputed areas.

301. Memorandum for the Files, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)[1]

Washington, May 25, 1955.

SUBJECT

Department's Position on OCB Paper: "Location of U.S. Antarctic Interests"

Following receipt of my memorandum of today's date,[2] Mr. Bishop (U/OP)[3] phoned to tell me that he had received the concurrence of Mr. Barbour (EUR) and Mr. Sparks (ARA)[4] in a Defense proposal to defer for one year consideration of the OCB paper[5] on location of U.S. Antarctic interests. Mr. Barbour later confirmed his concurrence in the Defense proposal in a meeting[6] also attended by Messrs. Parsons and Hilliker.[7]

In the course of the meeting Mr. Barbour said that he was not convinced of the need for the proposed bilateral negotiations in which the U.S. would "trade" its rights in certain areas for those of other countries in other parts of the Antarctic. Unless the need was overriding for a move in the direction of a U.S. claim, he would prefer to acquiesce in the Department of Defense request, particularly since it was providing the money for U.S. activities in the Antarctic.

I replied that no overwhelming case could be made for starting the negotiations now. Events in Antarctica, due to the nature of the region, could never be predicted with complete certainty. We could say, however, that we had already delayed too long in making a claim and that our bargaining position relative to those of other countries would continue to deteriorate in the coming year. The international situation, particularly with Argentina, was now favorable where it had not been in the past and might not be next year. We foresaw that next year there probably would be other reasons for not starting negotiations, e.g., avoiding interference with the IGY. The proposed postponement therefore probably would be for three or four years rather than only one. Mr. Hilliker added that the result of continuing our present policy of reserving rights everywhere would be the eventual limitation of any U.S. claim to the presently unclaimed sector between 90° and 150° w. longitude.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/5–2555. Secret.

[2] Not further identified.

[3] Max Bishop, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

[4] Edward J. Sparks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until June 1955.

[5] Document 299.

[6] Not further identified.

[7] Marselis G. Parsons of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs and Grant G. Hilliker of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

Mr. Barbour reiterated his earlier position.

HR

---

302. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 3, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Inquiry Concerning United States Antarctic Claim

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Ralph E. Flanders
Mr. William Godel—Department of Defense
Mr. John S. Leahy, Jr.—H
Mr. Walworth Barbour—EUR
Mr. Grant G. Hilliker—BNA

Referring to Senator Flanders' letter of April 28 [2] to Mr. Morton, I said that we had requested a meeting to discuss the question of Antarctic claims in view of the difficulty of adequately clarifying our position in a letter.

I told the Senator that the Departments concerned had been actively considering for the past several months the question of a possible U.S. claim in the Antarctic, reversing the previous policy of reserving U.S. rights everywhere in the area. We had recently decided to postpone the action for a year during which time U.S. expeditions in the area might obtain additional information upon which we might better select the areas of greatest value to the United States.

The Senator supposed that the existence of other countries' claims also affected the problem. Mr. Godel replied affirmatively and explained that U.S. expeditions would be in the Antarctic over the next several years after a period of several years of U.S. inactivity.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/6–355. Secret.

[2] In this letter Senator Flanders expressed concern over the reluctance of the United States to exercise its sovereignty in declaring claims in the Antarctic, and the Senator indicated that he might introduce legislation in the Senate making claims in the area. (*Ibid.*)

He handed the Senator a copy of the "Bluebird" map [3] and stated that the coming expeditions would establish five permanent U.S. stations (Little America, Marie Byrd Land, South Pole, McMurdo Sound, and Weddell Sea). The area is of some strategic value, he said, because the Drake Passage is an alternate route around South America in the event the Panama Canal should be disabled. No mineral discoveries had yet been made by the U.S. or any other country which would justify exploitation according to methods thusfar known. Other countries had established bases in the area, particularly around the Palmer Peninsula, which gave them very strong rights. Nevertheless the Administration was definitely moving in the direction of making an official claim.

I stated that we planned, once a decision on a claim had been made, to enter into negotiations with other claimants for the mutual recognition of claims. The Senator asked that we keep him informed so that when that time is reached he might introduce a bill for the assertion of a claim. He explained this desire on grounds of personal interest in the Antarctic and implied that he expected the bill would be handled by the Armed Services Committee of which he is a member.

B

---

[3] Not further identified.

---

303. Memorandum of Discussion at the 258th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 8, 1955 [1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of agenda items 1–5.]

6. Antarctica (NSC 5424/1; Progress Report, dated July 13, 1955, by OCB on NSC 5424/1 [2])

Mr. Anderson [3] briefed the Council and read from the latest Moscow radio broadcast dealing with the plans of the Soviet Government for an expedition to Antarctica in connection with the International Geophysical Year. He also emphasized the Planning Board's judgment that recent Russian interest in Antarctica and other developments suggested the desirability of a review of U.S. policy toward Antarctica.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on September 15.

[2] Not printed. (Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430; Antarctica—5424/1)

[3] Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President.

Dr. Flemming referred to the point made in the Progress Report that no single office or unit in the Executive Branch had been given responsibility for coordinating Government policies and programs with respect to Antarctica. He wondered, therefore, whether the NSC should refer the problem of organizing such a unit to the Bureau of the Budget and to the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization. However, Secretary Hoover pointed out that there was no real conflict or issue among the Government agencies over Antarctica. From the operating point of view this region was preponderantly a Defense Department responsibility, but actually cooperation among all the departments was going ahead so smoothly that Secretary Hoover could perceive no necessity for placing exclusive concern and responsibility for the affairs of Antarctica in any one Government department or agency. The OCB, he believed, was operating very effectively in this field. Dr. Flemming then said he would withdraw his proposal.

Governor Stassen[4] strongly supported the Planning Board's recommendation for a review of NSC 5424/1, on grounds of what seemed to him the obvious fact that if the Soviets once got a foothold in Antarctica they would never abandon the region. Accordingly, he believed that the U.S. had better set forth its claims in this region before the Soviet expedition arrived.

Secretary Hoover commented that the trouble was that if the U.S. staked out formal claims, the situation in Antarctica might become more confused and worse than it was at present, with so many other friendly governments also making claims in the region.

General Cabell[5] stressed the significance of the recent Soviet interest in Antarctica. It was, he said, by no means a mere passing interest or one solely in relation to the Geophysical Year.

The Vice President commented that all these points added up to the advisability of a review of this policy.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

---

[4] Harold Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.

[5] Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, U.S.A.F., Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

[6] Paragraphs a–b below constitute NSC Action No. 1437. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to review the policy on Antarctica contained in NSC 5424/1.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

304. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)[1]

Washington, September 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Background on Antarctica for Mr. Casey's[2] Call Wednesday,[3] 11:00 a.m.

Australia is one of seven countries which up to now have had claims or significant interests in Antarctica. She has one permanent station in the area of her claim (see attached map)[4] and may soon establish another one.

United States policy, as established by the NSC in July 1954, and subsequently developed in the OCB, is to step up a program of exploration, mapping and scientific investigation, looking toward the formal assertion of a United States claim (which unlike other countries we have never yet made) and eventually to negotiations with other claimant countries to reconcile overlapping claims.

This general policy is for the present being implemented as part of our national contribution to the world-wide cooperative scientific enterprise known as "The International Geophysical Year", to take place in 1957–58. This involves an enormous amount of preparation and planning in the geophysical sciences. Part of this is centered on the Antarctic and there are periodic meetings of scientists, headed up on our side by the National Science Foundation, to plan the details. One of these is now being held in Brussels.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 031.1102/9–1355. Secret. Drafted by Outerbridge Horsey, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

[2] Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister of External Affairs, visited the United States during September to attend the opening meetings of the Tenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, which began on September 20. Casey held meetings with the principal officers of the Department of State on September 12 and 14.

[3] September 12.

[4] Not printed.

We sent an expedition last year on the SS *Atka* to explore locations for future stations. Another expedition leaves November 1 for New Zealand and thence to Little America, where it will set up an air strip at McMurdo Sound and establish another station in Little America. Both of these are in the sector claimed by New Zealand. We shall in due course establish stations at Points 2 and 3 on the attached map.

The USSR, with little previous record of interest in Antarctica, has announced an ambitious program for participation in the IGY and there are natural fears that her interests are more than scientific. They propose a station on the Knox Coast in the Australian claim. . . .

In order to protect the Australian claim, Mr. Casey may refer to a recent announcement from our people in Brussels as to our plans for the Knox Coast and may say something to the effect that Australia would be glad to give us any cooperation we need in connection with our activities *within her claim.* This kind of statement would be within the customary relationship between us on the one hand, New Zealand and Australia on the other, each seeking to protect whatever claims it has. Our customary reply is to thank them but to point out that we cannot recognize their claim and that we must fully reserve all our own rights.

There has been a renewed interest on the part of other claimant countries as to our intentions, because at the time Admiral Dufek (Commander of our Antarctic expedition this fall) was given Rear Admiral rank by Act of Congress in June, 1955, the Committee report referred to a "governmental decision taken in July 1954" and to his expedition as being "to implement the governmental policy on Antarctica."

305. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 14, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Antarctica

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador
Mr. John Quinn, Department of External Affairs
Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Counselor of Australian Embassy
Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Horsey, Director, BNA

Mr. Casey opened by saying that Antarctica was particularly important to Australia because the climate of the southern half of their country was affected by the air masses from Antarctica. He said there were strong feelings in Australia in regard to Antarctica and that, from the long range defense point of view they could not afford to have a place which was within aircraft range of Australia in hostile hands. He said there were also certain mineral resources in the area which they had investigated. He referred also to its meteorological importance to Australia and New Zealand. He mentioned that they were on the track of some automatic meteorological recording and transmitting equipment which was being manufactured by a small firm near Paris. If this worked they intended to put a string of stations in along the coast of the sector which they claimed. Later in the conversation he said he had made inquiries in Washington and had been told that we did not have any such equipment ourselves. He asked that we renew our inquiry and let the Australians know if in fact we had any such equipment and with whom the Australians could talk about it. Mr. Murphy said we would undertake to do this.

Mr. Casey also said that they were in the course of preparing the most detailed map yet made of Antarctica particularly of the area of the Australian claim which he showed Mr. Murphy on the attached map. He said that Australia had proclaimed a system of law for "our area" and the islands which they claimed. He said they are working very closely with the French. He expressed appreciation for the photographs which we had given them, which had been taken on the Byrd Expedition.[2] He referred to their permanent station at Mawson and said they had had another one at Heard Island which they had abandoned because of the lack of resources, but it could be reoccupied at any time. He said they were considering the establishment of another mainland station in the area at Vestfold Hills. He said they were renting a Danish ship and sending an aircraft down to be stationed there.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/9–1455. Secret. Drafted by Horsey.

. . . .

Mr. Casey said they had heard rumors that we were reappraising our policy on Antarctica and asked what Mr. Murphy could tell him in that connection.

Mr. Murphy said that we did not recognize the validity of any of the claims so far advanced and noted that many of them involved areas in which we also had an interest based on a long history of exploration. He referred to the friction resulting from the conflicting claims of the United Kingdom, Chile and Argentina. He referred also to the 1948 proposal for some form of common sovereignty and to the Soviet injection of its interest at that time.[3] He said that at some suitable time we favored negotiation among the seven claiming countries, excluding the USSR, so that conflicting claims could be reconciled.

Mr. Casey said that Mr. Pearson[4] had mentioned the same idea of internationalization during his recent visit to Ottawa and that Mr. Casey had opposed it strongly. So far as Australia was concerned, they wanted the status quo. For their part they were progressing with useful scientific work and saw no reason for international action. He did not think there was now much friction.

In response to a question Mr. Murphy said that there was nothing imminent so far as our ideas of negotiation were concerned, and, in response to Mr. Casey's request for consultation, said that we would, of course, consult with them in due course when we had anything specific in mind.

---

[2] Reference is presumably to the Antarctic development project code-named "Operation Highjump", headed by Richard E. Byrd, in which American ships, aircraft, and men extensively explored and photographed various portions of Antarctica between December 1946 and February 1947.

[3] For documentation regarding suggestions by the United States for creation of a condominium arrangement for Antarctica, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 969 ff.

[4] Presumably the exchange between Casey and Pearson occurred sometime during Casey's early September 1955 visit to Canada.

306. Minutes of a Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, Executive Office Building, Washington, September 21, 1955 [1]

PRESENT

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State—Chairman
Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Theodore C. Streibert, Director, U. S. Information Agency
Mr. John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration
Mr. Gordon Gray, Alternate for Mr. Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Alternate for Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Paul F. Foster, for Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. C. Dillon Glendinning, Acting Director, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury
Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, and their Assistants

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1–3.]

Agenda Item 4—OCB Guidance Requested by OCB Working Group on Antarctica (NSC 5424/1)

(Mr. Felix Wormser, Assistant Secretary of the Interior; Dr. Thomas Nolan, Acting Director, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior; Admiral George Dufek, Capt. Jerrold Ketcham, Cdr. Charles Snay of the Department of Defense; Dr. Alan Waterman, Director of National Science Foundation, and Mr. Neil Carothers, III, National Science Foundation, were present for this item.)

(a) Noted statement by the Department of the Interior of Interior's proposed program with respect to Antarctica. [2]

(b) Acted as follows with respect to the recommendations in the Executive Officer's memorandum for the Board, "OCB Guidance Requested by OCB Working Group on Antarctica (NSC 5424/1)", dated September 13, 1955: [3]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Minutes. Secret. Drafted on September 23.

[2] The proposed program referenced here was presumably presented orally. In a memorandum of September 13 to the members of the Operations Coordinating Board, OCB Executive Officer Staats reviewed the proposal by the OCB Working Group on Antarctica that the Department of the Interior be designated the appropriate agency to prepare maps from existing and future photographs and mapping data. It was observed that very few of the photographs and mapping data assembled by U.S. expeditions, particularly those in the late 1940's, had been used to make maps with U.S. place names.

[3] See footnote 2 above.

(1) Compilation of Maps

Agreed that the compilation of maps (as distinguished from the aerial photographs from which the maps may be derived) could best be performed by the Department of the Interior. Agreed further to support a request by the Department of the Interior for legislative authority and appropriations to undertake mapping no later than FY 1957 and that the request by the Department of the Interior to the Bureau of the Budget should be coordinated through the OCB Working Group on Antarctica, in order that activities of all agencies participating in the Antarctica program may be properly related, including the activities of the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation. Also noted the urgency of the immediate initiation of the mapping program and urged the Department of Defense to make available FY 1956 funds in an amount up to $200,000 for transfer to the Department of the Interior for this purpose.

(2) Expedition on Knox Coast in Calendar 1955

Concurred in the State–Defense recommendation that an expedition to the Knox Coast should not be made this year.

(3) Proposed Fiscal Year 1957 Plans of the Department of Defense for the Antarctica Program

Noted a presentation of the Department of Defense FY 1957 Antarctica program and agreed that the program presented satisfies the operational requirements on Defense on NSC 5424/1 without specifically concurring as to the amount of funds, personnel and/or details of other logistical support.[4]

[Here follows the remainder of the minutes.]

---

[4] The texts of the Department of Defense presentation under reference here and accompanying memoranda by OCB Executive Officer Staats are not printed.

---

307. **Editorial Note**

The ANZUS Council held a meeting at the Department of State on the morning of September 24. The 19 participants included Secretary of State Dulles and Under Secretary of State Hoover for the United States, External Affairs Minister Casey and Ambassador Sir Percy Spender for Australia, and External Affairs Minister

Thomas L. MacDonald and Ambassador Sir Leslie Munro for New Zealand. According to the United States Minutes of the meeting, Casey raised the issue of Antarctica at the conclusion of the meeting:

"Mr. Casey then raised the question of Antarctica. He said that since his talk with the Acting Secretary on September 14 there had been new developments. The Russians had exposed their plans for future activities in Antarctica. These plans envisaged regular flights of aircraft to Antarctica, probably as many as five or six a year. . . . Mr. Casey said that Australians hoped that the U.S., U.K., New Zealand and Australia could get together to concert their positions with regard to Antarctica.

" . . . Australia felt that there should be the fullest talks before any new developments occur.

"Mr. Hoover explained the U.S. position prior to U.S.S.R. interest in the area. . . . The U.S. was now gathering material for a reassessment of its policy but was not yet in a position to discuss the matter authoritatively." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 55)

---

308. Statement Prepared in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs[1]

Washington, undated.

We can well understand the interest caused by our activities in the Antarctic. Any and all U.S. activities are considered by us, in addition to their immediate practical objectives, which in the scientific field particularly are of benefit to other friendly countries as well as to ourselves, as measures to support the overall U.S. position.

This position is one in which, as the Australian Government well knows, the U.S. does not recognize any of the claims so far advanced and reserves all rights arising out of U.S. activities. We recognize that this is a position which may occasionally be construed as competition with the claims of other nations but, under present circumstances, we see no way which that situation can be avoided.

The immediate practical objectives sought in our Antarctic activities are in conjunction with and in support of the International Geophysical Year, exploration, geography, and the earth sciences. The flights in question will contribute to this knowledge. In addition, they will permit, we hope, the determination of ice conditions immediately before the movement of ships into the area, current weather data and a more precise analysis of the origins of weather in the Antarctic. The scientific data which can be obtained on upper air conditions will be of use to the over-all scientific endeavor planned for the International Geophysical Year. Such aerial photography as may be produced as a result of these flights will contribute to the geographic knowledge of the Antarctic continent. It is, of course, our intention to make all of these data and materials available to interested friendly countries including Australia who desire them.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10–2155. Confidential.

It is, of course, also true that the interest of the Soviet Union in the Antarctic presents a problem in which we are all concerned. It will be recalled that initially under the program for the International Geophysical Year the United States planned only three or four stations, none of which would have been located within the Australian claimed sector. When it was learned in July that the Soviets would be placing a station on the Knox Coast, the United States agreed at the International Conference in Brussels to establish a similar station to help offset any possible political consequences of Soviet action by insuring the presence of other countries (including the United States) which have a history of past activity in the general area. In view of the fact that we could not establish a station before the arrival of the Russians, the Department of Defense proposed the flights in question, in addition to the more important reasons which I have just mentioned, as a partial substitute. The State Department could see no objection to the project and considered it a routine operation fully consistent with our previous policies and actions. Because the flights were not the result of any new national policy decision, we did not take the initiative for consultation on the survey flight through diplomatic channels. However, because of the concern over the project, and the regrettable lapse over the initial press release, we are now sorry that we did not explain the entire project fully at the outset through diplomatic channels.

It is, incidentally, not yet certain that, following the report of the survey party, we shall actually be able to undertake the proposed flights. It is expected that it will be possible to make a decision on this point within the next few days and we shall be in touch with the Australian Embassy in due course.

309. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)[1]

Washington, October 26, 1955.

DEAR HERB: In confirmation of our conversation on the subject of SAC flights to Antarctica,[2] this office has determined that for the reasons we discussed the present operation by the Strategic Air Command should be cancelled.

However, in view of the desire of the Department of State that all possible efforts be made to obtain "first sightings" and mapping data in that area where the Soviets are expected to install their base and from which they will conduct their operations, we have requested the Department of the Navy to instruct its expeditionary Task Force to reschedule its mapping flights so as to anticipate what we judge to be the most probable time of the Soviet effort.

In order to provide the maximum time for Task Force 43 to conduct its operations, however, we would appreciate it if the Department of State would initiate such diplomatic action as may be feasible to persuade the governments of Australia, Argentina, and South Africa to delay or withhold permission for Soviet flight operations from bases within their countries.

We recognize, of course, that such action might involve other diplomatic considerations which would make a direct approach to these governments undesirable and defer to your judgment on this matter.[3]

Sincerely yours,

Reuben

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 031.1102/10–2655. Confidential.

[2] In a memorandum of October 21 to Barbour, Hoover briefly reviewed the substance of a telephone conversation with Deputy Secretary Robertson. Robertson outlined the following reasons why the Department of Defense was hesitant to undertake aerial surveys over certain areas of Antarctica by means of Strategic Air Command aircraft: 1) the operations could not begin until early December, 2) inadequate coverage by surface vessels and lack of other facilities caused serious jeopardy of life, and 3) the cost of such operation was $4 million over and above expenditures contemplated in existing plans. (*Ibid.*, 031.1102/10–2155)

A memorandum from Barbour to Acting Secretary Hoover, dated October 21, recommending that Hoover support earlier proposed flights to Antarctica if the Department of Defense was still interested in them, is not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Telegram 129 to Canberra, November 1, drafted in EUR/BNA and signed by Horsey for Hoover, reads as follows:

"B–36 Antarctic flights discussed with Australian Counselor October 21 (memorandum pouched addressee missions) will not take place. Navy expedition will try make desired reconnaissance with own equipment. Decision cancel B–36 flights solely motivated by operational and budgetary reasons." (*Ibid.*, 031.1102/11–155)

310. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

CA-3818 *Washington, November 15, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Soviet Interest in the Facilities in Connection with the Antarctic Expedition

We are concerned over reports which have been received indicating that the Soviet Union may formally request the use of base facilities in the Southern Hemisphere in support of the Soviet Antarctic program during the International Geophysical Year. Our concern is motivated by fears that the Soviet interest will not be limited to that period. The use of such facilities has other strategic significance, and we should like to see that a coordinated policy toward a possible request for base facilities be adopted by those most likely to be approached. The addressee missions are therefore instructed to approach at an appropriate level the governments to which they are accredited, in formally conveying the following: [2]

"The United States has followed with interest plans announced by the Soviet Union for an Antarctic expedition in connection with the International Geophysical Year. We do not yet know whether Soviet activity in the Antarctic is motivated by real scientific interest or whether it heralds an attempt at permanent occupation of a portion of the Antarctic. We feel sure that our friends and allies who have a traditional interest in the Antarctic Continent share our concern over the latter possibility.

"The United States has learned that the Soviet Union has informally requested assistance at recent IGY meetings in the nature of landing rights at airfields as stopping points for planes en route to the Antarctic. We believe that the extension of such assistance would be contrary to the interest of all having an interest in the Antarctic unless we can be assured that the main Soviet interest is connected with the International Geophysical Year and thus limited in its duration.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 031.6102/11-1555. Confidential. Sent to Buenos Aires, Canberra, London, Pretoria, Santiago, and Wellington. Drafted by Edwin D. Crowley (EUR/BNA) and cleared by Horsey and appropriate officers in BNA, L/ARA, OSA, and EE.

[2] The text that follows is identical with a text drafted by Crowley and sent from Barbour to Acting Secretary Hoover in a memorandum of November 3, which Hoover approved. (*Ibid.*, 031.1102/11-355)

"In the common interest we believe we should adopt a common policy towards any official Soviet overtures by keeping each other informed of such developments."

. . . .

Hoover

---

311. National Security Council Report[1]

NSC 5528 *Washington, December 12, 1955.*

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5424/1[2]
B. NSC Action No. 1437–b[3]

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1437–b, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting.

Attention is invited to the three alternative courses of action set forth in the enclosed draft statement of policy. Whichever of these courses is adopted is intended to supersede NSC 5424/1.

A Financial Appendix covering Antarctica is also enclosed,[4] and a map is being prepared for later circulation.

It is recommended that the enclosed statement of policy, in the form adopted by the Council, be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it, direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

James S. Lay, Jr.[5]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series. Secret. Considered by the NSC at its meeting on January 12; see Document 313.

[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, Part 2, p. 1760.

[3] See footnote 6, Document 303.

[4] Not printed.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ANTARCTICA

General Considerations

1. Antarctica is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic "summer" and much of it has never been seen or explored. In the past it has been thought to have little or no economic importance and only remote strategic significance. Antarctica has considerable immediate importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments. Furthermore, the recent Soviet decision to send expeditions to the Antarctic is evidence of the interest the Soviets have in the area and the importance they attach to it. This development is a cause for concern to the U.S. and its friends and allies in the Southern Hemisphere.

2. Formal claims to Antarctic territory have been made by the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the U.K. The U.S. has neither recognized any of these claims nor made any official claim of its own, but has consistently sought to reserve all its "rights". The USSR has made no Antarctic claims but has asserted a right to participate in any territorial settlement on the basis of the claimed discovery of the continent by Bellingshausen in 1820–21.

3. The U.S. has a basis for claims to major areas in all of Antarctica, as the result of discovery, exploration and unofficial claims made on behalf of the U.S. The areas in which the U.S. has been active lie with the U.K., Argentine, Chilean, Australian and New Zealand claims, as well as within an unclaimed sector (90°W–150°W). Formal claims and sustained activities by other claimants now threaten to weaken the basis for U.S. claims in almost all parts of Antarctica.

4. In view of the long history of U.S. activity, public interest, and the possibility that the Antarctic may later assume an importance which is not now apparent, it would be inadvisable to allow U.S. "rights" to deteriorate. The fact that other countries have long standing claims in the Antarctic while the U.S. has none will weaken any claim the U.S. may advance in the future. On the other hand we do not have sufficient knowledge about the continent to permit an informed choice of the best locations for U.S. claims now. Moreover,

any decision to put forward U.S. claims must take into account (a) the possibility of objections by friendly governments, (b) possible adverse effects on scientific cooperation in connection with the International Geophysical Year, and (c) propaganda from unfriendly quarters.

5. Three practicable alternative courses of action are open to the U.S. with regard to the Antarctic:

Alternative A—Continue to reserve U.S "rights" without recognizing the claims of other countries.[6]

Alternative B—Claim no more than the unclaimed sector (90° to 150° W longitude) at this time.

Alternative C—Claim the unclaimed sector and all other areas which can appropriately be claimed by the U.S. on the basis of its activity therein.

The arguments for and against each of these alternatives are briefly suggested in the following paragraphs.[7]

6. *Alternative A*—Continue to reserve U.S. "rights" without recognizing the claims of others.

a. Arguments for Alternative A:

(1) It would permit freedom of action by the U.S. in all parts of Antarctica.

(2) It would not in itself increase the irritation of other countries with the U.S.

(3) Knowledge of the Antarctic is insufficient to permit an informed estimate as to whether a claim should ever be made or, if made, to determine which areas should be claimed. More complete knowledge may become available in the next few years.

(4) The basis for future U.S. claims would be improved by U.S. operations in the area, 1956–59.

(5) It might not involve as much expense as the maintenance of extensive claims.

b. Arguments against Alternative A:

(1) The present policy results in uncertainty and irritation to other friendly nations. These countries fear that the U.S. eventually intends to pursue a policy of ruthless self-interest. In this atmosphere the U.S. can do nothing towards a reduction of tensions and as activities increase in support of U.S. "rights", irritations tend to increase.

---

[6] Alternative A was advanced by the representative of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the adviser of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[7] Alternative C was advanced by the representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury. In a memorandum of December 30, 1955, to Assistant Secretary of State Merchant, Horsey argued against Alternative C and in favor of Alternative A. A note on the margin of that memorandum in Horsey's hand and dated January 12, 1956, reads: "After considering this LJM said he thought we should go along with alternative C." (Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/12–3055)

(2) Of greater importance, perhaps, is the fact that existing U.S. rights tend to weaken unless investments in excess of those being made at the present time are made over wide areas on the continent. These costs may be larger than the price of supporting claims to selected areas.

(3) Waiting for a more favorable time to make a claim is apt to be an illusory policy, since in practice a politically opportune moment to make a claim tends never to arise.

(4) There is doubt as to whether exploration during the next few years will permit a more intelligent selection of U.S. claim areas.

(5) The U.S. is and will continue to be at a disadvantage with respect to the perfection of a claim to Antarctica, so long as we do not officially announce a claim, a step usually considered indispensable in the acquisition of territory by discovery or discovery and use.

(6) A "waiting" policy would not advance the objective of denying the area to the Soviets as adequately as a policy of making U.S. claims before the Soviets establish a basis for a claim.

7. *Alternative B*—Claim only the unclaimed sector (90° to 150° W longitude) at this time.

a. Arguments for Alternative B:

(1) It would be the ideal solution from the view point of minimizing friction with other claimant countries.

(2) It would permit the U.S. to make constructive proposals for the settlement of over-all differences among the claimants.

(3) It would concentrate U.S. Antarctic activities in one sector and would avoid dissipation of effort indiscriminately everywhere on the continent.

(4) The cost of maintaining such a claim would be less than a more extensive claim and perhaps less expensive than present policy.

b. Arguments against Alternative B:

(1) A limited claim would eventually exclude the U.S. from other areas which are found to be of value and where the U.S. has had activity.

(2) There is no way of knowing whether or not this area is or will be of value.

(3) Such a claim would still make it impossible to work out a satisfactory arrangement with other countries unless there were a willingness to negotiate out other areas of U.S. interest.

(4) Soviet plans for the International Geophysical Year involve the establishment of bases only in the sector claimed by Australia. Since there will be no Soviet bases in the sector lying between 90° and 150° W longitude upon which to base a Soviet claim, there appears to be no urgency requiring immediate establishment of a U.S. claim.

(5) A claim by the U.S. in the near future might stimulate the USSR to make a claim and thus convert the Antarctic into an area of U.S.–USSR tension.

8. *Alternative C*—Claim the unclaimed sector and all other areas which can appropriately be claimed by the U.S. on the basis of its activity therein.

a. Arguments for Alternative C:

(1) It would perfect existing U.S. "rights" most effectively in the absence of an intention to make larger investments than at the present time.

(2) It would permit the U.S. to concentrate its efforts on more limited areas rather than dissipate them indiscriminately on the continent.

(3) While the initial reaction of other claimants would be one of irritation, a claim would provide a basis for negotiations leading to a reduction of controversy.

(4) Regardless of value, the U.S. can justify claims only where it has had activity. During the next few years activity will continue to be concentrated in areas of activity in the past.

b. Arguments against Alternative C:

(1) It would initially, at least, cause greater irritation to other claimants than does present U.S. policy or policy of claiming the unclaimed sector only.

(2) Knowledge of the Antarctic is at present inadequate to permit an informed decision as to the best areas to be claimed.

(3) Maintaining such claims might be more expensive than the cost of maintaining "rights".

(4) A claim by the U.S. in the near future might stimulate the USSR to make a claim and thus convert the Antarctic into an area of the U.S.–USSR tension.

(5) It would adversely affect international scientific cooperation in connection with the International Geophysical Year.

9. It may be of future strategic importance to the free world that the Soviet bloc have no control over any portion of Antarctica. From the standpoint of countering Soviet activities and future claims, either of the two courses of action involving U.S. claims (Alternative B or C) would be superior to the continued reservation of U.S. "rights" (Alternative A). It must be recognized that, however the U.S. acts, the Soviets are likely to make future claims based on activity (including conceivably IGY activity), and cannot be prevented from doing so or, in the near future at least, physically barred from the subcontinent. However, a U.S. claim before the Soviets establish a basis for claim, would set up a legal position opposed to that of the Soviets and would permit the U.S. to work in the direction of a common front of claimants. Hence, when the issue of sovereignty finally comes to a head—either in the International

Court, through arbitration or otherwise—the U.S. would then be in a stronger position to prevent a successful Soviet claim and to establish a structure wholly composed of free world nations. From this standpoint, as between Alternative B and Alternative C, B would be slightly superior, in that U.S. claims in conflict with the existing claims of others would tend to weaken our opposition to later Soviet claims likewise conflicting and likewise based on activity.

10. It should be noted that adoption of either Alternative B or C involving the advancement of formal U.S. claims might conceivably be the first step in embarking the U.S. upon a course of defending vast and remote areas which would be identified as U.S. territory and accepted at home and abroad as requiring protection from trespass or adverse occupation or use by the power and prestige of the U.S. The future consequences of such a course cannot now be clearly foreseen.

Objectives

11. Orderly progress toward solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica in such a way as to minimize friction with and among our allies.

12. Maintenance of control over the Antarctic by the U.S. and friendly powers and denial of the area to the USSR.

13. Preservation so far as possible of U.S. freedom of action to utilize in U.S. and free world interests such strategic potentials as the Antarctic may turn out to have.

14. Freedom of exploration, of scientific investigation and of access to such resources as may be discovered in the Antarctic for nationals of the U.S. and friendly powers; and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data.

[Here follow five pages that present in tabular form the three courses of action presented in the body of the draft statement on policy.]

312. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

Washington, January 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

Antarctica (NSC 5528)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations regarding a draft statement of policy prepared by the NSC planning Board entitled, "Antarctica"—NSC 5528. [2]

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement, from the military point of view, with the objectives proposed and with the courses of action common to the three alternatives set forth in the draft statement of policy. The basic divergency reflected in the alternative courses of action centers upon the question as to whether the United States should now announce its claims in Antarctica and, if so, to what areas or territories:

Alternative A—Make no claim at this time, but continue to reserve U.S. "rights" without recognizing the claims of other countries.

Alternative B—Claim no more than the unclaimed sector (90° to 150° W longitude) at this time.

Alternative C—Claim the unclaimed sector and all other areas which can appropriately be claimed by the U.S. on the basis of its activity therein.

3. The military importance of Antarctica, aside from the geographic, might well lie in its hidden scientific secrets and its yet undiscovered strategic materials. Unrestricted and continuing scientific investigation, exploration, and mapping in the Antarctic is essential to arrive at a dependable appraisal of its military worth. Now as in the past, the United States is exercising the right of conducting such activities in areas of its own choice in Antarctica, notwithstanding the "claims" of other nations. An announcement of United States claims to specific areas might well result in a curtailment of this freedom of action. In this connection, United States participation in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) includes the establishment over a widespread area. In contrast, nations which have laid formal claims are establishing their stations in Antarctica, in support of the IGY, within the areas of their respective claims. It is to be noted, however, that: (a) the USSR is establishing stations in

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series. Secret. NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated this memorandum to the members of the NSC under cover of a brief memorandum dated January 10, 1956. (*Ibid.*)

[2] *Supra.*

the Antarctic without regard to claims of other nations, and (b) the USSR has advanced no formal claims to areas in the Antarctic. Thus, the USSR and the United States are following similar practices in these respects.

4. The sizable operations scheduled by the United States and other nations for the next three years (1956–1959), should add considerably to our present inadequate knowledge of Antarctica. The information thus gained, when evaluated, will place the United States in a better position to determine the areas of value to which claim could appropriately be made. A formal claim at this time to areas claimed by other countries, as proposed in Alternative "C", could lead to international disputes with respect to areas of little or no value to the United States, whereas a further delay might operate to weaken future claims to areas desired. As regards the action proposed in Alternative "B", it could be misinterpreted as tacit approval of other nations' claims to the remainder of Antarctica, to the detriment of possible future United States action.

5. After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, on balance and for the present, the course of action under Alternative "A" best serves United States military interests. They consider, however, that the statement of policy specifying this course of action should be modified as set forth in the Appendix hereto [3] to provide that the United States be alert and fully prepared to announce and to justify a broad claim at the time circumstances made such action necessary to our national interest in advance of final determination of those areas in the Antarctic to which the United States will lay formal claim.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing constitute, in substance, the Department of Defense position with respect to the draft statement of United States policy on Antarctica—NSC 5528.

7. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.F. Twining [4]
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

---

[3] Not printed.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

313. Memorandum of Discussion at the 272d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 12, 1956[1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of agenda items 1–2.]

3. ANTARCTICA (NSC 5424/1; NSC 5528;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 10, 1956;[3] Progress Report, dated January 11, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5424/1[4])

Mr Anderson briefed the Council both on the contents of the proposed revised policy for Antarctica and on the analysis of the accompanying Progress Report on this policy. He then called on Commander Mansfield, USN,[5] who, with the help of a map, explained to the National Security Council the various claims made to areas of Antarctica by the several nations, as well as other information germane to Council consideration of policy towards Antarctica.

Before the briefing was completed, the President informed Mr. Anderson that he was going too fast and that he, the President, wanted to ask a question. Who was the geophysical expert present for this discussion? When informed that Dr. Waterman, head of the National Science Foundation, was the expert in question, the President asked Dr. Waterman what we could hope to get out of making claims to certain areas of Antarctica in return for the expense which substantiating these claims would involve us in.

Dr. Waterman replied that very little was known at the present time with respect to the economic resources of Antarctica. Meteorological data, however, would prove very valuable. The President then suggested that even if mineral deposits were actually found in Antarctica, the cost of their extraction would make their value highly problematical. Dr. Waterman replied that it was hard to say, but that in any case it would be difficult to establish the value of such resources in the short period of activity which we would be engaged in during the International Geophysical Year. The President then called upon the Secretary of State to give his views as to the usefulness of the United States making a claim to various areas in Antarctica.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 13.

[2] Document 311.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series)

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[5] Commander J.E. Mansfield, Department of the Navy.

Secretary Dulles said that of course the United States would be confronted by a good many difficulties and problems if it proceeded to make a claim to any such areas. . . .

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the draft of policy prepared by the NSC Planning Board did take cognizance of the question whether to stay where we are, reserving our rights in Antarctica, or to change our policy by making formal claims. The President said to Mr. Anderson that this was all very well, but before he bought a horse he wanted to know what he was going to do with him besides feed him. After all, only a moment ago we were talking about balancing our budget. Accordingly, the President asked Admiral Duncan[6] whether the costs of carrying out our policy in Antarctica for FY 1957 were in fact the minimum costs.

Admiral Duncan replied in the affirmative, and stated that the financial figures were based on a costing-out of the plans for 1957 by a subcommittee of the Operations Coordinating Board. The costs were confined to the International Geophysical Year activities, to reconnaissance, and to the stations which were to be set up in the Antarctic area. The President then inquired whether the program and the figures had been looked at by the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Duncan said that they had been scanned by Secretary Wilson very closely. Thereafter, the President stated his opinion that the program should accomplish the objectives sought by the scientists, but there should be no elaborate plans for reconnaissance over and above the scientific needs.

Admiral Duncan explained that one of the reasons for the high costs involved in the program stemmed from the fact that there was no precise language which clarified the objectives sought by the policy or limited the scope of operations to be conducted by the United States under this policy. For example, continued Admiral Duncan, no one knew precisely what would be required in order to establish a U.S. claim or claims in Antarctica. Accordingly, if the paper were to be approved, Admiral Duncan suggested clarifying language for its objectives prior to approval.

The President said that in his view our policy toward Antarctica should consist in the first place of a reservation of every claim that we might ultimately want to make to areas of Antarctica. Secondly, to do all that we [*was*] required accomplish our operations under the International Geophysical Year. Beyond this, the President could not see that anything else was needed. Agreeing with the President, Admiral Duncan said that we should carry out our plans to achieve out scientific purposes, but do nothing about establishing claims to Antarctica until we see what is actually revealed about the resources of the area in the course of carrying out our program for the International Geophysical Year.

---

[6] Admiral Donald B. Duncan, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

. . . .

The President again stressed the fact that he was not interested in reconnaissance in Antarctica over and beyond what was required for scientific purposes. He concluded with a reiteration of what he conceived our policy toward Antarctica should be. It was perfectly clear to him that we should first continue to reserve our rights in the area; second, achieve what the scientist wishes to achieve in connection with the International Geophysical Year program; and third, ask the Secretary of State to initiate exploratory conversations with other interested free world countries regarding the possibility of creating a condominium in the area.

The National Security Council: [7]

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5528 in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum, and of the reference Progress Report.

b. Adopted the following amendments in the existing policy on Antarctica (NSC 5424/1):

(1) Substitute the following for subparagraph 9–b:

> "b. Seek to reach an agreement among the U.S. and free world claimants to Antarctic territory which will (1) reserve their respective rights pending future solution of the territorial problems, (2) reduce international friction among them, and (3) permit freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in the Antarctic by free world nationals and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data.

(2) Substitute the following for paragraph 10:

> "10. Support a planned program in the Antarctic for scientific purposes only, based on Government responsibility for financing the activities required by the national interest. Specifically:
>
> "a. Such a program should include periodic expeditions to the Antarctic and the maintenance of permanent stations in the Antarctic area for scientific purposes only.
>
> "b. U.S. programs in Antarctica in connection with the International Geophysical Year should be designed in support of this policy.

---

[7] The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1500. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

"c. The Department of Defense will act as the Executive Agency for operations in the Antarctic by or on behalf of the U.S. in cooperation with private interests and other interested Government agencies."

Note: The above amendments to NSC 5424/1, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of that paper, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for that policy.[8]

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[8] The revisions prescribed here were incorporated in revised pages of NSC 5424/1, circulated by Lay to the members of the National Security Council under cover of a memorandum of January 16.

---

314. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)[1]

Washington, February 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

Antarctica: Indian Proposal for UN Discussion

It is understood that the recent Indian proposal to include the "Antarctic question" on the agenda for the next meeting of the next General Assembly[2] was discussed during the last meeting of OCB.

. . . The explanatory memorandum has not yet been presented by the Indians to the UN secretariat and we have no details on the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/2–2456. Secret.

[2] Telegram 641 from New York, February 24, reads: "On instructions, Indian delegation February 17 requested Secretary General UN include 'the question of Antarctica' on agenda 11th GA. Indians have promised explanatory memo 'in due course' but have not yet submitted. New Dehli press report says Indians contemplate asking GA proclaim entire Antarctic area UN trust territory. Department and Mission have made no comment." (*Ibid.*)

Indians proposal. Rumor has it that it involves a UN trusteeship over the Antarctic.

. . . .

Until we have seen the Indian proposal we are not in a position to say whether or not we would favor it. Should we favor a trusteeship we would be going contrary to the views of a number of our friends. The atmosphere surrounding the problem at the moment makes it unlikely that the UN could contribute to a solution and under NSC 5424/1 as revised we could not agree to a UN trusteeship. However, such a solution has merits which should be given full consideration. We would not necessarily oppose such solution and if the Indian proposal takes this form we may have to review our policy again. You will recall the Secretary mentioned this UN possibility during his briefing before the recent [revision] of NSC 5424/1.

You may wish to pass this on to the OCB at its next meeting and say that until the details of the Indian proposition are available we cannot make any useful comment. Each Department should, however, review its thinking on our policy so that we can reach an agreed position if a trusteeship is proposed.

---

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations[1]

Washington, September 3, 1956—2:15 p.m.

73. 1. Re Antarctica. Indian UN Del has given USUN copy GOI's draft explanatory memo in support its proposal inscribe Antarctica agenda 11th GA and has requested our comments. GOI seeking views other interested governments. Memo substantially identical with that given us by NZ Embassy Aug. 22 copy which transmitted attachment Department's memo conversation same date.[2] Memo suggests "GA should call upon all states agree and

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/9–356. Confidential. Drafted by David Bane of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Cleared by EUR, ARA, NEA, BNA, and L/UNA. Initialed for Hoover by Samuel De Palma, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Also sent to New Dehli and pouched to Buenos Aires, Canberra, London, Oslo, Paris, Santiago, and Wellington.

[2] Neither printed.

affirm peaceful utilization Antarctica for the general welfare and in particular agree that area shall not be used in any manner that would promote increase world tensions or extend to this area influence and effects existing tensions."

2. FYI We would welcome Indian decision withdraw item or agree postponement its inscription this session; and we do not expect take final position on inscription until it definite Indians intend press for inscription. In meanwhile, we wish to avoid any discussion specific terms Indian proposal. End FYI

3. USUN (and Embassy New Dehli if similarly approached) should take following line in responding Indian request our views: US position on inscription not yet determined. Indian draft memo helpful in giving US clearer indication Indian objective. While we have not undertaken formulate detailed comments on Indian memo we would like to make certain general observations at this time. We can see no need to raise Antarctica in UN at this juncture and believe it politically unwise to do so. While GOI apparently wished avoid raising question territorial claims we doubt if this can be avoided entirely. This could lead to exacerbation existing rivalries among countries having claimed Antarctic territory making even more difficult an eventual solution problem. Moreover, we doubt whether any constructive result likely be obtained. There is freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in Antarctica as evidenced by extent of voluntary cooperation by countries currently participating IGY activities there. We fail see legitimate basis for what we understand to be Indian concern over possible use Antarctic region for nuclear testing. As we have indicated previously US has no present intent or plan to use Antarctica as nuclear testing site. Agenda for 11th GA already heavy. For these reasons we would hope GOI would not press for inscription at this time. We wish underline however US doubts re discussion Antarctica in UN does not mean US has modified its desire further international cooperation Antarctica and Indians probably aware past US efforts this end. We would appreciate being informed by GOI whether and when it intends submit explanatory memo UN.

Hoover

316. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Adams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)[1]

Washington, November 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

Antarctica

It is the near unanimous consensus within the Department that we should oppose inscription of the Indian item on Antarctica. We have, therefore, revised our position paper to recommend that we oppose inscription and I have attached a status report on clearances obtained. We expect to have the opportunity to go over this paper with you when we review all of our position papers for the General Assembly.[2]

[Attachment]

Position Paper Prepared in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

Status of Clearance:

The attached paper recommending the US oppose inscription of the Indian item has been approved in substance by ARA, EUR, and FE. NEA is willing to go along with this recommendation but would have preferred abstention on the ground that this is one instance in which we need not necessarily oppose an initiative by a member of the Asian-Arab-African group. L/UNA considers the question as to whether the US should abstain or vote against on the question of Antarctica to be a policy decision and one not involving a question of law. AEC concurs in IO's recommendation and has expressed the hope that inscription can be avoided. A copy has been sent to Defense for its information.

USUN has strongly recommended to the Department that we support the Latin Americans on this issue on grounds that we will be needing their support badly on other matters at this General Assembly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/11–656. Confidential. Drafted by David Bane.

[2] The enclosed Position Paper is the last draft found and apparently was the official policy statement on this topic used by the U.S. Delegation at the Eleventh General Assembly.

[Subattachment]

SD/A/C.1/463

QUESTION OF ANTARCTICA

The Problem

The Indian government has proposed the inscription of the question of "the peaceful utilization of Antarctica" on the agenda of the 11th General Assembly. In its explanatory memorandum submitted by letter dated October 16, the Indian government suggests that the "General Assembly should call upon all States to agree to and affirm the peaceful utilization of Antarctica for the general welfare and in particular agree that the area shall not be used in any manner that would create or accentuate world tensions, or extend to this area the influence and effects of existing tensions". The Indians have said that it is not their intention to embroil the UN in territorial claims and counterclaims. They reason generally that the Antarctic has considerable strategic, climatic, geophysical and economic significance for the world as a whole, and they wish to obtain international agreement on the peaceful use of the region now because they fear (1) that the manifest intensification of international interest in that region may lead to its becoming a source of East-West tension, and (2) that the area may possibly be used as a nuclear testing site. In response to an Indian request for our comments on their explanatory memorandum while still in draft, we told them that while the US position on inscription has not yet been determined, we see no need to raise Antarctica in the UN at this juncture and believe it politically unwise to do so and we would hope India would not press for inscription at this time.

The reaction of the seven friendly power claimants to territory in the Antarctic to the Indian initiative has been unfavorable. Chile and Argentina are opposed to inscription and we understand that the entire Latin American group has decided to support them. Norway has indicated that it will oppose inscription and that the other Scandinavian countries will likely follow suit. The UK, Australia and New Zealand have all deprecated the Indian initiative and have endeavored without success to persuade the Indians to withdraw the item. These countries have apparently not yet taken a final position on inscription but may oppose together with the older Commonwealth members. France may be expected to oppose as well as certain other Western European countries. After allowance for abstentions, it would appear that the vote on inscription may be close and that the United States position may be determining. Moreover, it is anticipated that the United States will be subjected to considerable pressure from friendly power claimants to oppose inscription, particularly Chile and Argentina on grounds of inter-American commitments and relationships.

We do not believe that discussion is precluded by Article 2(7) as argued by Chile and Argentina. Since the United States has consistently refused to recognize claims made by other countries to territory in the Antarctic, we would hardly support a negative position on inscription on grounds that this would constitute domestic intervention. The real problem posed for the United States is whether UN consideration of the Antarctica item within the limits envisaged by the Indians might adversely affect its national interest in the Antarctic region to an extent that would justify United States opposition to inscription and a further departure from the United States policy of endeavoring generally to favor inscription of items on the Assembly's agenda, particularly those items which appear to be directed to some extent against the United States.

United States Position

1. In the event the Indians press for inscription, the United States should oppose on grounds that we can see no need to raise Antarctica in the UN at this time and we question the desirability of adding such an item to an agenda which already includes a number of important questions needing thorough consideration at this session.

2. The United States should not play a prominent role in the debate or consultations.

3. In the event the item is inscribed, the United States should try to obtain Indian agreement to postpone consideration of the item on the ground that there are a number of more important questions needing thorough consideration at this Session.

4. If the item is discussed and India presses for a vote on a resolution, the United States should attempt to secure the passage of a resolution acceptable to it and friendly powers along the following lines:

> "The General Assembly (1) notes with satisfaction the extent to which member states are cooperating voluntarily in the Antarctic region with a view to furthering scientific knowledge in the interest of international peace and welfare; and,
>
> "(2) expresses confidence that member states will continue to cooperate to this end and to conduct their activities in the Antarctic

region in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

Comment

Claims to sovereignty over areas of the Antarctic region, some of which are in conflict, have been advanced by several states, and it may be that further claims will be put forward by other states in the future, particularly within the unclaimed sector. Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK have all advanced claims to Antarctic territory. The United States, however, has made no official claims to territory in the Antarctic for itself to date and continues to follow the policy of reserving all rights that it or its citizens have in that area. The United States has consistently refused to recognize claims to Antarctic territory made by other countries. On occasion in the past, the United States has specifically rested its refusal to recognize a claim to sovereignty on the ground that discovery alone, unaccompanied by effective occupation of the area in question, cannot support a valid claim to sovereignty. In May, 1955 the UK instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice against Argentina and Chile, respectively, to secure a declaration by the Court of sovereignty over certain islands and lands in the Antarctic. However, because of the refusal of the Argentine and Chilean governments to accept the Court's jurisdiction, the cases were dropped.

The United States proposed for consideration the establishment of a UN trusteeship over the Antarctic in 1948, and discussed such an arrangement with the UK, Argentina and Chile. Since this proposal met with some opposition from the British and was not well received in either Argentina or Chile, the United States then suggested for consideration and transmitted to the Argentine, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK in early August 1948 a draft agreement proposing an international administration (condominium) for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. Only the UK and New Zealand accepted the proposal as a basis for discussion.

Present United States policy objectives in Antarctica call for (1) orderly progress toward a solution of the territorial problem which would ensure control to the United States and friendly powers and exclude its most probable enemies; (2) freedom of exploration and scientific investigation for nationals of the United States and of friendly powers; and (3) access to useful natural resources. The courses of action recommended envisage the reassertion of United States "rights" in the Antarctic while simultaneously seeking an agreement with the free world claimants to Antarctic territory which will reserve their respective rights pending a future solution of the territorial problems, reduce international friction among them, and permit freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in the Antarctic by free world nationals. Although consideration has been given to the eventual assertion of reasonable claims in the Antarctic as offering the most effective way of protecting existing and potential United States "rights", no decision to this effect has yet been taken.

The passage of a resolution along the lines of that suggested in paragraph 4 of the United States Position would not appear to conflict with, or require any fundamental modification in, present United States policy objectives on Antarctica. However, while the United States may have no objection to affirming its peaceful purposes and intentions in Antarctica in terms of the conduct of its activities in that area in the future, it would consider undesirable the passage of a resolution along the lines proposed by the Indians calling for the peaceful utilization of the Antarctic land mass as such or forbidding the use of Antarctica in a way that will contribute to an increase in world tensions.

While there is some disagreement among the principal territorial claimants to Antarctic territory, it is not of such a serious nature to require UN action. There has been complete freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in the Antarctic as indicated by the high degree of cooperation manifested between the countries participating in IGY activities there. While it is possible that UN consideration of the Antarctica item might tend to exert pressure on friendly powers to resolve their conflicting territorial claims, we think it more likely that it could lead to an airing of differences between free world claimants to the advantage of the USSR, as well as provide the latter with an additional opportunity to try to hinder free world freedom of action in that area. While the USSR has advanced no Antarctic claims as yet, it has asserted its right (1950) to participate in any Antarctic settlement. This does not mean, however, that the USSR might not one day decide to try to assert claims to Antarctic territory, particularly in the unclaimed sector on the basis of Bellingshausen's expeditions (1819/21) and current Soviet activities in connection with the IGY, especially if the United States were to do so.

There appears to be little doubt that in the light of present United States policy objectives in the Antarctic and until the future course of United States action in that area has been more precisely defined, the United States should endeavor for the present to limit, to the extent possible, UN consideration of Antarctica in order to maintain the maximum degree of freedom of action for the United

States and friendly power claimants to territory in that area. It is recognized that UN consideration and the adoption of a peaceful uses resolution on Antarctica could lead in due course to UN consideration of other aspects of the Antarctic problem including the question of sovereignty. This in turn might stimulate pressure for internationalization of the Antarctic under some sort of UN administration. Such a development, moreover, could tend to make it increasingly difficult for the United States to depart from its present reserved position and begin the implementation of a national claims policy in the event the United States were to decide to do so.

It should also be recognized that United States support for inscription of the Indian item, however explained, would tend to be regarded as having more than procedural significance and as implying that the United States is prepared to acknowledge a present UN interest in the Antarctic and that it is perhaps disposed to consider the question of Antarctica within the UN framework. United States advocacy of the policy of internationalization of the Antarctic in 1948 would tend to support this implication.

In considering our national interest in this question, we believe that we should give considerable weight to the fact that our failure to support the Latin American bloc on this issue would probably be received unfavorably by it and particularly by Chile and Argentina. USUN has strongly recommended that we support the Latin Americans on this issue on grounds that we will be needing their support badly on other matters at this General Assembly.

The type resolution apparently sought by the Indians would likely be interpreted as precluding the use of Antarctica as a nuclear testing site and perhaps the establishment of military bases as well. The United States has taken the position that it has no present intent or plan to use the Antarctic as a nuclear testing site and has so indicated this to the Indians. It is doubted, however, whether United States assurances as regards its *present* intentions in this respect will suffice to deter the Indian initiative. On the other hand, it is possible that a United States vote against inscription may tend to weaken our present position on nuclear testing in the Antarctic, lend credence to the Indian concern that we may be contemplating the use of Antarctica for nuclear testing later on, and stimulate further and more determined Indian efforts in this regard.

The Indian argument that nuclear testing in the Antarctic region may be criticized as inimical to international welfare through a possible dislocation of the ice cap, etc., is not supported by known scientific evidence. At any rate, we are not aware of any plans to test nuclear weapons there. Neither we nor the other countries involved could accept an understanding that a resolution such as that sought by India, if adopted, would preclude the establishment of military bases in the Antarctic region within the area of national claims since it could be cited as a precedent for other areas of the world. As for any resolution of the type sought by India on the Antarctica being cited as a precedent UN action precluding nuclear testing in the UN trust territories, it is not considered that the two situations are sufficiently analogous to constitute a major threat to the United States position in this regard, although it would probably tend to weaken that position.

---

317. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, December 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on NSC 5424/1 (Antarctica)

The Progress Report covers the period January 12, 1956 through August 8, 1956. It summarizes the principal developments in the Antarctic and finds our present policy to be adequate for the period under review.

Two developments of significance have occurred since August 8 cut-off date.

(1) . . .

(2) The Indian Government withdrew at the last minute the item on Antarctica which they proposed for inscription on the agenda of the present General Assembly. Under this item the Indians had in mind obtaining a United Nations proclamation-type resolution under which member governments would affirm their intention to use the Antarctic for peaceful purposes only, having in mind particularly the possible use of Antarctic regions as sites for nuclear experiment. In withdrawing the item Mr. Krishna Menon explained that his Government was doing so in order to have time to prepare the item better and to persuade other governments of its importance. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Indians may well re-introduce the subject at a subsequent meeting of the General Assembly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series, Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by William G. Bowdler of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs. Cleared by EUR, FE, IO, and L.

Hence, while the problem referred to in paragraph 8 of the Progress Report has lost its immediacy, it remains as a problem which is likely to arise in the future.

The portion of the Report of most direct interest to the Department of State is the section contained under paragraph 3 (c) having to do with the negotiation of an agreement among the United States and free-world claimants to territory in the Antarctic. Events during the period under review have not made necessary any formal agreement to maintain existing cooperative relationships in the region. With respect to relations between the UK, Argentina and Chile, which have conflicting claims in the Antarctic, these three Governments on November 21, 1956 renewed their annual agreement not to send warships into the area during the current Antarctic season except for the customary movements. This should minimize the most likely source of friction among the free nations in the region.

Recommendation: That at an appropriate opportunity during the course of consideration of the Report you mention the action taken by the Indians in withdrawing their agenda item.

---

318. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)[1]

Washington, December 5, 1956.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on NSC 5424/1 (Antarctica)

Although IO does not consider that the Progress Report on Antarctica prepared by ARA dated December 4 presents fully the UN aspect of this matter, it is prepared to concur on the understanding that it will have an early opportunity to set forth its views in connection with the Department's presently contemplated basic review of US policy on Antarctica.

Although the Indians withdrew their item on Antarctica from the provisional agenda of the present GA session, we anticipate that further efforts will be made to raise this item at the 12th GA and we do not believe that we can exclude the possibility that this item might be inscribed. Inasmuch as UN consideration of Antarctica may have an important bearing on the future course of US action in that area, IO considers that present US policy objectives in Antarctica should be reviewed in light of this possible eventuality. We believe it likely that UN consideration of Antarctica will inevitably tend to focus attention upon the political aspects of the Antarctica problem. On the one hand, such a development could tend to make it increasingly difficult for the US to depart from its present reserved position and begin the implementation of a national claims policy. On the other hand, UN consideration might tend to reinforce and give moral support to the US policy of reserving its position on national claims and would leave the US free to explore once again, if it should decide to do so, a policy of internationalization along lines taken in 1948 as perhaps offering the best means of limiting the activities of our more probable enemies in that region and of resolving the conflicting claims issue.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 62 D 170, Antarctic General Correspondence, Book I. Drafted by David Bane; copy sent to Bowdler.

In considering our position on this item for the present or 11th GA session, it became apparent that some more precise indication as to the future course of US action in the Antarctic region was needed in order to insure that US handling of this question in the UN would neither tend to predetermine nor tend to run counter to whatever course of action the US might eventually wish to adopt. As matters presently stand, there is no indication that the US is contemplating the adoption of a policy calling for the announcement of official territorial claims in the Antarctic; on the other hand, the US has neither reaffirmed nor rejected publicly or to the seven friendly power claimants to territory in the Antarctica the position it took in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica.

319. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, December 31, 1956.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on NSC 5424/1 Antarctica

The Progress Report covers the period January 12 through August 8, 1956, summarizing principal developments in the Antarctic and finds our policy adequate for the period under review.

There have been certain subsequent developments which should be kept in mind in connection with any present discussion of the subject:

(1) . . .

(2) India withdrew the item on Antarctica which was referred to in paragraph 8. It was explained that this was done in order to have time to prepare the item better and to persuade other governments of its importance. It may, therefore, be expected to reintroduce the proposal at a later date.

(3) Argentina, Chile, and the UK on November 21, 1956, renewed their annual agreement not to send warships into the Antarctic except for customary movements. This is expected to forestall any special friction arising out of the conflicting claims of the three countries.

Recommendation:

That you agree to the paper as drafted.[2] You may wish to mention the subsequent developments cited above, especially (1) and (2).

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series, Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Robert E. Wilson who became Officer in Charge of Antarctic Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on December 19. Cleared by EUR, FE, IO/UNP, and L.

[2] The source text contains no indication of the Secretary's action.

320. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)[1]

Washington, March 11, 1957.

DEAR MR. SPRAGUE: In accordance with the arrangement agreed upon at the OCB meeting held December 19, 1956, officers of the Department have been reviewing United States position on Antarctic claims and have discussed the matter with officers of Defense.

Meanwhile, the question has assumed a degree of urgency. Press and radio reports originating in Australia have publicized the information that the Australian Government is apprehensive about Soviet military activities in the Antarctic and has urged the United States to make a territorial claim and give up its policy of non-recognition of other countries' claims. The Australian Government is expected to raise this question again in connection with the SEATO Conferences in Canberra.

A review of our policy consideration over the past few years shows that this Department has quite consistently been in favor of making a territorial claim or claims and entering into negotiations with other countries concerning their respective claims. In recent years a foremost consideration has been the exclusion from the Antarctic of countries whose interests are likely to be inimical to the United States.

In 1948 it was proposed that the Antarctic be placed under UN trusteeship. The British Government rightly pointed out that this would give the U.S.S.R. a voice in controlling it, so instead, the United States proposed a condominium composed of the seven claimant nations—UK, France, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Chile—plus the United States, which would also assert a claim. This suggestion was not received favorably by most of the other interested countries, and since that time we have given consideration to a number of alternative suggestions.

UN consideration of Antarctica was again proposed in 1956 when India sought to place the question on the agenda of the General Assembly. The United States was opposed to this, partly because it would stand in the way of a settlement of the territorial question among the nations conceded to have paramount interest, and partly because it could well be another wedge whereby the Soviets might gain a voice in the control of the continent.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/3–557. Secret. Drafted by Robert Wilson on March 7. Cleared by ARA, S/P, L, FE, EUR, and IO. Copies were sent to the Embassies at Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, and London.

Fortunately the Indians decided to withdraw their proposal, but they may be expected to reintroduce it at a later date. In anticipation of this, it is felt that the foremost objective of our national policy on Antarctica, "to ensure maintenance of control by the U.S. and friendly powers and exclude our most probable enemies" (NSC 5424/1, Par. 6) makes it highly desirable that the United States be in a position to align itself with the other Free World countries that have made Antarctic claims and have been most active there.

Although NSC 5424/1 does not itself provide for making a territorial claim, it leaves the door open for such action at an opportune time, when it is determined that such a course will best serve basic objectives.

The Department is now of the opinion that a proposal which merits consideration is that the United States should become a claimant to the Unclaimed Sector of Antarctica between 90° and 150° W. Long. Implicit in this action would be the abandonment of the present policy of not recognizing the claims of other countries although such recognition would not be automatic. In any ensuing negotiations with other claimants the pattern of foreign claims recognition would emerge.

It is in our national interest to assure that the territory of the Antarctic is either in the hands of the United States or of other friendly countries. Five-sixths of the continent is already claimed by seven other countries, all friendly to the United States and on which it is felt we could rely for cooperation in almost any undertaking we might have there. It is true that American explorers have discovered and explored certain areas within other countries' claims also, and that we could probably justify claims to some of them. We have never done so, however, and it is not felt that any present need would be served by so doing, although several countries have indicated that they would be willing to entertain any American suggestions of transfer based on possible conflict of claims.

Further delay in asserting claim to the Unclaimed Sector, which is not likely to be challenged by any other Antarctic claimant, will weaken our position and is an open invitation for others to step in and establish "squatters' rights".

As a claimant to a sector of Antarctica the United States would be on equal footing with other claimants in any joint effort to resist encroachment on the part of unfriendly powers anywhere in the Antarctic. As an official claimant, the United States would be in a better position to promote internationalization if this should again be deemed expedient. Furthermore, the possession of a stake as an official claimant in the continent would give us greater bargaining power in any future transfers or redistribution of territory.

It is therefore the Department's intention to continue to advocate the adoption of an affirmative claims policy by the National Security Council. Inasmuch as the present review was undertaken as a prelude to consideration of the matter by the OCB Working Group, an expression of the current Defense position, both on the assertion of a U.S. claim and on possible internationalization, in the light of current Soviet activities and the Australian approach, will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

321. Editorial Note

Antarctica was discussed during the meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization members at Canberra, March 13–14. In an April 3 letter, Robert Cutler, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, noted:

> "As a result of Australian concern over the presence of the Soviets in Antarctica, following the termination of the International Geophysical Year (1957–1958), and subsequent discussions at the recent SEATO meetings at Canberra, the Secretary of State requested that the National Security Council undertake a review of U.S. policy with respect to claims in Antarctica."

Eisenhower, he continued, had approved Planning Board review of the question. (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Antarctic Commission and Expedition)

322. Memorandum for the Files, by the Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs (Watrous)[1]

Washington, March 25, 1957.

INTER-AGENCY MEETING ON THE ANTARCTIC

At the request of Ambassador McClintock (S/P), an inter-agency meeting was held on March 22 to discuss preparation of a position paper on the Antarctic for discussion by the NSC Planning Board on April 5. Present were:

State	*Defense*
Amb. McClintock, S/P	Mr. Ernst[5]
Mr. Crowley, BNA[2]	Mr. Zander
Mr. Bane, UNP	
Mr. Hewitt, L/UNA[3]	*CIA*
Miss Whiteman, L/ARA[4]	2 Representatives
Mr. Watrous, OSA	

Ambassador McClintock opened the meeting by outlining the actions required by the Secretary's request for an NSC review of the United States Antarctic policy, and asked Mr. Watrous to comment on events leading up to State's letter of March 11 to Defense. The Ambassador then asked if Defense had arrived at a position.

Mr. Ernst replied in the negative, adding that because of the forthcoming NSC Planning Board Meeting, Defense had felt that the question should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that several considerations had to be taken into account, such as the strategic importance of the Drake Passage, the presence or absence of minerals, and post-IGY activity. In response to Ambassador McClintock's question about expenses in connection with any U.S. claim, Mr. Ernst indicated that Defense, because of a tighter budget and the low priority accorded the Antarctic vis-à-vis combatant forces, would be reluctant to defray much of the cost.

Mr. Ernst also said that Defense is interested in being able to move freely about Antarctica, and is wondering what effect a U.S. claim would have on other claims; should this result in the creation of walls around the several claims, he said, our making a claim would be contra-productive. In this light, he felt that some form of pooling, or condominium, might be explored, possibly on Australian initiative. The Indian proposal in the UN was also touched on briefly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101.2/3–2557. Secret.

[2] Edwin D. Crowley, a member of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs since May 1, 1955.

[3] Warren E. Hewitt, Attorney-Adviser in the Department of State.

[4] Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs.

[5] Presumably Roger Ernst of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

In reply to a question about the validity of claims, Miss Whiteman stated that to have a better claim a nation must have done more than other nations, and that no two claims were really equal.

Ambassador McClintock gave his opinion that we were actually faced with a diplomatic problem: to get the Russians out of Antarctica. He wondered whether a claim on our part would accomplish this.

The CIA representative said that in his judgement it was doubtful, and that it appeared that the Soviets were moving in the direction of remaining. He then reviewed the USSR's recent position on Antarctica, with emphasis on its scientific and economic interests.

Ambassador McClintock then suggested, and it was agreed, that during the week ending March 29 papers should be drawn up on several aspects of the problem, and that after these had been exchanged and considered, another meeting should be held on April 2, at 3 p.m. In brief, papers were to be prepared as follows:

Defense: Strategic Considerations.
CIA: Probable Russian Reactions.
Amb. McClintock: NSC Summary.
Mr. Bane: UN Considerations.
Mr. Watrous: Positions of Other Claimants.

---

323. Memorandum for the Files, by the Officer in Charge of Antarctic Affairs (Wilson)[1]

Washington, undated.

INTER-AGENCY MEETING ON THE ANTARCTIC

The second meeting was held April 3 at the invitation of Ambassador Robert McClintock (S/P) at 3 p.m. in Room 5105. In attendance were:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 031.1102/4–357. Secret.

State
Ambassador McClintock, S/P
Mr. Crowley, BNA
Mr. Bane, UNP
Mr. Hewett, L/UNA
Miss Whiteman, L/ARA
Mr. Watrous, OSA
Mr. Wilson, RPA

Defense
Mr. Ernst

CIA
Two representatives

Mr. McClintock apologized for postponing the meeting one day. He said the matter was not quite so urgent since we had been given until April 12 (instead of April 5) to present the inter-agency recommendations to the NSC.

He said the papers presented by all agencies[2] except Defense were satisfactory, and asked Mr. Ernst when Defense could be expected to make up its mind. Mr. Ernst said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet made up its mind. They are discussing the answer to the Department's March 11 letter,[3] he said, but there is as yet no agreement on how the answer is to be. But they are giving it high priority and hope to reach a firm decision in the near future. He said he could anticipate that Defense might have some reservations about limiting the US claim (if any) to the Unclaimed Sector, as they are more interested in other parts of Antarctica.

Mr. Bane said he was sure a US claim would precipitate UN action and we should be prepared for this if we decide to go ahead with a claim. He said this did not mean IO is opposed to making a claim, and added that it would be much better to act quickly if we are going to make a claim than to let the thing drag on until the Antarctic issue is again raised in the UN.

Miss Whiteman said L is in favor of making a claim and has been for many years, but that off the record she wished to point out that she thinks the one sure way to precipitate a Soviet claim is to make one of our own, and therefore we should be prepared for this.

Mr. Crowley said we could anticipate the Russians would either make a claim or go to the UN to protest against all claims and appeal for internationalization, but that they would not do both. In other words, if the Russians are going to make a claim, they would lose India's support.

The CIA representatives expressed the opinion that we are building trouble for ourselves by upsetting the apple cart and that the benefits to be gained by pleasing the Australians would not be worth the antagonizing of the Russians. Ambassador McClintock said we are already in trouble anyway.

---

[2] None found.

[3] Document 320.

In closing the meeting, Ambassador McClintock said he believed the most the NSC could be expected to decide at this time is to initiate conversations with our Allies (i.e. the seven present claimants) preparatory to making a claim. He said he felt that we should agree to tell the other friendly countries that we are going to make a claim but haven't decided exactly what and would like to discuss it with them. This would also be the opportunity for safeguarding our rights to utilize all Antarctic territory. The Ambassador said he personally is opposed to a condominium, since condominiums never work, and that it would be much better just to cut up the pie and divide it among the US and present claimants. If the other countries prefer a trusteeship, then we could consider that, and he said that he could imagine many worse solutions than a trusteeship on which Russia would be represented, if it eventually should come to that.

After the meeting, Ambassador McClintock expressed to me the view that since this is clearly a diplomatic problem . . . [4] not a military or intelligence one . . . State's recommendations will carry more weight than that of other agencies with the NSC, and therefore he anticipates that NSC will agree to making a claim. In his view, there is no turning back now on State's policy, since it has been formally expressed in the March 11 letter to Defense.

---

[4] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

---

324. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

Washington, April 19, 1957.

DEAR MR. MURPHY: Thank you for your letter of 11 March concerning Antarctic claims. The Department of Defense has given your proposal careful study and we recognize that some form of international control may be useful. We are also in substantial agreement that the assertion of a claim by the United States is now timely. It is our belief, however, that there are valid reasons for considering assertion of a claim broader than that outlined in your letter.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/4–2657. Secret.

Since this question was considered by the Planning Board on April 12 and will be before the NSC on 2 May, I would suggest that the resolution of our respective departmental views be left for that machinery. This will provide an opportunity for all agencies including our two Departments to be directly represented in further consideration of this question.

Yours very truly,

Mansfield D. Sprague[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

325. Memorandum for the Files, by the Officer in Charge of River Plate Affairs (Watrous)[1]

Washington, April 23, 1957.

SUBJECT

Antarctica
1. Meeting of the NSC Planning Board; and
2. Rubottom–Bowie Conversation

On April 22 I attended a meeting of the NSC Planning Board to discuss our claims policy in the Antarctic. State was represented by Mr. Bowie, S/P; and Mr. Leonhart, S/P,[2] also attended.

Various views concerning possible claims were expressed. Admiral Dufek favored claiming . . . .

Several speakers, including the representatives of Interior and the National Science Foundation, expressed opposition to our making claims now, on one or more of the following grounds:

1. Too little is known of Antarctica; we would be in a better position to know *what* to claim after further scientific investigation.
2. Making a claim would not in itself get the Russians out; it might, in fact, cause them to claim.
3. Making a claim might stop the flow of scientific information from the Russians which we need badly.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/4–2357. Secret.

[2] William Leonhart, National Security Council Planning Board Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and Alternate Department of State Representative to the NSC Planning Board.

These arguments appeared to impress the Chairman, General Cutler, who compared making a claim now to buying a pig in a poke. Mr. Bowie also had some reservations about our making claims at this time, while the representative of the JCS favored a policy of claiming now.

There was also an inconclusive discussion of the possibility of taking the Antarctic to the UN.

General Cutler said that he would draw up an interim report for submission to the NSC; copies of his draft are to be sent to the interested agencies.

Following the Secretary's meeting on April 23, Mr. Rubottom asked Mr. Bowie about the meeting described above. The latter said that he had been impressed by the advocates of not making claims at this time, and that he was not convinced that making claims would achieve our policy objectives. Mr. Rubottom raised the point that if we continued to delay claiming we might end up with nothing.

Mr. Bowie explained that General Cutler's draft would be sent to him, and that ARA would receive a copy for comment.

[When this copy is received I shall see that the interested areas of State get together to arrive at a Departmental position on it. LDW.][3]

---

[3] Brackets in the source text.

326. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the National Security Council[1]

Washington, April 26, 1957.

SUBJECT

Interim Report on Antarctica

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5424/1[2]
B. NSC 5528[3]
C. NSC Action No. 1500[4]

1. In accordance with the President's directive of March 20, 1957, based on a recommendation from the Secretary of State, the Planning Board has been engaged in a review of U.S. policy on Antarctica. Admiral Dufek, who has been in charge of U.S. Antarctica expeditions, and representatives of Interior and the National Science Foundation have participated in Planning Board discussions. Because the Planning Board is not yet prepared to recommend a revision of existing Antarctica policy, I submit this interim report.

2. The existing U.S. policy on Antarctica, adopted in July, 1954, provided that the United States would not make a formal claim to any Antarctica territory, but would reserve and at an appropriate later time reassert all its rights therein. At that time, and in subsequent reconsideration of the policy by the National Security Council in 1956, the major emphasis of U.S. programs in Antarctica was placed upon scientific activities in support of the International Geophysical Year.

3. . . .

4. The Planning Board has been considering the following matters in relation to any change in U.S. policy on Antarctica which would authorize the present assertion of a formal claim by the United States to any part of that continent, whether or not such part is now unclaimed or claimed by other powers:

a. It is not possible now to determine that the United States has at this time, or will have at some future time, a strategic or economic interest in Antarctica. On the other hand, the possibility of such a future determination of a U.S. interest should not be prejudiced by U.S. action or inaction now.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series Memoranda. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and of the Interior, to the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget, the National Science Foundation, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 297.

[3] Document 311.

[4] See footnote 7, Document 313.

b. A known value to the world is the scientific information as to world weather conditions which is being ascertained, in collaboration with other participating nations, during the International Geophysical Year. Such information may improve future long-range weather forecasting and contribute more precise knowledge as to the earth's atmosphere. There has been excellent cooperation among the different countries, including the Soviet Union, participating in these scientific activities in Antarctica. It is possible, although not certain, that the assertion by the United States of a formal claim in Antarctica might cause lessened Soviet cooperation during the International Geophysical Year, in Antarctica and elsewhere.

c. Existing knowledge of the natural resources of any part of Antarctica is inadequate to provide informed guidance to the United States in asserting a formal claim to any particular area. However, the existing unclaimed area of Antarctica appears to be of less value than other areas which are already claimed by other friendly Free World nations but in which the United States also has inchoate rights.

d. The assertion by the United States of a formal claim might legally improve the Free World position in Antarctica by completing Free World claims to the entire Antarctic continent. However, such an assertion might stimulate the assertion of Soviet claims and an extension of Soviet propaganda. In any case, the assertion of a U.S. claim will not prevent, and at best will only render more difficult, the acquisition and strengthening by the Soviet Union of legal claims to any part of Antarctica. In the final analysis, the Soviets can be denied access to the Antarctic continent only by force.

5. If the United States were to assert a formal claim to the unclaimed sector of Antarctica, it might be desirable at the same time for the United States to join with Australia and New Zealand in a condominium for administrative purposes over the sectors now or in the future claimed by the three powers. At the same time, the United States would assert formal claims, or reserve its rights to assert formal claims, in parts of Antarctica other than the unclaimed sector.

6. It is possible that India (which considered such action last year) may place Antarctica on the agenda of the United Nations with a view to some type of U.N. control. The Planning Board has requested the State Department to study and report on whether there could be developed some type of U.N. trusteeship over Antarctica which would protect friendly Free World claims and rights in the area, and to set forth in such report the advantages and disadvantages of the Free World initiating such a proceeding.

7. Before the end of 1958, when the International Geophysical Year terminates, the United States should adopt a long-term policy toward Antarctica. Because logistic problems in Antarctica necessitate preparing now for any operations to be carried on in Antarctica

in 1959, it is necessary to develop at least minimum policy guidance as soon as possible.

8. The JCS Planning Board Adviser believes that the United States should now determine to assert formal claims in Antarctica at the appropriate time, and expresses opposition to any proposal for U.N. control or trusteeship in Antarctica.

Robert Cutler

---

327. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board [1]

Washington, April 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

Antarctica

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5424/1
B. Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, April 26, 1957

The enclosed comments on Antarctica, prepared pursuant to Planning Board request on April 22, are transmitted herewith for the information of the Planning Board and for appropriate use in connection with briefings for the Council meeting of May 2, 1957.

The enclosures consist of:

(1) Comments by the Director, National Science Foundation.
(2) Comments by the Department of the Interior ad hoc representative on the Planning Board.
(3) Comments by Admiral Dufek, USN (transmitted by the Defense Member of the Planning Board).

Marion W. Boggs[2]

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5424 Series, Memoranda. Secret.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Enclosure 1]

ANTARCTICA

Comments by the Director, National Science Foundation

From the standpoint of basic research in science, the special interest in Antarctica lies generally in the field of the geophysical sciences; and these are now largely covered in the International Geophysical Year program. The area is unique, of course, in its location and size and, scientifically, because a polar region with the possibility of stable observation stations provides opportunities for scientific observations on phenomena which are intensified or confined to the region. For example, radio interference has its maximum intensity in the polar regions where the causes of the interference seem to be most pronounced. Also, there is evidence that the enormous mass of cold air over this large continent is a breeding ground for storms. Until we know the results of the basic research being carried out during the International Geophysical Year, one can hardly forecast what special fields will turn out to be of great importance. However, it is reasonably certain that considerable progress in improvement of weather forecasting, even in the Northern Hemisphere, will depend upon meteorological observations in Antarctica. Also, better understanding of the causes of radio noise (static) and radio communication blackout and of how to avoid them is practically certain.

The essential point is that at present, continuing observations in this area would be in the national interest from the standpoint of science, defense, and general welfare. In order to place basic research in proper perspective with respect to other scientific and non-scientific U.S. interests, it may be stated that after the International Geophysical Year, the value of basic research *alone* would not at present appear to justify the logistic costs. However, the value of mission-related research, observation, and scientific or technical activity is determined by specific ends to be achieved. In the case of weather forecasting and improved communications, this value is undoubtedly high; other activities such as economic resource evaluation may also be determined to be important. Finally, we assume there are national interests in maintaining U.S. activity based on considerations which are entirely unrelated to science.

The U.S. should certainly not wish to be denied the right to conduct observations in the Antarctica, especially in the fields of meteorology and radio communication. Because of the effort and expense involved, the best way to secure the desired information would be by setting up a network of observing stations in cooperation with other nations. With the establishment of such a network of stations corresponding approximately to the current International Geophysical Year network but not necessarily so extensive, it would be possible at minimum cost to conduct further scientific research, both basic and applied, and provide bases for other technical activities of an operational nature, to the extent deemed desirable to further the missions of various government agencies and to further broad U.S. aims.

Alan T. Waterman[3]

[Enclosure 2]

ANTARCTICA

Comments by the Department of the Interior Ad Hoc Representative on the Planning Board

1. There is very little known about the Antarctica area from a biological point of view. Evidences of large quantities of fish, whales, bird life, and plankton indicate that there may be rich resources of marine and aquatic life concerning which the United States should be better informed. It would be desirable in the public interest to explore the area and develop a greater knowledge of conditions affecting biological life in the region. It is possible that certain conditions in the area exert substantial influences on the movement of fish throughout the world and are therefore of concern to the U.S. fishing industry.

2. Practically nothing is known about the mineral resources of Antarctica. It is possible that the Palmer Peninsula may contain mineralized zones since it would appear to be an extension of the South American Continent. It is possible that Antarctica may contain some minerals which would be useful to the United States, but to date no work at all has been done on the geology of the area. It is desirable to reduce to topographic maps the information gathered to date and formulate a program to explore the geology of the continent.

3. Consideration should be given now to establishing a program to process the information which will flow to the United States as a result of the studies being made during the IGY.

4. Because so little information is presently available to the United States it would not appear to be wise to assert a claim to any

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

area, if we have a choice in claiming areas, because we would be possibly claiming areas which are utterly worthless. It would seem to be reasonable to process claims in areas that hold future potential value, if possible.

5. It is suggested that no affirmative action would be taken at this time which might upset the orderly progression of the programs outlined by the various governments for the IGY. The United States will gain more by free interchange of information collected by all nations participating in IGY than it would collect if this relationship were impaired by overt and unnecessary action at this time. It is understood, of course, that security and political considerations may be overriding. With respect to these considerations the Department has no comment.

6. It is respectfully recommended that no action be taken to process United States claims until after IGY, and that primary consideration be given to accelerating our scientific research in the area before definitive action is taken on cláiming any portion of it in the future.

John G. Liebert[4]

[Enclosure 3]

ANTARCTICA

Comments by Admiral Dufek (Extract from letter by Admiral Dufek to Office of the Secretary of Defense)

Following are some aspects that should be considered in assessing the value of Antarctica:

I—Value of Antarctica

The value of Antarctica can be assessed in three categories:

1. Economic.

a. At the present time Antarctica has no practical commercial value other than in the surrounding oceans such as whaling, sea food, plankton, etc. The United States cannot profitably participate in whaling due to restrictive legislation in this country to protect the domestic animal and fat industries.

b. At the present time the extent of its mineral wealth is not known. Geologists agree that this continent contains the greatest coal deposits in the world. Various explorers have found traces of gold, iron, tin, chromium, cobalt, copper, lead, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, silver, sulphur and titanium. However, the present tremendous difficulties and cost of transportation to establish and operate bases in the Antarctic prohibit profitable mining operations. *However*—this is a vast continent. Less than two-tenths of one per cent of this continent has been surveyed geologically. Nuclear power in the future could possibly make mining profitable if rich mineral deposits were discovered.

---

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

2. Strategic value.

a. Antarctica has had no strategic importance in past wars. However, it has been found possible to conduct nearly all types of military operations in Antarctica. Should the Panama and Suez canals be destroyed—the waterways connecting the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans in the Southern Hemisphere would assume great importance.

b. Polar bases are of tremendous value for weather predicting for military operations.

c. Studies of weather, magnetism, cosmic rays and the ionosphere will have a bearing on control of rockets, guided missiles and space ships.

3. Scientific value.

a. The results of the scientific program will have a tremendous impact on mankind. The value of weather prediction and control is self-evident. Other results will become evident as the IGY progresses.

II—Some aspects of the timing of claims to Antarctica

1. At the present time complete harmony exists between the nations (including Russia) having scientific stations in the Antarctic. An announcement of claims at this time would probably handicap the IGY.

2. We do not know which areas of Antarctica contain valuable mineral deposits and which do not. Claiming certain areas, and relinquishing claims to other areas may result in loss to valuable assets.

3. At the present time the Russians are contained in one area south of Australia. The Australian government has expressed concern about this. However, an announcement of claims by the Free Countries might cause the Russians to extend their operations in other areas. They have some basis for claims in the Palmer Peninsula because of the past operations of Admiral Bellingshausen in that area.

4. It is believed that claiming the entire Antarctic by the Free Nations would not cause the Russians to move out.

George Dufek [5]

---

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

328. Memorandum of Discussion at the 321st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 2, 1957 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Antarctica* (NSC 5424/1; NSC 5528; NSC Action No. 1500; [2] Memo for NSC from Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, subject: "Interim Report on Antarctica", dated April 26, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of the Planning Board's Interim Report on Antarctica, in the course of which he referred to a map of the Antarctic Continent which indicated the claims of the various nations to portions of Antarctica. In the course of explaining why the Planning Board had thus far been unable to present the Council with a revised policy statement on Antarctica, Mr. Cutler read verbatim paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 of the Interim Report. In sum, the Planning Board did not feel that it had sufficient sound information as to the economic and strategic importance of Antarctica to the United States. Furthermore, the Planning Board had been unable to make up its mind as to the wisdom of changing our current policy, which calls for the reservation of all U.S. rights in Antarctica, to a new policy which would call for the assertion by the United States of formal claims to portions of the Antarctic Continent. In conclusion, Mr. Cutler said that the Planning Board would welcome any light which the Council might be able to throw on problem. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note and the map of the Antarctic Continent is filed with the Minutes of the meeting.)[3]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 2.

[2] See footnote 7, Document 313.

. . . .

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed the Interim Report on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, contained in the reference memorandum of April 26, 1957.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[3] Not further identified.

[4] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1705. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

---

329. Memorandum of Conversations, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957[1]

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Making a Claim in the Antarctic

PARTICIPANTS

3 p.m. Meeting	*4 p.m. Meeting*
Amb. McClintock, S/P	Ambassador Murphy
Mr. Watrous, ARA	Ambassador McClintock, S/P
Mr. Luboeansky, ARA	Mr. Snow, ARA[2]
Miss Whiteman, L/ARA	Mr. Haynes, IO
Mr. Meeker, L	Mr. Watrous, ARA
Mr. Bane, UNP	Mr. Luboeansky, ARA
Mr. Gerig, ODA	Mr. Bane, UNP
Mr. Crowley, EUR/BNA	Mr. Gerig, ODA
Mr. Kavanaugh, SPA	Mr. Crowley, EUR/BNA

As a result of two meetings held on the Antarctic, it was agreed that the State Department should propose to the National Security Council that a determination of U.S. policy in favor of the U.S.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/5–1357. Secret. Drafted by Earl H. Luboeansky.

[2] William P. Snow became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on June 16, 1957.

making a claim in the Antarctic be approved. The matter of extent of the claim (i.e., whether only to the unclaimed area between 90° and 150° W. Long., or, whether in addition, to other areas as desired by the Defense Department under its present policy), was also discussed though this question was not considered pertinent to the problem immediately at hand. It was generally felt that, if a claim were made, a more extensive claim would be preferable to a less extensive, and that agreement regarding the disputed area could then be made by negotiation with the other powers concerned.

The group favored the traditional type of unilateral claim, and in conjunction therewith, recognition subject to negotiation by the U.S. of claims already made by the other powers. The possibility was recognized, however, that if the U.S. made a claim the entire matter might be thrown into the United Nations. That the Russians might also make a claim, either before or after U.S. action, was also considered possible. In the event that the question of claims in the Antarctic were taken up by the UN, the logical solution seemed to be the establishment of a trusteeship to be administered by the states directly concerned, or as a last resort, a UN trusteeship to be administered by an official of the UN itself. Another possibility was that of a condominium involving joint sovereignty and control, by the claimant powers, with appropriate relationship with the United Nations. A condominium was considered preferable to the trusteeships although in either case the opposition of Chile and Argentina could be expected. Probable opposition of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand on the trusteeship arrangement also might be expected.

It was agreed that the Russians would probably not, under any circumstances, leave the Antarctic, nor would any claim or establishment of a sovereign administration over the area cause them to leave. . . . It was agreed then that a determination of policy in favor, in principle, of the U.S. making a claim in Antarctica should be recommended and that the matter of timing would be left to future considerations. A possible date of January 1, 1959, the end of the International Geophysical Year, was suggested.

If a determination of policy in favor of making a claim is approved, it was agreed immediate diplomatic discussions with the other claimant powers should be undertaken to develop agreed positions as to timing of the U.S. claim and form of administration of the area.

330. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board[1]

Washington, May 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

Antarctica

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5424/1
B. NSC 5528
C. NSC Actions Nos. 1500 and 1705[2]
D. Memos for Planning Board, April 18[3] and 29, 1957
E. Memo for NSC, "Interim Report on Antarctica", April 26, 1957
F. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, April 22, 1957[3]

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject[4] and attached studies on "Establishment of a Condominium over Antarctica" and "Application of a UN Trusteeship over Antarctica," prepared by the Department of State, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, May 24, 1957, at 10:30 a.m.

Marion W. Boggs[5]

[Enclosure]

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

General Considerations

1. Antarctica, comprising a vast continent and nearby islands, is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic "summer", and much of it has never been seen or explored. It has little or no present economic value. However, it has considerable immediate importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially ad-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica—NSC 5715. Secret.

[2] See footnote 7, Document 313, and footnote 4, Document 328.

[3] Not printed.

[4] A completed draft policy paper on Antarctica was submitted to Deputy Under Secretary Murphy on May 20, by Bowie. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica—NSC 5715)

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

vanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

2. The existing U.S. policy on Antarctica, adopted in July, 1954 and amended in January, 1956, provided that the United States would not make a formal claim to any Antarctic territory, but would reserve and at an appropriate later time reassert all its rights therein. At that time, and in subsequent reconsideration of the policy by the National Security Council in 1956, the major emphasis of U.S. programs in Antarctica was placed upon scientific activities in support of the International Geophysical Year.

3. While Antarctica's strategic significance appears to be remote, the arrival in the area of Soviet scientific expeditions in connection with the International Geophysical Year has aroused concern among our Antipodean Allies, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United Kingdom, as to possible future Russian activities in that area. . . . Soviet expeditionary parties have already established scientific stations and semi-permanent installations in the area presently claimed by Australia, and there is evidence that they intend to remain in Antarctica after the International Geophysical Year.

4. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: One extending between 90° and 150° west longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° east and 20° west longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery and scientific activity within the other national claims, and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced its tenuous claim, based on a single sighting expedition under Von Bellingshausen in 1819–21. However, extensive Soviet activity in the area during the past two years provides a basis for Soviet claims which the Western powers might find legally difficult to refute. Since World War II, the USSR has taken part in pelagic whaling in the area. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claims of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States has reserved all its "rights" in the area, and the USSR has asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.

5. In 1948, the United States explored unsuccessfully with the claimant powers the possibility of placing the Antarctic under some form of international administration. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected, publicly or to the present claimant powers, the position it took publicly in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica. Conversations with the other

friendly governments who have advanced claims to portions of Antarctica have produced no agreement. Argentina and Chile take a pronounced nationalistic and emotional attitude toward their prospective and sometimes conflicting claims, which cover the Drake Straits and the Palmer Peninsula, and from a purely strategic point of view constitute most important areas in Antarctica. Argentina and Chile contest the claims of the United Kingdom to the same area, and their quarrel with Great Britain is exacerbated by Argentine sensitivity over the Falkland Islands dispute. However, there is reason to believe that both Argentina and Chile would resist Soviet claims to areas in the Antarctic. In summary, there is no present agreement among the claimant powers on any type of international administration of Antarctica.

6. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda, but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic will become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. In the event that a trusteeship should be proposed, it does not seem probable that the presence of the USSR as a member of the Trusteeship Council as presently constituted would cause insurmountable difficulty in the immediate future. However, the presence of the Soviet Union as one of the trust powers would be unacceptable.

7. . . . In this connection, Australia has suggested that the United States might assert a claim to Antarctic territory. Such a U.S. claim would not necessarily induce Soviet withdrawal, and might even have the opposite effect of stimulating a Soviet claim. A U.S. claim, however, would improve the legal position of the United States in opposing any Soviet claims which might be made in supporting Australia in any efforts to induce the Soviets to withdraw, and in participating in joint action with other Free World claimants. Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom seem to feel that the United States should claim the sector between 90° and 150° west longitude, and they would not be averse to the formal expression of wider claims by the United States.

8. . . . it would seem desirable, on balance, that the United States, irrespective of the Soviet position, make a formal claim to portions of Antarctica and be prepared to recognize claims by friendly Free World claimants.

Objectives

9. Orderly progress toward a solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica which would ensure maintenance of control by U.S. and friendly powers and serve to exclude our most probable enemies.

10. Freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in the Antarctic for nationals of the United States and friendly powers, and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data.

11. Access to natural resources which may be found to be useful.

Major Policy Guidance

12. The immediate question is not whether to assert a claim but when. It is generally agreed in the scientific and intelligence community that the present highly satisfactory cooperation among the countries participating in the IGY in the Antarctic, including the Soviet Union, might be jeopardized by the precipitate utterance of a U.S. claim to territory in the Antarctic. In consequence, unless the USSR in the meantime puts forward a claim, it is recommended that the United States refrain from announcing a claim in Antarctica until the close of the IGY in December, 1958. The tentative target date, therefore, for the putting forth of a U.S. claim is January 1, 1959. However, if before that time the USSR sets out a claim, or if UN action on Antarctica appears imminent, the United States should be prepared immediately to make public its claims.

13. The question then becomes one of what form the U.S. claim or claims to areas in Antarctica should take. The following possibilities suggest themselves:

a. The United States could put forward claim to the unclaimed sectors between 90° and 150° west longitude and poleward of the Norwegian claim (between 45° east and 20° west longitude) and reserve its rights to other areas based on U.S. discovery, U.S. scientific exploration, or other U.S. activity. This would have the effect of completing a 360° circle around Antarctica, with the result that the entire continent and its adjacent islands would have been formally claimed by the United States and the other seven Free World powers who are also allies of the United States. The corollary of a U.S. claim would be an expression by the United States of its recognition in whole or in part, and subject to negotiation with the other claimant powers, of the Antarctica claims of the seven Free World countries listed in paragraph 4 above.

b. In negotiating the claims issue with the claimant powers, the United States might, with respect to those areas in which its claims were in conflict with those of other claimant powers, express its willingness to establish a form of joint administration or condominium over the disputed areas with the individual powers concerned. For example, if the United States were to claim areas falling within the area claimed by Chile or Argentina or both, the United States might indicate its readiness to consider administering jointly with the power or powers concerned the area in dispute.

c. The United States could, in setting forth its formal claim to areas in Antarctica, simultaneously declare its readiness to merge its claims with those of the other Free World powers in a condominium with a suitable relationship to the United Nations. In the absence of an effective Soviet claim, such an international administration of Antarctica would thus ensure its retention in Free World hands and would obviate the necessity of negotiating out rival claims as between the eight Free World powers. However, there is reason to believe that both Argentina and Chile would strenuously resist the concept of a condominium. The nature of such an international administration and the arguments pro and con for a condominium are set forth in Tab A.

d. The United States likewise might, while expressing its formal claim to areas in Antarctica, declare its readiness to participate with the other seven Free World claimant powers in a United Nations trusteeship. It is probable, unless the USSR could get sufficient support for its own claim in Antarctica, that sufficient voting strength could be mustered in the United Nations to prevent any Soviet pretension to be considered as "a state directly concerned" in a UN trusteeship and to assure that such a trusteeship would be administered by all or some of the present Free World claimant powers. Conversely, the USSR might be able to prevent General Assembly approval of a trusteeship which excluded the USSR. Tab B sets forth the arguments in favor and against the application of a UN trusteeship of Antarctica.

14. It is recommended that, keeping in mind the need for action before or on the tentative target date of January 1, 1959 for putting forth a U.S. claim to Antarctica, and having due regard for the possibilities analyzed in the preceding paragraph, the United States commence forthwith diplomatic conversations among the seven Free World claimant powers. In these conversations the United States would indicate its intention to put forth a formal claim to the unclaimed sectors of the Antarctic and all other areas to which it has rights derived from discovery, exploration, or other authority, and would discuss among the seven Free World powers the alternatives set out in paragraph 13 above. Following these conversations, it should be possible to develop agreed positions both as to timing and the form the U.S. and other claims should take, particularly in respect of such international administration of Antarctica as meets with the greatest support by the Free World powers interested in that continent.

15. Meanwhile, the United States should continue its scientific, logistical, and financial preparations for its continuing presence in Antarctica through the IGY *and for some years beyond.* One basic principle of polar resupply is that each station should have at all times sufficient supplies to last two years. In this way the failure of

one resupply expedition will not interrupt the following season's operations. If the United States expresses a formal claim over areas in Antarctica either before or on January 1, 1959, the principle of resupply requires that this year's expedition—Deep Freeze III—should carry with it emergency supplies for any station that will remain active after 1959. Depending upon the status of Free World versus Soviet claims, the United States should be prepared to maintain further, but possibly not as extensive, expeditions in recurring two-year periods. Looking further ahead, preservation of our rights and protection of our potential interests will require U.S. activity in Antarctica for a long time to come.

16. The Executive Agent for the U. S. Government in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica should be _____. The responsible Agency for conducting the diplomatic negotiations precedent to the expression of a formal claim will be the Department of State.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SUBJECT

Establishment of a Condominium over Antarctica

1. The U.S. in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The U.S. thereafter suggested for consideration and transmitted to the seven powers a draft agreement proposing an international administration in the form of a condominium for the Antarctica whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. This approach was equally unsuccessful.

2. Arguments for establishing a joint administration for the Antarctica comprising the U.S. and the seven claimant powers would include:

(a) Such a regime would have the advantage of placing the U.S. and the seven powers in a position to maintain that they had de jure right to and control of the Antarctic region.

(b) At the same time, agreement on the part of the U.S. and the seven powers to cooperate with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN and to administer the Antarctic area in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security (both of which provisions were provided for in the 1948 agreement) would tend to blunt or reduce concern in and outside of the UN over the possible use of the Antarctic by the condominium powers for other than peaceful purposes.

(c) The establishment of such a regime for the Antarctic would in no way preclude the U.S. and the seven powers from reaching agreement at a later time to apply voluntarily for the application of a UN trusteeship to the Antarctic area if they should so wish.

(d) The conclusion of a joint administration would resolve the conflicting claims issue as between the seven claimant powers and would eliminate the necessity of the U.S.'s having to decide now upon the entirety of the area to which it might wish to lay claim in the Antarctic. As was contemplated in 1948, the U.S., under such an arrangement, would lay claim to areas in the Antarctic to which it had right (presumably but not necessarily limited to the unclaimed areas), to place it on an equal footing with the seven powers. Thereupon the U.S. and the seven powers would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime dedicated to administering and developing the area as a unit, not as individual segments. As matters stand now, the U.S. is reluctant to lay claim to areas in the Antarctic until it is in a position to ascertain more precisely all the areas to which it might wish to lay claim. By seeking a condominium agreement, the U.S. and the seven powers could move before Antarctica becomes a subject for continuing discussion in the UN and not be retarded by the conflicting claims issue. Under such an arrangement, the announcement of a U.S. territorial claim would occur approximately simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of a condominium agreement.

(e) A joint as distinguished from an individual country or segment approach to Antarctica would appear to be the most effective and least burdensome way financially to further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena. (This could be either a condominium or a trusteeship.)

(f) There is no reason why an agreement between the U.S. and seven powers to establish a condominium over the Antarctic designed to facilitate the further development of the area in the interest of all mankind could not be presented as a dramatic Free World initiative. Access to the area for scientific purposes would be open to all members of the UN or specialized agencies; however, it would be subject to the controls and regulations promulgated by the joint administration.

(g) Although the establishment of a condominium would not preclude the Soviets from claiming the right to participate in the administration of the area based on such claims as it might make, and while it would not force or necessarily bring about the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the area, it would provide a basis for the U.S. and the present claimant powers to question its validity of the Soviet presence in the area.

3. Arguments against establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the U.S. and the seven claimant powers would include:

(a) It is considered unlikely that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual "sovereign" rights even to a joint administration or condominium limited to the U.S. and themselves. However, it is thought that this could be presented to them as a more palatable alternative to UN supervision within the trusteeship system.

(b) The Soviets and the Indians, for example, would likely attack in and outside of the UN a condominium proposal as inconsistent with IGY objectives and as an attempt to exclude all other countries from the area as a part of the development of the Antarctic as a Free World military base.

(c) The announcement of the establishment of a condominium over the Antarctic would probably precipitate Soviet counter-action in the form of a claim to territory in the Antarctic. On the basis of this claim they might either seek participation in the condominium, or merely continue to administer their own zone.

(d) The establishment of a condominium would not bring about or necessarily lead to the withdrawal of USSR personnel from the area or make the USSR more responsive to such control measures as might be promulgated by the condominium administration. Moreover, because of the difficulty of policing boundaries in the Antarctic area, it seems probable that the USSR would have access to considerable territory adjacent to their area as well. The right of the USSR to maintain a military base within the area of its claim would be difficult to challenge on legal grounds, and could, as a practical matter, continue to be exercised whether challenged or not.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SUBJECT

Application of a UN Trusteeship over Antarctica

1. The NSC Planning Board has requested the Department of State to study and report on whether there could be developed some type of UN trusteeship over Antarctica which would protect friendly Free World claims and rights in the area, and to set forth in such report the advantages and disadvantages of the Free World's initiating such a proceeding.

2. While the trusteeship system was established primarily for the development of peoples, there is nothing in the Charter excluding the application of a UN trusteeship to uninhabited areas. It could be justified by the first of the four basic objectives of the system as stated under Article 76, viz., "to further international peace and security". (This has particular interest now since India's current interest in obtaining GA consideration of Antarctica derives in large part from India's concern that Antarctica might become a possible area of East-West tension as well as a possible nuclear testing site.) Under Article 77(c) of the Charter the trusteeship system may be applied to territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. (Those countries having made official claim to territory in the Antarctic consider themselves sovereign within the areas of their claims and hence could be expected to consider themselves as states responsible for administration within the meaning of Article 77.) The Charter also provides that territories held under mandate as well as territories detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War may be placed under the trusteeship system; however, these are not possibilities in the case of Antarctica.

Under Article 79 of the Charter, the terms of trusteeship shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned. (The exact criteria for determining a "state directly concerned" have not been agreed upon in the UN.) Article 81 provides that the trusteeship agreement shall include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority may be one or more states or the Organization itself. (In the latter case, the Organization would designate an administering agent.) Thus the terms of trusteeship agreed upon between the U.S. and the seven claimant powers could provide for the designation of one or more of their number as the administering authority, or the United Nations Organization itself as the administering authority. Moreover, the seven powers and the U.S. could agree to designate part or all of the Antarctic region as a strategic area; however, all functions of the UN relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreement, are exercised by the Security Council and would be subject, therefore, to the Soviet veto (Article 83). Additionally, designation of the Antarctic as a strategic area would likely be interpreted by some nations as being in conflict with the objective of peaceful utilization of Antarctica. On the other hand, the functions of the UN with regard to trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of trusteeship agreements, are exercised by the General Assembly. The question of the approval of a proposed trusteeship agreement by the General Assembly requires a two-thirds vote. The UN, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the state or states directly concerned.

All of the foregoing considerations would apply equally if one or more of the claimant powers were to seek individually rather than jointly the application of a UN trusteeship to an area or areas of Antarctica. It is doubted, however, whether any of the claimant powers would be prepared to seek the application of a UN trusteeship to a part of the Antarctic region in the absence of a common agreement with respect to such an approach. Nor could an initiative by one power to seek a UN trusteeship for its claimed area provide a basis for the UN's imposing a trusteeship on other parts of the Antarctic.

3. While a trusteeship over Antarctica would be possible in principle, whether it could be established as a practical matter would depend upon whether the U.S. and the present claimants to territory in the Antarctic, viz., Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK, could reach common agreement both in principle as well as upon the terms of trusteeship to be submitted to the UN for approval. The latter would include the designation of the administering authority.

4. There has been no attempt made thus far within the UN framework to urge the states most directly concerned with Antarctica to explore the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over the area in the common interest. India placed Antarctica on the provisional agenda of the 11th GA with a view to obtaining the adoption of a resolution calling for the peaceful utilization of Antarctica. India insisted that it had no wish to raise the question of the status of territorial claims in Antarctica but was concerned over the possibility of Antarctica's becoming a scene of "cold-war" conflict. India withdrew the item when it became apparent that there might

not be a majority for inscription. It is anticipated that India will try again to raise Antarctica at the 12th GA. If Antarctica should become a subject for discussion in the UN under these circumstances, it would appear inevitable that attention will be focussed on the political aspects of this problem which could lead to pressure for the establishment of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica with a view to furthering international peace and security. However, the GA could only recommend such action to member states concerned. It could not establish a trusteeship over the Antarctic with itself as the administering authority in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

5. The U.S. in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The U.S. proposed to the UK, Chile and Argentina for consideration the possible establishment of a voluntary joint or collective non-strategic UN trusteeship for Antarctica, the terms of which were to be agreed on by the U.S. and the seven claimant powers before submission to the UN GA for approval. The trusteeship was to be a joint trusteeship administered by the foregoing powers who were to merge and join their respective claims to and interests in the area in a special regime. To place itself on an equal juridical footing with the other powers, the U.S. contemplated making at an appropriate time an official claim to areas in Antarctica to which it had the best rights. The proposed trusteeship agreement also contemplated free access to, and freedom of transit through or over the area of Antarctica under such rules as the special regime established by the administering authorities might prescribe. Additionally, the administering authorities were to take all necessary measures in the trust territory, within the terms of Article 84 of the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since this proposal met with some opposition from the British and was not well received in either Argentina or Chile, the U.S. then suggested for consideration and transmitted to all seven claimant powers in early August, 1948, a draft agreement proposing an international administration (condominium) for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. Only the UK and New Zealand accepted the proposal as a basis for discussion. Australia, Argentina, and Chile rejected on grounds of sovereignty. The latter took the position as well that internationalization was inconsistent with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance although the U.S. took exception to this. France favored some scheme of internationalization that would not involve the surrender of individual sovereignty; and Norway viewed internationalization as unnecessary.

6. The U.S. has neither reaffirmed nor rejected publicly or to the seven friendly power claimants to territory in the Antarctic the position it took in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica.

7. It is anticipated that the USSR might claim all or a part of the unclaimed sector of Antarctica in the near future. Since neither the USSR nor any of the states presently claiming areas of Antarctica have succeeded in establishing the permanent occupation and control normally required by international law as a basis for the establishment of sovereignty over terra nullius, the USSR claim might well stand on the same legal footing as the other claims.

8. Arguments for seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

(a) A proposal by the U.S. and the seven claimant powers for the application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica would reduce appreciably Indian and international concern manifested in the UN as regards Antarctica's possibly becoming a scene of East-West conflict or being used for military or nuclear development purposes.

(b) Agreement by the U.S. and Free World territorial claimants on internationalization under a trusteeship arrangement would eliminate friction arising among them because of conflicting claims.

(c) If the proposed trusteeship agreement designating the U.S. or one or more of the seven claimant powers as the administering authority were approved by the GA, the USSR would be excluded from participation in the administration of Antarctica although it might be expected to argue for its inclusion as a power directly concerned and to subject the Antarctic trust administration to annual criticism in the Trusteeship Council. However, it is not thought that the Soviets could pursue this line beyond seeking detailed reports and their inclusion in visiting missions to the area.

Once the USSR had made a claim, however, its insistence on the status of a "state directly concerned" would be difficult to dispute on legal grounds. The USSR could be expected to seek participation in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement and the administration of the territory. However, if the U.S. and the seven powers were to agree to the designation of the Organization as the administering authority, this would appear to offer the most effective way of excluding the Soviets from participation in a joint administration of the Antarctic.

(d) The approval of such a trusteeship agreement would reserve to the Western powers primary control over the strategic use and economic value of the area although it would envisage free access to the area for scientific purposes under conditions prescribed by the administering authorities.

(e) An international or joint administration for Antarctica could serve to promote most effectively the further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as permit an equitable sharing of the financial burden. Such an administration would facilitate the correlation of meteorological observations.

(f) If the U.S. and the seven claimant powers were to be able to reach common agreement on such a proposal to submit to the UN, it would be a dramatic move in terms of demonstrating a Free World initiative within the UN framework dedicated to the development of a largely undeveloped continent in a way best designed to further the scientific knowledge and well-being of all peoples. Such a move would strengthen the UN in that it would constitute evidence of Free World faith in UN institutions.

(g) While the approval by the Assembly of a trusteeship arrangement for the Antarctic to be administered by the U.S. or one or more of the present claimant powers would not necessarily result in the physical exclusion or withdrawal of the Soviets from Antarctica, UN pressure could be mustered to facilitate the exercise of control over Soviet activities in the Antarctic.

9. Arguments against seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

(a) It is considered not only unlikely but improbable that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual "sovereign" rights in Antarctica and to accept voluntarily such UN supervision over the Antarctic as might be exercised by the Trusteeship Council. Chile and Argentina, backed by the entire Latin American bloc, as well as the UK, Australia and New Zealand, strongly opposed consideration of Antarctica at the last GA session even though India made it clear that its initiative was in no way intended to raise the question of territorial claims. (The U.S. also decided to oppose inscription.) It is believed that the reaction would be even more negative if the suggestion were made that the trusteeship be administered by the UN. The position taken by the present claimant powers would also appear to preclude the possibility of one or more of the claimant powers' seeking an individual trusteeship arrangement for its claimed area.

(b) The establishment of a UN trusteeship administered by the U.S. and the seven powers would not further the attainment of the present U.S. policy objective which seeks to ensure control of Antarctica to the U.S. and friendly powers and exclude its most probable enemies from the area. Although U.S. and claimant powers under a trusteeship agreement would have primary control over the area, they would find it difficult as trust powers to exclude any power including the USSR from access to the area for scientific purposes, etc. Moreover, the administering authorities would have to be prepared to accept a continuing and close UN interest in the area.

(c) It cannot be assumed that a UN trusteeship is the only or even the most effective way of furthering scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as facilitating the correlation of meteorological observations.

(d) If the U.S. and the seven powers were to agree to request application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica on the basis of terms proposed by them, it is anticipated that the USSR would endeavor to establish its status as a "state directly concerned" under Article 79; and, at a minimum, try to modify the proposed terms of the trust agreement, particularly as regards provisions for the future admission of additional states to participate in the international administration. While it is possible that the Soviets might be able to line up a blocking one-third vote to prevent the approval of the proposed trust agreement, the Free World powers could likely block similarly any amendments unacceptable to them. Such an impasse, however, would hardly contribute to a lessening of tension over Antarctica.

If, as is anticipated, the USSR had claimed part or all of the presently unclaimed territory in Antarctica, its claim would be on a legal basis equivalent to that of the other claimant states, and a U.S. position that the USSR alone, of all the claimants, is not a "state directly concerned", would be difficult to support. If the USSR's status as a "state directly concerned" were accepted it could claim the right to participate in the drafting of the terms of trusteeship and would have a strong basis for claiming a right to serve as one of the administering powers in view of its claim to a sector of the territory. An attempt to deny them this status might result in an impasse in the Assembly in which no trusteeship agreement could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.

10. Arguments in favor of the claimant powers' seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

(a) A UN trusteeship administered by the Organization, as prescribed in Article 81, would exclude the USSR from direct participation in the administration of the area. If the USSR were to be considered a "state directly concerned", it could claim the right to participate in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement under Article 79, but it would have no direct role in the administration of the area.

(b) If such a trusteeship were proposed by the present claimant states the USSR would experience difficulty in organizing an effective opposition to it in the Assembly without assuming the role of a selfish obstructionist. A number of states which would support the USSR in its objections to a trusteeship administered by the other claimant powers but excluding the USSR, such as India, would be unable to support its objections to a trusteeship administered by the Organization.

(c) A trusteeship administered by the Organization would appear to offer an effective means of controlling the activities of the USSR in the area. The USSR could not undertake activities in the area contrary to the wishes of the UN without damaging its international posture. This would require the USSR to justify the activities which it proposed to take and would preclude military activities by them in the entire area.

11. Arguments against the claimant powers' seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

(a) It is considered even more improbable that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded not only to accept voluntarily the application of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica but to give up as well the right to participate in the administration of the area in favor of an administering authority selected by the UN. This would dilute even further whatever claims and rights the U.S. and the present claimant powers have in the Antarctic.

(b) While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would eliminate the possibility of the USSR's participating in the administration of the area, it would also eliminate by the same token the present claimant powers and the U.S. This would likely be considered too high a price to pay by the present claimant powers.

(c) While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would provide an effective means of controlling Soviet activities in the Antarctic this could operate to limit the activities of the U.S. and the present claimant powers in the area as well.

331. Memorandum for the Files, by Earl H. Luboeansky of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs[1]

Washington, May 31, 1957.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Murphy, G
Mr. Haynes, IO
Mr. Bane, IO
Mr. Snow, ARA
Mr. Luboeansky, ARA
Mr. Meeker, L
Mr. Mayer, L
Mr. Crowley, EUR
Mr. Kavanaugh, FE
Miss Bacon, FE
Mr. McClintock, S/P
Mr. Leonhart, S/P

SUBJECT

Antarctic Policy

A meeting in Mr. Murphy's office was called at Mr. Snow's request preparatory to the meeting of the Planning Board of the National Security Council on June 3. The purpose of the meeting was to assure that the Department of State was in agreement with the NSC Planning Board's draft statement of policy providing for the making of claims in the Antarctic. Mr. Murphy indicated that it was the Secretary's desire that the United States policy in regard to the Antarctic be reviewed and that provision be made for making claims at an appropriate time in the Antarctic. This appeared to be the general consensus of the group although Mr. Mayer indicated that in the case of EUR a Bureau level policy had not been established. This he said would be done at an early date. In discussing the method of control over the area, Mr. Mayer, EUR,[2] and Mr. Meeker, L, expressed opposition to the paragraph in the draft NSC statement of policy regarding possible establishment of the trusteeship. This paragraph, basically drafted in IO, stated, in effect, that a UN trusteeship arrangement over the Antarctic would not provide adequate protection for U.S. and free world interests. Messrs. Meeker and Mayer were of the opinion a trusteeship might be the most feasible method of solving the territorial or other problems relating to Antarctica.

Mr. Murphy in closing stated that the primary consideration was that the National Security Council should go forward to establish a policy providing for the making of claims in the Antarctic.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/5–3157. Confidential.

[2] The source text is not clear as to Mayer's identity. He is listed with the Office of the Legal Adviser in the list of participants and with the Bureau of European Affairs in the text. Presumably the reference is to Ernest de Wael Mayer, Officer in Charge of Northern European Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

The other matters were not of immediate concern and would have to be worked out in the best possible manner.

---

332. Memorandum of Discussion at the 328th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 26, 1957[1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *ANTARCTICA* (NSC 5424/1; NSC 5528; NSC Actions Nos. 1500 and 1705; Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: "Interim Report on Antarctica", dated April 26, 1957; Progress Report, dated May 8, 1957, by OCB on NSC 5424/1;[2] NSC 5715;[3] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Antarctica", dated June 21, 1957[2])

Mr. Cutler briefed the National Security Council very thoroughly on the high points in the draft statement of policy on the subject, and called attention to the map of Antarctica which had been distributed at the beginning of the meeting. (Copies of Mr. Cutler's briefing note and the Antarctica map are filed in the minutes of the meeting.[4]) At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler called on the Secretary of State to speak.

. . . .

On this subject, Secretary Dulles insisted that he could see no necessity for spending any money that we don't want to spend in the future to carry on scientific work in the Antarctic. The point was that we already have a sufficiently good basis for U.S. claims in the Antarctic. Mr. Cutler also pointed out that the Planning Board had contemplated the reduction of U.S. bases in the Antarctic at the end of the International Geophysical Year. The President expressed the view that the United States would probably not need any permanent stations in Antarctica after the termination of the IGY on December 31, 1958. Certainly, as the Secretary of State had said, we wouldn't need very much in the way of permanent stations. Secretary Wilson, however, complained of the expenses that this policy would involve for the Defense Department, particularly in the light of the tight budgetary situation we were now facing. Mr. Brundage expressed the view that it was a very bad time for the United States to stake out claims in Antarctica. Mr. Cutler then quoted paragraph 19 of NSC 5715, to the effect that the United States was not to announce any claims until IGY considerations were no longer a major factor. At that time, after NSC review, the United States would announce the total definitive U.S. claim.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on June 27.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed, but see *infra*.

[4] Not further identified.

. . . .

The National Security Council: [5]

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5715, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 21, 1957.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5715, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Paragraph 13:* Delete the asterisk and the footnote relating thereto.

(2) *Paragraphs 16–19:* Delete the asterisks preceding these paragraphs, and the footnotes relating thereto.

(3) *Paragraph 17:* Delete the asterisk at the end of this paragraph, and the footnote relating thereto.

c. Noted the President's directive that the statement of policy on Antarctica, as amended and approved, be given a limited distribution on a strict need-to-know basis.

d. Agreed that, in reducing U.S. Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period in accordance with paragraph 23 of NSC 5715, consideration should be given not only to reducing the number of U.S. stations in the area but also to substituting expeditions for permanent stations.

Note: NSC 5715, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5715/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–5.]

---

[5] Paragraphs a–d and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 1738. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

333. National Security Council Report[1]

NSC 5715/1 *Washington, June 29, 1957.*

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5424/1
B. NSC 5528
C. NSC Actions Nos. 1500 and 1705
D. Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: "Interim Report on Antarctica", dated April 26, 1957
E. Progress Report, dated May 8, 1957, by OCB on NSC 5424/1[2]
F. NSC 5715
G. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Antarctica", dated June 21, 1957
H. NSC Action No. 1738

The National Security Council, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, National Science Foundation, at the 328th Council meeting on June 26, 1957, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5715, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1738–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5715, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5715/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

In accordance with the President's directive in NSC Action No. 1738–c, the enclosure is being given a limited distribution on a strict need-to-know basis.

In adopting the enclosure, the Council agreed (NSC Action No. 1738–d) that, in reducing U.S. Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period in accordance with paragraph 23 thereof, consideration should be given not only to reducing the number of U.S. stations in the area but also to substituting expeditions for permanent stations.

A Financial Appendix, Annex A ("Establishment of a Condominium Over Antarctica"), Annex B ("Application of a UN Trusteeship Over Antarctica"), and a map of the area,[3] are also enclosed for the information of the Council.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica—NSC 5715. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior, to the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget, of Central Intelligence, and of the National Science Foundation, and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A one-page table of contents is not printed.

[2] References E–G are not printed.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5424/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.[4]

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

General Considerations

1. Antarctica, comprising a vast continent and nearby islands, is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic "summer", and much of it has never been seen or explored. It has no present economic value. However, it has considerable importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

2. The existing U.S. policy on Antarctica (NSC 5424/1), adopted in July, 1954 and amended in January, 1956 (NSC Action No. 1500), provided that the United States would not make a formal claim to any Antarctic territory, but would reserve and at an appropriate later time reassert its rights therein. At that time, and in subsequent reconsideration of the policy by the National Security Council in 1956, the major emphasis of U.S. programs in Antarctica was placed upon scientific activities in support of the International Geophysical Year (IGY).

3. While Antarctica's strategic significance appears to be limited, the arrival in the area of Soviet scientific expeditions in connection with the IGY has aroused concern among our antipodean allies, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United Kingdom, as to possible future Russian activities in that area. . . . Soviet expeditionary parties have already established scientific stations and semi-permanent installations in the area presently claimed by Australia, and there is evidence that they intend to remain in Antarctica after the International Geophysical Year. In addition, prominent in the

---

[3] Not printed.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Soviet program are non-IGY activities, such as ground-controlled aerial photography, mapping, hydrographic charting, basic geology and biology, which were not a part of U.S. activities during the past season.

4. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: one extending between 90° and 150° west longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° east and 20° west longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery and on scientific and other activity, both within the other national claims and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced a claim, which might rest on the tenuous historical basis of a single sighting expedition under von Bellingshausen in 1819–21. However, extensive Soviet activity in the area at the present time could provide a possible basis for Soviet claims which the Western powers might find difficult to refute. In addition, the USSR has since World War II taken part in pelagic whaling in the area. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claims of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States, on numerous occasions in diplomatic notes, and publicly, has expressed its policy of reserving all its rights in the area, and the USSR has officially asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.[5] Japan, the Union of South Africa, and Belgium are participating in the IGY program in Antarctica but have made no claims. Declaration of a claim by the United States or the USSR or other powers might precipitate additional announcements of claims by countries, such as the Union of South Africa, which have begun to show an increasing interest in the area.

5. In 1948, the United States explored unsuccessfully with the claimant powers the possibility of announcing a U.S. claim and placing the Antarctic under some form of international administration. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected, publicly or to the present claimant powers, the position it took publicly in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica. U.S. policy as a matter of fact did not call for further discussions with the other claimant powers regarding the possibility of internationalization of Antarctica. There is some indication, however, that the United Kingdom and Australia have not entirely ruled out internationalization as a possible solution to the Antarctic claims problem. Argentina and Chile take a pronounced nationalistic and

---

[5] By a Soviet Memorandum of 1950 to the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France. [Footnote in the source text.]

emotional attitude toward their respective and, to a considerable extent, conflicting claims, covering the Drake Straits and the Palmer Peninsula. Argentina and Chile contest the claims of the United Kingdom to the area, and their quarrel with Great Britain is exacerbated by the Argentine-UK dispute over the Falkland Islands.

6. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic may become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. In the event that the issue is raised in the General Assembly, it is possible that a trusteeship arrangement might be proposed as a means of resolving the Antarctic claims problem. The United Nations, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned. If a trusteeship were to be accepted and applied, it does not seem likely that the presence of the USSR as a member of the Trusteeship Council would cause insurmountable difficulty in the immediate future for the United States and the friendly claimant powers. However, the presence of the Soviet Union as one of the trust powers would be unacceptable.

. . . .

8. The existence of a vast unclaimed area in the Antarctic is an open invitation to other powers, friendly and unfriendly, to make claims in the area and develop activities there. The basis of U.S. claims in the unclaimed area might be prejudiced by prior claims other powers might make in the area. Similarly, with respect to presently claimed areas, the legal basis for U.S. claims might be impaired with the passage of time, by increased activity by the Soviets or the present claimant powers, or by U.S. inactivity in these areas.

9. If the United States were to assert a claim, the timing of the claim would become important. The precipitate utterance of a U.S. claim might impair the present highly satisfactory cooperation among the countries participating in the International Geophysical Year in the area, including the Soviet Union. The United States could avoid impairing IGY cooperation by refraining from announcing a claim in Antarctica until activities in connection with the International Geophysical Year are terminated, or until the value to be derived from cooperation in the scientific and intelligence fields is reduced to a point no longer outweighing other factors. However, if

before that time the USSR sets out a claim, or if UN action on Antarctica or other developments make it advisable or necessary, the United States could be prepared immediately to make public its claims.

10. The following are the possibilities with respect to the extent of U.S. claims:

a. *As to presently unclaimed areas:*

> (1) The United States might claim the area from 90° to 150° west longitude on the basis of extensive exploration and scientific and other activity.
>
> (2) The area poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° east and 20° west longitude, in the absence of a prior claim by another friendly power such as Norway itself, could be claimed for the United States, though there has been less U.S. activity in this area to justify such a claim. A possibility which would have certain political advantages is to explore with Norway, prior to or concurrent with a declaration of claim by the United States, extension of the present Norwegian coastal claim inward to the South Pole.

The net effect of claiming the unclaimed area would be the completion of a 360° circle encompassing the entire continent and its adjacent islands in the area formally claimed by the United States and friendly powers.

b. *As to presently claimed areas:*

> (1) Rights based on U.S. discovery, U.S. scientific exploration, or other U.S. activity in any and all areas presently claimed by other powers, might be reserved as hitherto. This would be a method of avoiding, for the present at least, a decision as to specific areas to be claimed, and would defer the determination of areas the United States considers most desirable. This course of action could be followed if the United States were prematurely forced to make a claim before a decision regarding specifically delimited claims in the presently claimed area can be made.
>
> (2) The United States might also make specific claims to portions of the claims of one or more of the other powers. A determination within the U.S. Government of what areas these claims might cover would be necessary at an early date. The United States might reach an agreement with the other claimants, preferably by means of prior negotiations, regarding action to be taken to settle the dispute over these areas, i.e., whether by relinquishment of portions of their claims, cession or exchange of territory, or merging of claims in connection with some sort of international administration. A decision to take no action in regard to the areas placed in dispute might also be made.

11. If a decision were made to put forth a claim, the question would then arise as to how the United States would exercise

sovereignty over the claimed area. The following possibilities, or combinations or gradations thereof, may be considered:

a. *National control.* An appropriate agency could be designated to administer the area claimed by the United States. Bilateral or multilateral arrangements could then be made with friendly claimant powers regarding the administration and use, including exploitation, exploration, scientific and other activity, of the respective areas in the Antarctic.

b. *International control*

> (1) *Condominium.* A condominium could be established whereby claims over all or part of the Antarctic would be merged, provided the United States and all or certain of the other friendly claimant powers were to agree on the advisability and desirability of taking such action. To the extent disputed area is involved, such an international administration would obviate the necessity of negotiating out rival claims as between the claimant powers. The United States, as one of the joint sovereigns over areas in which the Soviets are located, would have a better basis for opposing objectionable Soviet activities or claims in those areas. It is expected, however, that both Argentina and Chile would strenuously resist the concept of a condominium. The nature of such an international administration and the arguments pro and con for a condominium are set forth in Annex A.
>
> (2) *Trusteeship.* One or more UN trusteeships could be established over parts or all of Antarctica, provided the states directly concerned agree. However, it would be difficult to secure UN approval of trusteeship arrangements which would offer a satisfactory degree of protection for friendly Free World claims and rights in Antarctica. Moreover, it is unlikely that agreement could be reached with the claimant powers, particularly Chile and Argentina, on the application of UN trusteeship arrangements to Antarctica, especially if it were proposed that trusteeships be administered by the UN rather than by the powers themselves. Annex B sets forth the arguments in favor of and against the application of UN trusteeships to Antarctica.

12. The designation of responsibilities within the executive branch for Antarctic matters depends to a large degree on the extent and direction in which the U.S. interest evolves. Current activities in the Antarctic are being carried on under the direction of the Navy acting as Executive Agent. The Department of Interior is the agency in the Government normally concerned with the civil administration of areas under the jurisdiction of the United States. Some areas, however, are administered by other agencies; for example, the Canal Zone is supervised by the Secretary of Army, and several islands in the Pacific, such as the Bonins, are administered by the Navy. The United States also acts for the UN in the administration of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. A Bill (S. 2189) "to promote the increase and diffusion of knowledge of the Antarctic", which would

create an independent Richard E. Byrd Antarctic Commission, recently has been introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Objectives

13. Orderly progress toward a peaceful solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica which would improve the basis for the establishment of sovereignty over the area by the United States and interested friendly powers.

14. Freedom of exploration and authentic scientific investigation throughout the Antarctic and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data, consistent with the objective in paragraph 13 above.

15. Access by the United States and friendly powers to the natural resources of the Antarctic.

Major Policy Guidance

16. Proceed immediately within the U.S. Government to determine the areas within presently-claimed territory to which the United States wishes to assert claims or rights.

17. On the basis of this determination, commence diplomatic conversations with the Free World claimant countries as appropriate for the purpose of:

a. Making known to them the U.S. intent to advance, at an appropriate time, a formal claim to the unclaimed sectors of the Antarctic and to certain other areas in which the United States has rights derived from discovery, exploration, or other activity.

b. Negotiating with them the possible extent of their and U.S. claims, the mutual recognition of claims, and the method of exercising sovereignty. (See paras. 10 and 11.)

In undertaking these conversations, it should be kept in mind that a breach of secrecy prior to full agreement with the other powers might require a prompt Presidential decision as to immediate public announcement of U.S. claims.

18. If, before completion of action under paras. 16 and 17, the USSR makes a claim, or if UN action or other developments make it necessary or desirable, assert a U.S. claim to the unclaimed sectors of Antarctica, and to such of the presently-claimed areas regarding which arrangements have been made with the Free World claimants concerned, and a reservation of U.S. rights within other presently claimed sectors. If at all possible, advance notice should be given to the friendly claimant powers.

19. Otherwise, refrain from announcing U.S. claims or reservations until IGY considerations are no longer a major factor. At that

time, after NSC review of action under paras. 16 and 17, announce the total definitive U.S. claim.

20. In view of the scientific nature of IGY cooperation and the strength of Free World claims based on the pre-IGY period, adhere to the principle that activities represented as participation in the Antarctic IGY program do not constitute a legal basis for the assertion of Antarctic claims.

21. Meanwhile, continue scientific, logistical, and financial preparations for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica. Preservation of our rights and protection of our potential interest will require U.S. activity in Antarctica for a long time to come.

22. Small scale reconnaissance mapping and geologic studies should be promptly undertaken in those areas which the United States determines ultimately to claim, in order to support and strengthen U.S. rights.

23. Make appropriate budgetary provision for two-year resupply, not exceeding the requirements for current level of operations, in order to insure a continuing U.S. presence through April 1959. Reduce U.S. Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period to a minimum essential to support U.S. interests.

24. The Department of Defense should be the Executive Agent of the U.S. Government through 1959 in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica. The agency to administer U.S.-claimed territory and participate in any joint administration which may be established in Antarctica should be designated at a later date.[6]

[Attachment]

FINANCIAL APPENDIX

Cost estimates in the Financial Appendix indicate order of magnitude.

Approval of the policy statement does not indicate approval of cost estimates in the Financial Appendix.

Appropriations and expenditures to finance the policy will be subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

---

[6] Consideration of the need for a separate Antarctic Commission will be handled through the legislative reference process of the Bureau of the Budget. [Footnote in the source text.]

Special Note

All estimates are subject to the assumptions, footnotes, and summary explanation shown below in this Financial Appendix.

ANTARCTICA
ESTIMATED COST OF THE PROPOSED POLICIES

Expenditures by Programs
FY 1955—FY 1960
(Millions of Dollars)

	Actual		Estimated			
	1955	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*	*1960*
Department of Defense[7]						
Out of Pocket Costs	2.4	11.3	18.9	10.5	11.4	11.4
Supporting Costs	.7	6.0	9.2	8.0	8.1	8.1
TOTAL	3.1	17.3	28.1	18.5	19.5	19.5
Department of Interior[8]	—	.2	—	1.7	—	—
National Science Foundation[9]	.2	2.4	.7	1.0	1.4	1.
Grand Total	3.3	19.9	28.8	21.2	20.9	20.5

Annex A

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONDOMINIUM OVER ANTARCTICA

1. The United States in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The United States thereafter suggested for consideration and transmitted to the seven powers a draft agreement proposing an international administration in the form of a condominium for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and

---

[7] The above Defense estimates for FY 1959 and FY 1960 assume continuation of current level of activity. The FY 1959 estimate is based on activity for a full fiscal year. A reduction in activity level subsequent to the IGY (which ends December 31, 1958) would result in a lower level of expenditure for FY 1959. The estimates provided below give a range of expenditure for FY 1960 based on alternative reductions in present Antarctic activity (seven stations).

a. Four Stations (McMurdo, Byrd, Pole and Weddell)	$15.	million
b. Three Stations (McMurdo, Byrd, and Pole)	11.5	"
c. Two Stations (McMurdo and Byrd)	8.5	"
d. One Station (McMurdo Sound)	7.	"

[Footnote in the source text.]

[8] The FY 1958 estimate depends on securing authorization and funds for mapping and scientific investigations by the Department of Interior. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] Includes an estimated $2 million for scientific activities ($1 million in FY 1959 and $1 million in FY 1960) on the assumption that there is to be activity in Antarctica in CY 1959 on a level equivalent to that carried on during the IGY. [Footnote in the source text.]

interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. This approach was equally unsuccessful.

2. Arguments for establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the United States and the seven claimant powers would include:

a. Such a regime would have the advantage of placing the U.S. and the seven powers in a position to maintain that they had de jure right to and control of the Antarctic region.

b. At the same time, agreement on the part of the United States and the seven powers to cooperate with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN and to administer the Antarctic area in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security (both of which provisions were provided for in the 1948 agreement), would tend to blunt or reduce concern in and outside of the UN over the possible use of the Antarctic by the condominium powers for other than peaceful purposes.

c. The establishment of such a regime for the Antarctic would in no way preclude the United States and the seven powers from reaching agreement at a later time to apply voluntarily for the application of a UN trusteeship to the Antarctic area if they should so wish.

d. The conclusion of a joint administration would resolve the conflicting claims issue as between the seven claimant powers and would eliminate the necessity of the United States having to decide now upon the entirety of the area to which it might wish to lay claim in the Antarctic. As was contemplated in 1948, the United States, under such an arrangement, would lay claim to areas in the Antarctic to which it had right (presumably but not necessarily limited to the unclaimed areas). to place it on an equal footing with the seven powers. Thereupon the United States and the seven powers would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime dedicated to administering and developing the area as a unit, not as individual segments. As matters stand now, the United States is reluctant to lay claim to areas in the Antarctic until it is in a position to ascertain more precisely all the areas to which it might wish to lay claim. By seeking a condominium agreement, the United States and the seven powers could move before Antarctica becomes a subject for continuing discussion in the UN and not be retarded by the conflicting claims issue. Under such an agreement, the announcement of a U.S. territorial claim would occur approximately simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of a condominium agreement.

e. A joint as distinguished from an individual country or segment approach to Antarctica would appear to be the most effective and least burdensome way financially to further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena. (This could be either a condominium or a trusteeship.)

f. There is no reason why an agreement between the United States and seven powers to establish a condominium over the Antarctic designed to facilitate the further development of the area in the interest of all mankind could not be presented as a dramatic Free World initiative. Access to the area for scientific purposes would be open to all members of the UN or specialized agencies; however, it would be subject to the controls and regulations promulgated by the joint administration.

g. Although the establishment of a condominium would not preclude the Soviets from claiming the right to participate in the administration of the area based on such claims as it might make, and while it would not force or necessarily bring about the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the area, it would provide a basis for the United States and the present claimant powers to question the validity of the Soviet presence in the area.

3. Arguments against establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the United States and the seven claimant powers would include:

a. It is considered unlikely that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual "sovereign" rights even to a joint administration or condominium limited to the United States and themselves. However, it is thought that this could be presented to them as a more palatable alternative to UN supervision within the trusteeship system.

b. The Soviets and the Indians, for example, would likely attack in and outside of the UN a condominium proposal as inconsistent with IGY objectives and as an attempt to exclude all other countries from the area as a part of the development of the Antarctic as a Free World military base.

c. The announcement of the establishment of a condominium over the Antarctic would probably precipitate Soviet counter-action in the form of a claim to territory in the Antarctic. On the basis of this claim they might either seek participation in the condominium, or merely continue to administer their own zone.

d. The establishment of a condominium would not bring about or necessarily lead to the withdrawal of USSR personnel from the area or make the USSR more responsive to such control measures as might be promulgated by the condominium administration. The right of the USSR to maintain a military base within the area of its claim would be difficult to challenge on legal grounds, and could, as a practical matter, continue to be exercised whether challenged or not.

4. In the absence of an agreement on the part of all of the claimant powers to enter into a condominium over Antarctica in its entirety, it is possible that a condominium could be established over a part of Antarctica by those claimant powers favoring such action. Although arguments generally along the lines of those indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above could be made for and against the establishment of a condominium over a part of the Antarctic, a partial condominium would not serve to achieve the purpose of a united front and the benefits to be derived therefrom as reflected in paragraph 2 above. Moreover, a partial condominium would resolve

the conflicting claims issue only as between those powers participating in the condominium.

Annex B

APPLICATION OF A UN TRUSTEESHIP OVER ANTARCTICA

1. The NSC Planning Board has requested the Department of State to study and report on whether there could be developed some type of UN trusteeship over Antarctica which would protect friendly Free World claims and rights in the area, and to set forth in such report the advantages and disadvantages of the Free World's initiating such a proceeding.

2. While the trusteeship system was established primarily for the development of peoples, there is nothing in the Charter excluding the application of a UN trusteeship to uninhabited areas. It could be justified by the first of the four basic objectives of the system as stated under Article 76, viz., "to further international peace and security". (This has particular interest now since India's current interest in obtaining GA consideration of Antarctica derives in large part from India's concern that Antarctica might become a possible area of East-West tension as well as a possible nuclear testing site.) Under Article 77 (c) of the Charter the trusteeship system may be applied to territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. (Those countries having made official claim to territory in the Antarctic consider themselves sovereign within the areas of their claims and hence could be expected to consider themselves as states responsible for administration within the meaning of Article 77.) The Charter also provides that territories held under mandate as well as territories detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War may be placed under the trusteeship system; however, these are not possibilities in the case of Antarctica.

Under Article 79 of the Charter, the terms of trusteeship shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned. (The exact criteria for determining a "state directly concerned" have not been agreed upon in the UN.) Article 81 provides that the trusteeship agreement shall include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority may be one or more states or the Organization itself. (In the latter case, the Organization would designate an administering agent.) Thus the terms of trusteeship agreed upon between the United States and the seven claimant powers could provide for the designation of one or more of their number as the administering authority, or the United Nations Organization itself as the administering authority. Moreover, the seven powers and the United States could agree to designate part or all of the Antarctic region as a strategic area; however, all functions of the UN relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreement, are exercised by the Security Council and would be subject, therefore, to the Soviet veto (Article 83). Additionally, designation of the Antarctic as a strategic area would likely be interpreted by some nations as being in conflict with the objective of peaceful utilization of Antarctica. On the other hand, the functions of the UN with regard to trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of trusteeship agreements, are exercised by the General Assembly. The question of the approval of a proposed trusteeship agreement by the General Assembly requires a two-thirds vote. The UN, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the state or states directly concerned.

All of the foregoing considerations would apply equally if one or more of the claimant powers were to seek individually rather than jointly the application of a UN trusteeship to an area or areas of Antarctica. It is doubted, however, whether any of the claimant powers would be prepared to seek the application of a UN trusteeship to a part of the Antarctic region in the absence of a common agreement with respect to such an approach. Nor could an initiative by one power to seek a UN trusteeship for its claimed area provide a basis for the UN's imposing a trusteeship on other parts of the Antarctic.

3. While a trusteeship over Antarctica would be possible in principle, whether it could be established as a practical matter would depend upon whether the United States and the present claimants to territory in the Antarctic, viz., Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK, could reach common agreement both in principle as well as upon the terms of trusteeship to be submitted to the UN for approval. The latter would include the designation of the administering authority.

4. There has been no attempt made thus far within the UN framework to urge the states most directly concerned with Antarctica to explore the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over the area in the common interest. India placed Antarctica on the provisional agenda of the 11th GA with a view to obtaining the adoption of a resolution calling for the peaceful utilization of Antarctica. India insisted that it had no wish to raise the question of the status of territorial claims in Antarctica, but was concerned over the possibility of Antarctica's becoming a scene of "cold-war" conflict.

India withdrew the item when it became apparent that there might not be a majority for inscription. It is anticipated that India will try again to raise Antarctica at the 12th GA. If Antarctica should become a subject for discussion in the UN under these circumstances, it would appear inevitable that attention will be focussed on the political aspects of this problem which could lead to pressure for the establishment of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica with a view to furthering international peace and security. However, the GA could only recommend such action to member states concerned. It could not establish a trusteeship over the Antarctic with itself as the administering authority in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

5. The United States in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The United States proposed to the UK, Chile and Argentina for consideration the possible establishment of a voluntary joint or collective non-strategic UN trusteeship for Antarctica, the terms of which were to be agreed on by the United States and the seven claimant powers before submission to the UN GA for approval. The trusteeship was to be a joint trusteeship administered by the foregoing powers who were to merge and join their respective claims to and interests in the area in a special regime. To place itself on an equal juridical footing with the other powers, the United States contemplated making at an appropriate time an official claim to areas in Antarctica to which it had the best rights. The proposed trusteeship agreement also contemplated free access to, and freedom of transit through or over, the area of Antarctica under such rules as the special regime established by the administering authorities might prescribe. Additionally, the administering authorities were to take all necessary measures in the trust territory, within the terms of Article 84 of the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since this proposal met with some opposition from the British and was not well received in either Argentina or Chile, the United States then suggested for consideration and transmitted to all seven claimant powers in early August, 1948, a draft agreement proposing an international administration (condominium) for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. Only the UK and New Zealand accepted the proposal as a basis for discussion. Australia, Argentina, and Chile rejected on grounds of sovereignty. The latter took the position as well that internationalization was inconsistent with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, although the United States took exception to this. France favored some scheme of internationalization that would not involve the surrender of individual sovereignty; and Norway viewed internationalization as unnecessary.

6. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected publicly or to the seven friendly power claimants to territory in the Antarctic the position it took in 1943 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica.

7. It is anticipated that the USSR might claim all or a part of the unclaimed sector of Antarctica in the near future. Since neither the USSR nor any of the states presently claiming areas of Antarctica have succeeded in establishing the permanent occupation and control normally required by international law as a basis for the establishment of sovereignty over terra nullius, the USSR claim might well stand on the same legal footing as the other claims.

8. Arguments for seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

a. A proposal by the United States and the seven claimant powers for the application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica would reduce appreciably Indian and international concern manifested in the UN as regards Antarctica's possibly becoming a scene of East-West conflict or being used for military or nuclear development purposes.

b. Agreement by the United States and Free World territorial claimants on internationalization under a trusteeship arrangement would eliminate friction arising among them because of conflicting claims.

c. If the proposed trusteeship agreement designating the United States or one or more of the seven claimant powers as the administering authority were approved by the GA, the USSR would be excluded from participation in the administration of Antarctica, although it might be expected to argue for its inclusion as a power directly concerned and to subject the Antarctic trust administration to annual criticism in the Trusteeship Council. However, it is not thought that the Soviets could pursue this line beyond seeking detailed reports and their inclusion in visiting missions to the area.

Once the USSR had made a claim, however, its insistence on the status of a "state directly concerned" would be difficult to dispute on legal grounds. The USSR could be expected to seek participation in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement and the administration of the territory. However, if the United States and the seven powers were to agree to the designation of the Organization as the administering authority, this would appear to offer the most effective way of excluding the Soviets from participation in a joint administration of the Antarctic.

d. The approval of such a trusteeship agreement would reserve to the Western powers primary control over the strategic use and economic value of the area, although it would envisage free access to the area for scientific purposes under conditions prescribed by the administering authorities.

e. An international or joint administration for Antarctica could serve to promote most effectively the further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as permit an equitable sharing of the financial burden. Such an administration would facilitate the correlation of meteorological observations.

f. If the United States and the seven claimant powers were to be able to reach common agreement on such a proposal to submit to the UN, it would be a dramatic move in terms of demonstrating a Free World initiative within the UN framework dedicated to the development of a largely undeveloped continent in a way best designed to further the scientific knowledge and well-being of all peoples. Such a move would strengthen the UN in that it would constitute evidence of Free World faith in UN institutions.

g. While the approval by the Assembly of a trusteeship arrangement for the Antarctic to be administered by the United States or one or more of the present claimant powers would not necessarily result in the physical exclusion or withdrawal of the Soviets from Antarctica, UN pressure could be mustered to facilitate the exercise of control over Soviet activities in the Antarctic.

9. Arguments against seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

a. It is considered not only unlikely but improbable that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual "sovereign" rights in Antarctica and to accept voluntarily such UN supervision over the Antarctic as might be exercised by the Trusteeship Council. Chile and Argentina, backed by the entire Latin American bloc, as well as the UK, Australia and New Zealand, strongly opposed consideration of Antarctica at the last GA session, even though India made it clear that its initiative was in no way intended to raise the question of territorial claims. (The United States also decided to oppose inscription.) It is believed that the reaction would be even more negative if the suggestion were made that the trusteeship be administered by the UN. The position taken by the present claimant powers would also appear to preclude the possibility of one or more of the claimant powers' seeking an individual trusteeship arrangement for its claimed area.

b. The establishment of a UN trusteeship administered by the United States and the seven powers would not further the attainment of the present U.S. policy objective which seeks to ensure control of Antarctica to the United States and friendly powers and exclude its most probable enemies from the area. Although the United States and the claimant powers under a trusteeship agreement would have primary control over the area, they would find it difficult as trust powers to exclude any power including the USSR, from access to the area for scientific purposes, etc. Moreover, the administering authorities would have to be prepared to accept a continuing and close UN interest in the area.

c. It cannot be assumed that a UN trusteeship is the only or even the most effective way of furthering scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as facilitating the correlation of meteorological observations.

d. If the United States and the seven powers were to agree to request application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica on the basis of terms proposed by them, it is anticipated that the USSR would endeavor to establish its status as a "state directly concerned" under Article 79; and, at a minimum, try to modify the proposed terms of the trust agreement, particularly as regards provisions for the future admission of additional states to participate in the international administration. While it is possible that the Soviets might be able to line up a blocking one-third vote to prevent the approval of the proposed trust agreement, the Free World powers could likely block similarly any amendments unacceptable to them. Such an impasse, however, would hardly contribute to a lessening of tension over Antarctica.

If the USSR had claimed part or all of the presently unclaimed territory in Antarctica, its claim would be on a legal basis equivalent to that of the other claimant states, and a U.S. position that the USSR alone, of all the claimants, is not a "state directly concerned", would be difficult to support. If the USSR's status as a "state directly concerned" were accepted, it could claim the right to participate in the drafting of the terms of trusteeship and would have a strong basis for claiming a right to serve as one of the administering powers in view of its claim to a sector of the territory. An attempt to deny them this status might result in an impasse in the Assembly in which no trusteeship agreement could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.

10. Arguments in favor of the claimant powers' seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

a. A UN trusteeship administered by the Organization, as prescribed in Article 81, would exclude the USSR from direct participation in the administration of the area. If the USSR were to be considered a "state directly concerned", it could claim the right to participate in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement under Article 79, but it would have no direct role in the administration of the area.

b. If such a trusteeship were proposed by the present claimant states, the USSR would experience difficulty in organizing an effective opposition to it in the Assembly without assuming the role of a selfish obstructionist. A number of states (such as India) which would support the USSR in its objections to a trusteeship administered by the other claimant powers but excluding the USSR, would be unable to support its objections to a trusteeship administered by the Organization.

c. A trusteeship administered by the Organization would appear to offer an effective means of controlling the activities of the USSR in the area. The USSR could not undertake activities in the area contrary to the wishes of the UN without damaging its international posture. This would require the USSR to justify the activities which it proposed to take and would preclude military activities by them in the entire area.

11. Arguments against the claimant powers' seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

a. It is considered even more improbable that the present claimant powers in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to accept voluntarily the application of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica and to agree to an administering authority selected by the UN. This would dilute even further whatever claims and rights the United States and the present claimant powers have in the Antarctic.

b. While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would eliminate the possibility of the USSR's participating in the administration of the area, it might also eliminate by the same token the participation of the present claimant powers and the United States. This would likely be considered too high a price to pay by the present claimant powers.

c. While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would provide an effective means of controlling Soviet activities in the Antarctic, this could tend to limit the activities of the United States and the present claimant powers in the area as well.

---

334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, August 23, 1957—8:47 p.m.

1563. Re London's telegram 1093,[2] please inform FonOffs London, Wellington, Canberra as follows: US in principle willing participate in proposed quadripartite working level talks which could be held Washington in October. Dept's first reaction to British suggestion is that creation of condominium including USSR would not best serve interests and security free world and would be inconsistent with present US policy. US itself was about to propose talks leading to merging of claims among present claimants and US and gradual development of condominium starting however with only the sector embracing Australian and New Zealand claims and unclaimed Marie Byrd Land. Later, countries presently claiming other parts Antarctic would be urged to accede to condominium. Immediate inclusion of British was not contemplated solely because of political situation Argentina and conflicting British-Argentine-Chilean claims. Our plans call for keeping arrangements secret until after IGY. This condominium could of course offer to make arrangements with USSR as to any continued Soviet activities. Inform Dept of FonOff reaction these observations.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 031.1102/8–2357. Secret. Drafted by Robert Wilson and approved for transmission by Snow and Dulles. Concurred in by Murphy, EUR, FE, IO, L, and S/P. Also sent to Wellington and Canberra and repeated to Santiago and Buenos Aires.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 031.1102/8–1357)

Repeated Santiago and Buenos Aires for information only not for discussion with governments.

Dulles

---

335. Paper Prepared in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State [1]

Washington, October 3, 1957.

QUESTIONS TO BE RAISED AT FOUR POWER TALKS CONCERNING AN ANTARCTIC CONDOMINIUM

1. It would be possible for a condominium to be established in which all members merge whatever claims of sovereignty they possess and retain undivided equal fractional shares of sovereignty over the entire condominium area. What reactions to this?

2. Should there be parallel administration by condominium members over separate portions of the condominium area, or should some form of international commission administer the entire area?

3. If an Antarctic Commission were established to administer a condominium, should there exist a veto power on the part of one state?

4. What should be the basic functions of an Antarctic Commission?

(a) Collection and dissemination of information?
(b) Planning and coordination of scientific activity?
(c) Planning and coordination of exploration for and exploitation of natural resources?

5. If the condominium had as a function the planning and coordination of scientific activity, should the commission have main-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10–357. Secret. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle.

ly advisory and consultative powers with respect to states which voluntarily wished to engage in Antarctic activities and have regulatory power only in the event that two states wished to use the same camp site or area on an expedition but did not wish to undertake a joint expedition?

6. If the commission were to have as a function the planning and coordination of exploration for and exploitation of natural resources:

(a) Should the condominium commission be vested with title, as distinguished from sovereignty, to all condominium lands?

(b) Should it be agreed that all member states shall have equal opportunity to share equally in any of the possible benefits from resources exploitation?

7. Should the condominium area be neutralized, in a military sense, in that armaments, weapons or ammunition, other than that required for killing of animals and police purposes, would be barred from introduction into the condominium area?

8. Should the expense of the condominium be shared equally?

9. Concerning judicial matters:

(a) Should disputes between states or between a state and the commission be subject to decision by the ICJ?

(b) Should criminal jurisdiction over persons committing crimes in the condominium area be retained by the state of the nationality of the criminal?

10. Should the condominium agreement be of indefinite duration, but subject to periodic review?

336. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the South African Ambassador (du Plessis) and Paul C. Daniels of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs[1]

Washington, October 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Proposed Participation of Union of South Africa in Four-Power Talks on Antarctica

The South African Ambassador came to my office at 3:00 p.m. today, by appointment made yesterday. He handed me an Aide-Mémoire classified "Secret" dated October 3, 1957,[2] the last paragraph of which reads as follows:

> "The Union Government understands that discussions about Antarctica between representatives of the United States and certain Commonwealth Governments are expected to take place in the near future. To the extent that these discussions may have a bearing on any regime for the future control and administration of Antarctica, the Union Government, in view of its real interest in the area, would appreciate it most highly if they could be invited to participate."

The Ambassador referred to recent talks in London between certain Commonwealth countries in which the subject of Antarctica was discussed. He said he understood that certain further talks were to be held in Washington on the same subject, and that as indicated in the Aide-Mémoire his Government was desirous of participating in such discussions.

I said that of course the United States Government appreciated the interest of the Union of South Africa in this matter, and as indicated last year it welcomed the opportunity to exchange information and views in regard to the Antarctic.

With reference to talks in Washington, to which the Ambassador referred, I stated that the initiative for such informal discussions had emanated from London, and that since the United States was not the initiator I could not very well presume to extend an invitation to any other Government to participate. Furthermore, I said I did not see how I could very well make an adequate reply to the South African proposal without prior consultation with the representatives of the other interested Governments. I said that I would gladly consult them as soon as possible, and thereafter prepare an Aide-Mémoire in reply to the one which he just handed me.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10–457. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Daniels. W.C. du Plessis became Ambassador to the United States in October 1956.

[2] Not printed; a copy is attached to the source text.

I took advantage of the occasion to point out that quite aside from the substance of any views or ideas which might be advanced in the course of exploratory conversations, the mere fact that any such talks were being held was considered to be highly confidential. All concerned were desirous of avoiding even a semblance of any unusual political activity at this time in regard to Antarctica which might have the unfortunate effect of precipitating action by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, other claimant countries would probably be disturbed if it were felt that the question of Antarctica were being discussed by a group of countries without their own participation.

Ambassador du Plessis readily agreed with the validity of these observations, and conceded the delicacy with which the matter would be handled. He added a further thought, namely, that if the talks were to become too widely known, or their importance exaggerated it might provoke India into taking further initiative in the United Nations.

I reiterated my desire to stay in close touch with the Ambassador in regard to matters of mutual interest in regard to Antarctica and assured him again that I would consult with other representatives in regard to possible South African participation in the forthcoming talks.

We both agreed that an answer to the Aide-Mémoire might well be deferred until after such consultation.

---

337. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Embassy of the Union of South Africa[1]

Washington, October 8, 1957.

The Government of the United States of America has given careful consideration to the Aide-Mémoire of the Embassy of the Union of South Africa, dated October 3, 1957, in which there are set forth the reasons which in the Union Government's view justify the Union's association with any organization or machinery which might be devised for the control and administration of Antarctica.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/10–357. Secret. Drafted on October 8 by Daniels, who delivered it to the South African Embassy that day.

The Aide-Mémoire of the South African Embassy states that the Union Government, in view of its real interest in the area, would appreciate it most highly if they could be invited to participate in discussions about Antarctica between representatives of the United States and certain Commonwealth Governments. It is assumed that this suggestion relates to general or formal discussions of a multilateral character, and would not necessarily refer to informal conversations which representatives of the Government of the United States may have with the representatives of other Governments interested in the Antarctic area, particularly if the initiative for such informal conversations comes from another Government.

The Government of the United States of America welcomes the expression of views of the Union Government, and is glad to reiterate its willingness to consult with that Government at any time in regard to Antarctic problems, and to exchange information in this field of mutual interest to the fullest extent practicable. It is believed that this policy of consultation will serve the purposes of the two Governments without the necessity of either one participating in all informal talks which representatives of either Government may have with representatives of other Governments on this subject.

During the current International Geophysical Year a wide range of scientific activities are being carried on in the Antarctic area by a number of countries, as the Union Government is aware, and accordingly the Government of the United States of America feels that it will be particularly useful during this time to maintain close contact with the Government of the Union of South Africa in the hope that close cooperation between the two Governments will lead to satisfactory solutions of any problems that may be encountered.

338. Memorandum From Paul C. Daniels to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, December 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

Antarctica

Preliminary examination of problems relating to Antarctica has been completed. This memorandum requests your approval of actions to be taken.

Background

Seven countries have thus far made formal claims to territory in Antarctica—United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina, and Chile. There are two large unclaimed sectors. The United States has important potential claims but has filed no formal claim. The Soviet Union has been engaging in extensive activity in Antarctica in connection with the current International Geophysical Year but has not as yet filed a claim. Japan, Belgium, and South Africa are also participating in the IGY program in Antarctica and have made no claims. Attached as Tab A is a map showing the status of claims.[2]

In 1948 the United States proposed to claimant powers an international condominium. No action was taken on this proposal. Nor has the United States publicly reaffirmed or withdrawn this proposal.

The NSC on June 26, 1957, adopted a policy (NSC 5715/1,[3] attached as Tab B) providing that (a) the United States should immediately determine the areas within presently claimed territory which it wishes to claim; (b) diplomatic conversations should be held with appropriate Free World claimants both to advise them of our intention to advance a formal claim to unclaimed sectors and to other areas in which we have rights and to negotiate mutual recognition of claims and the method of exercising sovereignty; and (c) the United States should assert an immediate claim if the USSR should make a claim or if UN action or other developments made this desirable.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/12–957. Secret. An earlier memorandum on this subject, including Tabs A–D, was originally drafted by Daniels for Secretary Dulles on November 13, and was cleared by seven interested bureaus. On December 3 Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy gave his tentative clearance while recommending to Daniels "that you recast your memorandum in order to give him [Dulles] a fuller picture of the problem. This revision would not appear to require new clearances." The source text contains Murphy's initialed clearance. On January 2, 1958, Daniels informed W. Stratton Anderson, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy at Oslo, in response to two previous letters, that "it has not been possible for the Department to send further information or instructions to your Embassy. This is because some tentative proposals regarding Antarctica which I formulated last November have not yet been given full Departmental approval." (*Ibid.*, 702.022/12–2357)

[2] Not printed.

[3] Document 333.

. . . .

Recommendations:

A. That secret consultations be initiated with the Governments of the claimant states, initially with Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, on the basis of the following tentative U.S. position:

1. The U.S. would promptly assert a territorial claim to the unclaimed portions of Antarctica, and at the same time reserve rights in other (unspecified) areas of that continent.

2. Simultaneously, the U.S. would suggest that the other present claimant states (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, and Argentina) join with it in establishing an international regime for Antarctica.

3. In the same proclamation, the U.S. would, without prejudice to any claims asserted by any of such claimants, propose an international conference of states which have a direct and substantial interest in the Antarctic region and which desire to cooperate in the establishment of an international regime for Antarctica. This conference would undertake the drafting of a statute for the proposed international regime.

A draft proclamation covering points 1, 2, and 3 above is attached (Tab D).[4]

4. The statute for the proposed international regime might provide for an International Authority under which states would not be obliged to renounce their claims or recognize other claims, or to transfer sovereignty to the Authority. The Authority would, however, be given administrative power over Antarctica. The statute might also provide for the organization, membership, and procedure of the Authority, for scientific activity, for economic policy including conservation of resources, for demilitarization, and for a working relationship with the United Nations. Attached as Tab E[5] is a tentative outline of the proposed international regime for Antarctica.

5. Invitations to the conference would be extended to Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, and the Soviet Union. South Africa should be invited because of its strategic interest and proximity to Antarctica. There are a number of pros and cons regarding Soviet participation which are summarized at Tab F.[6] On balance it is believed that it would be

---

[4] Enclosure 1 below.

[5] Not printed.

[6] Enclosure 2 below.

desirable to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union to attend the conference.

6. The proclamation asserting the U.S. territorial claim and proposing an international settlement of Antarctica along the foregoing lines would be issued as soon as possible after the consultations with other friendly governments without necessarily awaiting the end of the International Geophysical Year at the end of 1958 and preferably before the opening of the next UN General Assembly anticipated in September 1958. This might forestall possible unfavorable action which might be initiated in the General Assembly by India or the Soviet Union.[7]

B. The OCB Working Group on Antarctica has been informed of the above tentative proposals, but no formal approval has been sought or obtained so far. On the other hand, no objections to this proposed course of action have been advanced. It is recommended that consultations with the claimant powers be initiated on the foregoing basis, and that the United States position be coordinated within the U.S. Government in the light of such consultations.[8]

The substance of the above recommendations has been cleared by the interested bureaus (ARA, EUR, FE, NEA, IO, S/P, L).

I hope that you may have an opportunity to discuss this subject with Mr. Murphy and myself prior to your departure for Paris.

Enclosure No. 1

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Whereas, over a period of many years, commencing in the early eighteen-hundreds, certain areas of the Antarctic region have been discovered, sighted, explored and claimed on behalf of the United States by America by nationals of the United States of America and by expeditions carrying the flag of the United States of America; and

Whereas, during such period, the Government of the United States of America and its nationals have engaged in well known and extensive activities in the Antarctic region;

Now Therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make known that:

---

[7] At this point in the source text, provision was made for Secretary Dulles to indicate approval or disapproval. In the space marked "Approve" Dulles wrote: "as Dept position, tentative." However, no date was appended and in light of Daniels' comments to Stratton Anderson noted in footnote 1 above, the Secretary's approval was doubtless received sometime after January 2, 1958.

[8] A further provision was made at this point for Secretary Dulles to indicate his acceptance or rejection, but the source text contains no indication of the Secretary's decision.

I—A. The following areas of the Antarctic region are within the sovereignty of the United States of America:

1. The area between 90° W. longitude westwardly to 150° W. longitude, and between 70° S. latitude and the South Pole, excepting areas of the high seas.
2. (Possibly an area in the vicinity of the South Pole and adjacent to the area of the Norwegian claim.)

B. With respect to other areas of the Antarctic region, the United States of America reserves its rights, pending the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with other states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic region.

II. It is the belief of the United States of America that the interest of mankind would be served, in consonance with the high ideals of the Charter of the United Nations, if other states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic region were to join with the United States of America in the conclusion of arrangements for the establishment of an international regime for the Antarctic region with a view to the accomplishment of the following peaceful purposes:

A. Encouragement and facilitation of international cooperation in the field of scientific activity for the maximum benefit of mankind.
B. Regulated development and utilization, in the general interest, of the natural resources of the Antarctic region.
C. Conservation, in the general interest, of renewable natural resources of the Antarctic region.
D. Effective demilitarization and neutralization of the Antarctic region.
E. Any other peaceful purposes not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

III. The United States of America accordingly proposes to convene at an early date a conference of states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic region and others having a direct and substantial interest in such region which desire to cooperate in the establishment of an international regime for the purposes stated above.

Enclosure No. 2

CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO POSSIBLE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR ANTARCTICA

The problem of possible Soviet participation in an international regime for Antarctica will be confronted when the time comes to invite certain countries to a conference for the purpose of establishing such a regime. If such invitations are issued, it is assumed that they will be extended to all the present claimant countries, i.e., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, and Argentina. If additional countries are invited to participate, both the Union of South Africa and the Soviet Union will have to be considered. (Possibly some thought should likewise be given to extending invitations to countries having a less substantial interest in Antarctica, such as Japan, Belgium, and perhaps Germany.) Both the Union of South Africa and the Soviet Union have made known their desire to be included in any international settlement relating to Antarctica.

Reasons for Not Inviting the Soviet Union to Participate In an International Regime on Antarctica

1. Such an invitation might be interpreted as a recognition of Soviet interests and rights in Antarctica, and thereby reinforce such rights as the USSR asserts unilaterally.

2. Soviet participation in the conference might render it more difficult to reach agreement on a satisfactory statute for the proposed international regime for Antarctica.

3. Soviet participation in the conference would be logically followed by Soviet participation in the international regime, and thereby render its smooth and effective functioning more difficult to achieve.

Reasons for Extending an Invitation to the Soviet Union

1. Russian interest in Antarctica goes back to Admiral Bellingshausen's voyage around Antarctica in 1819–1820. In recent years Soviet whaling activities in the Antarctic region have been important. Soviet scientific activities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year are quite extensive. Even though it is held that such scientific activities constitute no valid basis for territorial claims or political action, the fact that the Russians apparently expect to continue being active in Antarctica beyond the end of the IGY will make it difficult to exclude them from any international regime. Inviting the Russians to the conference would not bring them to the Antarctic, since they are already there. Failure to invite them would not cause them to leave.

2. The Soviet Union has consistently reserved all its rights in Antarctica. It has insisted on being included in any international settlement of the Antarctic problem, specifically in an official memorandum of 1950.

3. If the Soviet Union is not invited to participate in the proposed conference, it would presumably go to great pains to discredit the conference, both directly, and through activity in the United Nations. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union has a certain logical basis for participation in Antarctic matters, such agitation might meet with more success internationally than would otherwise be the case.

4. Failure to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union would very likely result in an undesirable intensification of Soviet activities in Antarctica, because the competitive situation would be accentuated.

5. Failure to invite Soviet participation in the proposed conference would be interpreted in some quarters as aggravating existing world tensions, and might alienate public opinion among the so-called "neutralists". This in turn would again stimulate proposals for the United Nations to take over the administration of Antarctica. (While this latter solution might conceivably be better than no solution at all, it is believed that an international regime limited to the relatively few states directly concerned would operate more efficiently, and likewise might be in a better position to prevent any undesired Soviet activities in Antarctica.)

6. If the Soviet Union is invited to the conference at the same time that the U.S. advances a territorial claim to a part of Antarctica, it would be harder for the Soviet Union or any other country to criticize the United States for advancing such a claim.

7. Inviting the Soviet Union to the conference would not give it any status as a recognized sovereign power in Antarctica, any more than the Union of South Africa. The eight claimant states would maintain their claims of sovereignty, and no unclaimed areas would remain.

8. If the Soviet Union should participate in the international regime to be established by the conference, it would be easier to observe and control its activities in Antarctica.

9. If the Soviet Union should participate in the proposed international regime, it would be greatly outnumbered by nations friendly to the U.S. There is no thought that it would have any veto power in such an organization.

Possible Results of Soviet Participation In Conference on Antarctica

In the event of Soviet participation in the proposed conference, the following alternative results might ensue:

1. A satisfactory agreement might be concluded establishing an international regime for Antarctica. (The term "satisfactory" means satisfactory to the United States.)
2. No agreement for such an international regime might be reached, and the conference fail.
3. An agreement for an international regime might be reached among most or all of the nations represented, with the exception of the Soviet Union.

Analyzing each of these three possible alternatives, the following considerations come to mind:

1) If a satisfactory agreement is concluded, no comment is necessary because that is precisely what we seek.

2) If no agreement is concluded, then the United States would continue (with the other seven claimant powers) asserting sovereignty over a portion of Antarctica, and reserving rights in other portions, in accordance with the U.S. proclamation which would have already been issued. This new situation, whereby all of Antarctica would have been pre-empted by specific territorial claims by the United States and other friendly powers, would probably be better than the present situation where there is a large unclaimed sector which the Soviet Union might, if it chose, lay claim to at any time.

3) If an agreement is concluded among all or most of the nations represented at the conference, with the exception of the Soviet Union, this would presumably improve the position of the United States and the other associated friendly powers in rebutting Soviet claims and in controlling Soviet activities in Antarctica. Such a joint association, even though falling short of a complete Antarctica settlement, would be preferable to the existing situation.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, perhaps on balance there is more to be gained by inviting the Soviet Union to participate in the proposed conference than in refraining from inviting them. The possible advantages appear to outweigh the possible disadvantages.[9]

---

[9] At this point, four documents were attached to the source text, all of which appear to have been drafted early in 1958 since they are not mentioned as being a part of the original document of December 9, 1957. Two of the documents are undated: the first draft of a paper entitled "Nature Of Proposed International Regime For Antarctica (Tentative Outline)" and "Proposal For International Regime For Antarctica (Without Prior U.S. Claim); Summary Of Arguments For And Against." Of the other two documents, one is a draft aide-mémoire from the Secretary of State to the Foreign Ministers of "other countries which have direct and substantial interests in Antarctica" inviting them "to join with the United States in the conclusion of arrangements for the establishment of an international regime for Antarctica." Marginal notations on this paper indicate that it was drafted by Daniels on January 14, 1958. The last paper of the four is a redraft of the paper entitled "Nature of Proposed International Regime for Antarctica (Tentative Outline)" unsigned but carrying the handwritten marginal notation: "revised for Secretary's comments 1/22/58."

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE

339. Editorial Note

United States interest in the scientific exploration of outer space during the mid and late 1950's was part of a broader concern with the military value of outer space exploration, including the use of extraterrestrial military reconnaissance and intelligence gathering satellite vehicles, and ballistic missile and anti-missile research and development.

---

340. National Security Council Report [1]

NSC 5520 *Washington, May 20, 1955.*

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. SCIENTIFIC SATELLITE PROGRAM

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board at the request of the Department of Defense, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on May 26, 1955.

A Financial Appendix, a Technical Annex (Annex A), and a letter containing the views of Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Secret. Notations on the source text indicate that this report is "Copy 1" for "The President." No copy of NSC 5520 was found in Department of State files. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence, and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A one-page table of contents is not printed.

Assistant to the President (Annex B), are also enclosed herewith for the information of the Council.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it, direct its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, under the coordination of the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, which is being given a limited distribution.

James S. Lay, Jr.[2]

[Enclosure]

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. SCIENTIFIC SATELLITE PROGRAM

General Considerations

1. The U.S. is believed to have the technical capability to establish successfully a small scientific satellite of the earth in the fairly near future. Recent studies by the Department of Defense have indicated that a small scientific satellite weighing 5 to 10 pounds can be launched into an orbit about the earth using adaptations of existing rocket components. If a decision to embark on such a program is made promptly, the U.S. will probably be able to establish and track such a satellite within the period 1957–58.

2. The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee recommended . . . an immediate program leading to a very small satellite in orbit around the earth, and that re-examination should be made of the principles or practices of international law with regard to "Freedom of Space" from the standpoint of recent advances in weapon technology.

3. On April 16, 1955, the Soviet Government announced that a permanent high-level, interdepartmental commission for interplanetary communications has been created in the Astronomic Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A group of Russia's top scientists is now believed to be working on a satellite program. In September 1954 the Soviet Academy of Sciences announced the establishment of the Tsiolkovsky Gold Medal which would be awarded every

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

three years for outstanding work in the field of interplanetary communications.

4. Some substantial benefits may be derived from establishing small scientific satellites. By careful observation and the analysis of actual orbital decay patterns, much information will be gained about air drag at extreme altitudes and about the fine details of the shape of and the gravitational field of the earth. Such satellites promise to provide direct and continuous determination of the total ion content of the ionosphere. These significant findings will find ready application in defense communication and missile research. When large instrumented satellites are established, a number of other kinds of scientific data may be acquired. The attached Technical Annex (Annex A) contains a further enumeration of scientific benefits.

5. . . .

6. Considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to the nation which first is successful in launching a satellite. The inference of such a demonstration of advanced technology and its unmistakable relationship to intercontinental ballistic missile technology might have important repercussions on the political determination of free world countries to resist Communist threats, especially if the USSR were to be the first to establish a satellite. Furthermore, a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the principle of "Freedom of Space". The implications of this principle are being studied within the Executive Branch. However, preliminary studies indicate that there is no obstacle under international law to the launching of such a satellite.

7. It should be emphasized that a satellite would constitute no active military offensive threat to any country over which it might pass. Although a large satellite might conceivably serve to launch a guided missile at a ground target, it will always be a poor choice for the purpose. A bomb could not be dropped from a satellite on a target below, because anything dropped from a satellite would simply continue alongside in the orbit.

8. The U.S. is actively collaborating in many scientific programs for the International Geophysical Year (IGY),[3] July 1957 through December 1958. The U.S. National Committee of the IGY has requested U.S. Government support for the establishment of a scientific satellite during the Geophysical Year. The IGY affords an excellent opportunity to mesh a scientific satellite program with the cooperative world-wide geophysical observational program. The U.S. can simultaneously exploit its probable technological capability for launching a small scientific satellite to multiply and enhance the over-all benefits of the International Geophysical Year, to gain

---

[3] See Document 361.

scientific prestige, ... The U.S. should emphasize the peaceful purposes of the launching of such a satellite, although care must be taken as the project advances not to prejudice U.S. freedom of action (1) to proceed outside the IGY should difficulties arise in the IGY procedure, ...

9. The Department of Defense believes that, if preliminary design studies and initial critical component development are initiated promptly, sufficient assurance of success in establishing a small scientific satellite during the IGY will be obtained before the end of this calendar year to warrant a response, perhaps qualified, to an IGY request. The satellite itself and much information as to its orbit would be public information. The means of launching would be classified.

10. A program for a small scientific satellite could be developed from existing missile programs already underway within the Department of Defense. Funds of the order of $20 million are estimated to be required to give reasonable assurance that a small scientific satellite can be established during 1957–58 (see Financial Appendix).

Courses of Action

11. Initiate a program in the Department of Defense to develop the capability of launching a small scientific satellite by 1958, with the understanding that this program will not prejudice continued research . . . or materially delay other major Defense programs.

12. Endeavor to launch a small scientific satellite under international auspices, such as the International Geophysical Year, in order to emphasize its peaceful purposes, provided such international auspices are arranged in a manner which:

a. Preserves U.S. freedom of action in the field of satellites and related programs.

b. Does not delay or otherwise impede the U.S. satellite program and related research and development programs.

c. Protects the security of U.S. classified information regarding such matters as the means of launching a scientific satellite.

d. Does not involve actions which imply a requirement for prior consent by any nation over which the satellite might pass in its orbit, and thereby does not jeopardize the concept of "Freedom of Space".

[Attachment]

FINANCIAL APPENDIX

1. Funds of the order of $20 million are estimated to be required to assure a small scientific satellite during the period of the IGY.

This figure allows for design and production of adequate vehicles and for scientific instrumentation and observation costs. It also includes preliminary back-up studies of an alternate system without vehicle procurement. The ultimate cost of a scientific satellite program will be conditioned by (1) size and complexity of the satellite, (2) longevity of each satellite, and (3) duration of the scientific observation program. Experience has shown that preliminary budget estimates on new major experimental and design programs may not anticipate many important developmental difficulties, and may therefore be considerably less than final costs.

2. The estimate of funds required is based on:

satellite vehicle	$10–$15 million
instrumentation for tracking	$2.5 million
logistics for launching and tracking	$2.5 million
Total	$15–$20 million

3. These estimates do not include funding for military research and development already part of other missile programs. They include costs for observations that might properly be undertaken by Department of Defense agencies as part of the Department of Defense mission. They do not include costs of other observations that may be proposed by other agencies. They will provide a minimum satellite for which two vehicle systems now under study offer good promise, "Orbiter" and "Viking". They also include exploratory studies for a back-up program based upon the "Atlas" missile and "Aerobee" research rocket development.

Annex A

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Scientific Values

1. The scientific information that may be expected from a satellite is dependent upon the size of the vehicle and whether it can be instrumented.

2. From a small, inert, trackable satellite, it is reasonable to expect that the following scientific values may be derived:

a. Analysis of currently available information on the upper atmosphere shows a need for additional basic information to support the development of manned craft and missiles for use at high altitudes. More accurate data on air density, pressure and temperature are required. From the analysis of actual orbital "decay" patterns, the air drag at high altitudes can be determined to a greater accuracy than by techniques now available.

b. Electronic tracking would probably permit direct and continuous determination of the total ion content of the ionosphere by comparison of simultaneous electronic and visual observations.

c. Anti-missile missile research will be aided by the experience gained in finding and tracking artificial satellites. It is expected that the satellite will approximate the speed and altitude of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

d. It is probable that a small scientific satellite would yield measurements of high geodetic value. More precise determinations of relative position between continents, the value of the gravitational constant averaged over long distances, and the earth's semimajor axis can probably be made by observations of a small scientific satellite.

e. The observation of an uninstrumented satellite in an orbital plane inclined to the equator can permit the determination of the rotation of the orbital plane in space about the earth's polar axis, commonly called the "regression of the nodes". This perturbation is caused by the oblateness of the earth. Its evaluation will have considerable significance in precisely forecasting satellite orbits.

Military Values

3. In addition to the scientific values listed above, some of which are clearly relevant to missile and anti-missile research and development programs of the Department of Defense, it may be noted that military communications programs will be enhanced by improvements in knowledge of the ionosphere and by improved knowledge of the rate of earth rotation. To this list must also be added the direct values of experience in organization, operation and logistics accruing to military missile forces detailed to execute a scientific satellite firing program. It is expected that the satellite will approximate the speed and altitude of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Orbit and Tracking Considerations

4. If a perigee approximately 200 miles and an apogee approximately 1,000 miles are used to fix the desired orbit, the satellite will pass completely around the earth in approximately 90 minutes. If an orbit over the earth's poles or an orbit inclined to the equator is selected, the satellite will pass successively farther west of the launching point on each revolution around the earth. This means that an individual tracking station set up for inclined orbits will not be in an observing position for every revolution. The optimum location for tracking polar orbits is at or near the poles. On the other hand, an equatorial orbit will place each observing station in position to observe every circuit of the satellite. Artificial satellites in a low roughly circular orbit will appear optically similar to a 5.6 magnitude star moving at a high angular rate. Optical observations in broad daylight will be impracticable and observations when the

satellite is in the earth's shadow will also be impracticable unless the satellite is illuminated. This means that experiments depending on passive optical tracking of a satellite cannot be conducted except during 50 minutes at dawn and 50 minutes at dusk. An inclined orbit would thus materially reduce the usable data per station for experiments based on passive optical observations. The usefulness of the satellite and the selection of the desirable orbit is, therefore, closely related to the degree to which the satellite can be acquired and tracked by electronic techniques as well as optical.

5. An inclined orbit utilizing Patrick Air Force Base at Cocoa, Florida, as a launching point has the following advantages over an equatorial orbit:

a. Eliminates necessity to mount tropical expedition to establish launching and tracking sites.

b. Permits observation from Navy Air Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, California; Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California; White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico; British-Australian Guided Missile Range, Woomera, Australia; and a large number of the free world's astronomical observatories.

c. Utilizes the full length (5000 miles) of Long Range Proving Ground for observations of the critical first part of the first orbit.

d. Permits an accumulation of geophysical data over a larger area of the earth's surface.

6. Disadvantages of an inclined orbit when compared to an equatorial orbit are:

a. Inclined orbit provides fewer opportunities to observe from a single base. This is especially critical for small uninstrumented satellites not observable by ordinary radar.

b. Inclined orbit from Patrick Air Force Base reaching a maximum latitude of 35° would result in the satellite passing on different circuits over virtually all of the world between 35°N latitude and 35°S latitude. This might increase substantially the amount of diplomatic negotiations necessary to implement the program.

Hazards to Human Life

7. The launching of a scientific satellite does not appear to threaten in any serious way the safety of air transportation at normal altitudes, nor the safety of personnel and property on the ground. All of the scientific satellites discussed above would be launched from locations where the initial flight of the booster system would be over water. At the end of this stage the booster rocket, which is the largest and potentially most lethal part of the satellite, would separate and fall into the water. Normal precautions taken in launching ordinary guided missiles would suffice to assure adequate safety of the launch and booster phases. The orbiting vehicle in all cases of both instrumented and uninstrumented satel-

lites would be designed with the objective in mind that the entire device would disintegrate and to a large extent vaporize under the heat of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. This vehicle would, therefore, create negligible hazards after re-entering the atmosphere.

Annex B

Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[4]

Washington, May 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Scientific Satellite Program

1. I should like to register my enthusiastic support of the proposal of the Department of Defense (RD–CGS 202/4) which you sent to me under cover of your memorandum of May 13, 1955.[5]

2. I am impressed by the psychological as well as by the . . . advantages of having the first successful endeavor in this field result from the initiative of the United States, and by the costly consequences of allowing the Russian initiative to outrun ours through an achievement that will symbolize scientific and technological advancement to peoples everywhere. The stake of prestige that is involved makes this a race that we cannot afford to lose.

3. Because of the basically new questions of ionosphere jurisdiction that are involved, and because the announced Soviet program in interplanetary communications makes it certain that a vigorous propaganda will be employed to exploit all possible derogatory implications of any American success that may be achieved, it is highly important that the U.S. effort be initiated under auspices that are least vulnerable to effective criticism. The extraordinary opportunities for exploitation of superstitions on the one hand and of imputed military hazards on the other that are inherent in a scientific "breakthrough" of such novelty make it imperative to enlist many voices speaking for numbers of nations to allay the potentially

---

[4] Drafted in the White House.

[5] Lay's memorandum has not been found. A copy of the proposal, dated May 10, 1955, drafted in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office File, Project Clean-Up. Entitled "U.S. Scientific Satellite Program," the paper contained many ideas and passages similar to those in NSC 5520.

boundless fears that may be stirred up, even though they are quite unwarranted.

I agree, therefore, with the suggested procedure of having our Government announce that it is ready to support the project through the U.S. National Committee of the International Geophysical Year. It is important for the following reasons that the U.S. proposal be made public at the time when it is submitted to the IGY:

A. The International Geophysical Year was established by the International Union of Scientific Societies which in turn is affiliated with UNESCO—part of the United Nations structure.

B. I am informed that the IGY in its Rome meeting last year endorsed the launching of a satellite as a desirable scientific step.

C. Since Russia is represented in this organization it would be in a position to know immediately of any U.S. offer made by the Government through the U.S. National Committee to launch a satellite.

D. If the U.S. offer was not made public the Soviet might take immediate action and do one of two things:

1) Announce it has already launched a satellite.
2) Make an offer to launch one themselves.

thus reducing the psychological significance and prestige values of the U.S. proposal.

4. The announcement of the U.S. offer might be made by Ambassador Lodge to the United Nations. Although the IGY is affiliated with the United Nations, for public reassurance the Ambassador might state that the United States would welcome some form of direct U.N. sponsorship for the project since its intent was to contribute to the world body of scientific knowledge through study of the satellite in flight. Needless to say, the offer of sharing knowledge would not be extended to the method of launching.

5. The fact that Russia was represented upon the International Geophysical Year which endorsed a satellite launching project can be used to good effect by us in the event that there should be a concerted Communist effort to brand the project as evil or threatening. We should, alternatively, be ready to meet a Soviet statement that it, too, is preparing to launch a satellite upon a shorter timetable or even, at some date, an announcement, true or false, that it has launched one.

6. Since a U.S. success in being the first to launch a small uninstrumented satellite could be quickly discounted if the Soviets were to follow it with an initial success in the launching of a satellite of more sophisticated type, I believe that the exploratory work on the latter type recommended in paragraph 11 C of the Department of Defense memorandum should be pursued vigorously

in the United States concurrently with the program recommended for immediate implementation.

NAR[6]

---

[6] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

---

341. Memorandum of Discussion at the 250th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 26, 1955[1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. NSC 5520 (NSC 5520; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary on the subject, dated May 25, 1955)[2]

Mr. Dillon Anderson briefed the Council on the contents of NSC 5520 (copy of briefing notes filed in the Minutes of the meeting).

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson's briefing, the President inquired whether any members of the Council wished to hear in greater detail on this project from Dr. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development. At the invitation of the President, Dr. Quarles proceeded to describe the earth satellite in greater detail.

. . . .

The Vice President inquired whether it would be possible eventually to develop an earth satellite which could stay up indefinitely. Dr. Quarles replied that it might be possible to do this at a later time.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 27.

[2] The memorandum enclosed the views of the JCS concerning NSC 5520 and read as follows: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed national policy, set forth in the attachment to a note by the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, dated 20 May 1955, subject as above. They agree that the proposed statement of policy is acceptable from a military point of view." A copy of Lay's May 25 memorandum and the enclosed memorandum by Radford to the Secretary of Defense, May 24, is *ibid.*, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Ambassador Lodge warned that the public relations aspects of establishing an earth satellite as proposed in NSC 5520 should be very carefully worked out. Otherwise the public relations effects could be harmful to the United States. Dr. Quarles replied that he thought that the auspices which it was proposed that the U.S. use in launching the earth satellite (the International Geophysical Year) would be effective in meeting the problem cited by Ambassador Lodge.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether it would take expensive and complicated instruments to observe the movements of the earth satellite. Dr. Quarles replied that at certain times in its revolutions about the earth the satellite could be seen with ordinary field glasses. More powerful instruments would be required at other times.

After further discussion, the President inquired whether any members of the Council perceived any objection to an attempt by the U.S. to launch such a satellite. There were no objections from members of the Council. Mr. Allen Dulles observed that it was very important to make this attempt, and Mr. Rockefeller suggested that the announcement of such an attempt might well be made in the United Nations.

The National Security Council: [3]

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5520) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5520.

Note: NSC 5520, as adopted, approved by the President (on May 27, 1955) and referred for implementation to the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[3] Paragraphs a–b and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1408. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

342. Editorial Note

On July 29, Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty issued a statement from the White House as follows:

"On behalf of the President, I am now announcing that the President has approved plans by this country for going ahead with the launching of small unmanned earth-circling satellites as part of the United States participation in the International Geophysical Year which takes place between July 1957 and December 1958. This program will for the first time in history enable scientists throughout the world to make sustained observations in the regions beyond the earth's atmosphere.

"The President expressed personal gratification that the American program will provide scientists of all nations this important and unique opportunity for the advancement of science." (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5520; also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1955, page 218)

---

343. Memorandum of Discussion at the 283d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 3, 1956 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *NSC 5520* (NSC 5520; NSC Action No. 1408; [2] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 13 and 25, and May 2, 1956 [3])

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 4.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 341.

[3] The April 13 memorandum enclosed a memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget of the same date addressed to Dillon Anderson stating that because of revised budgetary estimates on the original six-satellite program, combined with Presidential approval of six additional instrumented satellites in the course of "the regular budgetary process" the "cost of this" revised "twelve-satellite program is now estimated at $90 million." The April 25 memorandum transmitted a draft NSC Action by the NSC Planning Board in light of the April 13 memoranda and also "in light of briefings by the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation on the current status of the implementation of NSC 5520." The May 2 memorandum enclosed the views of the JCS on the memoranda of April 13 and 25 in which the JCS, the Chairman not participating, emphasized that "any decision to utilize alternate missiles" in the scientific satellite program "must be made with the realization that other missile programs may be interrupted and delayed materially." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Policy Paper 5520)

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs[4] explained the problems which confronted the development of an earth satellite, and analyzed the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board for Council action on this subject (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). Mr. Anderson then suggested that Secretary Wilson speak first, to be followed by Dr. Alan Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation.

After a moment's hesitation, Secretary Wilson said he did have one point he wished to make. The proposed record of action made provision for avoidance by the earth satellite program of any interference with the Defense Department programs for the ICBM and the IRBM. While this was sound, Secretary Wilson pointed out that there were other programs and projects on "our Master Urgency List"[5] with which the earth satellite program should not come into conflict. Accordingly, he suggested a priority for the earth satellite program just under the items listed in the Defense Department's Master Urgency List. Secretary Wilson also indicated his support for the original program designed to try to launch six earth satellites. He concluded with a warning that the earth satellite program must not be permitted to limit or interfere with major Defense Department programs.

Dr. Waterman opened with a statement that American scientists generally were eager to see the earth satellite program carried out very actively. Dr. Waterman believed that this could be done if we were to add six more satellites to the original six planned for in implementation of the policy set forth in NSC 5520. He reminded the Council that the National Science Foundation had made a supplementary request for funds in the amount of $28 million for the earth satellite program. There was plainly no reluctance on the part of Congress to provide additional funds for this project. This request on Congress for additional funds was designed by the National Science Foundation to cover as far as possible the cost of adding six additional satellites to the six originally planned. On the other hand, Dr. Waterman said, the National Science Foundation was now willing to leave the question of an additional six satellites open, provided the question was kept under continuous review. In any case, he insisted, it was essential to try to get at least one and perhaps several successful flights of an earth satellite. If there were several such successful flights, we would have much more complete and precise scientific information.

Dr. Waterman then explained that there were two particular aspects of the earth satellite program deserving of special emphasis.

---

[4] Robert Cutler.

[5] Not further identified.

First, the scientific significance of the program was very considerable. In illustration of this point Dr. Waterman cited several instances of scientific data which could be expected as a result of the successful launching of an earth satellite. Information of great value for meteorology would be certain to be achieved. Information of value with regard to communications could also be expected, and this latter information would be of great interest to the Department of Defense.

The second point of emphasis was the international nature of the commitment the United States had made to launch an earth satellite. This announcement had been enthusiastically acclaimed by scientists and scholars all over the world. Accordingly, both from the point of view of our own immediate national interest and from the aspect of peaceful world cooperation, the earth satellite program should be vigorously carried out under U.S. leadership. Dr. Waterman concluded by predicting that this investment would pay off in increased good will towards the United States from all the other countries in the world.

When Dr. Waterman had concluded his statement, the President said he could perceive no objection to the provision of additional funds necessary to carry out the program for the original six satellites. On the other hand, he did not see any need now or any reason to expand this program by adding six additional satellites. He therefore recommended that we push on with the program of six satellites despite the additional cost, and that we make the decision to add additional satellites only if we subsequently found that we needed additional scientific information.

Secretary Wilson said that he strongly approved the recommendation of the Planning Board now before the Council—namely, to proceed with the original program, with the proviso that a further report on the need for an additional six satellites be submitted to the Council next autumn. The President repeated his view that it might prove possible and desirable to add an additional six satellites later on if success were achieved by the present program.

Secretary Wilson reminded the Council of some of the facts in the early development of the earth satellite program. He pointed out that originally the program called for the launching of a simple, comparatively uninstrumented earth satellite about the size of a basketball. As the program developed in the Department of Defense, plans were agreed upon for elaboration of the instrumentation of the satellites. If such instrumentation became too elaborate, there were bound to be high costs as well as possible interference by the earth satellite program with the ballistic missile programs of the Defense Department.

The President said that it had been his understanding when the Council first adopted NSC 5520, that it had been informed that the successful launching of an earth satellite might be expected to provide information useful to the programs for developing the ICBM and the IRBM. Secretary Wilson, however, pointed out that it was likely to be the other way round, and that the missile programs would be helpful to the earth satellite program rather than the reverse. In any event, there was no evidence available at present that the launching of an earth satellite would provide any notable assistance to the ballistic missile programs of the Defense Department. The President said he judged he was mistaken, and Secretary Wilson went on to say that much the same scientists and technicians were working on the missile programs and on the earth satellite program, and there were by no means too many such knowledgeable people. There was also, of course, a severe budgetary problem.

Secretary Humphrey wondered if the National Security Council must not now decide to carry out such programs as this on a more selective basis. There was a terrific financial burden on our country already, and military costs were steadily increasing. All these programs must be set in a better order. The earth satellite program was an interesting thing and it might even prove helpful; but was the earth satellite program really a pressing and urgent matter? Were we, for instance, willing to cut out an infantry division or a certain number of B–52 aircraft, in order to launch successfully an earth satellite? If we add something to the Defense Department programs we should be prepared to cancel some other program. We were in no position to do everything that seemed to us interesting and useful. If we put these programs in some order of priority we would go a long way to help solve our budgetary problems.

Dr. Flemming called the Council's attention to the fact that the action proposed on this subject by the NSC Planning Board confined itself to reaffirming the original program to launch six satellites. Nevertheless, replied Secretary Humphrey, the cost of even the original program was already going out of sight. This project, he insisted, ought to be lined up against other Defense Department programs and projects to see which one of the latter we cancel out in favor of developing the earth satellite.

The President said that he had not been notably enthusiastic about the earth satellite program when it had first been considered by the National Security Council, but that we certainly could not back out of it now. The President could not imagine the United States having made an announcement that it proposed to launch an earth satellite and then failing to deliver on its commitment. To this Secretary Humphrey replied by proposing that we spend the sum of $20 million originally estimated to be the cost of launching an earth satellite, and see whether we could get one up into its orbit for this amount of money.

Secretary Wilson said that the successful launching of an earth satellite might one day provide information of very considerable value to the defense of the United States. He was presently engaged in trying hard to prevent the Soviets from having access to valuable secrets of the Defense Department. Accordingly, he was much interested to know whether, if the earth satellite were successful, all the information we obtained from its flight was going to be made known to all the nations of the world, as seemed to be proposed by the people responsible for the International Geophysical Year programs. If this proved to be the case, Secretary Wilson asked how we were expected to keep ahead of the Soviets.

Mr. Anderson pointed out to the President that there were two parts to the problem before the National Security Council. One was the recommendation to go ahead with the development of the six-satellite program. The other was the question of the need for additional satellites. The answer to this would come later.

The President said he understood this perfectly, but that he wished to ask some questions about the nature of the instrumentation to be used in the earth satellite. In response, Secretary Holaday explained that the present vehicle weighed only about twenty pounds and that, of course, there was therefore not much room for elaborate instrumentation. On the other hand, if we developed a series of earth satellites we could put differing instruments in each of them and thus greatly add to the information which would be obtained from their flights. He also emphasized that the six-satellite program was the essential back-up—the number necessary for reasonable assurance that at least one satellite could be successfully launched. Secretary Holaday expressed the opinion that if, after six tries, we failed to get at least one of the earth satellites successfully launched and in its orbit, we would have to have recourse to a radically different launching vehicle such as the Redstone missile or the like. Secretary Wilson interrupted at this point to indicate that when one got into the area of alternative launching vehicles such as Redstone, there was real danger of a conflict between the earth satellite program and the ballistic missile programs of the Defense Department.

Secretary Humphrey then pointed out that when the Council originally considered the proposal to launch an earth satellite the estimated cost was stated to be $20 million. Now we find ourselves talking in terms of $60 or $90 million. The President, however, pointed out that we were talking of $60 million, not $90 million, since $60 million was now estimated to be the cost of the six-satellite program, and $90 million the cost of an additional six satellites, which was not, for the time being at least, before the Council. Secretary Wilson indicated that he was prepared to go up to $60 million, but not to $90 million.

The President then put various other questions, relating to the manner of launching an earth satellite. He expressed the view that if two out of the six launchings of an earth satellite failed, it would not be sensible to go on to try to launch the remaining four with the same kind of missile. He doubted whether, accordingly, the additional four would amount to much as an added factor of safety in ensuring a successful launching.

Secretary Humphrey repeated his recommendation that the Council authorize the expenditure of the $20 million originally estimated, and see what we could get for that amount of money. Thereafter we could take another look. The President replied that the trouble with Secretary Humphrey's recommendation was that funds might run out and we would have to stop somewhere in the middle of our effort to launch an earth satellite. He still wanted to know what assurance we would get from the attempt to launch six satellites that we would not already have secured from the effort to launch the first two. Would we try to launch all six of these satellites with the same type of launching missile? This did not seem very sensible to the President, who repeated his view that if we failed on the first two or three attempts we would have to shift to a different launching vehicle. Dr. Waterman attempted to explain to the President the need for at least six satellites. He pointed out that success in getting an earth satellite into its orbit depended on the precision with which the satellite was aimed and the precise speed with which it was sent into the atmosphere. If there was an error in either of these respects the satellite could not be got into its orbit. It must be pointed just right and have the exact speed. One could not be sure of obtaining these results with less than six satellite launchings. The President said that Dr. Waterman apparently meant that six satellites represented the minimum factor of safety. Dr. Waterman replied that this was emphatically the view of the American scientists. The President then said that he surrendered, and certainly would not engage in a fight with all the scientists of the nation.

Secretary Wilson expressed himself as opposed to developing very much instrumentation in the earth satellite until such time as we had succeeded in getting one up into its orbit. Thereafter he would be quite willing to equip the others with more detailed and elaborate instrumentation. The President said he disagreed with this view. As far as he could determine, instrumentation was not a very significant cost factor in the earth satellite program, and he would provide instrumentation for all six of the satellites from the outset.

Secretary Wilson then reverted to the budgetary aspects of the earth satellite program. The Director of the Budget expressed the view that since it was now going to cost so much more than originally estimated to cover the program for six earth satellites, it would be best if the funds which had been requested for an additional six satellites be applied to the cost of carrying out the original program for six satellites. The President expressed the view that the Council should stick to the original program of six satellites, but should add the desirable instrumentation, which he understood would not be a heavy cost item. The President repeated his disapproval of a program for an additional six earth satellites.

Continuing on the budgetary aspects, Secretary Wilson pointed out that we seemed about to spend $60 million on the earth satellite program over a period of two years. Some 3000 scientists and other people would be involved in the business. We would have to pay them approximately $10,000 a year apiece, since good smart scientists and technicians were required, and they were very hard to come by.

The President again indicated that the priority assigned to the earth satellite program should be below what Secretary Wilson had referred to as the priorities assigned in his "Master Urgency List". Mr. Anderson pointed out that the President's suggestion corresponded to the recommendations formulated by the NSC Planning Board. Dr. Waterman asked whether, if such a recommendation were approved by the National Security Council, the need for an additional six satellites could be kept under review by the Council. The President replied in the affirmative, and indicated that he would expect a progress report on NSC 5520 to be presented to the National Security Council in the fall of this year. At that time the Council could again consider the need for an additional six satellites.

Secretary Wilson said he had just been reminded by Secretary Robertson[6] that it would be necessary to go to the Congress now to get the additional $20 million which would now be required to carry on the six-satellite program. The President replied that we should get whatever we have to get to carry out the original program. Secretary Wilson said that in any event he could not squeeze any more money out of current Defense Department funds so that such funds could be diverted from other programs in order to make up the deficit on the earth satellite program.

Mr. Anderson inquired about the "Master Urgency List", of which he would have to have knowledge if the Council's record of action indicated that the priority for the earth satellite program was to be below the priority assigned to programs on this master list.

---

[6] Reuben B. Robertson, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Wilson suggested that the Council action indicate that priority for the earth satellite program should come just after the priority assigned to items on the "Master Urgency List". The President said that in that case he certainly wanted to see the Defense Department's "Master Urgency List". Secretary Wilson replied that it would be very good for the President to see this list and be aware of its content. The President then suggested that it might be wise to give the "Master Urgency List" an NSC number and to be sure that the Council action on the earth satellite program did not interfere with the priorities assigned to the "Master Urgency List", which included items of vital importance for the defense of the United States.

. . . .

The National Security Council: [7]

a. Noted and discussed the reports on the subject by the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, National Science Foundation, contained in the enclosures to the reference memorandum of April 13, and the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 25; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 2.

b. Agreed that, in view of the policy set forth in NSC 5520, the considerations upon which such policy was adopted, and the public commitments already made pursuant thereto, it is not in the national security interest either (1) to cancel the program or (2) to slow down the program, missing the International Geophysical Year (IGY).

c. Recommended the continuation of the policy in NSC 5520 designed to launch a scientific satellite or satellites by 1958 during the International Geophysical Year, with the understanding that the program developed thereunder will not be allowed to interfere with the ICBM and IRBM programs but will be given sufficient priority by the Department of Defense in relation to other weapons systems to achieve the objectives of NSC 5520.

d. Requested the Department of Defense to submit a progress report on NSC 5520 not later than October 1, 1956; including a report on further studies of the need and feasibility of constructing and launching up to six additional satellites as recommended by the U.S. National Committee for the IGY and the Director, National Science Foundation, beyond the six currently programmed by the Department of Defense, and of utilizing alternative missiles to those contemplated in Project Vanguard.

e. Noted that the President directed the implementation of NSC 5520 to be continued under the coordination of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director, National Science Foundation.

---

[7] Paragraphs a–e and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1545. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

Note: The actions in b, c, d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director, National Science Foundation.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

344. Memorandum of Discussion at the 310th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 24, 1957[1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Scientific Satellite Program* (NSC 5520; NSC Actions Nos. 1408 and 1545;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "NSC 5520", dated April 13, 1956;[3] Progress Report, dated October 3, 1956, by the Department of Defense on NSC 5520;[4] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 9 and December 3, 1956[5])

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of NSC 5520. In the course of his briefing he analyzed the issue between the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation as to whether the program should involve the attempt to launch six or twelve satellites. He also pointed to the considerable rise in the costs of the program since it had first been adopted by the National Security Council. He indicated that Dr. Furnas,[6] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, would outline the position of the Department of Defense in favor of the present program for launching six satellites. Dr. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, would subsequently present his views in favor of a program for twelve satellites. Before hearing from either speaker, Mr. Cutler suggested that it would be useful for the Director of Central Intelligence to report briefly on what was known about the Soviet program for launching an earth satellite. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.[7])

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on January 24.

[2] For NSC Action Nos. 1408 and 1545, see footnote 3, Document 341, and footnote 7, *supra*.

[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

[4] This 3½-page report to the National Security Council from the Department of Defense described the progress of the technical program designed to launch a total of six earth satellites "not earlier than 31 October 1957."

[5] The November 9 memorandum transmitted an 8-page draft report on the U.S. scientific satellite program to date together with a memorandum and a letter, dated October 10, to Arthur S. Flemming from Dr. I.I. Rabi, Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization, stressing the Committee's belief that "Failure by the U.S. to launch satellites successfully during the IGY in the light" of the U.S. commitment to do so "would result in loss of U.S. scientific prestige that would be compounded by successful Soviet launching." The December 3 memorandum transmitted to the NSC the views of the JCS regarding the draft report transmitted to the NSC by Lay in his memorandum of November 9. The Joint Chiefs simply "noted the reference document and have no comments to offer." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Policy Paper 5520)

. . . .

Upon the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' remarks, Dr. Furnas briefly summarized the progress to date of the U.S. program to launch an earth satellite in accordance with NSC 5520. In the course of his remarks he pointed out that the final preliminary test would occur in September 1957. After this date all six satellites would be in existence and ready to launch. The first attempt actually to launch a satellite was scheduled for October 31, 1957. Dr. Furnas expressed the view that at least one of the six launchings would prove successful in getting the satellite into its orbit. After describing very briefly the instrumentation of the earth satellites and the means envisaged for tracking them, Dr. Furnas indicated that the program was essentially on schedule.

Turning to the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board, Dr. Furnas stated that the Department of Defense concurred in two of the three recommendations of the Planning Board, viz., paragraphs 8 and 10; but did not concur in paragraph 9, in which the National Science Foundation recommended a program for launching twelve instrumented satellites rather than the six currently envisaged in NSC 5520. He then listed the several reasons for the non-concurrence of the Department of Defense.

At the conclusion of Dr. Furnas' report, Mr. Cutler called on Dr. Waterman to provide the Council with his views in favor of the recommendation advanced in paragraph 9.

Dr. Waterman indicated that he would first like to call the Council's attention to developments and changes in this program which had occurred since the Council last considered the subject.

---

[6] Clifford C. Furnas.

[7] Not found.

Following this he provided a brief picture of what the satellite really means, stressing that he would approach the subject . . . from the point of view of a civilian scientist, ... Dr. Waterman pointed out that an earth satellite was unique as a means of observing space, because once it was in position it observed without the need of any unit of propulsion. Accordingly, if successfully launched, the earth satellite would provide us with a continuous record of information on outer space. Such information would be of enormous value . . . .

In view of the above possibilities, Dr. Waterman believed that ordinary prudence suggested that we do all we possibly could to achieve this kind of information. Dr. Waterman also pointed out that the United States was now taking the lead—as compared to the Soviets—in the development of instrumentation for satellites. While he believed that the Russians might well surprise us in the achievement of a launching unit, he did not believe that they were likely to equal us in the instrumentation of the satellite itself, although they will do their utmost to try to get ahead of us in this area also.

The foregoing remarks, continued Dr. Waterman, explained the recommendations of the National Science Foundation for a program to include six extra satellites. Such a program of twelve launchings Dr. Waterman believed would guarantee at least one successful launching. The added merit of the twelve-satellite program would consist of the greatly increased scientific data which we could anticipate.

With respect to the problem of financing six extra satellites, Dr. Waterman pointed out his view that the actual expenditure for the six satellites would not necessarily occur next year, but would come after the completion of the present program, at the end of two years. If, having restricted ourselves to a program of only six satellites, we have to start all over again with a new program two years from now, the ultimate costs would be much larger than they would be if we were simply to add six additional satellites to the present program.

Dr. Waterman said he would close his remarks by pointing out that the program which he advocated was intended to respond directly to scientific purposes, and it would in addition provide an excellent start on the program recently outlined by Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations, calling for supervision and control of the exploitation of outer space.

At the conclusion of Dr. Waterman's statement, Mr. Cutler invited him to refresh the Council on certain basic facts with respect to the speed and the orbit of the earth satellite. Dr. Waterman replied that the orbit would be elliptical, and that the satellite would vary in its distance from the earth within a spread of 200 to 800 miles. The speed of the satellite was estimated to be 18,000 miles per hour, and it would circle the earth in a period of one and a half hours.

Mr. Cutler then summarized the three recommendations of the Planning Board report on the satellite program, and pointed out that the total costs of the program had risen from the initial estimate of some $20 million to $83 million for launching six satellites. He then pointed out that the question before the Council was whether it was desired to authorize a program involving six additional satellites.

The President inquired of Dr. Waterman when it was expected that we would launch our first earth satellite. Dr. Waterman replied that the first launching would occur in October of this year, and that the remaining five satellites would be launched at intervals of two months thereafter. The President then inquired as to the costs of the satellites themselves, not including the launching and other costs of the program. Dr. Waterman replied that the sum was $10 million. Dr. Furnas added that the cost of six additional satellites would be $30 million if we also included the costs of the launchings.

Secretary Wilson stated his belief that if we were to add six additional satellites to the program we would be crowding ourselves and incurring very great expense. The fact is that we were running out of money in the Department of Defense, and that was the real issue before the Council this morning. Looking at the matter strictly from the point of view of the Defense Department, Secretary Wilson added that if we were going to spend another $30 million there are other things that the Department of Defense would like to buy for that sum of money. Accordingly, rather than crowd the earth satellite program too much by adding six satellites, Secretary Wilson advocated postponing the decision for a year.

The President indicated his general agreement with the position taken by Secretary Wilson, pointing out that we were involved with a program the cost of which, from its inception to the present, had risen from $20 million to over $80 million. We were talking of adding additional satellites and spending additional money without waiting to see what we could achieve with our current program of trying to launch six satellites. The President said he thought that the current program was a good program, and that we should see what results it produced before putting another $30 million into the program. This kind of gamble he did not feel was justified, and he closed with a statement that we should complete the present program before adding another.

Mr. Cutler said he would like to address a question to Dr. Waterman. Suppose, he inquired, we were successful in actually launching three of the six satellites called for by the present program. Would Dr. Waterman feel that even in this event it would be desirable to add six additional satellites to the existing program? Dr.

Waterman replied that the real question was this: We believe that we will get at least one successful launching out of the present program of six. But there was so much more that we wanted to learn than we were likely to learn from only one successful launching that he believed we ought to make sure the continuation of the program if this proved necessary.

Secretary Humphrey stated that as far as he could see, all the Council was talking about was whether we should now proceed to obligate ourselves in this unknown field for additional funds at the present time in order that we may save money in the future if we decide to go ahead with a bigger program at some future time. Secretary Humphrey said he was opposed to this course of action in view of our present financial situation and our need to be more selective in our national security expenditures.

The President said that once we have succeeded in getting one satellite into its orbit we will then desire to make a decision as to how many more such satellites we need to have. This might well prove to be more than six. Perhaps we should even want to launch an earth satellite once every year.

Mr. Cutler said that he thought that what Dr. Waterman had just said in his statement, about the beneficial effect on our missiles program of the information we would get from an earth satellite, was perhaps the most significant aspect of the satellite program if one had regard for the vast sums of money that the Government is devoting to the program for achieving intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Dr. Flemming asked the President if he might read the recommendations of Dr. I.I. Rabi, Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee of ODM, on the earth satellite program.

After Dr. Flemming had finished reading Dr. Rabi's recommendations, Mr. Cutler turned to Dr. Furnas and asked if the following proposal offered a solution to the dilemma: After three successful launchings, could the Defense Department then decide on the need for an additional six satellites? Dr. Furnas replied that this seemed to him a good idea, and that such a course of action would not involve a very heavy additional cost. Secretary Wilson also thought well of Mr. Cutler's suggestion.

The President then asked Dr. Flemming to interpret Dr. Rabi's recommendations. Was Dr. Rabi, asked the President, calling for a program now comprising twelve instead of six satellites? Dr. Flemming replied that the position taken by Dr. Rabi was consistent with that advocated by Dr. Waterman. The President then stated that we should go ahead with our present program and later take up the question of future programs, even though such a course of action would involve additional costs later on.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether the Council would agree to bringing up the issue of additional launchings after three launchings had been attempted under the present program. The President replied that he was not averse to the issue being brought up any time after we had achieved one successful launching of an earth satellite. If we do otherwise, we shall simply be gambling on something which it wasn't necessary to gamble on. Our future program ought to be based progressively on what we find out in the course of implementing our present program.

After Mr. Cutler had summarized a proposed Council action in accordance with the discussion, and after the President had amended slightly Mr. Cutler's proposed action, Secretary Wilson said he was obliged to raise the question of financing the present program. The Department of Defense simply did not have the funds necessary to cover the increased cost, now that it was estimated that the total program would cost $83 million. The President turned to the Director of the Budget, and said that he would simply have to "scratch around" and get this additional $17 million out of existing appropriations.

The National Security Council: [8]

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject, prepared by the Department of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1545–d, and the comments thereon by the National Science Foundation and the Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization (Annexes A and B to the reference memorandum of November 9, 1956); in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 3, 1956, and an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the Soviet earth satellite program.

b. Noted the President's directive that the present program under NSC 5520, of endeavoring to launch six scientific satellites, should be continued; but that the Department of Defense should submit to the Council a progress report on the program at any time a significant development occurs, but not later than the completion of the third attempted launching.

c. Directed the NSC Planning Board, in the light of experience gained from attempted launchings under NSC 5520, to consider and report to the Council whether broad national security interests require a continuing program beyond NSC 5520 for making explorations in and from the outer regions about the earth.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

---

[8] Paragraphs a–c and Note constitute NSC Action 1656. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

345. Memorandum of Discussion at the 322d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 10, 1957 [1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Scientific Satellite Program* (NSC 5520; NSC Action No. 1656; [2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 3, 1957 [3])

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Cutler explained that another hike in the costs of this program had induced the President to schedule the matter for discussion by the National Security Council. Mr. Cutler said that there would be a presentation by Assistant Secretary of Defense Holaday and other officials of the Research and Engineering Division of the Department of Defense. Dr. Detlev Bronk, President of the National Academy of Sciences, and Dr. Alan Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, were likewise present, and would comment on the report by the Department of Defense. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

After Mr. Cutler had finished his briefing and had noted that the costs of the program had increased from the original estimate (May 1955) of $15–20 million to the estimate of April 1957, of $110 million, he turned to call upon Secretary Holaday to present the Defense Department report. The President, however, interrupted with a vigorous complaint to Mr. Cutler that before he slid over some very important facts it would be well to recall that the original program, calling for six satellites, was primarily a safety program designed to assure that at least one of these six satellites could be successfully orbited. There was no intention necessarily to launch six satellites. Another problem which disturbed the President was the very costly instrumentation currently being provided for the six satellites. Such costly instrumentation had not been envisaged when NSC 5520 had originally been approved by the President. The President therefore stressed that the element of national prestige, so strongly emphasized in NSC 5520, depended on getting a satellite into its orbit, and not on the instrumentation of the scientific satellite.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on May 11.

[2] See footnote 8, *supra*.

[3] The May 3 memorandum transmitted a four-page "Memorandum for the President" from Percival Brundage, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, concerning "Project Vanguard". It also noted that the President asked that the scientific satellite program be discussed at the forthcoming May 10 meeting of the NSC, and that, in preparation for that discussion, the Department of Defense was preparing a report "on the current accomplishments and costs" of the program. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Policy Paper 5520)

Mr. Cutler explained that he had not intentionally passed over these problems, and that they would be dealt with in the presentations by the Defense Department which were now to follow. Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Holaday, who in turn stated that Dr. Hagen would make the first report on the nature and performance of the earth satellite program and the schedule of test launchings. (A copy of Dr. Hagen's report is filed in the minutes of the meeting. [4])

Dr. Hagen was followed by Assistant Secretary Holaday, who confined himself to an analysis of the cost aspects of the program to launch an earth satellite, with particular emphasis on the reasons which had led to the marked increases in the estimated costs of completing the program. He concluded his remarks with certain recommendations as to ways and means of funding the remainder of the program.

At the conclusion of Secretary Holaday's remarks, Mr. Cutler called on Dr. Bronk for a statement of the scientific aspects and importance of the earth satellite program. Dr. Bronk said that he would divide his brief report into three main parts. He dealt first with what he described as the immediate practical values to be derived from the successful orbiting of a scientific satellite. Among these, he stressed . . . information on the determinants of weather; and lastly, the influence of outer space on communications. He commented on the intense anticipation with which scientists were waiting for the receipt of this kind of scientific information.

Dr. Bronk stated that the second aspect of his analysis would be concerned with what might be described as the spiritual aspects of the program. If a satellite were successfully orbited, it would constitute the movement of man into an entirely new area of the universe into which he had never moved before. This was, accordingly, a challenging adventure, and if it were successfully concluded would mark a whole new chapter—indeed, a new epoch—in science and history.

---

[4] Not found.

Finally, Dr. Bronk said he would touch on the international aspects of the earth satellite program. These aspects, he said, were of very great concern to our scientists. The fact that our earth satellite program was being carried out in connection with the International Geophysical Year and in association with scientific groups from many foreign countries, would bring our scientists into a relationship with the scientists of other countries which could be very significant. We are taking the lead, but we are associated with a variety of other nations.

Mr. Cutler then called on Dr. Waterman, who said he would confine himself to discussing the matter of responsibility for funding the earth satellite program, as between the National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense. The gist of Dr. Waterman's remarks was that if it proved necessary to go to the Congress for a supplemental appropriation in order to complete the program set forth in NSC 5520, the Department of Defense was in a much better position, and had a much clearer obligation, to do so than did the National Science Foundation. On the other hand, Dr. Waterman expressed the earnest hope that some way might be found to provide for the costs of completing this program without going up to the Congress with a request for supplemental appropriations.

The President said that two thoughts had come to his mind at once as he had listened to this series of reports and comments. In the first place, there was no particular reason to assume that the latest estimate of the costs of completing the program ($110 million) would prove firmer than the earlier estimates. Indeed, it was quite possible that the costs of completing the program would go to $150 million, or even higher. His second impression, said the President, was that everybody wanted to duck responsibility for finding the money to fund the program.

Mr. Cutler then requested the Director of Central Intelligence to report on what we knew about the Soviet program to launch an earth satellite, and on the world-wide effects of a U.S. decision to abandon its own earth satellite program at this time.

Mr. Dulles indicated that the Soviets had not followed through on their promise to provide the organizers of the International Geophysical Year with the appropriate details of their program, ... With respect to the effect of a U.S. abandonment of our program, Mr. Dulles pointed out that the program had been widely advertised and warmly welcomed throughout the world of science. If the Soviets succeeded in orbiting a scientific satellite and the United States did not even try to, the USSR would have achieved a propaganda weapon which they could use to boast about the superiority of Soviet scientists. In the premises, the Soviets would also emphasize the propaganda theme that our abandonment of this peaceful scientific program meant that we were devoting the resources of our scientists to warlike preparations instead of peaceful programs.

Mr. Cutler then invited comments from Secretary Wilson. Secretary Wilson replied that when the earth satellite program was first broached in the spring of 1955, it had been clearly and publicly stated that any of the scientific information resulting from the successful launching of an earth satellite would be made available freely to the whole world. Accordingly, our earth satellite program partook of the character of a pure research product rather than of the character of directed research which the Department of Defense could appropriately describe as vital to U.S. national security. Of course, continued Secretary Wilson, we in the Defense Department do have some defense interest in the satellite program. Nevertheless, it was not the kind of program which Defense could properly underwrite and for which it could properly provide money, as it had done lately, out of the DOD emergency funds for research and development. Indeed, Congress had already criticized the Defense Department for allocating money out of its emergency funds to tide over the earth satellite program, and Secretary Wilson said he could not really blame Congressional critics for their attitude. He complained that he was already having enough trouble in providing money out of his emergency funds for research projects which were truly vital to national defense.

The Director of the Budget pointed out to Secretary Wilson that the Department of Defense Emergency Fund ran out each year and had to be renewed each year.

When Mr. Cutler inquired of Secretary Herter the views of the Department of State, Secretary Herter replied that he felt much as did Mr. Allen Dulles. The State Department favored completing the earth satellite program because of the prestige it would confer on the United States. He could not speak authoritatively of the problem of funding the program, which he said did present a rather frightening picture. Asked for his opinion, Admiral Strauss[5] replied that he concurred in the views of Secretary Herter.

The President then commented that there was one lesson to be learned from the experience with the earth satellite program: In the future let us avoid any bragging until we know we have succeeded in accomplishing our objectives. The President then said that he would like to be informed as to how much the increased costs of the earth satellite program derived from increased costs of more elaborate instrumentation. Secondly, he wished to inquire whether the launching of an earth satellite could be rendered easier if the satellite did not contain so much instrumentation as currently planned.

---

[5] Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In replying to the President, Secretary Holaday pointed out that the diameter of the earth satellite had been reduced from thirty inches to twenty inches, although he admitted that the instrumentation had become a little "gold-plated", or at least "chromium-plated", as it had developed. Secretary Holaday also admitted that at the start of the earth satellite program we had not realized fully the requirements of the velocity. Likewise, more observation stations were now going to be established than had originally been thought necessary. Such items as these helped to explain the increasing costs of the program.

The President responded by pointing out that although Secretary Holaday had said that the 30-inch sphere had now been reduced to a 20-inch sphere, this was still larger than the "size of the basketball" which had been mentioned when NSC 5520 had first been considered by the Council. The President confessed that he was much annoyed by this tendency to "gold-plate" the satellite in terms of instrumentation before we had proved the basic feasibility of orbiting any kind of earth satellite. Secretary Wilson added the comment that irrespective of the merit of the earth satellite program, this program had too many promoters and no bankers.

Mr. Cutler alluded to a suggestion that if we succeeded in orbiting one of the test vehicles which would have no scientific instrumentation, it might be possible to abandon the rest of the program for launching the fully-instrumented scientific satellite. The trouble with this reasoning, according to Mr. Cutler, was that the six instrumented satellites were already in the pipeline. Accordingly, if we abandoned the attempt to launch these satellites, we wouldn't save very much money and we would miss achieving our objectives.

Secretary Humphrey inquired what was expected to happen if and when we succeeded in orbiting an earth satellite. Would we not then initiate another tremendous program to launch additional satellites and secure additional information about outer space. Secretary Wilson commented that this was the likely eventuality, and that this was the American way of doing everything—bigger and better.

The President observed that it was quite conceivable that the information we achieved from the successful launching of an earth satellite would be so great as to merit a continuing program thereafter. The trouble was that our original "basketball" satellite program had grown bigger, better, and more costly, at the same time that everybody wished to duck financial responsibility for its completion.

Secretary Wilson said that there was another significant factor to account for the increasing costs of programs such as this. Whenever you put a time limit on a new and large scientific program, you immediately encountered financial troubles. The costs were bound to rise if the objective had to be achieved when a specific and relatively short time interval was set.

The President observed that in any event he did not see how the United States could back out of the earth satellite program at this time. We should, however, keep it on no more elaborate a basis than at the present time. Beyond this there was the problem of how to finance the completion of the program. In this respect the President suggested that in view of the fact that we have run out of money, there was no other recourse than for Defense and the National Science Foundation jointly to appear before the Congressional committees, tell them the story, and ask for supplemental funds. Secretary Wilson agreed with the President that we could not now abandon the program, and the President informed Secretary Wilson, Mr. Brundage and Dr. Waterman that they should make arrangements to go before the Congressional committees with a request for funds to finance the program on its present basis. Before doing so, however, the President said he wished the scientists who had been concerned with this program to take another hard look at it to see if there were any ways by which the costs could be cut or minimized. The President said he was not hopeful in this respect, but that it was worth a try. Thereafter the whole truth should be presented to the committees of Congress.

Mr. Cutler said he assumed that the President wished Defense and NSF to make their joint presentation to the same committees of Congress which had been dealing with the earth satellite program in the past. Mr. Cutler also suggested that the President would wish an immediate report to the National Security Council as soon as the Defense Department has succeeded in orbiting a test vehicle.

Mr. Brundage pointed out that the President's decisions would also involve the use of $5.8 million more of the emergency funds of the Department of Defense. The President agreed, and again called for a report by the Defense Department scientists as to what could be saved if these scientists were a little more restricted in their hopes and ambitions for the earth satellite program. Secretary Wilson commented that at least such a review by the scientists might help to prevent a further elaboration of the earth satellite program.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Discussed the subject, in the light of a presentation by the Department of Defense and comments by the Director, National Science Foundation, the President, National Academy of Sciences, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

[6] Paragraphs a–b and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1713. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

b. Noted the President's directive that the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520 should be continued on no more elaborate basis than at present and under the following conditions:

(1) The necessary arrangements should be made with the Congressional committees which previously dealt with this program, for joint presentations by the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation, as to:

(a) The additional funds to be made available from the Defense Department Emergency Fund to continue the program through August 1, 1957; and
(b) The additional funds which must be appropriated in Fiscal Year 1958 to the Department of Defense in order to complete the program at a total cost not to exceed $110 million.

(2) Prior to the joint presentations under b–(1)–(b) above, the scientists working on this program should again scrutinize it carefully to determine whether the estimated additional funds required can be reduced by restricting the program in ways which will not jeopardize the current objectives under NSC 5520.

(3) In addition to the report required under NSC Action No. 1656–b, the Department of Defense should submit a report to the Council immediately if one of the test vehicles is successfully orbited as a satellite.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, National Science Foundation, for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

346. Editorial Note

On October 4, the Soviet Union launched the world's first orbiting earth satellite, designated "Sputnik I." The satellite weighed 184 pounds, or eight times as much as the proposed United States satellite, and orbited the earth once every 88 minutes. Radio signals from the Soviet satellite were picked up by United States Navy tracking stations within moments after Sputnik reached orbit. The Soviet Government announced the achievement the same day.

347. Memorandum of a Conference, President's Office, White House, Washington, October 8, 1957, 8:30 a.m.[1]

PRESENT

The President	Persons
Quarles	Hagerty
Waterman	Harlow
Holaday	Pyle
Hagen	Goodpaster
Adams	Cutler

1. Quarles presented and explained a memorandum on the Earth Satellite, Oct. 7, 1957 (copy filed with NSC).[2]

2. The President decided not to shift from the present orderly procedure to produce an Earth Satellite. It is understood that Mr. Holaday will counsel with the Army. Quarles suggested that for an additional $13 million the Army could provide a rocket capable of orbiting the Satellite about one month ahead of the proposed orbiting in March, 1958 (using Navy rocketry).

3. The Department of Defense will issue a statement along the lines presented by Quarles and attached to the above-mentioned memorandum (detached and given to Hagerty).[3]

4. The President made these guiding points:

a. The U.S. determined to make the Satellite a scientific project and to keep it free from military weaponry to the greatest extent possible.

b. No pressure or priority was exerted by the U.S. on timing, so long as the Satellite would be orbited during the IGY 1957–1958.

c. The U.S. Satellite program was intended to meet scientific requirements with a view toward permitting all scientists to share in information which the U.S. might eventually acquire.

5. Quarles made the important point that the Russians having been the first with their Satellite to overfly *all* countries, they have thereby established the international characteristic of orbital space.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean-Up, Satellites. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

[2] Not found.

[3] Apparent reference to the statement by the President released by Hagerty on October 9; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 28, 1957, pp. 673–674.

We believe that we can get a great deal more information out of free use of orbital space than they can.

. . . .

7. Apparently the thrust of the rocket used by the Russians to put up their Satellite was around 200,000. The thrust of our rockets runs from 27,000 (Navy) up to 150,000 at present. It is believed that the Russian rocket was the one used in their August rocket tests. Quarles pointed out that the Army had sent up a rocket within a year 6/700 miles in the air. Its speed was much lower than the speed of the rocket used by the Russians—probably mach 12 at the peak, with a very much lower speed at the top of the trajectory.

8. According to the newspapers, the Russians have offered to take up some of our instrumentation in the next Satellite launched. This will pose a very difficult problem for us as we do not think they know how to make some of the very delicate material which we will include in our Satellite. Apparently, our scientists believe the present Russian Satellite is far more crude and less instrumented than what we have in mind.

9. The President desires to have today for his press conference the following information:

(1) From DOD. What action was being taken by the U.S. in regard to guided missiles beginning in 1953?

(2) From DOD. When was the first scientific committee set up on guided missiles?

(3) The date and nature of the Killian Committee's consideration of guided missiles.

(4) What were the priorities for guided missiles and the date of establishment for the priorities?

(5) As to the Earth Satellite:

a. The date and nature of Killian Committee consideration?

b. What were the priorities for the Earth Satellite and the date of establishment of such priorities?

(6) What were the estimated costs for the Earth Satellite program and the dates of establishing those costs? (The President's recollection was that the final cost estimate was $110 million, with a possibility of going to $150 million, the increase being due largely to increased instrumentation and reserves for contingencies; it being understood that an increase up to $150 million would require further consideration by the President. [4])

---

[4] The transcript of the President's press conference on October 9 is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957,* pp. 719–733.

348. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957[1]

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security (NSC 5520; NSC Actions Nos. 1656 and 1713[2])

Mr. Cutler explained the order in which the various aspects of this item of the agenda would be presented to the members of the Council. He then called on the Director of Central Intelligence for a briefing on the Soviet earth satellite.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that . . . on October 4 the Soviets had fired their earth satellite from the Tyura Tam range. Its initial path followed the range, crossing approximately over the range's other end at Klyuchi. . . . after the successful orbiting of the earth satellite and after the second circuit of the earth by the satellite, the Soviets announced their achievement. This delay in the announcement was in line with the previous statements of the Soviet Union that they would not announce an attempt to orbit their satellite until they had been assured that the orbiting had been successful. . . .

• • • • • • •

Mr. Dulles then turned to the world reaction to the Soviet achievement. He first pointed out that Khrushchev had moved all his propaganda guns into place. The launching of an earth satellite was one of a trilogy of propaganda moves, the other two being the announcement of the successful testing of an ICBM and the recent test of a large-scale hydrogen bomb at Novaya Zemlya. . . .

Larded in with Khrushchev's propaganda statements had been a number of interesting remarks, such as the one in which Khrushchev consigned military aircraft to museums in the future. With respect to this remark, Mr. Dulles pointed out that U.S. intelligence had not observed as many Soviet heavy bombers on airfields as had been expected. This raised the question as to whether the Soviets are in the process of de-emphasizing the role of the heavy bomber. There had been no clear verdict yet by the intelligence community on this question.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11.

[2] For NSC Action Nos. 1656 and 1713, see footnote 8, Document 344, and footnote 6, Document 345.

Mr. Dulles thought that there was no doubt that in gearing up all this propaganda of recent days and weeks, the Soviets had had an eye to the situation in the Middle East, and wished to exert the maximum influence they could summon on that situation. Much of the Soviet propaganda comment is following closely the original Soviet boast relating their scientific accomplishments to the effectiveness of the Communist social system. The target for this particular thrust, thought Mr. Dulles, was evidently the underdeveloped nations in the world. He informed members of the Council that he had copies of an FBIS[3] summary of Soviet comment, which were available to any who wished to have them.

The Chinese Communist reaction was to declare quickly that the launching of the earth satellite was proof of Soviet military and scientific supremacy over the United States. Maximum play on this theme was being provided in all the Soviet satellites.

Thereafter, Mr. Dulles touched on the reactions in Western Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. He concluded his remarks by emphasizing that the Soviet Union was making a major propaganda effort which was exerting a very wide and deep impact.

At the conclusion of Mr. Allen Dulles' briefing, Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Quarles to speak. Secretary Quarles began by stating that much of what he was going to say would be familiar to the President and other members of the Council. The President quipped that this was indeed the case, and he was beginning to feel somewhat numb on the subject of the earth satellite. Thereafter, Secretary Quarles outlined briefly the development of satellite programs beginning with the period of World War II. The possibilities of a satellite had been picked up first in this country by the Air Force, because of its interest in the possibilities of a reconnaissance satellite. The birth of the earth satellite program occurred in Rome, at the IGY meeting of 1954. The President had announced in 1955 the nature of the U.S. earth satellite program, in which he had stressed the supremacy of scientific objectives.

Secretary Quarles went on to point out that our American scientists had recommended adoption of the proposal of the Navy Department which had come to be known since as Project Vanguard. He also pointed out the qualification that the U.S. earth satellite program was not to interfere with the high priority of ballistic missiles programs of the United States.

Secretary Quarles thought it quite proper to emphasize the paramount scientific aspect of the U.S. earth satellite program. Our

---

[3] Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the Central Intelligence Agency; it monitored foreign broadcasts and summarized them in digest form, circulating the summaries daily to various agencies and offices of the U.S. Government.

Government had never regarded this program as including as a major objective that the United States should launch an earth satellite first, though, of course, we have always been aware of the cold war implications of the launching of the first earth satellite.

Another of our objectives in the earth satellite program was to establish the principle of the freedom of outer space—that is, the international rather than the national character of outer space. In this respect the Soviets have now proved very helpful. Their earth satellite has overflown practically every nation on earth, and there have thus far been no protests.

Turning to the military implications, Secretary Quarles pointed out that the U.S. program had used separate rockets from the rockets employed in the program to achieve military ballistic missiles. The evidence was to the contrary in the Soviet Union, where the earth satellite program had always been integrated into the military ballistic programs of the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was clear evidence that the Soviets had embarked on their earth satellite program with a prime objective of being the first nation to orbit an earth satellite. They have now offered to cooperate with the United States and permit us to place our own instrumentation in one of their satellites. Our disposition is to find a good reason to refuse this offer. Since our own instrumentation is better and more elaborate than theirs, we would stand to lose more than we would gain by accepting their offer.

As to the implications of the Soviet achievement, Secretary Quarles said he would not comment on the cold war aspects, since they had been dealt with by the Director of Central Intelligence. Beyond this, it was clear that the Soviets possess a competence in long-range rocketry and in auxiliary fields which is even more advanced than the competence with which we had credited them; although, of course, we had always given them the capability of orbiting an earth satellite. Finally, said Secretary Quarles, the outer space implications of the launching of this satellite were of very great significance, especially in relation to the development of reconnaissance satellites.

At the conclusion of Secretary Quarles' presentation, the President stated that he had one or two questions. Pointing out that Secretary Quarles had said that the U.S. satellite would orbit the earth at a lower height than the Soviet satellite, the President wanted to know whether our satellite would not, as a result, encounter more interference. Secretary Quarles replied that perhaps our satellite for this reason would not last as long as the Soviet satellite. The President then asked whether the result of this would not affect U.S. prestige. Secretary Quarles replied that to counter the fact that our satellite might not last so long, would be the advantage that our satellite would contain more refined equipment, as a result of which we would learn more from our satellites than could be learned from the Soviet satellites.

The President then said that he had one other question. He said that he had read in a newspaper lately that two so-called intelligence people in the United States had claimed that the Soviet satellite was actually taking photographs of the United States for the use of the Soviet Union. People in the Defense Department had said that this was not so and could not be done. Who precisely, therefore, was doing this kind of talking? Where does such talk come from? Secretary Quarles replied that he did not know the two individuals in question, and would probably never find out who they were. Nevertheless, he doubted the truth of any such rumors, though we could not know for certain that the Soviet earth satellite could not take pictures. In any case, he couldn't conceive of anyone in the know making such an allegation as this which, to the best of his belief, was groundless.

The Vice President inquired of Secretary Quarles whether it was still part of our own U.S. plans that, when we orbit our own satellite, the information obtained from it will be made available to all interested people in all countries. Secretary Quarles replied in the affirmative, and the Vice President commented that it would be a great propaganda advantage for the United States to give out such information.

Secretary Quarles then suggested that the Council might like to hear from Dr. Waterman or perhaps from Dr. Hagen (head of Project Vanguard). Dr. Waterman referred to the President's earlier question as to the range to which we should attempt to send our own earth satellite. We would know better the answer to this question when we have received the full information from the Soviet earth satellite. Dr. Waterman then suggested that Dr. Hagen comment to the Council on the present status of our own and of the Soviet satellite program.

Dr. Hagen read a report to the Council on this subject. Among other things, he noted that the average height of the Soviet satellite above the earth was 370 miles. Its closest point to the earth in its elliptical orbit was about 200 miles; its furthest point from the earth about 500 miles. While it was still unsafe to predict how long the Soviet satellite would remain in orbit, Dr. Hagen thought it might be only for a few weeks.

Thereafter, Dr. Hagen gave a brief outline of the objectives and status of the U.S. earth satellite program. One earth satellite had actually been completed. Three others were in various stages of completion. The first 3-stage test vehicle had been shipped to Florida yesterday for testing in December.

Mr. Cutler then called on Dr. Waterman, who stressed the fact that the United States had two very important assets in our rivalry with the Soviet Union. First, we have been very open and aboveboard as to what we will do in our program, as the Russians have not been. Secondly, we have had very great experience and possess very great skill in designing the scientific things that these satellites can do. We think we are ahead of the Russians in this area, and that our satellites will provide us with very sophisticated observations. Looking ahead, continued Dr. Waterman, we ought to consider two significant matters. In the first place, we want to produce a satellite which can either return to the earth undamaged or which at least can send undamaged material back to the earth. Secondly, we must consider the possibility of satellites or space platforms which orbit the earth indefinitely and keep sending back information. Finally, said Dr. Waterman, there was a moral to take to heart. This satellite problem was a typical marriage of science with engineering, and the strength of our U.S. technology depends upon this marriage.

Mr. Cutler then called on Dr. Bronk, who stated initially that there was one thing about which he was very greatly concerned—that is, that we avoid getting our whole scientific community into a race to accomplish everything before the Russians do. He therefore thought we should adhere strictly to our stated earth satellite program and not be deflected from our course merely by the fact that the Russians had been the first to launch an earth satellite.

The President pointed out that all those around the table and others could anticipate before very long being obliged to testify before Congressional committees, to talk to the press, and the like. In the circumstances, he could imagine nothing more important than that anybody so involved should stand firmly by the existing earth satellite program which was, after all, adopted by the Council after due deliberation as a reasonable program. In short, we should answer inquiries by stating that we have a plan—a good plan—and that we are going to stick to it.

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Herter for an appraisal of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the successful launching of the Soviet satellite. Secretary Herter initially stated that it was extremely difficult to make such an assessment because there was such a mass of information pouring into the Department of State. While there had been insufficient time to analyze this intake, there were already some indications of the serious effects of the Soviet success which we hope to be able to counteract.

Thereafter, Secretary Herter read selected quotations to illustrate his point, with particular reference to Turkey, Morocco, and the Philippines. He also pointed out the probable repercussions of the Soviet success in the United Nations. The United States may now encounter much greater difficulty in defending its disarmament position.

By and large, continued Secretary Herter, the reaction of our allies had been pretty firm and good, though even the best of them require assurance that we have not been surpassed scientifically and militarily by the USSR. The neutralist countries are chiefly engaged in patting themselves on the back and insisting that the Soviet feat proves the value and the wisdom of the neutralism which these countries have adopted.

Summing up, Secretary Herter described the first foreign policy reactions as "pretty somber". The United States will have to do a great deal to counteract them and, particularly, to confirm the existence of our own real military and scientific strength.

Governor Stassen enlarged somewhat on the repercussions in the United Nations. He believed it was yet too soon to measure these repercussions with any assurance, but already the first surprise was settling down and the diplomats in the UN have begun to realize that the fundamentals of the world situation have not been changed—namely, that the capability for mutual annihilation still exists. Governor Stassen doubted whether there would be any quick shifts among UN members.

Mr. Cutler then called on Mr. Larson,[4] who said that he was hesitant to say what he was going to say because he was not sure that he really believed it. He then went on to say that while we could not permit ourselves to be panicked by the Soviet achievement, he did wonder whether our U.S. plans were now adequate with regard to the next great break-through. If we lose repeatedly to the Russians as we have lost with the earth satellite, the accumulated damage would be tremendous. We should accordingly plan, ourselves, to accomplish some of the next great break-throughs first—for example, the achievement of a manned satellite, or getting to the moon. Do we have any such plans, asked Mr. Larson. If not, our people should begin to think about them.

The President replied to Mr. Larson by stating that while he could hardly quarrel with Mr. Larson's conclusions if the Soviets were to win every time, the fact remained that the United States couldn't possibly set up a whole vast scientific program of basic research in areas about which we don't know anything, and then attempt to outdo the Russians in each aspect of such a program. We must, above all, still seek a military posture that the Russians will respect.

The Vice President inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles whether it was possible to provide estimates of the amounts of money allocated to basic research by the United States in comparison with the USSR. [Name deleted] answering for Mr. Dulles, could not give a clear response, though he could not say that the Russians had put in more resources than we have. Mr. Dulles said that at least the Soviets have concentrated more heavily on the guided missiles field than we have, ever since 1945. The President, agreeing with Mr. Dulles, pointed out that the United States had not made any all-out effort in the field of ballistic missiles until after the Killian Committee had submitted its report to the National Security Council.[5] He added that of course the Soviets were bound to be ahead of the United States in certain fields and in certain discoveries.

---

[4] Arthur Larson, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

The Vice President warned the Council that we must be prepared for the fact that Congress would insist on examining in great detail what we have been doing in the missiles field. In the course of such an examination they are certain to ask the question which he had just put—as to the relative amounts which the United States and the USSR had allocated to their respective missiles programs. Accordingly, we must be prepared to answer such a question.

After Mr. Larson had reiterated his plea for planning for a U.S. win in the next great break-through, Dr. Bronk commented that, in line with Mr. Larson's views, the United States could, if it chose, give much greater emphasis to the spectacular achievements that we have made in the scientific field—for example, we could stress our vast achievements in the field of cancer research. Regrettably, it was hard to get the press to take an interest in these achievements. Mr. Cutler suggested that we might perhaps have announced the successful launching of a U.S. missile with a range of 3500 miles. Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Operations Coordinating Board was presently engaged in examining our public relations policies with respect to our missiles programs. General Twining cautioned that we should not permit ourselves to become hysterical about the Soviet achievement.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of:

(1) An intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the Soviet earth satellite, its relation to the Soviet ballistic missiles program, and world reaction to the Soviet earth satellite.

(2) A briefing by the Department of Defense on the information regarding the Soviet earth satellite obtained by scientific

---

[5] Reference is to the Killian report of February 14, 1955, not printed.

[6] Paragraphs a–b and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1799. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

tracking, and on the status of the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520.

(3) Comments by the Director, National Science Foundation, and the President, National Academy of Sciences, on the scientific implications of the Soviet earth satellite.

(4) An appraisal by the Department of Defense of the military implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

(5) An appraisal by the Department of State of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

b. Noted the statement by the President on the subject issued at his press conference on October 9, 1957; and the President's statement at this meeting of the importance of adhering to the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520 as being well-reasoned and deliberately planned.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information and guidance to all holders of NSC 5520.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

349. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of Defense (McElroy)[1]

Washington, October 17, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Scientific Satellite Program (NSC 5520)

I am writing this memorandum to you as Secretary of Defense because the Department of Defense is the responsible executive agency for carrying out the U.S. scientific satellite program in accordance with NSC 5520.

At a recent meeting of the National Security Council the President made very plain that the overriding objective of the IRBM and the ICBM programs is the successful achievement of these ballistic missiles with the necessary range and reasonable accuracy, in priority over related problems.[2]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean-Up, Satellites. Secret.

Although recent Council action has not reflected a similar expression by the President with reference to the U.S. scientific satellite, the President's concern in this regard is no less clear. As you know, the President issued a statement to the press on October 9[3] that the first satellite test vehicle was planned to be launched in December, and that the first fully instrumented satellite vehicle would be launched in March, 1958.

In line with this statement the President said yesterday that he wanted to be sure that the launching of the U.S. scientific satellite proceed as planned and scheduled. He is, of course, conscious of the understandable desire of the scientists to perfect the instrumentation that goes into the satellite. Nevertheless, he made very plain that any efforts further to perfect such scientific instrumentation should not be permitted to delay the planned launching schedule.

In order that there might be no ambiguity, I thought it advisable to send this memorandum to you as head of the responsible executive agency, with a copy to the Director of the National Science Foundation.[4]

Robert Cutler[5]

---

[2] NSC Action 1800–c. [Footnote in the source text. NSC Action No. 1800–c was taken at the 339th meeting of the NSC following discussion of agenda item 2, "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs"; see *supra*.]

[3] See footnote 3, Document 347.

[4] A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "discussed with P on Oct 22—he was very firm on this as correct. RC." Another note indicates that it was Robert Cutler's personal copy.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

350. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Gates) to the Secretary of Defense (McElroy)[1]

Washington, October 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

Earth Satellite Program

1. I am gravely concerned about the effects of the Presidential statement of 9 October[2] on the dates of intended firings of Vanguard vehicles. It said in effect that test vehicles were planned to be launched in December and a fully instrumented satellite in March 1958. The statement has been widely—though erroneously—interpreted in the press and within the administration as a commitment to achieve satellites on those dates. There is in fact only a probability—not a certainty—that satellites will be achieved on these first attempts.

2. This is true in spite of the application of every effort and unlimited enthusiasm toward getting the satellite tries off at the earliest possible moment. We have been re-examining the possible effects of increased priority and fiscal and facilities support, but it appears that no actions in these areas can now positively assure meeting the dates of the White House release. We will certainly do everything we can for success.

3. All experience with experimental rocket programs shows that no one can have confidence that the dates of planned firing attempts will always hold firm. It should be made clear that this historic fact applies to this program as to others, in order to warn before the event rather than explain afterward.

Thomas S. Gates[3]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for Science and Technology Records, Additional Records 1957–61 (A76–16), Box 15, Space (October 1957). Official Use Only.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 347.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

351. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McElroy) to the Secretary of the Navy (Gates)[1]

Washington, October 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

Vanguard Program

REFERENCE

(a) Sec/Navy Memo to Sec/Def, dtd 22 Oct 1957, subj: Earth Satellite Program[2]

Your memorandum of 22 October expressed concern that the Presidential statement of 9 October on the U.S. satellite program has committed the Navy to meet the December 1957 launching of a test vehicle and a March 1958 launching of an instrumented satellite.

Subsequent to the above, I have received a confirmation from the President that he expects the Department of Defense to meet these commitments.

At the time the U.S. satellite program responsibility was assigned to the Navy, the atmosphere of a completely scientific effort in the framework of the International Geophysical Year prevailed. The Soviet's success with their satellite has changed the situation. We now have the added burden of not only launching a successful satellite but doing it as per our current schedule. The psychological factors in this matter have obviously received a new emphasis. If necessary, a back-up program to insure success will be initiated.

We must, therefore, go forward with deliberate speed in this program and meet the above dates if at all possible.

Requests for assistance to maintain this schedule should be called to the attention of the Assistant for Guided Missiles. We are attempting to obtain an additional launching stand for you.

Neil McElroy[3]

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for Science and Technology Records, Additional Records 1957–61 (A76–16), Box 15, Space (October 1957).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

352. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

Impact and Implications of Soviet Earth Satellites

In view of your interest in the impact and implications of the Soviet earth satellites, you may wish to note the following summary of our recent estimate on this subject brought up to date to include Sputnik II. [2]

1. Following its announcement of Sputnik I on October 14 [*4*], Soviet propaganda emphasized the satellite's scientific aspects but relied for the most part on free world sources to bring home its military implications. The rest of the Bloc elaborated both themes in volume. The second launching produced a smaller volume of propaganda along similar lines.

2. Outside the Bloc, Sputnik I tended to remove misconceptions about Soviet technological capabilities and to confirm its temporary ICBM lead. The resulting widespread concern was deepened by Sputnik II, which caused many to believe that the gap between the US and the USSR was wider than first realized. Although these views were tempered by the general belief that the US will match the USSR achievement in reasonable time, Sputnik II raised at least some doubts as to US ability to catch up quickly.

3. The USSR's prestige has risen substantially and the US has suffered a serious, although not decisive, setback. World opinion tends to hold that the sputniks per se have not altered the strategic balance of forces in the short run, since Soviet ICBMs are not yet thought to be in mass production. Nevertheless, some new weight has been lent to Soviet foreign policy pronouncements and increased credibility may attach to Soviet claims in other fields.

4. Observers throughout the world agree that beyond the immediate future US ability to match the Soviet advance is crucial and that a significant lag would have far-reaching effects. In Western Europe, particularly, this has led to the conviction that NATO efforts must be strengthened, collaboration increased, and US leader-

---

[1] Source: Department of State, P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661, Earth Satellite. Secret. Drafted by George W. Jaeger of the Office of Intelligence Research. Copies were sent to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Counselor of the Department of State, S/P, EUR, NEA, and PA.

[2] The second Soviet earth satellite, officially designated "Sputnik II," was launched on November 3, 1957. Considerably larger than Sputnik I, this second Soviet satellite carried a dog—the first living organism to be placed in earth orbit.

ship revitalized. In addition, in Europe and leading countries elsewhere, the sputniks gave new urgency to problems of strategy and military planning arising from the advent of ballistic missiles.

5. The USSR will make further intensive propaganda efforts to exploit the situation but probably does not believe that it is justified in radically altering its foreign policy for the present. Nevertheless, the Kremlin will experience some gain in confidence, may expect to seize political opportunities at less risk, and will exploit any sign of US failure to meet the challenge.

6. Free world opinion will be influenced by the Soviet achievement for some time to come. In Europe, pressure for increased US, US–UK and NATO effort and collaboration will continue. At the same time, further stimulus will have been given to development of European advanced weapon capability, partly because of continuing anxiety that the US may gradually withdraw once it has an operational ICBM. Fear that the US will enter bilateral negotiations with the USSR will also continue to be felt. Elsewhere in the world no major realignments seem probable in the short run, although attitudes will be influenced by progress in the weapons race. The status of US bases is for the present not likely to be affected.

7. Delayed or insufficient demonstration of United States success in the ballistic field would produce political and psychological effects of substantially more serious nature—for example, on attitudes toward neutralism and on the cohesion of alliances.

---

353. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

Washington, November 25, 1957—7:34 p.m.

475. President Council International Civil Aviation Organization (Binaghi [2]) letter October 22 to US representative Council (David [3]) inquired whether in view development satellite capable traversing outer space states consider time ripe for international action re question of sovereignty outer space; if so whether they consider

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/11–2557. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted and initialed for the Secretary by H. Alberta Colclaser, Assistant Chief of the Aviation Division, Office of Transport and Communications, Bureau of Economic Affairs. Sent to 21 posts.

[2] Walter Binaghi, Argentina.

[3] Presumably Paul T. David, American economist. The letter is not printed.

ICAO or some other existing organization or special conference should handle problem; if ICAO how it should be undertaken. A copy of Binaghi letter and US reply pouched with DS–4.[4]

David directed reply that considerably more experience and technical development needed prior action on problem. To evolve at this time theories re international principles applicable outer space or rules and regulations this matter might create undesirable and unnecessary obstacles and could do little further this work. Reply also noted that predominance interests other than civil aviation makes it appear unlikely US Government would desire make ICAO responsible consideration this problem.

Embassies requested promptly discuss this problem appropriate officials government addressee posts pointing out inability predict this early date what may be desirable methods dealing this problem. Unknown whether similar letters sent other Council representatives. However in view importance this matter every appropriate effort should be made to obtain concurrence US view expressed above and instruction by governments to Council representatives in accord with it. November 18 Council session Japan, Belgium and Mexico requested ICAO study outer space at early date. Long-range ICAO work program lists outer space study as project "which may possibly be undertaken in 1959". We believe Council should shelve any such projects, and hope other members will join with us in opposing ICAO study space problems when question comes up again in Council.

Report soonest views governments approached and reaction US view. Since Council increasingly pushing toward study approach governments soonest.

Background includes anxiety ICAO Secretariat assume action responsibility this field and note in report Legal Commission Tenth Assembly ICAO approved by Assembly that when work re law outer space timely ICAO appropriate forum. Nevertheless view ICAO responsibilities international civil aviation and nature development outer space activities US Government wishes avoid action this organization. Canadian representative likewise received letter from Council President and replied to effect matter should first be examined by United Nations and that even preliminary explorations ICAO states would be of no avail until more important aspects covered by UN. However reply continued by suggesting report and analysis ICAO Observer at UN be circulated asking states comments. Further stated that problems did fall within ICAO functions and that there might be some benefit from having matter on future general work program Legal Committee. We hope Canada and any others holding latter views can be persuaded to revise them.[5]

---

[4] Not further identified.

Dulles

---

[5] In circular telegram 495, December 2, the Department informed 20 diplomatic missions that "Letters comparable Binaghi letter Oct. 22 to David received by representatives US, UK, Canada and France only. Nov. 25 ICAO President circulated memo all Council representatives raising question whether now appropriate initiate studies outer space and suggesting informal Council discussion this matter Fri. Dec. 6. Dept. hopes instructions Council representatives received by that date." (Department of State, Central Files, 701.022/12–257) No formal action was taken by the ICAO on this issue during the remainder of 1957. For additional information, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1957 (New York, United Nations Office of Public Information, 1958), pp. 471–476.

---

354. Memorandum of Discussion at the 347th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 5, 1957[1]

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. Public Announcements of Launchings of U.S. Scientific Satellites

Growing out of the discussion of the previous item, Secretary Dulles said that he was about to be obliged to leave the meeting, and before doing so he had a word to say about the postponement yesterday of our attempt to launch our first scientific satellite. He earnestly hoped that in the future we would not announce the date, the hour, and indeed the minute, that we were proposing to launch our earth satellite, until the satellite was successfully in orbit. Speaking very earnestly, Secretary Dulles said the effect of the publicity of the last few days, culminating in the final decision to postpone the attempt to launch our first earth satellite, had had a terrible effect on the foreign relations of the United States.

The President commented that he was all for stopping such unfortunate publicity, but he had no idea how we could stop it.

Secretary Quarles then undertook to explain what had happened yesterday. He stated that we were, in a sense, hoist by our own petard. We had in our earth satellite program dedicated ourselves from the beginning to work upon this program as a scientific experiment. We had accordingly promised the IGY scientists throughout the world that we would inform them when we proposed to try to launch our earth satellite and to give them all the desired information about it. It is too bad that yesterday's test had to be postponed, but we had promised the scientists of the world to inform them when we made our attempt to launch the satellite, so that they could all be ready at their various stations to receive the scientific data coming from the earth satellite. Secretary Quarles said that these remarks constituted not an excuse, but an explanation.

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on December 6.

Still speaking feelingly, Secretary Dulles asked whether we could not possibly avoid further announcements of launchings until we were assured that they were successful. Secretary Quarles replied that we could only do so by changing our policy with respect to the fundamental purposes of our scientific satellite program. Secretary Dulles commented that what had happened yesterday had been a disaster for the United States.

The President inquired whether the scientists of the world would lose very much significant data if they were unaware that the United States had actually successfully launched a scientific satellite until it had orbited the world at least once.

Dr. Killian likewise inquired whether, in our next try to launch a satellite, we could not assure ourselves of its successful orbiting before we notified the world that we were attempting to launch such a satellite.

The President inquired whether what had happened at the Florida grounds yesterday constituted a failure to launch the scientific satellite. Secretary Quarles replied that it had not been a failure, but that a delay had occurred in the course of the countdown. The President then went on to inquire whether there were not other launching sites available for the earth satellite. Couldn't we launch our satellite from some desert region rather than from the thickly-populated Florida coast? Secretary Quarles replied that while it might well be desirable to have additional launching sites for the earth satellite, none had been prepared. The President then inquired whether it was not possible to shield the activities and the installations from which the satellite would be launched. Could not something be done so that not everyone within miles of the Florida base could see the rocket?

Secretary Dulles continued to express his irritation at our practice of giving out such precise announcements of the days, hours, and minutes of our launching attempts. What had happened yesterday had made us the laughing-stock of the whole Free World, and was being most effectively exploited by the Soviets. Secretary Quarles again replied that our announcement policy had been drawn up in terms of a certain philosophy about our scientific satellite program. Perhaps we should change this philosophy.

Dr. Killian then suggested that he and Secretary Quarles, together with Dr. Bronk and Dr. Waterman, should sit down and try to figure out how best to deal with the timing of our announcements of attempts to launch our earth satellites.

Mr. Allen stated that from the point of view of the U.S. Information Agency, he emphatically believed it would be best if the President were to order that no announcement was to be made next time until the scientific satellite was actually in its orbit.

The National Security Council: [2]

Noted the President's request that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, in consultation with the Director, National Science Foundation, and the President, National Academy of Sciences, study whether public announcement of any attempted launching of a U.S. scientific satellite could be postponed until a successful launching had been assured.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Director, National Science Foundation, and the President, National Academy of Sciences, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 4–7.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[2] The paragraph and Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1822. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

355. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Berding) to the Secretary's Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley) [1]

Washington, December 5, 1957.

For your information there is quoted below an excerpt from my preliminary and informal notes on the OCB luncheon of December 4, 1957:

"*Publicity on Launching of U.S. Satellite*

"At the OCB luncheon there was extended discussion of the publicity connected with the attempt to launch an earth satellite at Cape Canaveral, Florida. There was general agreement that the extensive and sensational news stories were having an extremely deleterious impact throughout the world. Mr. Herter remarked that the psychologic beating which the U.S. took because of the launching of Sputnik was being exceeded by the beating the U.S. is suffering because of the publicized fizzle in Florida. The fact that papers throughout the U.S. were carrying official U.S. Navy photographs of arrangements for the launching was mentioned, as were the facilities being accorded to the press at the launching site. Mr. Sprague said that the Department of Defense had been under great pressure from the press, which had adopted an attitude that delay or failure in the launching was impossible. Further, the press felt that it was entitled to full coverage irrespective of the possible impact overseas.

"Later, General Cutler expressed strong views that the proposal to name U.S. satellites after scientists was inadvisable. He felt that the use of names would be misunderstood and would make the U.S. vulnerable to propaganda attacks. Names might mean one thing in English and to the West, but might mean something quite different in other languages and areas. Nationality, racial and religious complications were foreseen. There was general agreement by the Board that efforts should be made to stop the proposed use of the name 'Goddard' for the first satellite and that the whole policy of giving names to satellites should be reviewed.

"*It was agreed* by the Board that Defense should report at the meeting next week on its experiences to date under the guidelines on publicity which were adopted by the Board on November 6, and particularly with regard to difficulties in applying the guidelines in the case of the attempted satellite launching in Florida. The Executive Officer of the OCB was called upon to present to the Board next week updated guidelines incorporating the OCB committee actions subsequent to November 6."

---

[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Earth Satellite. Secret. Drafted by Arthur L. Richards, Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, whose typed signature appears at the end of the source text. Copies were sent to Elbrick, Rubottom, Robertson, Rountree, and Wilcox.

Arthur L. Richards [2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

356. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the President [1]

Washington, December 6, 1957.

The Director of Guided Missiles has provided the following preliminary report concerning today's unsuccessful Vanguard firing:

"The countdown for the TV–3 Vanguard launching on 6 December 1957 was quite normal after an early hold near the beginning of the count. All components appeared to be working correctly. At 1145 countdown was completed and the vehicle lifted off the stand. After two seconds, it settled back on the pad apparently due to loss of thrust in the first stage motor. It fell over and burst into flames. Both the first and second stages were destroyed and the third stage was thrown clear without igniting.

"A preliminary study of the instrumentation records by the Naval Research Laboratory personnel has been made, and at last report the cause of the accident had not been ascertained with certainty. For safety reasons, a close inspection of the vehicle and launching pad had not been completed at last report. As far as yet determined, there has been only limited damage to the launching pad. No personnel were injured.

"Unless more substantial damage to the launching pad is discovered in further inspection, the back-up TV–3 vehicle will be mounted on it and should be ready for launching before the end of the calendar year. Barring unforeseen delays, the Navy still expects to adhere to its previous launching schedules for the full scale satellite."

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for Science and Technology Records, Additional Records 1957–61 (A76–16), Box 15, Space (December 1957).

We will furnish a more complete report as soon as necessary details are available.

Donald A. Quarles[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

357. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Killian) to the President[1]

Washington, December 6, 1957.

SUBJECT

Publicity Concerning U.S. Earth Satellite Tests

Today I reviewed with Mr. Snyder,[2] Mr. Holaday, Mr. Dearborn[3] and Dr. Waterman the news policy, responsibility and procedure concerning U.S. satellite tests.

It was agreed that henceforth release of information by Government personnel concerning Satellite tests would be centralized and controlled directly from Mr. Snyder's office in DOD. This will be done, not to deprive the press of proper information, but rather to permit more orderly handling of information and statements about tests.

DOD will also attempt to make improper observations and eavesdropping more difficult at Patrick but with limited prospect of success.

Mr. Snyder will inform me in a few days about arrangements he is making with the Army about publicity on forthcoming Army satellite tests. Secretary Quarles and I will review plans for future tests.

The following background facts were developed in reaching these decisions:

---

[1] Source: Department of State, P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661, Earth Satellites, etc. Confidential. Attached to a covering memorandum from Richard Hirsch, OCB Staff Representative to the OCB Working Group on Certain Aspects of the Earth Satellite Program, that indicates that this memorandum was circulated in connection with expected item discussion at the OCB meeting on December 11. It is not possible to determine whether this memorandum was in direct response to the unsuccessful Vanguard firing the same day as discussed in Quarles' memorandum, *supra*.

[2] Presumably Murray Snyder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

[3] Not further identified.

1. The Operations Coordinating Board has given full consideration to the problem for over a year and has issued a series of guidelines for handling public information. The first were issued on January 23, 1957, the most recent on November 1, 1957. The latter specifically stated:

> "Releases and statements . . . [4] should . . . avoid arousing unfounded expectations by over-commitment in areas of uncertainty such as launching schedules, and possibilities of achieving orbit."

Draft news releases were agreed to by the Operations Coordinating Board on December 2, 1957.

2. The National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences are responsible for the release of information concerning the "participation of the U.S. in the Earth Satellite program of the IGY" and information "relating to the scientific aspects of the program."

3. The Department of Defense has the responsibility "for the review, coordination and release of all new information relating to the launching vehicle and the launchings."

4. The policy has been for release of maximum information concerning the Satellite within security limitations.

5. The Office of Naval Research has handled verbal inquiries about tests but the Defense Department's Office of Public Information has issued all formal statements after clearance with the Operations Coordinating Board.

6. The Press has developed effective audio-visual monitoring techniques which make it impossible to conduct any major firings at Patrick without their knowledge.

7. It is impossible to conduct launchings safely from any other site now existing.

J.R. Killian, Jr. [5]

---

[4] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

358. Memorandum From the Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Richards) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Berding) [1]

Washington, December 11, 1957.

For your information there is quoted below an excerpt from my preliminary and informal notes on the OCB meeting of December 11:

"*Guidelines for Public Information on the U.S. and Soviet Scientific Earth Satellite Programs*

"At the meeting on December 11, there was extended discussion of publicity on the recent test at Cape Canaveral, Florida. Mr. Murray Snyder (Defense) and Dr. Alan T. Waterman (National Science Foundation) were present for this item. Mr. Snyder told the Board of the experiences of Defense in handling publicity at Cape Canaveral. He pointed out the physical limitations on controlling the press at the launching site, as well as the policy considerations if additional restrictions were to be attempted. In the first place, the recent Vanguard test was, as had been made clear, purely scientific in nature. It was well established policy to permit full press coverage of such scientific projects. Furthermore, it was impossible to control speculation by the press. Even more damaging stories would be published if less factual information was given out. To keep people away from the launching site would require some Presidential action similar to that at the time of the Manhattan project and this would create great public relations problems. As for the future, Mr. Snyder suggested certain changes in the OCB Guide Lines, the principal point being that all official releases should emanate from his office in the Pentagon.

"Mr. Herter said that official releases were only a small part of the picture. It was the speculative stories which did the damage. Perhaps these could be best controlled through appropriate official releases. At the same time, the Guide Lines for the Pentagon spokesmen should not be inflexible.

"Governor Stassen said that every effort should be made to keep attempted launchings secret until a satellite was actually in orbit. It seemed essential to him that one man should be in charge of all releases and that this man should operate under clear directives.

---

[1] Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Earth Satellite. Secret. Copies were sent to Philip Farley; Elbrick; Edward L. Freers, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs; Walter M. Rudolph, Science Adviser in the Department of State; and Harold Stassen.

As a matter of policy, releases should underrate the possibility of success rather than give exaggerated opinions of the possibility of success. He said that 'U.S. prestige should not ride on expectations as tenuous as the doubtful success of Vanguard'.

"Mr. Allen (USIA) said the recent failure of the test had subjected the U.S. to damaging ridicule overseas. Our position at the moment was undignified and damaging and reflected a dangerous lack of discipline. One trouble was that the Guide Lines were directed toward a purely scientific experiment. Since the Russian ICBM announcement and the successful launching of Sputnik it was no longer possible to treat the tests in this light. Rather, they had become a part of psychologic warfare and competition.

"It was agreed that the OCB Guide Lines should be amended along the lines suggested by Mr. Snyder. However, the actual language should be refined and submitted to the Board for approval in approximately two weeks' time."

Arthur L. Richards [2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

359. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal United States Information Service Posts [1]

CA–1477

Washington, December 17, 1957.

INFOGUIDE

The Post-Sputnik Posture of the United States and the Free World

1. Recent Soviet success in the field of outer space rocketry has increased Soviet prestige and credibility overseas while reducing public confidence in US leadership. The Soviets have sought to exploit their gains in world opinion by increased efforts at political and economic penetration and continued efforts, in disarmament and

---

[1] Source: Department of State, P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661, Earth Satellites, etc. Confidential. The source text is a USIA document cleared in the Department of State by J. Burke Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The source text indicates that copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force.

other fields, to promote a bilateral US–USSR approach to negotiation in hopes of splitting the US from its allies.

2. Against this background, it is especially important now and in the period immediately ahead that the US maintain a public posture that effectively conveys the idea that America and the free world are united and strong—militarily, politically, economically and morally—but that at the same time we are proceeding solidly to increase and consolidate that strength in ways that will improve free world security and decrease the danger of war. Such a framework should allow us to put specific US and free world actions in the military, scientific and diplomatic fields in a perspective that effectively contributes to the total picture of free world strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

3. Three elements in the American and free world public posture stand out presently as of special relevance to a balanced portrayal of US and free world strength and purposes: (a) the present effectiveness of US and free world military capability; (b) strengthening of US and free world scientific coordination and measures for training of future scientists and engineers; (c) the continuing free world quest for peace and reduction of tensions through disarmament and settlement of outstanding political issues:

A. The Military Posture of the Free World

The fundamental premise of our national posture on military preparedness is that US and free world deterrent and retaliatory military strength is *now* at a high degree of effectiveness but that in close coordination with our allies we are taking important steps to increase that effectiveness by a variety of specific measures. In addition to individual announcements and releases detailing these measures, the Agency will seek to bring this information together periodically into a unified story.

The President's November 7 speech [2] sketches a broad outline of US and free world military strength and contains much useful material about our present military posture and the measures we are taking to increase its effectiveness. The NATO heads of State meeting [3] provides additional important evidence of free world unity in facing up to the realities of the Soviet challenge.

---

[2] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957,* pp. 789–799.

[3] Reference is to the NATO Heads of Government meeting at Paris, December 16–19, 1957.

B. Increasing US and Free World Scientific Strength

In his November 7 address, the President said that the recent Soviet scientific accomplishments "have provided us all with renewed evidence of Soviet competence in science and techniques important to modern warfare." He also pointed out the critical problem posed for us in the future by the heavy emphasis the Soviets have been placing on training of scientists and engineers.

To meet the situation posed by these facts, the US is taking specific steps to strengthen scientific education and basic research, and is formulating ways of improving the coordination and exchange of scientific information with friendly countries. Such measures can be expected to contribute substantially to increased free world security.

The recent Soviet scientific achievements have tended temporarily to obscure the clear overall advantage the free world holds in most fields of science and technology, including the broad range of peaceful scientific and technological accomplishments that—in contrast with the Soviet system—have resulted in direct material benefits to millions of people in every country. To help exploit this advantage more fully, posts will be provided with an increased flow of materials illustrating the high level and the humane and diversified character of free world science as it has flourished under free political and economic institutions.

C. The Continuing Search for Peace

Present emphasis on the effectiveness of the free world military posture and the measures being taken to improve it should not be allowed to obscure the overriding objective of US policy: the achievement of a secure and lasting peace. As public opinion overseas begins to reflect on the rapid and dramatic developments of recent months, there is likely to be a strong resurgence of concern as to what lies beyond the apparently unending upward spiral of armaments. Already in many areas the preoccupying question is not "Who's ahead in the arms race?" but rather "What are the prospects now for war or peace?"

An indispensable element of our national posture, therefore, must be sustained evidence of our active pursuit of peace and reduction of tensions. We can point to an impressive recent history of US efforts for peace since the end of World War II: our role in originating the United Nations, in proposing control of atomic energy, in negotiating for disarmament, in initiating the atoms-for-peace program and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and in seeking settlement of outstanding political issues. But it is even more important to emphasize that in spite of current Soviet intransigeance, the US and its partners remain committed to the first-step disarmament measures proposed in London last August for nuclear control, prevention of surprise attack, suspension of tests, and reduction of armed forces and armaments. The maintenance of the necessary deterrent military strength does not in any way conflict with our efforts for peace; it supports these efforts by reducing the possibility of aggression and providing the opportunity for continued search for the peaceful settlement of differences and for a way out of the nuclear dilemma.

The main thing is that the US and the free world should appear to be strong and growing in strength in all departments, scientific, military, economic, and this strength is dedicated to peace. The element of belligerence, therefore, should never be allowed to enter into the statement of our case.

Allen

---

360. Memorandum From Charles A. Haskins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)[1]

Washington, February 3, 1958.

SUBJECT

U.S. Scientific Satellite

1. On the night of Friday, January 31, 1958 the U.S., using the Jupiter C launching vehicle, successfully placed in orbit around the earth the partially instrumented satellite Explorer.

2. NSC 5520, approved by the President on May 27, 1955, sets forth policy on the U.S. Scientific Satellite Program. The Courses of Action in that paper read, in pertinent part:

"Initiate a program in the Department of Defense to develop the capability of launching a small scientific satellite by 1958 . . . [2]
"Endeavor to launch a small scientific satellite under international auspices, such as the International Geophysical Year . . . "

3. Three Council actions are also pertinent:

(1) On January 24, 1957 the Council:

---

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean-Up, Satellites. Secret.

[2] All ellipses are in the source text.

"Noted the President's directive that the present program under NSC 5520, of endeavoring to launch six scientific satellites, should be continued; but that the Department of Defense should submit to the Council a progress report on the [satellite] [3] program at any time a significant development occurs, but not later than the completion of the third attempted launching." (NSC Action No. 1656–b)

(2) On May 10, 1957 the Council:

"Noted the President's directive that the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520 should be continued on no more elaborate basis than at present and under the following conditions:

. . . .

"(3) In addition to the report required under NSC Action No. 1656–b, the Department of Defense should submit a report to the Council immediately if one of the test vehicles is successfully orbited as a satellite." (NSC Action No. 1713)

(3) On January 22, 1958 the "IGY scientific satellite (Vanguard–Jupiter C) programs," along with six others, were placed in the highest priority both for research and development and for achieving operational capability. (NSC Action No. 1846)

4. Explorer is not the scientific earth satellite contemplated by NSC 5520 or by NSC Actions 1656–b or 1713. Explorer can be regarded as a "significant development" requiring a progress report under NSC Action No. 1656–b. The report required by NSC Action 1713 "if one of the test vehicles is successfully orbited as a satellite" applied specifically to the Vanguard program, but might now be construed to encompass a successful Jupiter C as well.

5. It is my understanding that the Vanguard program will continue; and the press has reported that the Army will attempt to launch another Jupiter C. Although it is not apparent that any further policy guidance from the Council is required at the moment, it would certainly be timely to have Defense brief the Council on where the IGY scientific satellite programs go from here.

CAH

---

[3] Brackets in the source text.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

361. Editorial Note

During 1954–1958, the United States Government in general, and the Department of State in particular, devoted substantial attention and energies to the preparation, planning, and implementation of United States scientific programs within the framework of the International Geophysical Year.

The origins of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) go back to 1950 when the Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere (MCI) recommended to its parent international scientific body, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), a third Polar Year similar to the Second Polar Year organized under the auspices of a number of international scientific bodies in 1932–1933 to conduct coordinated international scientific observations in the polar areas. The ICSU Bureau, the eight-member executive body of the Council, endorsed the MCI plan in January 1951 and in October of that year the ICSU Executive Board decided to create a special committee to work on plans for a third Polar Year. In March 1952 the ICSU Bureau named an eight-person committee to study the matter in detail and invitations were issued to all nations adhering to the ICSU to join the effort. The Soviet Union was not a member of ICSU, but later agreed to join the international effort in its capacity as member of several subsidiary ICSU organizations.

As more nations agreed to join the enterprise, objections were raised as to confining scientific endeavors and observations to the polar regions and it was proposed to name the forthcoming endeavor the International Geophysical Year. The special eight-person committee named in March 1952 and now somewhat enlarged met at Brussels from June 30 to July 3, 1953. Continuing to represent international scientific unions rather than national groups, this committee named itself the Comité Spécial de l'Année Géophysique Internationale (CSAGI) and it was chosen to run the IGY. May 1954 was set as the deadline for the submission of detailed national programs for the dispatch of expeditions and for observation. Thus, 2½ years lead time was available before the beginning of the IGY, which was scheduled to open on July 1, 1957, and run through December 1958 in order to take maximum advantage of the period of expected peak sun spot activity and eclipses.

Although the IGY was concerned with numerous scientific programs of planetary observation and evaluation including the Arctic, the equatorial region, and three selected pole-to-pole meridians along which a maximum number of tests and observations were conducted, the chief foci of all efforts were Antarctica and the exploration of outer space through the launching of various earth satellites by rocketry. Considerations of space have precluded documentary treatment of the United States Government's strong interest and participation in all aspects of the IGY expressed chiefly through the National Academy of Sciences and the Operations Coordinating Board and, in lesser measure, through the Departments of State and Defense. However, a number of Department of State files contain information concerning planning and implementation of IGY projects plus government reaction to Soviet IGY achievements, specifically the launching of the first Earth Satellite ("Sputnik"). These files are: S/SA Files: Lot 61 D 333, filled with detailed records of United States participation in the numerous CSAGI and regional scientific meetings during the years 1955–1958; S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, containing rich documentation on strategic and scientific planning and implementation of various IGY projects in which the United States participated; P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661, containing information on the American Earth Satellite program; and Central Files, 031, 702.22 and 911.80, 81, and 82, concerned with scientific expeditions, Antarctica, and general scientific subjects, respectively.

Index

- Adair, H. Ross, 434, 445
- Adams, Sherman, 128*n*, 246*n*, 326–327, 755
- Adams, Ware, 189*n*, 232, 248, 646
- Aerobee rocket, 727
- Afghanistan:
  - Law of the Sea, 602–603
  - United Nations, 52, 124, 159, 188, 219
    - Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 488, 489, 507
- Africa, 500–501
- Aiken, George D., 364*n*
- Albania, 209, 507, 572, 604
  - U.N. admission for, 104, 264, 276, 281, 286, 295–296, 372, 429
    - British position, 380–381
    - Package proposal, 269–270, 285, 329–330, 336, 339*n*
    - Soviet position, 370, 375
    - U.S. position, 279, 283, 304–305, 311, 322, 327, 352–353, 357, 419
- Aldrich, Winthrop W., 413–414, 467, 472
- Algeria (*see also* North Africa), 44–45, 49–50, 54–55, 58, 83–85, 126, 216, 259–260, 504
- Allen, George V., 64*n*, 467, 773, 779–782
- Allen, Ward P., 263
- Allison, John M., 414–415, 441–442, 444–445, 449–450, 452–454, 457–459, 475
- Alphand, Hervé, 338*n*, 348, 367–368, 380, 381, 400, 425
- Anderson, Dillon, 620–621, 626, 640–641, 732, 734*n*, 735, 738, 740
- Anderson, W. Stratton, 716*n*, 718*n*
- Antarctica (*see also under specific country headings*):
  - Atomic testing in, 645, 647, 651–652, 683, 704

Antarctica—Continued
  - Australia, 610, 613, 615–616, 622–628
  - Background on, 716–717
  - Chile, 613, 615–616
  - Condominium in, 642, 649–656, 666, 674, 679, 680–682, 685–686, 698, 701–704, 717, 720
  - Drake Passage, 620, 659, 677, 696
  - Fisheries, 669–670
  - Four-Power talks on, 710–718
  - International administration, 676–677
  - International cooperation in, 645, 666, 668–671, 678, 696
  - Knox Coast, 620, 627, 629
  - Little America, 620, 623
  - Location of U.S. interests in, 611–619
  - Mapping of, 626–627, 630, 669, 678, 695, 699
  - Marie Byrd Land, 613, 710
  - Military significance of, 638–639, 651–652, 662–663, 671
  - Minerals in, 624, 669–671
  - New Zealand, 608*n*, 613, 616, 628
  - Norway, 613, 616
  - Palmer Peninsula, 613, 620, 669, 671, 677, 696
  - Radio communications in, 668–669
  - Ross Island, 608*n*
  - Soviet interest in, 609, 614, 650, 686, 695, 709
    - Australian position, 656, 658, 661, 671, 676, 694
    - British position, 676, 694
    - New Zealand position, 676, 694
    - U.S. position, 633, 659–661
  - Territorial claims in, 608*n*, 609–610, 625, 711

Antarctica—Continued
  Territorial claims in—Continued
    U.S. proposed claims, 657, 661, 663–664, 668–670, 673–680, 690–692, 698, 718–719
  United Kingdom, 612–613, 616, 628
  U.N. trusteeship for, 643–654, 656–657, 661, 663, 666, 674–690, 696, 698–699, 702–710
  U.S. bases in, 679–680, 691, 701
    Byrd, 701*n*
    Marie Byrd Land, 620
    McMurdo Sound, 620, 623, 701*n*
    South Pole, 620, 701*n*
    Weddell Sea, 612–614, 620, 701*n*
  U.S. policy toward, 607–608, 632–637, 649–650, 693–710
  Weather in, 624, 640, 666, 668–669, 671
Anti-colonial countries, 66–72
ANZUS, 249, 251, 627
Apartheid, 13, 45, 51, 57, 84, 122, 217–218
Appleby, Paul, 142, 238
Arab-Israeli dispute, 231, 255
Argentina (*see also Argentina and Argentine subheadings under other subjects*):
  Antarctica, 610, 612–613, 615–616
    Condominium in, 649, 656, 674, 679, 682, 685, 703, 717, 720
    Territorial claims, 609, 633, 649, 653, 655, 676–677, 695–696
    U.N. trusteeship for, 647–649, 674, 684, 687, 706, 708
  Law of the Sea, 556
  United Nations, 27, 105, 120, 145, 202*n*, 211–212, 216
    Membership issues, 209, 369, 488, 494–495, 507
  United States, relations with, 651
Armand-Ugon, Enrique C., 99, 107
Armour, Norman, 289*n*
Arneson, R. Gordon, 768
Articles on the Regime of the Territorial Sea. *See* Law of the Sea.
Artificial satellites. *See* Earth satellites.
Atlas rocket, 727
Atomic energy, 16–17, 44, 46, 50, 55
Atomic radiation, 14–15, 44, 46, 50, 55, 215
Atomic war, 171
Atomic weapons, 14–15, 50, 123, 249, 645, 647, 651–652, 683, 704, 757, 782
Atoms-for-peace program, 781
Australia (*see also Australia and Australian subheadings under other subjects*), 12, 17, 19, 213, 729
  Antarctica:
    Condominium in, 649, 656, 685, 717, 720
    Territorial claims, 609, 633, 676, 695
    U.N. trusteeship for, 647, 674, 684, 687, 706, 708
  United Nations, 105–106, 211, 233–234, 475
    Charter review, 5, 27, 31, 37
    Membership issues, 209, 294, 369, 393, 490, 496–497, 505, 507
Austria, 406, 602–603
  United Nations, 102*n*, 188, 219
    Admission to, 104, 275–277, 333, 336, 372, 389
      Soviet position, 264–265, 273, 285–286, 294, 321, 356
      U.S. position, 269–270, 279–281, 283–284, 295, 311, 352–353, 355, 419
    Membership issues, 209, 488–489, 507
Austrian State Treaty, 274*n*, 307

Bacon, Ruth E., 100*n*, 282*n*, 297*n*, 386, 389*n*, 422*n*, 425*n*, 455*n*, 477, 690
Badawi, Abdel Hamid, 107, 212
Baghdad Pact. *See* Middle East Treaty Organization.
Baker, Vincent, 176*n*
Ballistic missiles. *See* Rockets.
Bandung Conference, 41, 110*n*, 274–277, 280–283, 286, 298, 321, 336, 353–354, 357
Bane, David, 644*n*, 646*n*, 653*n*, 659–661, 673, 690
Barbour, Walworth, 611*n*, 616*n*, 618–620, 630*n*, 631*n*
Barco, James W., 1*n*, 36, 114, 141, 194, 260*n*, 289*n*, 416*n*
Barulin, Alexandr, 258, 262
Basdevant, Jules, 107
Becker, Loftus, 248, 251–254, 569, 577, 581*n*
Belaúnde, Victor A., 273, 286, 296, 320, 341–342, 346, 358, 361, 382–383, 409–410, 418
Belgium, 17, 770
  Antarctica, 695, 716, 720
  United Nations, 31, 33, 105–106, 119, 209, 400, 450–451, 505, 507

- Bell, Laird, 30–31, 36–37
- Bellegarde, Dantes, 13
- Bellingshausen, Adm. Fabian Gottleib von, 633, 650, 671, 695, 720
- Ben Gurion, David, 195
- Bender, Albert F., 128, 132, 133*n*, 141, 145–147, 202–203, 233–239
- Berding, Andrew H., 774, 778
- Binaghi, Walter, 769–770, 771*n*
- Bishop, Max, 618
- Blake, Robert O., 154
- Blakeney, F.J., 624
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 59–61, 63*n*, 172*n*, 176*n*
- Boas, Frank, 569
- Boggs, Marion W., 667, 675
- Bohlen, Charles E., 164, 241, 351, 455–457
- Bolivia, 120, 209, 235, 488, 507, 602–603
- Bolton, Frances P., 500–501
- Bond, Niles, 40*n*, 114, 291*n*, 293*n*, 436*n*
- Bonin Islands, 698
- Bowdler, William G., 652*n*, 653*n*
- Bowie, Robert R., 64*n*, 347, 663–664, 675
- Brazil, 12, 50, 171, 313*n*, 553
  - United Nations, 52, 105, 120, 188, 209, 216, 226, 369, 505, 507
- British-Australian Guided Missile Range, Woomera, Australia, 729
- Bronk, Detlev W., 748–750, 761, 763, 773
- Brown, Barry, 48
- Brown, Constantine, 46
- Brown, Elizabeth Ann, 264, 267*n*, 277*n*, 283*n*, 389*n*, 418*n*, 455*n*
- Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 325
- Brucker, Wilber M., 465
- Brundage, Percival, 692, 748*n*, 751, 753
- Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 627
- Bulgaria, 572
  - United Nations, 12, 106, 124, 145, 159, 188, 219
    - Admission to, 104, 264, 276, 281, 295–296, 331, 333, 372, 429
      - Package proposal, 269–270, 285–286, 329, 336, 339*n*
      - Soviet position, 370, 375
      - U.S. position, 279, 283, 305, 311, 322, 327, 352–353, 357, 419
- Bunche, Ralph, 233, 247
- Bunker, Ellsworth, 147
  - United Nations, 12, 106, 124, 145, 159, 188, 219
    - Charter review, 27, 29, 32–33, 36–37
- Bunker, Ellsworth—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 488, 507
- Burma:
  - United Nations, 12, 106, 124, 145, 159, 188, 219
    - Charter review, 27, 29, 32–33, 36–37
    - Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 488, 507
- Burns, Robert L., 581
- Byelo-Russia, 209, 348, 507, 572
- Byrd, Richard E., 625*n*
- Byrd, Robert C., 434, 445, 449

- Cabell, Lt. Gen. Charles P., 621
- Caccia, Harold, 467
- Cambodia:
  - United Nations, 124
    - Admission to, 104, 268, 281, 372
      - Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
      - Soviet position, 264, 270, 285, 321
      - U.S. position, 269, 276–277, 283, 295, 311, 419
    - Membership issues, 210, 490, 507
- Canada (*see also Canada and Canadian subheadings under other subjects*), 313*n*
  - Atomic energy, 16–17
  - Law of the Sea, 534, 591–592, 595–596, 598, 605–606
  - Outer space, 770–771
  - United Nations, 105, 116–117, 145, 173–174, 211, 215, 222, 309
    - Charter review, 27, 31, 37, 226
    - Membership issues, 209, 294–295, 488–489, 507
- Cape Canaveral, 774, 778
- Carnahan, Albert Sidney Johnson, 237–239, 243
- Carothers, Neil, III, 626
- Casey, Richard G., 622–625, 627–628
- Central Intelligence Agency, 758*n*
- Ceylon:
  - United Kingdom, relations with, 343, 348
  - United Nations, 120, 124, 159, 188, 213, 219
    - Admission to, 104, 281, 355, 372, 389
      - Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357

- Ceylon—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Admission to—Continued
      - Soviet position, 264, 270, 285–286, 321
      - U.S. position, 269, 276–277, 283, 295, 311, 419
    - Membership issues, 209, 490, 506
- Chetchetkin, Igor V., 202–203
- Chiang Kai-shek, 317*n*, 464–466
  - Mongolian People's Republic, U.N. admission to, 379, 387–391, 394, 404*n*, 408, 412–413, 420–422, 426–427, 429–432, 436–439, 464–467
- Chile:
  - Antarctica, 610
    - Condominium in, 649, 656, 674, 679, 682, 685, 703, 717–720
    - Territorial claims in, 609, 633, 649, 653, 655, 676–677, 695–696
    - U.N. trusteeship for, 647–649, 674, 684, 687, 706, 708
  - Law of the Sea, 529, 539, 555–556, 586
  - United Nations, 120, 212
    - Charter review, 26*n*, 31, 37
    - Membership issues, 209, 488, 505, 507
  - United States, relations with, 651
- China, People's Republic of, 51, 301, 508–509, 758
- China, representation in the United Nations. *See* Chinese representation in *under* United Nations.
- China, Republic of (*see also China, Republic of subheadings under other subjects*):
  - Attacks on British shipping, 293
  - Japan, relations with, 414–415, 452, 458–459
  - Law of the Sea, 532
  - Military agreement with the United States, 251
  - Soviet Union, relations with, 401–402
  - Tachen Islands, 403
  - United Nations, 145, 195*n*, 197*n*, 239–240
    - Charter review, 26*n*, 31, 33, 37
    - Security Council seat for, 105–106, 211–212, 228
  - United States, relations with, 171, 403–404, 466–467
- Chiperfield, Robert B., 311, 362
- Chromium, 671
- Church, Marguerite Stitt, 434, 445
- Ciudad Trujillo Conference. *See* Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources . . . *under* Law of the Sea.
- Coal, 670
- Cobalt, 671
- Colclaser, H. Alberta, 769*n*
- Cold war, 55–56, 58–59, 65, 110
- Collective Measures Committee. *See under* United Nations General Assembly.
- Collective Security Project, 248–257
- Colombia:
  - United Nations, 119–120
    - Charter review, 26*n*, 27, 31, 37
    - Membership issues, 209, 369, 488, 496–497, 505, 507
- Colonialism (*see also* Self-determiniation), 43–45, 56, 66, 110, 207, 323, 460
- Comité Special de l'Année Geophysique Internationale, 784–785
- Communism, 55, 273, 274*n*, 432
- Congress, U.S., 699
  - Acts of:
    - Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, *1953*, 532–533
    - Submerged Lands Act, 520
  - House Foreign Affairs Committee, 434, 439–443
  - Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 272
  - U.N. membership issues, 310–311, 316, 434–435, 439–445, 449–450
- Continental shelf (*see also* Law of the Sea), 532–535
- Cook, Charles D., 117*n*, 241*n*, 311*n*
- Copper, 671
- Corcoran, Thomas J., 493*n*, 499*n*
- Cordova, Roberto, 99, 107
- Costa Rica, 12, 52, 120, 556
  - U.N. membership issues, 209, 369, 488, 505, 507
- Couve de Murville, Maurice, 308–309, 312*n*
- Crawford, Boyd, 364
- Crosthwaite, Ponsonby Moore, 27, 38, 288, 312, 315
- Crowe, M.A., 369
- Crowe, Philip K., 287
- Crowley, Edwin D., 631*n*, 659, 661, 673, 690
- Cuba (*see also Cuba and Cuban subheadings under other subjects*):
  - Law of the Sea, 535, 554
  - United Nations, 27, 120, 202*n*, 216

Cuba—Continued
  United Nations—Continued
    Council seats in, 12, 105, 211
    Membership issues, 209, 383, 430, 493*n*, 496–497, 507
Cutler, Robert:
  Antarctica, 658, 664, 665–667, 672–673, 691, 693
  Earth satellites, 735, 742–743, 745–753, 755, 757, 761–765, 774
Cyprus, 49, 58, 70, 72, 125–126, 216, 259–260, 469
Czechoslovakia, 50, 215, 602
  United Nations, 105, 120, 188, 225
    Charter review, 26*n*, 27, 31, 37
    Membership issues, 209, 332, 506–507

Daniels, Paul C., 713–714, 716, 722*n*
David, Paul T., 769–770, 771*n*
de Margerie, 347–349
De Palma, Samuel, 100–101, 291*n*, 644*n*
Dearborn, Henry M., 776
Defense, U.S. Department of:
  Antarctica, 627, 659, 661–662, 700
  Earth satellites, 726, 734*n*, 743, 750, 764, 777
  Law of the Sea, 521, 566
Denmark, 209, 213, 369, 488–489, 507
Deutsche Innen-und Aussenhandel Co., 167
Diaz-Ordonez, Virgilio, 383
Disarmament, 15–16, 44, 49, 54, 124, 214–215, 260, 762, 782
Disarmament Commission, 15–16, 230, 309
Dixon, Pierson J.:
  United Nations:
    Charter review, 3, 30, 38*n*
    Membership issues, 309–310, 343–344, 359–360, 367–368, 380–382, 397, 411–412, 448–449, 474
Dominican Republic, 554
  United Nations, 31, 37, 105, 120, 211–212, 216
    Membership issues, 209, 383, 488, 507
Dreier, John C., 513–515, 518, 519*n*, 553*n*
du Plessis, W.C., 713–714
Dubs, Adolph, 570
Dufek, Adm. George, 607, 608*n*, 623, 626, 663, 665, 667, 670–672
Dulles, Allen W., 329–330, 626, 733, 743, 750–751, 757–758, 762–763
Dulles, John Foster, 7, 151*n*, 260*n*, 313, 316*n*, 389*n*, 416*n*
  Antarctica, 627, 641, 652, 655, 690–691, 711, 716*n*, 718*n*
  Austria, 274
  Collective Security Project, 251, 253–254
  Earth satellites, 771–772
  Human rights covenants, 21*n*, 22*n*
  Law of the Sea, 538, 552–558, 566–567, 570–572, 597–603
  Self-determination, 69
  Sputnik, effect of, 768
  United Nations, 168–169, 227, 246
    Charter review, 2, 4–6, 32–33, 192, 194
    Corps for observation and patrol, 204, 247
    Enlargement of councils in, 98–100, 148–149, 151–152
    Membership issues, 297, 299, 321–322, 326–328, 333, 337–338, 341, 346
      British resolution, 418
      Canadian resolution, 392–393, 395–397, 415–416
      Chinese representation, 467–469, 473–474, 502–503
      French position, 308, 333
      Italian position, 307, 431–433
      Japan, 475, 476*n*
      Korea, Republic of, 490–491, 495–496
      Mongolian People's Republic, 388–390, 408–409, 422, 425–426 436–438, 443
      Spanish position, 317–318
      U.S. position, 293, 374, 379, 410, 419–420, 439–441
      U.S.-Soviet negotiations, 351–356
      Vietnam, Republic of, 491, 495–496
    Non-member participation, 272, 288–289, 291–292
    Scale of assessments, 115–117, 198–202
    Secretary-General election, 197–198, 232, 241–242
  United Nations General Assembly, 10–17, 108, 134
    Speech in, 230–231, 303–304, 335

- Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  - U.S. anti-Soviet incidents, 160–161, 242–243
- Duncan, Adm. Donald B., 641–642
- Dunne, Irene, 239

- Earth satellites:
  - Costs of, 726–727, 736–740, 745–754
  - Development of, 734–747
  - Explorer I, 782–783
  - Hazards of, 729–730
  - Instrumentation of, 739, 744, 749, 752
  - Intelligence uses of, 759–760
  - International interest in, 736, 750
  - Launching of, 764–767, 771–779
  - Military uses of, 725, 728, 751
  - Soviet, 757–764, 768, 779–782, 785
  - Sputnik I, 754, 768, 785
  - Sputnik II, 768
  - Tracking of, 728–729
  - U.S. policy on, 723–727
  - Vanguard project, 748*n*, 758, 760
- Eastern Europe, 76
- Eastland, James O., 61–62, 97
- East-West trade, 154–155
- Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 19–20, 51
  - Elections to, 12, 52, 65, 87, 211–212
  - Enlargement of, 60, 99, 105–106, 120–121, 213
- Ecuador:
  - Law of the Sea, 529, 539, 552, 555–556, 586
  - United Nations, 37, 105, 120, 187
    - Membership issues, 209, 488, 507
- Eden, Anthony, 287*n*, 360, 467, 470–471
- Egypt:
  - Suez crisis, 141, 170, 196, 501
  - United Nations, 105, 124, 159, 188, 211–212, 219
    - Charter review, 27, 29, 37, 226
    - Good Offices Committee, 264, 268, 273, 285
    - Membership issues, 209, 361, 488–489, 507
- Eire. *See* Ireland.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 7, 141, 170–171, 250, 303, 331–332, 429, 470–471
  - Antarctica, 610, 640–642, 658, 690, 718–719
  - Atoms-for-Peace program, 781
  - Earth satellites, 732–734, 736–741, 745–747, 748–756, 764–767, 771–772
  - Rockets, 763, 775
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
  - United Nations, 259
    - Membership issues, 318, 325, 327, 467–468, 478, 486–487
      - Mongolian People's Republic, 379, 388, 408–409, 412–413, 423, 437–438, 443, 464
- El Salvador, 12, 37, 120, 209, 226, 235, 488, 507, 556
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 300, 774*n*
- English, Benedict M., 569
- Entezam, Nasrollah, 360, 367
- Ernst, Roger, 659
- Ethiopia, 159, 209, 488, 504–505, 507
- Etorofu Island, 479

- Falkland Islands, 677, 696
- Farley, Philip J., 774, 778*n*
- Faro, Louis de, 13
- Federal Republic of Germany. *See* Germany, Federal Republic of.
- Fedorenko, Nikolai T., 240, 244
- Finland:
  - United Nations, 102*n*, 120, 144, 188, 219, 229
    - Admission to, 104, 270, 275, 281, 283, 336, 372
      - Soviet position, 264, 285–286, 321, 356
      - U.S. position, 265, 269, 276–277, 295, 311, 352–353, 419
    - Membership issues, 209, 400, 507
- Fisheries. *See under* Law of the Sea.
- Flanders, Ralph E., 619
- Flemming, Arthur S., 621, 737, 742*n*, 746
- Fobes, John E., 40*n*, 128, 132, 133*n*, 141, 147, 202*n*
- Forced labor, 52, 65, 71–72, 112
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 758
- Formosa (*see also* China, Republic of), 509
- Foster, Adm. Paul F., 626
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meetings, Geneva, *1955*, 15
- France, 16, 56, 460
  - Algeria issue, 50, 85, 126, 217
  - Antarctica, 610, 613, 616
    - Condominium in, 649, 656, 685, 717, 720
    - Territorial claims, 609, 633, 676, 695
    - U.N. trusteeship for, 647, 684, 706, 708
  - United Nations, 105–106, 202*n*, 211–212, 215

France—Continued
  United Nations—Continued
    Charter review, 26*n*, 31, 33, 37
    Membership issues, 209, 294–295, 299, 333, 394, 496–497, 506*n*, 507
    Secretary-General election, 195, 197, 203*n*
Francois, J.P.A., 531
Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Convention, 525
Freedom of Space, 724–725, 755, 759, 769–771
Freers, Edward L., 778*n*
Freitas-Valle, 446, 448
Frye, William, 47
Fulbright, J. William, 364*n*
Fur Seal Convention, *1911*, 525
Fur seals, 593, 596
Furnas, Clifford C., 743, 745–746

Ganem, Andre, 460
Gates, Thomas S., 766–767
Gbedemah, 500
Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, *1954*, 499
Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government, *July 1955*, 7, 17, 278, 283, 331
Gerig, Benjamin, 673
George, Walter, 311, 363*n*
German Democratic Republic, 167–168
Germany, 76, 269–270
Germany, Federal Republic of, 171–172, 267, 276, 329, 336, 720
Ghana, 200, 210, 236, 496*n*, 497, 500, 504, 507
Glazebrook, George P. de T., 395–396
Gleason, S. Everett, 622, 640*n*, 643, 672–673, 732*n*, 742, 748, 764, 771*n*
Glendinning, C. Dillon, 626
Godel, William, 619–620
Gold, 670
Gold Coast, 460
Good Offices Committee. *See under* United Nations General Assembly.
Goodpaster, Andrew J., 467, 755
Goott, Daniel, 154–155
Gough, Betty C., 36, 141
Gray, Gordon, 325, 347, 468*n*, 626
Greece, 125, 532
  United Nations:
    Charter review, 27, 29, 32–33, 36
    Cyprus issue, 49, 58, 125, 216

Greece—Continued
  United Nations—Continued
    Membership issues, 209, 488–489, 505, 507
    Security Council seats in, 12, 102*n*, 105, 144, 229
Green, James F., 40*n*
Green, Theodore Francis, 363*n*
Greenbaum, Edward S., 143
Greenland, 45
Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 157–158, 160–161, 241, 243, 347
Guatemala, 12, 106, 209, 488, 506–507, 553
Guerrero, Jose Gustavo, 99, 107
Guryanov, Alexandr K., 98*n*

Habomai Islands, 479
Hackworth, Green, 107
Hagen, John P., 749, 755, 760
Hagerty, James C., 734, 755
Haiti, 106, 120, 209, 507
Halibut Convention, 525
Hall, William O., 460
Halleck, Charles A., 311
Hamilton, Thomas J., 43, 46–47, 429
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 1–2, 97, 498, 542
  Election as U.N. Secretary-General, 195, 197–198, 202–203, 211, 232, 241
Han, Phillip, 483
Hancock, Patrick, 347
Hanes, John W., 204, 248*n*
Harlow, Bryce N., 755
Harsh, Joseph C., 48
Hartley, Virginia F., 189–192, 254*n*, 475*n*, 495*n*
Haskins, Charles A., 782–783
Hatoyama, Ichiro, 449–450, 452–453, 457, 476
Hays, Brooks, 36, 323
Hearn, Capt. William, 581*n*
Heeney, Arnold D.P., 393, 462*n*, 477–478
Heinzen, Bernard G., 569
Herrington, William C., 524–528, 550–552, 553*n*, 577*n*, 581*n*, 582–584, 590*n*
Herter, Christian, 205–220, 261–262, 497, 506–510
  Earth satellites, 751, 761–762, 774, 778
  Law of the Sea, 572, 574, 581–590, 606
Hewitt, Warren E., 659, 661
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 334, 363
Hickerson, John D., 92

- Hilliker, Grant G., 608, 618–619
- Hirsch, Richard, 776*n*
- Hoffman, Paul G., 146
- Holaday, William M., 738, 748–749, 752, 755, 776
- Holland, Henry F., 64*n*, 538*n*, 550, 553*n*
- Hollister, John B., 626
- Honduras, 120, 209, 383, 488, 507
- Hoover, Herbert J., Jr., 334*n*, 335*n*, 345*n*, 568
  - Antarctica, 609*n*, 611*n*, 616*n*, 621, 626–628, 630–632, 643–645
  - United Nations, 26–27, 128*n*, 134, 141
    - Membership issues, 299, 316, 317*n*, 321, 323–328, 341, 362, 391*n*, 401–404, 454–455
      - Chinese representation, 300–301, 471, 473*n*
- Horsey, Outerbridge, 484, 486*n*, 622*n*, 624, 630*n*, 634*n*
- Howe, Fisher, 572
- Hsu Mo, 107, 119, 531–532
- Hu Shih, 234
- Hughes, Rowland R., 532
- Human rights, 21, 54–57, 65, 71–72, 112
- Humphrey, George, 325, 733, 737–739, 746, 752
- Humphrey, Hubert H., 155–156, 164*n*, 364
- Hungary, 602
  - Revolt in, 133, 145, 161, 213–214
  - United Nations, 84, 188, 213, 216, 217, 219
    - Admission to, 104, 270, 281, 285–286, 295–296, 329, 336, 357, 372, 429
      - Soviet position, 264, 339*n*, 370, 375
      - U.S. position, 269, 276, 279, 283, 305, 311, 322, 327, 331, 333, 352–353, 419
    - Membership issues, 204, 507

- Iceland, 209, 285, 369, 507, 526
- Iguchi, Sadao, 384
- India (*see also India and Indian subheadings under other subjects*), 50, 74, 126–127, 352
  - Kashmir dispute, 255, 259
  - South Africa, relations with, 13, 122, 218
  - United Nations, 41, 124, 138, 174, 188, 202*n*, 216, 219, 222
- India—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Antarctic trusteeship proposal, 123, 643–649, 651–653, 656–657, 666, 677, 689, 696, 703–707
    - Charter review, 26*n*, 27, 31–33, 37, 226
    - Council seats in, 12, 48, 106, 120
    - Enlargement of councils, 102, 114, 130, 159, 187, 190, 192
    - Membership issues, 209, 290, 358, 369, 393, 488, 507
  - United States, relations with, 69, 246
- Indonesia:
  - United Nations, 50, 124–125, 159, 188, 219, 568
    - Charter review, 27, 29, 32–33, 36, 226
    - Council seats for, 12, 48, 52, 105
    - Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 507
- Inter-American Conference, Tenth, Caracas, *1954*, 535, 539
- Inter-American Council of Jurists, 523, 527, 536
- Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters. *See under* Law of the Sea.
- Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 253, 515, 706
- Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 541
- Intercontinental ballistic missiles. *See* Rockets.
- Interior, U.S. Department of the, 627, 663, 667, 669–670, 698
- Intermediate-range ballistic missiles. *See* Rockets.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, 227, 229, 781
- International Civil Aviation Organization, 769–770, 771*n*
- International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea, *1958*, 570–590, 597–606
- International Council of Scientific Unions, 784
- International Court of Justice (World Court), 98–99, 106, 114, 119–121, 212–213, 250, 255, 284, 516, 636–637, 649
- International Finance Corporation, 20, 51

International Geophysical Year (IGY):
  Antarctica, 640, 700, 785
    Soviet activities in, 629, 631–636, 650, 676, 694
    U.S. activities in, 610, 622, 628–629, 638–639, 665, 676
  Earth satellites, 725–726, 731, 734, 741, 742*n*, 750
  U.S. policy regarding, 784–785
International Labor Organization, 71
International Law Association, 530
International Law Commission, 22, 100, 114, 120–121, 515, 523
International Longshoremen's Association, 154
International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, *1955*, 522–524, 527–530, 541, 546, 594
International Union of Scientific Societies, 731
Iran, 105, 119, 171, 202*n*, 226, 568
  U.N. membership issues, 209, 369, 475, 506*n*, 507
Iraq, 37, 119, 124, 145, 159, 202*n*
  U.N. membership issues, 209, 369, 488, 505, 507
Ireland:
  Partition of, 349
  United Nations, 226
    Membership issues, 209, 504, 507
    Admission to, 104, 270, 281, 285, 372, 389
      Bandung Conference position, 286, 336
      Soviet position, 264, 321, 356
      U.S. position, 269, 276, 283, 295, 311, 318, 333, 352–353, 419
Irian. *See* West New Guinea.
Israel, 50, 195, 231, 255, 285, 354, 507
Italy (*see also Italy and Italian subheadings under other subjects*):
  China, Republic of, relations with, 406
  Communism in, 273, 274*n*, 432
  United Nations, 106, 119, 202*n*, 216
    Admission to, 104, 275, 281, 294, 372, 389
      French position, 370
      Latin American position, 436
      Package proposal, 270, 286, 336, 355
      Soviet position, 264, 273, 285, 321–322, 356
Italy—Continued
  United Nations—Continued
    Admission to—Continued
      U.S. position, 269, 276–277, 283–284, 294–295, 305, 311, 327, 333, 352–353, 419
    Membership issues, 209, 488–489, 493*n*, 505, 507
    Non-member participation, 267, 272
  United States, relations with, 307–308, 318

Jaeger, George W., 768
Jandrey, Frederick W., 261*n*
Japan (*see also Japan and Japanese subheadings under other subjects*), 171, 351–352, 414–415, 592, 770
  Antarctica, 695, 716, 720
  Korea, Republic of, relations with, 510–511, 526, 560
  Military agreement with the United States, 251
  Peace Treaty with the United States, 22*n*
  United Nations, 200, 211, 216, 228, 236, 272
    Admission to, 47, 268, 281, 372, 475–476, 478–479, 486–487
      Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
      Package proposal, 270, 285–286
      Soviet position, 264, 313–314, 321, 380–381, 450–455, 457–459, 475, 479–482
      U.S. position, 122, 265, 276–277, 279, 283–284, 295, 304–305, 327, 333, 419
      U.S.-Japanese talks on, 384–385, 484
    Membership issues, 210, 493*n*, 504–505, 507
Jarman, John, 434, 445
Jenner, William, 48
Jerusalem, 231
Johnson, Lyndon B., 311
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 638–639, 664, 667, 692, 732*n*, 734, 742
Jones, John Wesley, 308, 431
Jones, Richard Lee, 142–143, 146–147
Jordan:
  United Nations, 124, 159, 188, 219
    Admission to, 104, 281, 372

- Jordan:—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Admission to—Continued
      - Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
      - Package proposal, 269–270, 285–286
      - Soviet position, 264, 321
      - U.S. position, 265, 276–277, 283, 295, 311, 419
    - Membership issues, 210, 504, 507
- Judd, Walter, 238–239, 434, 441–442, 445, 449–450
- Jupiter rockets, 782–783

- Kase, Toshikazu, 399, 476*n*, 485
- Kashmir, 246, 255, 259
- Keegan, James M., 569
- Kerley, Ernest L., 569
- Ketcham, Capt. Jarrold, 608, 626
- Key, David McK., 267–268, 271, 277, 280–281
- Khalaf, Kadhif M., 202*n*
- Khalidy, Awni, 38
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., 757
- Kidron, Mordecai R., 448
- Killian, James R., Jr., 772–773, 776–777
- Killian Committee, 756, 763
- Kim Dong-jo, 483
- Kirkpatrick, Ivone A., 347
- Kirlin, Florence, 361, 532–535
- Kissick, Harold G., 40*n*, 522, 538*n*
- Klaestad, Helga, 107
- Knowland, William F., 142–143, 146–147, 311, 334, 338, 362
- Kojevaikov, Fedor Ivanovich, 107
- Koo, V.K. Wellington, 119, 212, 292–293, 373–374, 387, 427–431, 437, 464, 470
- Korea, 14, 52, 126, 259, 294–295, 297, 299, 509
- Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 211, 264, 305, 336, 430, 482, 489, 491, 495, 512
- Korea, Republic of:
  - Japan, relations with, 510–511, 526, 560
  - Military agreement with the United States, 251
  - United Nations:
    - Admission to, 268, 276, 278, 280–281, 285–286, 336, 362, 483–484, 488–491
      - Argentine position, 494–495
- Korea, Republic of—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Admission to—Continued
      - British position, 496–497, 503, 505
      - Canadian position, 505
      - China, Republic of, position, 496–497
      - Cuban proposal on, 430
      - French position, 505
      - Japanese position, 510–511
      - Soviet position, 210–211, 264, 270, 305, 479, 512
      - U.S. position, 122, 269, 322, 419, 480, 482, 495–497
- Korean Political Conference, Geneva, *1954*, 14
- Korean war, 181–182, 509
- Kossuth, Lajos, 358
- Kotelawala, John Lionel, 286–287, 360
- Kulazhenkov, Anatoliy G., 244
- Kunashiri Island, 479
- Kurile Islands, 453, 457
- Kuznetsov, Vasily V.:
  - United Nations, 144, 155, 169–170, 369
    - Membership issues, 319, 324, 339, 350, 366–367, 379–382, 384–385, 399
      - Use of vetoes, 305–306, 309, 313, 450–451

- Lall, Arthur S., 38
- Laos:
  - Law of the Sea, 602
  - United Nations:
    - Admission to, 104, 268, 281, 372
      - Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
      - Soviet position, 264, 270, 285, 321
      - U.S. position, 269, 276–277, 283, 295, 311, 419
    - Membership issues, 210, 490, 492–494, 507
- Larson, Arthur, 762–763
- Latin America:
  - Antarctica, 647–651, 687, 708
  - Atomic radiation, 51
  - Law of the Sea, 513–515, 518–522, 530, 536–541, 568
  - U.N. councils, enlargement of, 98–99, 149–152, 155–156, 161–162, 164
- Laugier, Henri, 13
- Lauterpacht, Hersch, 81*n*, 107

- Law of the Sea:
  - Continental shelf, 532–535
  - Fisheries, 537, 542–547, 575, 579–584, 597–599, 605–606, 669–670
    - Conservation of, 525–528, 546, 575–578, 581–584, 588–596
  - Innocent passage, 550
  - Inter-American relations regarding, 513–515, 518–522, 526
  - Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, Ciudad Trujillo, *1956*, 537–541, 552–557
    - Mexico City resolution, 535–536, 538*n*, 553–556
  - International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of the Sea, *1958*, 570–590, 597–606
  - International Law Commission draft articles on, 515–518, 527, 542–550, 557–558
  - International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, *1955*, 522–524, 527–530, 541, 546, 594
  - Landlocked states, 601–603
  - Military issues, 563–567, 588, 599–601
  - Navigation, 559
  - Submarine cables and pipelines, 547–548
  - Territorial waters, limits of, 531–532, 538, 548–552, 559–567, 569–570, 586–588, 599–601
- Lay, James S., Jr., 609, 626, 632, 643, 694, 723–724, 730, 732*n*
- Lead, 671
- Leahy, John S., 619
- Lebanon, 26*n*, 31, 124, 159, 209, 369, 488, 507
- Leffler, Ross, 581*n*
- Leonhart, William, 663, 690
- Leverich, Henry P., 242*n*
- Liberia, 12, 41, 120, 209, 226, 369, 507
- Libya:
  - United Nations, 20–21, 124, 188, 219
    - Admission to, 104, 269–270, 281, 372
      - Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
      - Soviet position, 264, 285, 321
      - U.S. position, 265, 276–277, 283, 295, 311, 419
- Libya—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Membership issues, 210, 488, 504, 507
- Lie, Trygve, 195*n*
- Liegert, John G., 667, 669–670
- Lippmann, Walter, 42, 47
- Lloyd, John Selwyn Brooke, 467, 474
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 109, 141, 145, 259–260, 307*n*, 311*n*, 391*n*, 451, 460
  - Earth satellites, 731, 733
  - Soviet seamen incident, 61, 97–98
  - United Nations:
    - Charter review, 1–8, 27–28, 30–32, 36, 194, 266–267
    - Corps for observation and patrol, 173–174, 205
    - Enlargement of councils in, 101, 114, 130, 144–145, 155–156, 159, 161–162, 164
    - Membership issues, 275, 299, 323–325, 341, 460
      - British position, 309–310, 312
      - Canadian position, 315–316
      - Canadian resolution, 369–370, 406–407, 415
      - Chinese representation, 302, 469, 473, 502
      - Congressional reaction to, 310, 361
      - French position, 312, 425
      - Ghana, 497, 500–501
      - Korea, Republic of, 488, 490, 494–497, 503, 505
      - Latin American position, 320, 383–384
      - Mongolian People's Republic, 395*n*, 404–406, 463, 485–487
      - Soviet Bloc countries, 330–337, 338*n*
      - U.S. position, 356–359, 374–380, 394, 399–401, 409–412, 419–420
      - U.S.-British discussions, 397–399
      - U.S.-Canadian negotiations, 365, 367–368, 393, 396
      - U.S.-Soviet discussions, 319, 366–367
      - Use of veto in, 321–323, 337, 338*n*, 339–342, 344–345, 346–347
      - Vietnam, Republic of, 488–490, 492–497, 503–505
    - Non-member participation, 271–272, 288–291

- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.—Continued
  - United Nations—Continued
    - Scale of assessments, 128–132, 142, 146–147, 202*n*, 233, 237–240, 243
    - Secretary-General election, 195, 197
    - Special Political Committee:
      - Soviet item, 167–172, 186
      - U.S. policies, 63–64
- Looney, Warren F., 522–524
- Lord, Mary P., 147
- Luboeansky, Earl H., 673, 690–691
- Lucet, Charles, 308, 479*n*
- Luxembourg, 202*n*, 209, 488, 505, 507, 602
- Lyon, Cecil B., 447–448

- MacArthur, Douglas, II, 347, 467, 474
- McCardle, Carl W., 64*n*, 347
- McClintock, Robert, 659–662, 673, 690
- McClurkin, Robert J.G., 384*n*
- Macomber, William B., 345*n*, 474
- McConaughy, Walter P., 292*n*, 386, 427*n*, 435*n*, 440*n*, 455*n*, 470*n*
- Macdonald, Thomas L., 628
- McElroy, Neil H., 764, 766–767
- McKay, D. Vernon, 40*n*
- MacKay, Robert A., 315, 393
- McKinnon, Robert A., 581*n*
- McSweeney, John M., 319, 448
- Macmillan, Harold, 288–289, 304–305, 315, 318, 324–327, 347–349
- Makins, Roger, 467, 473*n*
- Malaya, 210–211, 236, 504, 507, 509
- Malik, Charles, 208–209
- Malik, Yakov Alexandrovich, 313, 360, 366, 382–383
- Manganese, 671
- Mansfield, Cmdr. J.E., 640
- Marcy, Carl, 364
- Mark, David E., 604–605
- Martin, Joseph W., Jr., 311, 334, 362
- Martin, Paul, 341, 343–345, 360, 365, 367–370, 382, 385, 393, 397–399, 462–463
- Mattingly, Barak, 334
- Maybee, John, 477
- Mayer, Ernest de Wael, 690
- Maza, José, 11, 425, 448
- Meany, William, 46
- Meeker, Leonard C., 239, 370–372, 400, 525, 673, 690
- Menon, V.K. Krishna, 38, 147–148, 259, 360, 446, 455, 460, 652
- Merchant, Livingston T., 64*n*, 98*n*, 395*n*, 416*n*, 418*n*, 462*n*, 467, 634*n*
  - Antarctica, 609*n*, 616*n*, 622–623, 643–644
  - U.N. membership issue, 307, 313, 347, 351
- Merrow, Chester E., 36, 323
- Mewshaw, Franklin L., 195*n*, 234–235
- Mexico, 50, 120, 770
  - Law of the Sea, 519, 534–535, 553–554, 556, 560, 594
  - U.N. membership issues, 209, 488–489, 507
- Middle East Treaty Organization, 249, 251–252, 256–257
- Miller, Ralph L., 553*n*
- Mir Khan, 449
- Missiles. *See* Rockets.
- Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere, 784
- Mollet Plan, 217
- Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 286, 305, 347, 349–356, 462–463
- Molybdenum, 671
- Monaco, 571
- Mongolian People's Republic:
  - India, relations with, 352
  - U.N. admission for, 46–47, 268, 276, 281, 285–286, 323, 330, 345–346, 357
    - British position, 348–349, 360, 368, 380–382
    - Canadian position, 344, 352, 461–462
    - Canadian resolution re, 317, 324–326
    - China, People's Republic of, position, 326*n*
    - China, Republic of, position, 338*n*, 361, 368, 373, 375, 378–379, 401–404
    - China, Republic of, veto of, 399, 407–409, 463–467
      - British position, 413–414
      - Japanese position, 414–415, 452, 455, 458–459
      - Latin American position, 436
      - U.S. position, 404–406, 420–422, 425–426
    - French position, 367–368, 370, 380–381
    - Japanese tie-in, 475, 480–481
    - Package proposal, 337, 365
    - Paraguayan position, 383
    - Soviet position, 210, 264

Mongolian People's Republic—Continued
  U.N. admission for—Continued
    U.S. position, 54, 122, 211, 269–270, 277–280, 283, 294, 296, 316, 326, 339, 342, 347–348, 350, 419, 479–480, 482–483, 485–488, 491, 495
    U.S.-China, Republic of, negotiations on, 386–391, 394–395, 423–424, 435–439
    U.S.-Soviet discussions on, 313–314, 353–354, 366–367
Monsma, George N., 100*n*, 418*n*
Morelli, Gaetano, 212
Morocco, 83, 460, 761
  United Nations, 84, 159, 188, 200, 219, 236
    Admission to, 122, 479, 481, 486*n*
    Membership issues, 209, 504, 507
Morton, Thruston B., 310–311, 619
Muniz, João Carlos, 447–448
Munro, Leslie, 208, 490, 506*n*, 628
Murphy, Robert O., 338*n*, 538*n*, 581*n*, 710*n*, 718
  Antarctica, 622, 624–625, 656–658, 662, 673, 675, 690–691, 716*n*
  United Nations, 161, 187, 277, 473*n*, 485, 487–488

Narcotics Commission, 229
National Academy of Sciences, 777
National Science Foundation, 627, 663, 667–669, 734*n*, 735, 743, 750, 777–778
National Security Council:
  Antarctic policies, 665–667, 672–673, 675–680, 692–710
  Actions:
    No. *1334*, 609*n*
    No. *1408*, 733*n*, 734
    No. *1437*, 621*n*, 632
    No. *1500*, 642–643, 665, 675, 691, 693–694
    No. *1656*, 747*n*, 748, 757, 783
    No. *1705*, 673, 675, 691, 693
    No. *1713*, 753–754, 757, 783
    No. *1738*, 692*n*, 693
    No. *1799*, 763–764
    No. *1800*, 765*n*
    No. *1822*, 773
    No. *1846*, 783
National Security Council—Continued
  Documents:
    NSC *5424*, 609, 620, 632, 640, 642–643, 644, 652, 655, 657, 665, 675, 691, 694
    NSC *5520*, 723–735, 737, 741, 743, 748–750, 764, 782
    NSC *5528*, 632–640, 642, 665, 675, 691, 693
    NSC *5715*, 691, 692, 693
    NSC *5715/1*, 692–694, 716
  Meetings:
    250th, 732–733
    258th, 620–622
    283d, 734–742
    310th, 742–748
    321st, 672–673
    322d, 748
    339th, 757–764
    347th, 771–773
  Planning Board, 663, 669, 737, 743, 745
Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California, 729
Naval Research Laboratory, 775
Navy Air Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, California, 729
Navy, U.S. Department of the, 559–567
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 287
Neidle, Alan F., 711*n*
Nepal:
  Law of the Sea, 572, 602–603
  United Nations, 159
    Admission to, 104, 281, 372
      Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
      Package proposal, 269–270, 285–286, 336
      Soviet position, 264, 321
      U.S. position, 276–277, 295, 311, 419
    Membership issues, 209, 507
Netherlands:
  Atomic energy, 50
  Indonesia, relations with, 124–125
  United Nations, 105, 124, 202*n*, 211–212
    Charter review, 27, 31, 33, 37
    Good Offices Committee, 264, 268, 273, 285
    Membership issues, 209, 505, 506*n*, 507
Netherlands New Guinea. *See* West New Guinea.

Neutrality, 74, 294, 561–563
New Zealand, 12
  Antartica:
    Condominium in, 649, 656, 685, 717, 720
    Territorial claims, 609, 623, 633, 676, 695
    U.N. trusteeship for, 647, 674, 684, 687, 706, 708
    U.S. expedition, *1955*, 610
  Atomic energy, 50
  United Nations, 31, 106, 233–234
    Membership issues, 209, 369, 393, 400, 490, 505, 506*n*, 507
Ngo Dinh Diem, 451
Nguyen Duy Lien, 499*n*
Nguyen Qui Anh, 493*n*
Nicaragua, 209, 507
Nickel, 671
Nikolaev, A., 153
Nitze, Paul H., 195–196
Nixon, Richard, 325, 334, 621, 762–763
Nkrumah, Kwame, 500
Nolan, Thomas, 626
Non-Self-Governing Territories, 45
Nong Kimny, 490
Noon, Malik Firoz Khan, 505
North Africa (*see also* Algeria), 70, 72
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 249–251, 253, 256–257
North Pacific Fisheries Convention, *1954*, 525, 597
Norway:
  Antarctica:
    Condominium in, 649, 656, 685, 717, 720
    Territorial claims, 609, 633, 676, 695
    U.N. trusteeship in, 647, 684, 707
    U.S. expedition, *1955*, 610
  United Nations:
    Charter review, 26*n*, 27, 31, 37
    Council seats in, 105, 120
    Membership issues, 209, 369, 488–489, 506–507
Nosek, Jiri, 208
Nugent, Julian L., 477
Nutting, Anthony, 306, 309, 314–315, 393, 397–399, 411

O'Connor, Roderic, 351*n*, 440*n*
Office of Defense Mobilization, 742*n*, 746
Office of Naval Research, 777
Okinawa, 171
Operation Deep Freeze III, 680
Operation Highjump, 625*n*
Operations Coordinating Board:
  Antarctica, 607, 611, 615, 627, 641, 656, 692
  Rocket launchings, 777
Orbiter rocket, 727
Ordonneau, Pierre, 312, 314–315
Organization of American States, 201, 249–253, 256, 523, 528
Ourot R. Souvannavong, 492, 494
Outer Mongolia. *See* Mongolian People's Republic.
Outer space, 785
  Anti-missile missiles, 728
  Freedom of space, 724–725, 755, 759, 769–771
  Moon flights, 762

Pakistan, 171, 255
  South Africa, relations with, 122, 218
  United Nations, 124, 173
    Council seats in, 12, 105, 120
    Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 488, 504, 507
Palestine, 124, 215–216, 257, 260
Panama, 120, 209, 211, 226, 488, 507
Paraguay, 120, 209, 383, 506*n*, 507, 602–603
Parsons, Arab, 47
Parsons, Marselis G., 618
Pastore, John O., 36, 239, 323
Patrick Air Force Base, 729, 776
Peaceful uses of atomic power. *See* Atomic energy.
Pearson, Lester B., 292*n*, 315, 393, 397, 461–463, 625
Pedersen, Richard F., 101*n*, 102*n*, 130, 165, 233
Pelt, Adrian S., 167
Pender, John H., 569
Permanent Court of International Justice, 82–83
Persons, Maj. Gen. Wilton B., 755
Peru:
  Law of the Sea, 519, 529, 539, 553, 555–556, 586
  United Nations, 105, 119–120, 216
    Good Offices Committee, 264, 268, 273, 285
    Membership issues, 209, 394, 475, 507
Pham Van Dong, 498
Philippines, 216, 568, 761

Philippines—Continued
  Military agreement with the United States, 251
  United Nations:
    Charter review, 27, 29, 31, 37
    Council seats in, 12, 48, 88, 105, 119, 151, 211–212, 228
    Membership issues, 209, 313n, 488, 493n, 496–497, 505, 507, 509
Phillips, Christopher H., 8–10, 40n, 132, 334n, 335n, 479n
Phleger, Herman, 64n, 389n, 518, 530, 538n, 542–550
Pinay, Antoine, 318, 324, 337, 348, 367
Poland, 602
  United Nations:
    Charter review, 27
    Council seats, 48, 88, 120, 227–229
    Membership issues, 209, 332, 507
Polar Year, 784
Popper, David H., 102n, 264n, 277–279, 280n
Portugal, 17
  United Nations:
    Admission to, 104, 281, 318, 372, 389
      Latin American position, 436
      Package proposal, 269–270, 285–286, 336
      Soviet position, 264, 321, 356
      U.S. position, 276, 283, 294–295, 311, 327, 333, 352–353, 419
    Membership issues, 210, 488–489, 507
Portuondo, Emilo Nunez, 473
Pratt, James W., 154, 495n
President's Science Advisory Committee, 724
Prochnow, Herbert V., 64n
Project Clean-up, 755n, 764n, 782n
Project Vanguard. *See* Vanguard program.
Puerto Rico, 348
Pyle, Howard, 755

Quarles, Donald A., 732–733, 755, 758–760, 763, 771–773, 775–776
Quinn, John, 624
Quintana, Lucia M. Moreno, 99, 107

Rabb, Maxwell M., 128n
Rabi, I.I., 742n, 746
Racial issues, 51–52, 122, 245–246
Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 665n
Radford, William, 468n, 732n
Radiation. *See* Atomic radiation.
Radio Free Europe, 330
Rahman, Ismail Bin Dato Abdul, 507
Ramsbotham, Peter Edward, 27, 398–399
Rankin, Karl L.:
  United Nations:
    Mongolian People's Republic, admission to, 342, 430–431, 438, 459, 463–467
      China, Republic of, position, 390–391, 394–395, 401, 412–413, 423–424
      Congressional views on, 434–443
      U.S. position, 408, 412n, 421, 436–437, 439–441
Ranklin, J. Lee, 538n
Rayburn, Sam, 311, 362
Raymond, John M., 570
Raynor, G. Hayden, 607–608, 616n, 618
Read, Benjamin H., 569
Read, John E., 107, 212
Reed, Charles S., 334
Richards, Arthur L., 774n, 775, 778–779
Richards, James P., 311, 362
Riesel, Victor, 154
Roberts, Peter, 100n
Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., 566n, 626, 630, 740
Robertson, Walter S., 388n, 416n, 418n, 419n, 422n, 425n, 435n, 439n, 440n, 455n, 470–471, 624, 774n
  United Nations:
    Chinese representation in, 292–293, 300–301, 317n, 467, 473n, 477–479
    Japan, admission to, 384–385, 476
    Mongolian People's Republic, admission to, 373–374, 386–387, 389, 391n, 404n, 427–431, 437, 464
Rockefeller, Nelson A., 626, 723, 730–733
Rockets, 759, 764–765, 769
  Jupiter C, 782–783
  Soviet, 756, 779
  Vanguard, 748n, 758, 760, 764–767, 775, 778, 783
Rome Conference. *See* International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, *1955*, *under* Law of the Sea.
Rountree, William M., 202n, 774n
Roux, Henri, 347
Roux, Jacques, 347

Rowan, Leslie, 467
Rubottom, Roy R., 652–653, 655, 664, 774*n*
Rudolph, Walter M., 778*n*
Rumania:
  United Nations, 84
    Admission to, 104, 281, 357, 372, 429
      Package proposal, 269–270, 285–286, 329, 336, 339*n*
      Soviet position, 264, 370, 375
      U.S. position, 276, 279, 283, 295–296, 305, 311, 322, 327, 331, 333, 352–353, 419
    Membership issues, 209, 507

St. Laurent, Louis S., 478
Sakhalin Island, 457
Salt, Barbara, 114, 263, 300
Sanders, William, 553*n*, 570*n*, 572–582
Santa Cruz, Hernan, 13
Santiago Declaration, 1952, 539–540
Sarper, Selim R., 489
Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 286–287
Satellites. *See* Earth satellites.
Satterthwaite, Livingston, 615
Saudi Arabia, 124, 159, 188, 210, 219, 369, 488, 507
Scandinavia, 647
Science Advisory Committee, 724
Scientific satellites. *See* Earth satellites.
Scott, Michael, 45*n*
Scott, Robert, 300–301
Sebald, William J., 64*n*, 297, 455*n*
Self-determination (*see also* Colonialism), 51, 54–57, 65, 69
Sette, Oscar E., 528*n*
Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 450, 452–453, 457, 484
Shikotan Island, 479
Silver, 671
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, *1945*, 373, 387, 401–403, 428, 432
Sisco, Joseph J., 34–36, 165, 195*n*, 230*n*, 232, 234, 310, 319, 416*n*, 446, 448, 483
Slavery, 52, 65, 71–72, 112
Smith, H. Alexander, 363*n*
Smith, Walter Bedell, 520*n*
Snay, Cmdr. Charles, 626
Snow, William P., 673, 690, 710*n*
Snyder, Murray, 776–779
Sobolev, Arkady, 61–63, 98*n*, 144, 351, 498
Sokolsky, George, 47
Solovyev, Viktor, 61–62
Somaliland, 460
Sone, Eki, 458
South Africa, Union of:
  Antarctica, 695, 713–717, 720–721
  Apartheid, 13, 84, 122, 217–218
  Atomic energy, 17
  Indians and Pakistanis in, 12–13, 52, 84, 122, 217–218
  United Nations, 188, 202*n*, 209, 216, 219, 504–505, 507
  U.S. position, 50
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 249, 251, 256–257, 658
Soviet Academy of Sciences, 724
Soviet Union (*see also Soviet Union and Soviet subheadings under other subjects*), 73–75, 84, 255–256, 781, 784
  Antarctica, 621, 623, 629, 631–632, 677, 682, 686–689, 707, 717, 720–722
  Atomic energy, 50
  Atomic radiation, 50–51
  Earth satellites, 731, 744, 750–751, 768–769
  Hungarian revolt, 133, 214
  Interplanetary communications, 724–725
  Law of the Sea, 604–605
  Seamen incident, 61–62, 97–98
  Seizure of Swedish ship, 559–560
  Submarines, 565–566
  Tyura Tam missile range, 757
  United Nations, 17–18, 41, 127
    Charter review, 1*n*, 24–25, 26*n*, 31, 33, 37
    Security Council seats in, 105–106, 120, 228
    Enlargement of councils in, 114, 130–131, 144, 151–152, 155–156, 161, 213
    Membership issues, 46–47, 290, 400, 444, 506–507
      Chinese representation, 209, 213, 265
      Japan, 264–265, 268–270, 274, 475–476
    Scale of assessments, 117, 243, 245
    Secretary-General election, 195*n*, 202–203, 232
    Special Political Committee item, 167–172, 186–189, 218–219

- Soviet Union—Continued
  - United Nations Emergency Force, 146
  - United States, relations with, 135–136, 154, 769, 779–780
    - Anti-Soviet incidents, 153, 157–158, 160–164, 240–244, 257–258, 261–262
- Spaak, Paul-Henri, 216, 380
- Space. *See* Outer space.
- Spain, 351–352, 406
  - United Nations, 9, 83, 119–120
    - Admission to, 104, 372, 389, 436
      - Package proposal, 269–270, 335–336, 355
      - Soviet position, 313–314, 321, 356, 366, 377–378, 380–381
      - U.S. position, 276–279, 295–296, 311, 317–318, 327, 333, 353–354, 419
    - Membership issues, 209, 488, 507
- Sparkman, John, 364*n*
- Sparks, Edward J., 618
- Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), 19–20, 44, 51, 54–55
- Specialized Inter-American Technical Conference, 523, 528
- Spender, Percy, 212, 446, 448–449, 624, 627
- Spiropoulos, Jean, 212, 531
- Sprague, Mansfield D., 220, 656, 662–663, 774
- Sputnik. *See under* Earth satellites.
- Staats, Elmer B., 609–610, 626, 627*n*
- Stassen, Harold, 266, 621, 762, 778–779
- Stavropoulos, Constantin A., 584
- Stephens, Thomas E., 323
- Stewart, Charles Allan, 446
- Stone, Lt. Gen. Charles B., III, 177
- Strategic Air Command, 630
- Strauss, Adm. Lewis L., 626, 751
- Streibert, Theodore C., 626
- Sudan:
  - United Nations, 159, 188, 200, 219, 235–236
    - Admission to, 122, 479, 481, 486*n*
    - Membership issues, 209, 488–489, 507
- Suez crisis, 141, 170, 196, 501
- Sulphur, 671
- SUNFED. *See* Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.
- Suomela, Arnie J., 528*n*
- Surinam, 45
- Sweden:
  - United Nations, 119, 128*n*, 174, 209, 222, 285, 313*n*, 369, 507
- Sweeney, Joseph M., 532*n*
- Switzerland, 174, 222, 276, 602
- Syria, 50, 259–260
  - United Nations, 12, 106, 138, 159, 188, 219
    - Membership issues, 209, 313*n*, 369, 507

- Taiwan. *See* China, Republic of.
- Tan Shao-hwa, 386, 464, 532*n*
- Taylor, Fred E., 577*n*
- Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, *1954*, 535, 539
- Territorial waters. *See under* Law of the Sea.
- Terry, William M., 577*n*, 581*n*, 590*n*
- Thailand:
  - United Nations, 12, 216
    - Charter review, 27, 31, 37
    - Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 490, 493*n*, 505, 506*n*, 507
- Thompson, Llewellyn E., 240–241, 244, 257–258
- Tibet, 509
- Tin, 671
- Titanium, 671
- Trieste, 602
- Tripartite Fisheries Conference, Tokyo, *1951*, 592
- Trujillo, Jose V., 382–384, 446, 449
- Truman, Harry S., 487*n*
- Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, 698
- Tsiang, Tingfu F., 309, 338*n*, 367–368, 379, 382, 387, 393, 395*n*, 399, 412, 429–430, 463, 474
- Tuna, 519, 592
- Tunisia, 83, 213
  - United Nations, 84, 188, 200, 219, 236
    - Admission to, 122, 460, 479, 481, 486*n*
    - Membership issues, 210, 488, 506–507
- Turkey, 125, 171, 761
  - United Nations:
    - Charter review, 27, 29, 32–33, 36–37
    - Council seats in, 12, 102*n*, 144, 229, 288
    - Membership issues, 209, 274, 394, 400, 505, 507
- Turkin, Nikolai, 98*n*

Twining, Gen. Nathaniel F., 639, 763
Tyler, William R., 347, 474

Ukraine, 209, 348, 507, 572
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union.
United Kingdom (*see also United Kingdom and British subheadings under other subjects*), 16, 19, 215, 255, 526
  Antarctica:
    Condominium in, 649, 656, 685, 717, 720
    Territorial claims, 609, 633, 649, 653, 655, 676–677, 695–696
    U.N. trusteeship for, 647, 656,674, 684, 687, 706, 708
    U.S. expedition, *1955*, 610
  Cyprus issue, 49, 216
  United Nations, 41, 128*n*, 130–131, 145
    Charter review, 3–4, 26*n*, 27–33, 35, 37, 226, 266–267, 288–289
    Council seats in, 105–106, 120
    Membership issues, 294–295, 299, 475
      Chinese representation, 209, 263, 300–302, 469–472, 474, 502–503, 506*n*, 507
      Ghana, 496*n*, 497
    Secretary-General election, 195, 197, 203*n*
  United States, relations with, 469
United Nations (*see also* Economic and Social Council, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, *and other United Nations headings and subheadings under other subjects*):
  Afro-Asian countries in, 110
  Chinese representation in, 14, 36, 55, 121, 209, 282
    British position, 263, 293
    British-U.S. discussions, 467–469
    Canadian-U.S. discussions, 477–479
    China, People's Republic of, 36, 44, 121, 209, 263
    China, Republic of, 121, 209–210, 263, 292–293, 506*n*, 507
    Eligibility criteria, 298–299
    French position, 479
    Indian resolution on, 506, 509
    Moratorium on decision on, 469, 471–474, 502–509
    Soviet position, 265

United Nations—Continued
  Chinese representation in—Continued
    U.S. position, 14, 209, 302–303, 336, 357, 506
    Veto of Mongolian People's Republic, effect on, 361, 368–370, 375, 378–379
  Commemorative meetings, 6–7, 273, 292*n*
  Contributions by member states. *See* Scale of assessments *below*.
  Corps for observation and patrol, 204–205, 220–223, 232–233, 247
  Council elections, 12, 86–87, 119–120, 211–212, 227–230
  Economic development, 68, 72, 111
  Enlargement of councils (*see also under* United Nations Security Council), 98–108, 113, 120–121
  General Assembly. *See* United Nations General Assembly.
  Intervention by, 80–85
  Libya, assistance to, 20–21
  Membership issues, 206–207, 210–211, 264, 268–269, 277–281, 329–335, 388, 499
    Anti-colonial countries, 460–461
    Austria/Italy question, 273–274, 307
    Baltic Soviet states, 461
    Bandung Conference position, 274–277, 280–283, 286, 336, 357
    Brazil-New Zealand resolution, 444, 450–451
    British position, 284, 304–305, 309–310, 312, 314–315, 343–344, 348–349, 359–360, 411–412
    British resolution, 418
    British-U.S. discussions on, 397–399
    Canadian resolution, 314–317, 326, 341–345, 348–350, 352, 354–356, 369, 385, 440
      Australian position, 446, 448–449
      Brazilian position, 446–448
      Canadian position, 446–447
      Ecuadoran position, 446–447
      El Salvadoran position, 446
      Guatemalan position, 446
      Indian position, 446–447
      Supporters meetings, 446–449
      U.S. position, 392–393, 406–407, 415–416, 420
    Canadian-U.S. discussions on, 365, 367–368, 393, 461–462

- United Nations—Continued
  - Membership issues—Continued
    - China, Republic of, position, 342, 345
    - Congressional views on, 361–364, 434–435, 439–445, 449–450
    - French position, 284, 308, 312, 314–315, 344–345, 348–349, 425
    - Italian position, 307–308, 431–433
    - Japan, 47
    - Latin American position, 320, 377–378, 383–384
    - Mongolian People's Republic. *See under* Mongolian People's Republic.
    - Package proposal, 46; 54, 269–270, 285–286, 299–300, 304–305, 329, 336, 339*n*, 355
    - Soviet position, 264, 270, 273, 284–285, 319–323, 356, 370, 375
    - Soviet resolution, 450
    - Soviet-U.S. discussions, 305–306, 339–340, 351–356, 366–367, 375, 377–378, 380–383
    - Spain-Mongolian People's Republic linkage, 375, 377–378, 383
    - Spanish position, 317–318
    - U.N. Charter provisions, 284–285
    - U.S. position, 122, 265, 269, 276–277, 283, 293–297, 305, 322–328, 331, 333, 352–353, 419
      - Congressional views, 310–311, 316
      - Dissenting views, 297–299
      - Statement to Ad Hoc Committee, 419–420
    - U.S. resolution, 399–401, 409–417
    - U.S. strategies for, 358–359, 370–372, 374–380
    - Use of veto in, 321–323, 337–342, 350, 376–379
    - Vietnam. *See* U.N. membership for *under* Vietnam, Republic of.
  - New members, 100–101
  - Non-member participation, 4, 271–272, 288–292
  - Salary and budget increases, 53
  - Scale of assessments, 115–117, 128–130, 132–133, 136–143, 145, 233–240, 243–245, 260
  - Secretary-General election, 195, 197–198, 202–203, 211, 234–235, 241–242
  - Security Council. *See* United Nations Security Council.
- United Nations—Continued
  - Special Political Committee Soviet item, 186–188
  - Sputnik, effect on, 761–762
  - Technical assistance, 21, 51, 65, 68–69, 72, 111, 246
  - U.S. policies in, 55–56, 58–59, 63–65, 73–77, 112–114
- United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 45, 52–53, 55
- United Nations Charter:
  - Articles:
    - *2 (7),* 58, 61, 80–85
    - *4,* 266, 268, 284–285, 481
    - *19,* 146
    - *23,* 155
    - *28 (2),* 264
    - *43,* 222, 250
    - *45,* 250
    - *51,* 248
    - *53,* 252–253
    - *61,* 105
    - *76,* 683, 704
    - *77,* 683, 704
    - *79,* 683, 688, 704
    - *81,* 683, 688, 704, 709
    - *83,* 684, 705
    - *84,* 680, 702, 706
    - *86,* 106
    - *97,* 198
    - *108,* 3–4
    - *109,* 4–5, 23, 26, 225
  - Chapter VII, 175, 222
  - Review of, 1
    - Admission of new members, 266–267
    - Australian position, 5
    - British position, 3–4, 288–289
    - Committee for, 51, 189–192, 212
    - Conference for, 192–194, 224–226
    - Draft resolution, 26–33, 35, 38–39
    - Spanish participation in, 9
    - U.N. perspectives, 23–25
    - U.S. position, 1–2, 5–8, 34
- United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), 14, 126–127
- United Nations Corps for Observation and Patrol, 172–185, 195–196
- United Nations Disarmament Commission, 214
- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 731

United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF), 137, 146, 173, 176, 178–181, 183–185, 196, 204, 220
  Financing of, 207, 233, 237, 239
  General Conference, *1956*, 210
United Nations General Assembly:
  Ad Hoc Committee, 419, 436*n*
  Advisory Committee on Administrative and Bugetary Questions, 227–229
  Agenda, inscription of items on, 43–45, 49–50, 58, 65, 70, 72, 77–80, 83–85, 111
  Collective Measures Committee, 175, 255, 264–265, 268, 273, 275, 277, 285, 341, 361, 410
  Committee on Contributions, 227–229
  Committees:
    First, 306
    Third, 71
    Fifth, 53, 87, 138, 145, 203, 235, 244–245
  French withdrawal from, 308
  Good Offices Committee, 264–265, 268, 273, 275, 277, 285, 341, 361, 410
  Interim Committee, 269
  Resolutions:
    620C (VII), 503
    810 (IX), 16
    899 (IX), 523
    914 (X), 49
    917 (X), 52
    957 (X), 45
    1017 B (XI), 503
    1136 (XII), 226
    Uniting for Peace, *1950*, 178
  Sessions:
    Eighth:
      Good Offices Committee, 285
    Ninth:
      Cyprus, 125
      International Finance Coporation, 20
      International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, *1955*, 522–523, 527–530
      Membership issues, 264
      West New Guinea, 124
    Tenth:
      Algeria, 337, 344, 348
      Charter review, 189
      Cyprus, 125
United Nations General Assembly—Continued
  Sessions—Continued
    Tenth—Continued
      Dulles speech re U.N. membership issues, 328, 335, 356
      Palestine refugees, 359–360
      Scale of assessments, 115–116
      Soviet tactics, 17–18
      U.S. delegation meeting, 34–37
      U.S. role in, 10–17, 19–22, 39–61
      West New Guinea issue, 124
    Eleventh:
      Admission of new members, 479
      Algeria, 217
      Antarctic trusteeship proposed, 643–654, 656–657, 677, 687, 696, 705–706
      Chinese representation in, 469, 471–474
      Cyprus, 216
      Enlargement of Security Council, 98–99, 187, 190, 213
      Hungarian revolt, 213–214, 231
      Indian Antarctic resolution, 677, 684–685, 687, 696, 705–706
      Law of the Sea, 523, 570–571
      Scale of assessments, 115–117, 198
      U.S. delegation meetings, 141–143, 145–148
      U.S. objectives for, 118–128
    Twelfth:
      Algeria, 217, 259–260
      British position, 258–259
      Charter review, 212
      Chinese representation, 502–509
      Cyprus, 216, 259–260
      Election of officers, 195, 208–209
      Enlargement of Security Council, 187
      Indian Antarctic resolution, 685, 706–708
      Kashmir, 259
      Membership issues, 512
      Scale of assesments, 198–202
      U.S. delegation meeting, 234–240
      U.S. instructions for, 205–220
      West New Guinea, 259
  Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, 213, 217
  Special Political Committee, 167–172
  U.S. participation in, 64–80, 86–97, 100–101, 108–114

- United Nations Force Project for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 196
- United Nations Human Rights Advisory Services, 22
- United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, 21
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 124, 215–216
- United Nations Security Council:
  - East Bloc seats on, 112, 133–134
  - Elections, 12, 48, 55, 57–58, 65, 87–90, 119–120, 211
  - Enlargement of, 65, 98–100, 107–108, 112, 120–121, 130–131, 148–149, 165–167, 187
    - Afro-Asian draft resolutions, 159, 164*n*, 165–167
    - Latin American draft resolution, 149–152, 155–156, 161–162, 166
  - Rule *59*, 409
  - Rule *60*, 371
  - U.N. membership issues, 285, 443–444, 450–452
- United Nations Trusteeship Council, 12, 99, 106, 120, 686
- United States Information Agency, 412*n*, 762*n*
- Urquia, Miguel Rafael, 446, 473
- Urrutia Holguin, Francisco, 320
- Uruguay, 209, 212–213, 488, 507, 553

- Vandenberg, Arthur H., 142, 199, 235, 237–238, 487*n*
- Vandenberg resolution, *1948*, 318, 357, 374, 387, 389, 419, 427, 441, 483, 485
- Vanguard program, 784*n*, 758, 760, 764–767, 775, 778, 783
- Vatican, 571, 602
  - Law of the Sea, 602
- Venezuela, 12, 120, 209, 488, 506*n*, 507, 554
- Viet Minh. *See* Vietnam, Democratic Republic of.
- Vietnam (*see also* U.N. membership for *under* Vietnam, Republic of), 274–275, 280–283, 286, 509
- Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 211, 264, 305, 336, 430, 482, 489, 491, 495
- Vietnam, Republic of:
  - Japanese reparations, negotiations on, 511
  - U.N. membership for, 210–211, 322, 336, 479–480, 482
- Vietnam, Republic of—Continued
  - U.N. membership for—Continued
    - Argentine position, 494–495
    - Bandung Conference position, 274–275, 280–283, 286
    - British position, 496–497, 503, 505
    - Canadian position, 505
    - China, Republic of, position, 496–497
    - Cuban proposal on, 430
    - French position, 505
    - Japanese position, 510–511
    - Lao position, 492–494
    - Level of support for, 488–490
    - Proposed resolution, 491
    - Soviet position, 285, 305, 572
    - U.S. position, 122, 264, 268–270, 276, 278, 280–281, 285–286, 294–295, 297, 299, 322, 419, 451–452, 495–497
    - Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, position, 498
    - Vietnam, Republic of, position, 498–499
- Viking rocket, 727
- Voice of America, 330
- Vorys, John M., 311, 361–362
- Vu Van Mau, 498–499

- Wadsworth, James J., 198*n*, 260*n*, 311*n*
  - United Nations, 147
    - Charter review, 7–8, 28–29, 36–39
    - Expansion of councils, 114–115, 149–150, 164–165
    - Membership issues, 314–315, 410–412
- Wainhouse, David W., 2*n*, 29, 114, 293–297, 351, 419*n*
- Walmsley, Walter N., 168*n*, 220–221, 248*n*
- Wan Waithayakon, Prince, 119
- Ward, Rear Adm. Chester, 581*n*, 583
- Waterman, Alan, 626, 640, 667–669, 735–736, 739–740, 743–746, 748, 753, 755, 760, 761, 773, 776, 778
- Watrous, Livingston D., 659–661, 663–664, 673
- Watson, Adam, 474
- Wells, Herman, 239
- Western Europe, 171, 758, 769
- Western European Union, 249–250, 251, 252
- West Irian. *See* West New Guinea.

West New Guinea, 43, 49–50, 58, 70, 72, 124–125
Whaling, 670, 676, 695, 720
White Sands Proving Ground, 729
Whiteman, Marjorie M., 515, 569, 659–661, 673
Whitman, Ann, 304
Whittington, William V., 569
Wigglesworth, Richard B., 434, 445
Wilcox, Francis O., 151*n*, 164*n*, 165*n*, 197*n*, 221*n*, 307*n*, 389*n*, 439*n*, 440*n*, 471*n*, 490*n*
  Antarctica, 646, 653–654
  Collective Security Project, 248, 254–257
  Earth satellites, 774*n*
  United Nations, 128, 172–174, 187–188, 202*n*, 227–228, 307*n*
    Charter review, 8, 32*n*, 192–194, 291
    Expansion of councils, 98, 101, 114
    Membership issues:
      Canadian resolution, 341, 415
      Chinese representation, 300, 473*n*, 502–503
      Congressional reaction to, 310, 361
      French position, 308–309
      Italian position, 431
      Japan, 475
      Korea, Republic of, 483–484
      Mongolian People's Republic, 404*n*
      Soviet position, 313, 321
      U.S. participation in U.N. General Assembly, 40*n*, 63–66, 92, 108–114, 132, 230–231
      U.S. position, 293, 316, 323–326, 328, 358, 374, 379, 410
Wiley, Alexander, 311, 363*n*
Wilkinson, J. Burke, 779*n*
Wilson, Charles E.:
  Antarctica, 638, 641, 692
  Earth satellites, 735–742, 745, 747, 751–753
Wilson, Robert E., 655, 656*n*, 660–662, 710*n*
Winiarski, Bohdan, 107, 212, 228
World Court. *See* International Court of Justice.
Wormser, Felix, 626
Wriston program, 95, 97
Women's rights, 22

Yalta Agreement, 373, 387
Yang Yon Chan, 483–484, 490
Yeh, George (Yeh Kung-chao), 387, 394–395, 401, 404*n*, 408*n*, 413, 420, 431, 436–438, 464–466
Yemen, 124, 159, 188, 219–220, 572
  United Nations:
    Membership issues, 209, 285, 369, 488, 507
Yingling, Raymund T., 518, 532*n*, 577*n*
Young, George, 347, 349
Yugoslavia, 12, 105, 188, 219
  United Nations:
    Membership issues, 209, 369, 507
    Security Council seat for, 48, 88, 102*n*, 105, 119, 144, 151, 229

Zablocki, Clement J., 434, 440, 444–445
Zafrullah Khan, Muhammad, 107
Zakharov, Alexei V., 162–164
Zamyatin, Leonid M., 319
Zaroubin, Georgi, 98*n*, 243
Zionism, 43
Zoricic, Milovan, 107, 212
Zorin, Valentin A., 257